[Marxism] Why I disagree with Petras on Venezuela

[Joaquín <jbustelo@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Tom O'Lincoln writes: "What, no comments on this? Petras makes a
reasonably authoritative case that Chavez is far from revolutionary. I
was looking forward to a rebuttal from his many defenders here."

Frankly, I find Petras quite a bit less penetrating than he is often
given credit for. The idea that Chávez is carrying out a Venezuelan "New
Deal" is the sort of colonial thinking that impedes many American and
imperialist country radicals from understanding what is going on in
Latin America. 

Those tempted to base their view of Venezuela on what Petras says should
look at his early 2002 article on Venezuela in Monthly Review. An
extract follows:

*  *  *

The first phase of this struggle is to destabilize the economy, via
closely coordinated actions with client business and professional
groups, and corrupt right-wing trade union bosses. The purpose is to
mobilize public opposition, and focus mass media attention on the
instability of the country, thus inhibiting investment from less
politicized capitalists, who are fearful of declining profits in a
conflictual situation. The mass media are engaged in a systematic
propaganda campaign to overthrow the Chavez regime, advocating a violent
seizure of power. Government and public protests against the subversive
behavior of the mass media allows Washington to orchestrate an
international campaign against ?violations of free speech,? particularly
via the U.S.-influenced Inter-American Press Association. 

The second phase of the Bush Administration?s strategy is to move from
destabilization directly toward a military coup. This involves two
steps. The first is to mobilize U.S. intelligence assets, retired
officials and those labeled ?dissidents? among the active military
officers from the more reactionary branches of the military?in the case
of Venezuela, the air force and navy. The idea is to force a political
discussion in the military command, provoke other like-minded officials
to come out in defense of the expelled officers, and to reinforce the
mass media-business message of the instability and imminent fall of
Chavez, thus further stimulating capital flight. The second step is to
organize authoritarian navy and air force officials to put pressure on
the army?the main bulwark of Chavez?s support?to gain adherents,
neutralize apolitical officers, and isolate Chavez loyalists.
Washington?s two step approach is to culminate in a military coup with
active U.S. military support, in which a ?transitional civic-military
junta? rules.

Linked with its internal strategy, Washington has implemented an
external strategy. Secretary of State Colin Powell has publicly
denounced Chavez as authoritarian, and both Powell and the IMF have
publicly stated their support for a ?transitional government??a clear
signal of U.S. support for those hoping to stage a coup. U.S. Special
Forces now operate in Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Panama, Afghanistan,
Yemen, the Philippines, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian
client states. It is more than likely that, in the event of a coup
attempt, the Pentagon will send tactical operatives and political
advisers to guide the coup and ensure that the appropriate configuration
of civilian personalities emerges for propaganda purposes.

The dangers facing the Venezuelan regime is that in Washington?s war of
political attrition, where daily propaganda barrages and provocative
actions abound, Chavez cannot depend on constant mass mobilizations. He
must actually implement immediate radical redistributive socioeconomic
policies to sustain mass commitments and active organized support. The
U.S.-orchestrated offensive is geared to creating permanent tension as a
psychological weapon to exhaust popular support and undermine army
morale.

Chavez?s independent foreign policy is what antagonizes the United
States: his opposition to Plan Colombia; his criticism of the U.S. war
in Afghanistan and the worldwide imperial offensive; his cordial
relations with Iraq, Libya, Iran, and Cuba; and his refusal to allow the
United States to colonize Venezuelan airspace. Unfortunately, this
foreign policy has not been adequately complemented by a series of
comprehensive socioeconomic reforms affecting the welfare of millions of
his unemployed and poorly paid supporters living in the slums and shanty
towns.

U.S. efforts to overthrow Chavez are based on his refusal, in early
October, to back Washington?s worldwide imperial offensive?the so-called
war against terrorism. Close advisers to President Chavez informed me
that a delegation of high officials from Washington visited Chavez and
bluntly informed him that he would ?pay a high price for his opposition
to President Bush.? Shortly thereafter the local business federation and
trade union bosses launched their campaigns?even though President Chavez
had introduced a very modest tax reform (mostly affecting foreign oil
companies), put in place a compensated land purchase plan, and
privatized the major publicly-owned electrical enterprise company in
Caracas.

Clearly, Chavez?s attempt to ride two horses?an independent foreign
policy and liberal reform domestic policy?makes him very vulnerable to
the U.S.-designed coup strategy.

*  *  *

With his profoundly imperialist-centric view of the world, Petras does
not see what I believe were the REAL reasons for the very palpable and
radical deepening of the political polarization at the end of 2001 in
Venezuela. The reason wasn't Chávez's refusal to go along with the war
on terror, but rather the package of economic laws he decreed in
November of that year, including the agrarian reform law. That was the
declaration of independence of the Bolivarian Revolution from the
Venezuelan capitalist class: at that moment, Chávez went from being
their opponent to being their enemy.

I say this not because I believe myself much more learned or insightful
than Petras but simply because I saw it on TV and read it in the
Venezuelan press. THAT, the economic measures, not Chávez's foreign
policy, is what the Venezuelan capitalists were crying bloody murder
about, and MOST OF ALL, they were crying bloody murder about the reform
in petroleum taxes and royalties and the Agrarian Reform.

Petras views these measures as a "liberal reform domestic policy," which
makes one wonder why the Venezuelan capitalists reacted in December 2001
with the screech of the vampire who wakes to find a wooden stake being
pressed against his chest. Also, it is clear Petras is using "liberal"
here in its classic meaning of laissez-faire capitalism rather than in
its U.S. meaning of "progressive" or "leftist."

To this day I do not know just *what* was in these laws to account for
that reaction. To investigate and explain that would be real
contribution to understanding this revolutionary process -- but I
suspect to actually figure it out, you'd have to know in a fairly
intimate way the class and property structures of Venezuelan society. 

For example, in the Cuban case, it is not true that the agrarian reform
decreed in the first half of 1959 went beyond or against capitalist
property relations in the countryside. It did not, not in principle.
However, it just so happened because of the class structure of Cuban
property holding and society, it DID "break the neck" and "smash the
foundation" (two of Fidel's phrases) of the capitalist class as it
really existed then in Cuba.

Rather than saying the Venezuelan capitalists are all wet about where
their real vital material interests lie, or accepting the idea that they
are all just Washington marionettes, and reacted the way they did
because W. was offended at Chavez's dissent, I think we should just
accept that, even if we don't understand these reasons in any detail,
based on the reaction of the capitalists we can be sure they had good
reasons to view the Chávez measures as a direct and intolerable attack
on their interests.

Petras back then was quite pessimistic about Chávez's chances for
survival, saying, "He must actually implement immediate radical
redistributive socioeconomic policies to sustain mass commitments and
active organized support," counterposing THOSE measures to the miserably
liberal "compensated land purchase plan" and "very modest tax reform
plan" which Chávez had actually adopted and which had driven the
capitalist class ballistic.

As it turned out, Chavez survived the coup without actually implementing
"immediate radical redistributive socioeconomic policies," whatever
those may be (I suspect this is Petras's way of saying the expropriation
of the bourgeoisie as a class, but at the level of abstraction and
generalization he is writing at, it is impossible for me to tell for
sure).

As to the then coming coup itself, Petras foresaw the opposition
striking at just the right moment, acting with perfect precision and
thorough preparation simply as puppets of the U.S. administration.
That's not how things happened, and that isn't how things work in
general. The Venezuelan capitalists aren't simply one more disciplined
platoon in Bush's army; the timing and modalities of the coup were not
the result of Washington orders but of the dynamics of the contending
forces within Venezuela, the personalities involved, etc. 

As to this current article, it is a little too pontifical for my taste.
For example, Petras talks about how the capitalists control the media,
to argue that control of the media isn't really all that important. "The
results of the referendum demonstrates that powerful grass roots
organizations built around successful struggles for social reforms can
create a mass political and social consciousness which can easily reject
media manipulation."

I would think it would have been important to emphasize two things: a)
the relatively greater popular share on the radio and the importance of
radio in a country like Venezuela, and b) that Chávez routinely and
repeatedly uses the TV and radio stations --ALL the TV and radio
stations-- to address the people, as he is entitled to do as head of
state.

In addition, the 41% pro-opposition vote shows there is still a
significant layer of working people under bourgeois political and
ideological domination, a domination that is imposed and maintained
through the media, among other instruments.

Moreover, it trying to prove that Chavez is an FDR "centrist," it seems
to me Petras tries too hard. Take this for example: "Chavez's commitment
to centrist-reformist policies explains why he did not prosecute owners
of the mass media who had openly called for the violent overthrow of his
government and also why he took no judicial action against the
association of the business leaders (FEDECAMARAS) who has incited
military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional order. In
Europe, North America and many other regions, democratically elected
governments would have arrested, and prosecuted these elites for acts of
violent subversion."

To suggest that Chávez should take judicial action against owners of the
media for what these media said to prove his revolutionary bona-fides
is, frankly, ultraleft. Any such action must be carefully weighed for
its domestic and international political impact. The second suggestion
is disingenuous. It is said Chavez took no action against the
*association*  of business leaders. But -- he did take action against
*the business leaders themselves* as well as other coup plotters. 

As for "democratic elected" (!) imperialist governments (North America,
Europe...) arresting and prosecuting "elites" for "acts of violent
subversion," obviously my memory needs to be refreshed. I don't recall,
at least not in my political lifetime, the ruling class in any of those
countries allowing the election of any government that could conceivably
be considered at least in some sense a people's government, nor do I
recall the capitalist class and its leading organizations being put
under heavy manners for calling for the overthrow of that kind of
government nor any other. On the contrary, anti-subversion laws have
--at least this is all I remember-- been invariably used against
revolutionary movements like the Basque and Irish patriots.

At any rate, I am perfectly OK with letting Chávez decide if and when
the time has come to take those or other measures, I don't think I have
much to contribute by kibitzing on those kinds of tactical questions and
I don't think Petras does either.

*  *  *

A more interesting discussion than where Petras goes off is WHY he goes
off, and not just he, but so much of the left.

I believe it comes from not fully appreciating the Bolivarian Revolution
as an irreducibly *national* movement, but rather viewing its national
character as a weakness or sign of moderation. 

The Bolivarian Revolution, like the Cuban before it, presented as a
revolution of national salvation, to lift up the country from the
degradation it had sunk to. In its first, immediate steps, it seemed
aimed not so much at imperialism,  but rather at the symptoms and social
pathologies resulting from imperialist domination.

Petras dismisses this outright, counterposing what he views a s a
"class" perspective: "Moralization campaigns (anti-corruption) are
commonly associated with middle class politics designed to create
'national unity' and usually weaken class solidarity."

However, not all such national movements have proved to be "middle
class" -- the Cuban Revolution in this way was strikingly similar to the
Venezuelan. Yet even the law decreeing the "forcible expropriation" of
the Cuban capitalists as a *class* (The Nationalizations Law of October
13, 1960), which irrevocably stamped the Cuban revolution with its
proletarian class character and socialist nature, was presented and
motivated as a defense of *national* interests against the "egotistic
and anti-national practices" of "the privileged interests that conspire
against the people."

Petras's counterposition of "class solidarity" to "national unity" is
precisely at the heart of his dismissive attitude towards the Bolivarian
Revolution. Whatever good data or useful insights about one or another
aspect of the process his article presents (and there are some), the
piece as a whole, like other writings of his about Venezuela that I've
read, are marked with this essentially sectarian stance of counterposing
the "real" class revolution to the pretend or merely "national" process
currently underway.

Joaquín


_______________________________________________
Marxism mailing list
Marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism