Why the Ven coup failed (was 'revolution will not be televised')

[Stuart Munckton <stuartmunckton@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Philip Ferguson wrote:

"Lou made the point that if Allende had've done this,
things would have been different in Chile.  However,
there is surely a problem here - Pinochet and co.
would probably have forcibly smashed a million-strong
demonstration anyway.  I think to a large extent
Chavez was lucky.  For whatever reason, the generals
in Venezuela decided not to physically smash the
masses outside the Palace.  However, since these
masses were unarmed I think it was physically possible
for them to be crushed.  We have to assume that the
generals made the decision that the overall
balance of forces in the country was not conducive to
a coup.

But how long will that last, especially if Chavez's
government makes further inroads into the prerogatives
of the bourgeoisie?  And one thing that struck me
about the Venezuelan elite in the film was how crazy
they are made by even relatively small reforms.  So if
the government really cuts into their economic power,
a serious coup could well be on the agenda and,
without the masses being armed, it is difficult to see
how even a million people outside the Presidential
Palace could stop a determined coup."

I don't think anyone, certainly not Chavez himself, is
going to deny that another coup can be completely
ruled out in Venezuela. And certainly there was more
than an element of luck involved in the turn around of
the coup. The coup plotters completely under-estimated
the situation amongst the population and most
critically amongst the rest of the armed forces. Their
over-confidence lead them to a serious of serious
errors because they appeared to beleive they were
invincible.

However it is a serious mistake I think to assume that
this was not a 'serious' coup attempt. It was. The
took power into their hands. They hunted down key
pro-Chavez leaders. They had plans to kill Chavez.
They installed a completely new government. Why didn't
they repress the people en masse like in Chile?

There are two important factors that Philip misses.

Firstly, it is not true that the peple were (or are
today) unarmed. What was it that sparked the coup?
Wasn't it a gun battle between pro-Chavez
demonstrators (civilians) organised byt eh Bolivarian
Circles to defend the palace and oposition
demonstrators and police? Since then, gun battles
between pro-Chavez demonstrators and right wing police
have ben a semi-regular feature. The government
doens't deny this, they just blame the police for
starting it.

The critical question here is not whether or not the
ogvernment has armed the people. they don't ned to arm
the people. There are guns everywhere in Venezuela.
Ther aree plenty of reports that sugest both the poor
and the middle class are armed. There was a good
interview with one of the leaders of the Bolivarain
Circles. SHe was asked about the government's denial
that it had armed them. She said that's right, they
hadn't arm,ed them. She produced her revolver that she
carries on every demonstration and said the government
doesn't ned to arm them, everyone in Venezuela who
wants a gun can get one. 

So the critcal question is has the government allowed
for the poor to be *disarmed* as Allende did in the
lead up to the coup. The answer is no. Disarming the
Bolivarian Circles was one of the key demands made by
the opposition in the post coup negotiations that went
on for months. It hasn't happened.

But even more important than this, as far as the April
coup was concrened, was that, unlike in Chile, in
Venezuela tha armed forces split. And the coup ploters
were in a decided minority. Military base after
military base came out against the coup. The soldiers
who were suposed to kill Chavez protected him. The
start of this rebellion in the armed forces started in
the city of Maracay - not too far from the capital.
There the paratrooper division, headed by a strong
Chavez supporter, were the first to declare themselves
against the coup. they took over the city and
established barricades on the streets. They were
prepared to start a march on the capital to seize it
by force if neccesary - which it didn't prove to be.
The poor themselves had marched to the barracks across
the country when the uprising started chanting
'Soldiers, friends, your President needs you'.
This coup was unique that the overwhelmoing majority
of divisions were ordered by the coup leaders were
told to stay in their barracks - not mobilised like
you would expect.

The key difference, leaving aside all the historicl
subjective reasons why a strong revolutionary
demoratci wing of the amred forces has developed in
Venzuela, betwen the aproach of Chavez and Allende is
that Allende did not attempt to work with and
strengthen the democratic left-wing base that existed
in the military and Chavez has made it a central part
of his strategy.

Form the start he consciously promoted people from the
base he had built inside the amred forces a,d moved to
retire, move out of the way, not promote right wingers
in the military. The opposition scream that Chavez had
'politicised' the Armed Forces ie: that promotions are
based on political allegience rather than merit. It
seems tob e true and has no doubt saved Chavez's life,
and ocuntles otehrs, so far.

Post the coup 400 officers have been 'retired' ie
purged, for their alleged role in the coup. The only
reason why they are not in jail is because the
counter0revolutionary forces, not the revolutioary
forces, control the courts (the supreme court ruled
the coup was not even a coup!). This means that, at
the moment, the officer caste in Venezuela is the
product of a conscious appraoch to drive out the
reactionaries and strengthen  the hold of the
demoratic revolutionary faction
. It has created an irony where it may prove that the
oficer caste is more reliable than the ranks, given
that you can consciously contro the politcs of who
becomes an officer, but the ranks are by their nature
more heterogenous.

This doesn't mean another coup can be ruled out. There
may be reactionaries still in their who haven't raised
their heads. And, as the process deapens, there may be
officers currently behind the process who break with
it. There is certainly enormous pressure for them to
do so. During the bosses lock out the head of the
military came out and said he had ben offered hundreds
and thousands of US dollars to lead another coup.

Another important factor is the way Chavez has used
the Amred Forces in a way calculated to transform its
nautre and consciousness. Decalreing that they ned to
'create bursts of life instead of the gunfire of
death', one of the first things his government did was
to send the soldiers into the countryside for a mass
program aiming to use the armed forces to help build
homes, roads, public works etc. And for them to work
alongside the communites themselves in deciding what
to do and involving the community in doing it with
them. This has created very strong links between the
soldiers and the poor, and this is why the poor - when
a military coup happened - went the military barracks
to *appeal* to the troops. They went chanting slogans,
not with guns to engage them in battle. This tells you
a lot about the links and trust that has been built up
between the average soldier and the poor. Those
soldiers were supposed to be an instrument to repress
the poor, and yet there the poor are, marching right
up to them and saying 'friend, join us in the uprising
against the coup'! And, overwhelmingly, they did.

This makes it very dificult for imperialism. They lost
a lot in that coup. Far from it not being serious,
they staked a lot on it succeeding. If they had gone
ahead and tried to massacre the people, it would have
been a civil war and one in which they were at a
decided disadvatange given that the people WERE
actually armed and that most of the armed forces were
not on their side.

They have lost their control over the military by
failing in that coup. Doesn't mean under the right
cirumstances they wont get it back, but it does make
it very very difficult. Imperialism and the Venzuelan
ruling class are in a lot of trouble and they know it.

On the hysterical response to quite mild reforms. It
think it shos a couple of things. One, there is no
space given the fundamental economic crisis and
neo-liberal ofensive for even mild reforms. To
seriously attempt to carry out even a program of mild
reforms will provoke a revoluitonary crisis.

The other thing is that what really scares the shit
out of the ruling class is not the refomrs so much
temsleves, but the slef organsaiton of the poor,
increasing class and revolutiojary consciousness -
which is being consciously facilitated by the
government, and especially Chavez. And also a healthy
class instinct that Chavez, a conscious revolutionary
for at least two decades, coming from a political
background directly tied to the old guerilla movements
of the 60's, does not intened the 'Bolivarian
revolution' to stop at a few mild reforms. He is
looking for a fundamental transformation and that is a
dangerous man to have President, especially when he
understads that he can't cary that out, Parliament
can't carry that out, only the workers and peasants
themselves can carry that out and uses every
opportunity he has to urge the poor to go and organise
themsevles. Including, in more recent times, calls for
workers to take their factories over.

What Chavez understands, and what so many on the Left
looking in don't, is that he can only go beyond mild
reforms in a fast as his social base is prepared,
ideologcally and organisationally, to actually carry
this out. When he was elected there was very little.
No organisation. He had the Presidency and that was
it. Didn't control Congress, every other instiution of
the State was dead against him. COngress gave him
abudget with no money, whilst the poor lined up in
their thousands outside the Presidentail Palace to
demand jobs etc. Many on the Left damn him because he
didn't attempt to imple,emt socialism the dya after
hin inaugration. If he had done that, he would without
question have a bullet in his head. 

Instead he moved to do what he could - mostd
critically call for elections for a constituent
assembly to draw up a new constiution through popular
consultation that serves as a program for the
revolutionary proccess. (Playing a similar role to
Fidel Castro's 'History will absolve me' spech in
someways), and, through the constituion, the armed
forces where he had a base and whom he sent out to do
some real work for a change, give the poor something
they could se was worthwhile in ordre to provide a
base to start organising them into grass roots
institutions that in amny cases are developing real
decision making power 9siuch as the land councils that
drew up the urban land reform).

All very wise and the exact opposite of what most of
the Western left would insist he should have done.
Thank god he pays no attention to them.

Stuart

ps My favourite part of 'the revolution will not be
televised' is the bit that shows a grass roots popular
organising meeting of the opositon. They are all
white, look like yuppies and the speaker is urging
those present to kep a close eye on their domestic
servants as they know that some of them are involved
with the Bolivarian Cricels. Sums everything up.

pps I'll admit it bugs me a little that Philip
Ferguson just *assumes* the people aren't armed. At
base this is based on the idea that Chavez is guilty
until he proves himslef innocent to us Marxists, that
he must automatically be some sort of bourgeios faker
or demagogoe, or at best, some sort of well meaning
but naive reformer who should have read 'State and
revoluti0on' and listened to us. It is rubbish. Chavez
has proven a hundred times over that he understands
the nature of the State. Whehter he can use this
undesrstanding to organise to prevent the capitalidt
State smashing the process is another question.




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