[Marxism] Stratfor claims US forces aim to withdraw to permanent bases after June 30

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

A retreat like this, pulling back from Iraq in order to threaten and
control other countries while accepting that Iraq will descend into
"chaos and anarchy" by US standards, seems like wishful thinking on
Stratfor's part.  How effectively the US could challenge Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Iraq if all the US can do is coexist with a massively
anti-occupation presence in Iraq which, under these circumstances, might
produce an anti-occupation government?  How would the deployments keep
the "dual power" situation which Stratfor sees in the Baghdad area, for
example, from being resolved against the US side.

Strategies of building permanent military bases in countries like the
Philippines, Azerbaijan, Saudi Arabia, and so on have always required a
degree of stability of the countries concerned.  Declining stability
forced Washington to give up its openly permanent bases in Saudi Arabia.


Raw US military power is very great, and already has to affect the
course of countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, but if the US
military has to retreat from most of Iraq, the effectiveness of that
threat will be  somewhat more eroded -- particularly the effectiveness
of the threat to remove other governments from power. If all the US can
offer as an alternative is "chaos and anarchy," they will be far less
attractive to any section of the population than the prospect of
occupation was in Iraq. The proposed retreat, while not ending the
occupation, is unlikely to really end the present war and will erode --
although far frome eliminating -- the fear inspired by the US military.

I believe Stratfor's approach is distorted by its interpretation of the
US operations in Iraq as primarily a chapter in an overall war in Al
Qaeda.  From this standpoint, the fight to control the land, the air and
water routes, and the resources of the Middle East are a tactic derived
from the primary need to destroy the terrorist threat to the United
States.  In actual fact, the conflict with Al Qaeda and similar groups
is derived tactically from the need to control the land, people, and
resources of the Middle East and South Asia.

>From this standpoint, the tactical shift reported and obviously
recommended by Stratfor would constitute a partial retreat to a weakened
position and could lead to more difficulties rather than less. For
instance, a large deployment of US forces in Kurdistan could make
antigovernment forces there more aggressive in opposition to their
presence, as well as heightening conflict with the Iraqi Arabs to the
south. I suspect no such retreat can take place very soon, including
after June 30.
Fred Feldman







Stratfor

U.S. Forces in Iraq: Disengaging To Engage

May 14, 2004   1404 GMT




Summary

Washington is re-evaluating U.S. deployments in Iraq in an attempt to
match its resources to its goals. The effort will conclude with a
massive in-country redeployment that will divorce U.S. troops from the
day-to-day grind of fighting in Iraq.

Analysis

The war in Iraq is not going as Washington had planned, and pacifying
the country is unlikely to be an option for a very long time. We suspect
-- and we see some indications -- that, despite putting a brave face on
the situation in Iraq, the Bush administration has finally recognized
this and is in the process of rethinking its strategy. Washington must
know that if U.S. policy in Iraq does not change, it will hinder
long-term U.S. goals in the Middle East.

Prior to the invasion, Stratfor laid out the underlying reasons for the
U.S. war in Iraq. First, the Bush administration went in with a
strategic goal: to acquire projection capabilities from within Iraq that
would allow Washington to pressure the entire Middle East, from Iran to
Saudi Arabia to Egypt. This would be impossible if U.S. troops were
bogged down in a guerrilla war with no end in sight.

Second, due to the insurgency and the fast-approaching U.S. elections,
the Bush administration must quickly mitigate military and political
damage in Iraq. At the same time, Washington must not abandon its
broader goals in the Middle East. The prospects for the administration
would be grim if U.S. forces continued to engage guerrillas through
2004.

Also, continued human losses will play an important role in the
elections. Moving troops out of harm's way could help the administration
escape significant military, economic and political damage.

For these reasons, the current strategy is untenable. Even if Muqtada
al-Sadr's forces, the Sunni guerrillas and the foreign jihadists were
brought under some degree of control, the United States does not want --
and it has no interest in -- policing Iraq, day in and day out. The U.S.
goal is to be able to pressure Iraq's neighbors, not to babysit the
Iraqis.

There are really only three options that would allow the United States
to avoid getting bogged down in Iraq. The first -- to withdraw
completely -- is unrealistic. Not only would it be an embarrassment, it
would be a strategic failure of mammoth proportions. That leaves CENTCOM
arguing internally about the two other options, both of which involve
redeploying forces within Iraq.

One, the enclave strategy, would leave U.S. forces stationed at a
smattering of bases around Iraq, very close to the cities. In such a
scenario, the forces would stay in their enclaves, but would frequently
engage militants and participate in the guerrilla war. The other option
is a complete geographic redistribution. This would pull U.S. forces out
of all Iraqi cities and redeploy them to major bases in largely
unpopulated portions of the country, effectively ending U.S.
participation in putting down the insurgency.

The enclave strategy -- according to Stratfor sources within CENTCOM --
originally had the greatest support from within the Bush administration.
But the Army repeatedly mentioned that it hated the idea. Enclaves might
remove U.S. forces from the day-to-day grind of patrolling Iraq, but
would make them vulnerable to artillery attack and they would have to
respond to major nearby uprisings. Supplying a network of enclaves would
be a logistical nightmare -- not to mention that convoys would be
constant, inviting targets. The Army also rejects the idea because the
only time U.S. forces would leave the enclaves would be to engage in
urban guerrilla warfare, a type of combat the Army tries to avoid at all
costs.

The redeployment strategy has the advantage of keeping the troops much
safer and more readily supplied. Most U.S. forces would be in the
relatively calm Kurdish north, or to the west and south of the
Euphrates. Supplies could easily be carted in from Turkey or Kuwait, and
the United States could focus on what it originally came to Iraq to do:
pressure Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The downside is that U.S. forces
would have to leave Iraq in the not-even-remotely capable hands of the
nascent native security forces. The country could descend into chaos and
anarchy.

Even now, Stratfor sources doing contracting work for U.S. commanders in
Iraq say there is a dangerous dual-power situation in Iraq, particularly
in Baghdad, where the United States controls only the Green Zone, and
guerrillas and criminal gangs have the run of the rest of the city.
Sources say U.S. tanks patrolling the capital do not translate into
control, and local police have a helpless, hands-off attitude -- and
those are only the ones who are not members of guerrilla or criminal
bands.

Our sources indicate that the specific locations of future bases are
already being discussed, although it is far from certain what their size
will be or even if the enclave or partial withdrawal strategy will be
adopted. What they do know is that bases will be positioned with
cross-border strikes -- as much as operational security -- in mind.

A base in Al-Basra province (south of Basra) would threaten Saudi Arabia
and Iran. A military facility close to the border between An Najaf and
Al Muthanna provinces, located away from Shiite shrines in southern
Iraq, could project into Saudi Arabia. Another in the western part of
Al-Anbar province could target Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Three other
bases would be built in the western and central parts of Anbar and
Ninawa provinces west of Mosul, near Syria. The enclaves close to
Baghdad and Kirkuk and on the border between Maysan and Wasit provinces
would keep Iran in check and serve as a main reaction force to quell
anti-U.S. movements. A majority of the bases also would protect the
major oil fields and pipelines.

After June 30, when it becomes clear that no real power transfer has
taken place and U.S. forces withdraw to several defensible bases,
security in the rest of the country could very well become a nightmare.
Washington must choose between pursuing military victory in Iraq at any
cost -- a risky proposition -- and focusing troops on the wider goal of
regional force projection. Neither mission is likely to succeed if the
administration tries to pursue them simultaneously.

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