Re: The Revolution Will Not be Televised

["Nestor Gorojovsky" <nestorgoro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

El Jueves 2 de Octubre de 2003 a las 9:00,
Philip Ferguson dijo sobre The Revolution Will Not be Televised que:

> Lou made the point that if Allende had've done this, things would have
> been different in Chile.  However, there is surely a problem here -
> Pinochet and co. would probably have forcibly smashed a million-strong
> demonstration anyway.  I think to a large extent Chavez was lucky.  For
> whatever reason, the generals in Venezuela decided not to physically smash
> the masses outside the Palace.

"Al saber le llaman suerte" (they call luck to wisdom) is a quite 
useful saying of Inland Argentina.

There were quite objective reasons for the different results of both 
coups, and not luck.

To begin with, there was too much abstract anti-militarism within the 
Unidad Popular, and as much abstract "revolutionism"; worse yet, the 
basic ideology of the right-wing and of the Armed Forces was not 
challenged, rather the opposite, by the Unidad Popular (most 
particularly the Communist Party, may I sound sectarian but truth is 
truth): the kernel to Chilean "conservatism" lies basically in its 
insularity, an insularity which has been ideologically imposed by the 
gang of "momios" (landowning oligarchs) and Valparaíso tradesmen (in 
their origin, most of them were English by birth: don't forget that 
until the Panama Canal was opened, Valparaíso was not a _final_ 
destination but the first important port to the North of Magellan 
Strait).

This insularity praises the Armed Forces as the only guarantee for a 
nation menaced on all its frontiers: Argentina on the East and South, 
Perú and Bolivia on the North and Northeast. Truth is quite 
different, however, but what really needs explanation here is that 
without a clear definition of a national and popular mission for the 
Armed Forces, there is little room for a "leftist" government to 
manoeuver.  Now, the Unidad Popular had no clear line on this 
essential issue. They only expected the Armed Forces to keep 
respectful of their "democratic traditions".

But while they harassed the military with their abstract "civilism" 
(civilismo: does the word exist in English?), at the same time they 
did little to reeducate them (to do so, they would have had to 
reeducate themselves first: the Chilean "Left", for instance, shares 
the oligarchic positions as to Bolivian landlocked position or the 
Loa River water dispute).  

All this is twice as sad because Allende's own party, the Socialist 
Party, was born with a revolutionary military coup, the Marmaduke 
Grove coup, in the early 30s.

Thus, the Chilean armed forces were lost for the process.

Another issue here is that the whole Unidad Popular government was, 
in essence, a _national-revolutionary_ or even _national-reformist_ 
government, not a _socialist_ government. But it showed itself, 
stupidly, as a socialist regime. A difference with Chávez is that 
Chávez does what he does not proclaim, while many in the Unidad 
Popular proclaimed what they could not do.

What is at stake here, in fact, is the essential role of the Armed 
Forces in both national revolutions. The Unidad Popular was an 
attempt of a modern national revolution in Chile, which wasn't able 
to understand itself for what it was. Thus, it was unable to split 
the Armed Forces and bring a sizable part of them to the people's 
side.

In Venezuela, things were exactly the other way round. 

Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
nestorgoro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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"Sí, una sola debe ser la patria de los sudamericanos".
Simón Bolívar al gobierno secesionista y disgregador de 
Buenos Aires, 1822
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