[Marxism] Che's stupid mistake, and love

["Jurriaan Bendien" <andromeda246@xxxxxxxxx>]

Obviously  I recognise Che's revolutionary heroism, that is not in dispute.
But by motorcycling into Latin America, he was heading into a trap. His
assassination was a terrible tragedy, and a setback from the point of view
of Cuba, but also even counterproductive for those American assassins who
took his life, precisely because it made Che into a martyr which increased
the popularity of his political legacy worldwide, rather than reduce it. The
killers "shot themselves into the foot" as it were. So nothing much was
gained politically by Che's venture, nor by killing him, beyond
immortalising Che as a political martyr. Question is, how can a dead Che
help us now ? For comparison, consider these two items of correspondence
which indicate something of how the Cuban government actually went about
giving aid to the MPLA government in Angola - clearly, a bilateral,
negotiated initiative, which didn't involve motorcycling into Angola, but
responded to an explicit political request of the Angolan MPLA government.

ITEM 1:

Dar es Salaam, January 26, 1975

Dear Comrades,

Given the situation on the ground of our movement and our country, and
taking into account the results of the exploratory trip of the official
Cuban delegation [Cadelo and Pina], we are sending you a list of the urgent
needs of our organization. We are confident that you will give it immediate
consideration.

1. The establishment, organization and maintenance of a military school for
cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we
need to prepare the members of our military staff.

2. We need to rent a ship to transport the war material that we have in Dar
es Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if this were a Cuban ship,
could take place outside of the territorial waters.

3. Weapons and means of transportation for the Brigada de Intervenci-n that
we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry
battalions.

4. Transmitters and receivers to solve the problem of communication among
widely dispersed military units.

5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men.

6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic.

7. Assistance in training trade union leaders.

8. Cooperation in the organization of schools for the teaching of Marxism
(to solve the problems of the party).

9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially
instruction manuals.

10. Financial assistance in this phase of establishing and organizing
ourselves. We also urge that the Communist Party of Cuba use its influence
with other countries that are its friends and allies, especially from the
Socialist camp, so that they grant useful and timely aid to our movement,
which is the only guarantee of a democratic and progressive Angola in the
future.

Comrades, accept our revolutionary greetings and convey the good wishes of
the combatants of the MPLA and of the new Angola to Prime Minister Fidel
Castro.

ITEM 2:

Letter from Raul Diaz Arguelles to Raul Castro
August 11, 1975

Report on the visit to Angola and on the conversations held with Agostinho
Neto, president of the MPLA, and the Political Bureau of the MPLA, as well
as with chiefs of the army staff of the FAPLA [the MPLA's armed forces]:

1. We arrived at Luanda, Angola, on Sunday, August 3 and established contact
with the MPLA. They immediately took us to a hotel. When President Neto
heard about [our arrival], he sent for us and put some of us up in his house
and the rest of the delegation in another companero's house.

In our first conversation with Neto we greeted him on behalf of the
commander-in-chief [Fidel Castro] and the minister of the armed forces [Raul
Castro], we gave him the present and the note from the commander-in-chief
and then we explained the purpose of our visit.

We based our explanation on the following points:

The request made by the MPLA when it was visited by a delegation from our
party and our government in January [Cadelo and Pina] and the request made
later in Mozambique by Cheito, the chief of staff of the FAPLA.
These requests were somewhat contradictory: During the January visit they
asked for aid and the training of cadres in Cuba and in Angola, and later in
Mozambique they asked only for the training of cadres in Cuba.
We were coming to clarify the aid we should offer, given the FNLA's and
Mobutu's aggression against the MPLA and the possible course of events
before independence in November. We knew that the forces of reaction and
imperialism would try with all their might to prevent the MPLA from taking
power, because it would mean a progressive government in Angola. Therefore
we were bringing Neto the militant solidarity of our commander-in-chief, our
party and our government, and we gave him the $100,000.
In the course of this conversation, the Angolans complained about the
paucity of aid from the socialist camp, and they pointed out that if the
socialist camp does not help them, no one will, since they are the most
progressive forces [in the country], whereas the imperialists, Mobutu and
... [one word sanitized] are helping the FNLA in every way possible. They
also complained that the Soviet Union stopped aiding them in 1972 and that
although it is now sending them weapons, the amount of assistance is paltry,
given the enormity of the need. In general, he [Neto] wants to portray the
situation in Angola as a crucial struggle between the two systems --
Imperialism and Socialism -- in order to receive the assistance of the
entire socialist camp. We believe that he is right in this, because at this
time the two camps in Angola are well defined, the FNLA and UNITA represent
reaction and world imperialism and the Portuguese reactionaries, and the
MPLA represents the progressive and nationalist forces. We agreed that we
would meet again the next day, because we needed to finalize the exact
timetables, quantities and details etc. of the requests they had made. (...)
We believe that [the MPLA] enjoys the general support of the population; the
population is organized and ready to fight, but lacks weapons, as well as
food, clothing and basic gear. We believe that we must help them directly or
indirectly to remedy this situation, which is in essence the resistance of
an entire people against the forces of reaction and imperialism.

Source: http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/17/documents/angola/

Jurriaan




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