Re: Reply to Eric Blair - the notion of "critique"

["Eric Blair" <eric@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Jurian,

Critique, then, is just another way to describe the product of the
dialectical method is it not?  That's at least how I understood the term.

More to come after I'm done reading.

Blair.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Jurriaan Bendien" <bendien@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Marxmail List" <marxism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, September 03, 2003 6:54 PM
Subject: Reply to Eric Blair - the notion of "critique"


> Eric wrote:
>
> If you have some time I'd like to start up some dialogue... maybe you can
> critique some of the ideas I've been having, help me with some problems
I've
> run into, offer some of your own ideas.   If not I understand, but you
> seemed like the guy to ask because it looks like we agree on quite a bit
> from what I've seen.
>
> Reply:
>
> Just a few comments. Well I will be away for a couple of weeks very soon,
> and I don't know yet what we share. The general theme in Castoriadis and
> people like that is that, as a result of the experience of Stalinism,
> something was lost to the idea of socialism, and thinking through that,
> people come to the conclusion we never had it anyway, or at any rate, Marx
> didn't have it either, and that is why Marx's own ideas provided an
> intellectual precursor for the Stalinist idea. In general, what is lost is
> the idea of proletarians as active subjects and imaginative human beings,
> capable just as much of revolt and self-emancipation as they are of
passive
> acquiesence in an alienated way to a system that nobody can control. I
> personally think that Castoriadis is interesting not so much because of
the
> answers he provides, with which I do not always agree, but rather because
of
> the questions he asks, which are very much foundational questions,
questions
> about "what the hell socialism means anyway". And there is no doubt about
> what it is really about in Castoriadis's eyes: the collective
> self-management of society's affairs by the direct producers themselves,
> through new forms of organisation which they have constructed themselves.
> And that is a very different idea from the "Leninist" concept of "the
> party-conquest of state power-dictatorship of the proletariat-statisation
of
> the means of production-subjugation of the worker to the party/state".
>
> But just to take up one point you are making: let me briefly examine the
> notion of a "critique". What is a "critique" anyhow ? Is it a bit of a
fancy
> French way for saying "criticism" (German: Kritik) ? Some years ago, I
> listened to a media discussion in which some research was mentioned which
> someone had done in California, and they concluded that even within a
> university most of the students did not have a clue about what "critical
> thought" was. They meant by critical thought, that you were critical of
> somebody, that you were hostile to them or want to attack them in some
way,
> as a personal attitude.
>
> When Marx talked about this, he doesn't mean simply attacking and denying
> somebody's point of view and suggesting another one to be followed
instead.
> Rather, he is talking about developing new ideas out of what already
exists
> around you, making new connections within that which already exists. You
can
> see this very clearly in Das Kapital. Marx said about his book "I really
did
> not do very much that was original or new, I make no big claim about
> originality - just a few conceptual distinctions such as concrete and
> abstract labour, labour and labour power, surplus-value as the general
form
> of profit, interest and rent, and so forth". Of course, Marx is a bit
> modest - having studied all the literature that was already there, and
> having made a critique about that, he arrives at very original
conclusions,
> which put the subject matter in a completely different light, if you like,
> reframes the subjectmatter in a new way. But he uses a very comprehensive
> apparatus of footnotes to indicate "who said it first", and rather than
> denying the evidence or denying what the scientific authorities said, he
> engages in argument with them, in order to arrive at different
conclusions.
> This is much more persuasive than saying "I hate you and I am not going to
> play anymore with you". Some people will say, for example, Marx's economic
> ideas are completely different from the political economists he studied,
and
> incommensurate with them. Others will say, that Marx simply continues a
> tradition that already existed. Both points of view are really wrong,
there
> are both continuities and discontinuities, but it is important to grasp
the
> methods which Marx uses to investigate and transcend the people he engages
> with, the people that he studies or criticises.
>
> So what is actually involve in a "critique" ? Basically, it probes the
> assumptions, the underlying premises (which may be hidden) of an argument,
> and relates these to the interests that people have in the real world, the
> personal "stake" they have in the argument. This is done by keeping on
> asking, "why ?" and "how" to reveal the ultimate basis of the argument,
the
> logic behind it, the evidence for it, the axioms involved, and in whose
> interest that is. It shows why the problem is a problem, or appears as a
> problem. Next, it follows the reasoning of the opponent's argument through
> carefully and systematically, in order to identify contradictions or
> inconsistencies in the argument. This is done by saying "if you accept X,
> then you must accept Y, but you do not accept Y or you infer Z, therefore
> there is an inconsistency." Then the critique aims to show, that if the
line
> of reasoning which the discussant has adopted, if pushed further, lead to
> conclusions which the discussant himself could not accept. Finally,
through
> elaborating the contradictions in the subjectmatter and pushing them to
> their ultimate conclusion, the subjectmatter as a whole is reframed and
> re-contextualised, because it is shown, that the questions posed and the
> problems posed are not adequate, and that the very assumptions made, and
the
> evidence referred to, show that the questions and problems should be posed
> in a different way, and that if this is done, then a very different
> perspective and analysis of the subjectmatter results, which both shows
the
> limits of the point of view of the opponent, and points to another point
of
> view which goes beyond it - a new point of view, which can contain
> everything that the opponent has adduced to support his case, but explains
> more, and indeed explains the very conditions or interests which give rise
> to the opponent's point of view. And that kind of thinking raises the
> discussion to a wholly new level, both preserving what was valid in the
> past, negating what was invalid, and going beyond it.
>
> Well, that is a very brief thumbnail sketch of the meaning of a "critique"
> in the tradition of rational critical thought, as I see it. Notice however
> that the success of the critique depends on taking somebody who you do not
> agree with seriously, and a preparedness to consider the various
> permutations of what somebody else has got to say in a genuine way, in
order
> to arrive, through a reasoned dialogue and interrogation of evidence and
> logic, at a better view. In order to have that dialogic process, there
have
> to be some shared ideas and assumptions, a shared focus, you must have
> something in common, even if it was only that we are all human beings. You
> cannot argue with something or somebody, if you operate on the basis of
> competely different, incommensurate assumptions, because in that case you
> live in "different worlds". This was already acknowledged by Aristotle.
The
> point of departure of a critique is precisely to say, that we have
something
> in common, some shared beliefs, assumptions, ideas, practices or whatever.
> It is just that, in thinking through this, we arrive at different
> conclusions. But those different conclusions are only as convincing or
> persuasive as the extent to which we have taken the views of somebody else
> seriously and not denied them or refused their existence or operated with
> some kind of prejudice. We are all partisan, because we all have a "stake"
> in the world, even if we are not fully aware of what it is, or cannot
decide
> or judge about it, for some reason. But what we can do, is be open to
> evidential inquiry and be open to rational thought and criticism, so that
a
> non-arbitrary conclusion is reached.
>
> I think that the intellectual tradition of a "critique" in this sense has
> sadly gone into decline, not just in Marxist circles but in society
> generally. I think there are a number of reasons for that, among others:
>
> 1) The phenomena associated with the idea that you have a Central
Committee
> of a party which is infallible, omnipotent and always correct, such as in
> the CPSU under Stalin, where certain people function as if they were God.
> This results in arguments from authority - it is true because I say so,
> because I am who I am, or it is true because a certain author says so, and
> only that author is to be believed, and no other authors, because I say
so.
> This attitude denies dialogue and denies independent critical thought.
This
> has very important consequences, because it means that people are divided
> into leaders and followers on the basis of power and authority, and the
> followers have to follow in the tracks and footsteps of the leaders
> according to some dogma. The result is that there is no longer a way of
> learning systematically from experience - the leaders prescribe how
> experience is to be interpreted "or else". But that is just to say that it
> is believed, that some people have a monopoly of reason, a bit like
Plato's
> "philosopher kings" who are able to grasp the pure forms of reason, while
> the tin soldiers below them grub in the mud.
>
> 2) The phenomena associated with postmodernist relativism, subjectivism,
> nihilism, vulgar pragmatism and so on, which cause a loss of belief in the
> power of cogent argument and serious evidential inquiry as a basis for
> practical action. If the truth is just what you think it is, if we all
live
> in different "worlds", and if I only see what I want to see, or even that
I
> only can see things from a partial, biased and limited viewpoint, if we
are
> all self-interested in everything we do, if the only thing that matters is
> if something "works" in practice and that ""the truth is what works", well
> then a critique is no longer possible, objectivity is no longer possible
or
> sharply reduced, because a critique requires precisely a reflective
"meeting
> of minds" and a common regard for the facts, rather than the assertion of
> "difference, individuality and uniqueness". The problem however with these
> irrationalist trends is that ultimately we do not live in different
worlds,
> we live in the same world and we just have different perspectives on it
> (this is the basis for Marx's approach: ""I have to find a way of knowing
> that can contain all these different worlds or collapse them into one").
The
> question is then what is common and different about those views, and how
the
> commonalities and differences arise. The extreme, unasked for mediation of
> our own relationships by other people whom we have nothing to do with, may
> lead to an escape into some internal world where we deny any possibility
of
> reaching an objective view of the situation, but, precisely we are social
> beings engaged in a perpetual metabolism with material reality, the ""real
> world" sets limits on that, and ultimately forces us to confront the
> objective realities anyhow, however much we might try to deny them, or
> pretend they are not there.
>
> Modern capitalism is in my opinion to a great extent a system of
"organised
> irresponsibility". The more people try to "parent" other people or mediate
> or interfere or organise what they do (or may not do), the more the
boundary
> of private and public collapses, the more the confidence of people in
their
> own natural ability to create solutions or create the world they want may
be
> reduced, or insofar as they are confident, the less people are interested
in
> taking responsibility for anything beyond themselves. They lose the belief
> of their ability to understand and influence the bigger picture, never
mind
> have any influence on it, they are disempowered. In that case, the
> distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary behaviour becomes
> increasingly arbitrary itself, because the possibility of an objective,
> totalising viewpoint is denied, and there is no objective criterion or
> standard anymore by which issues can be judged and resolved, only
subjective
> ones. We are not really talking with each other anymore, it is just "your
> word against mine", and if you don't like what I say I just go somewhere
> else, and then everything is relative. In that case, "living according to
an
> idea" is just lifestylism and arguments are settled on the basis that
> somebody has more power, more money or a greater ability to assert himself
> or herself in some way. But if you have no way of getting out of
> subjectivist escapism, then ultimately having a lot of power, money or
> ability for assertion may not help anybody either. All we are left with
then
> is some evaluation of the observed behavioural consistency of a person
> according to some scale of values, and all we can do is decide whether we
> can relate to that, or whether we cannot.
>
> Marx rolls out of that one, by saying that if everything is relative, then
> so is the idea that everything is relative, and the movement of ideas has
> both an internal logic and material sublimates, it can be rationally
> understood and explained, including with reference to something existing
> beyond that world of ideas, namely practical reality, and the relationship
> between ideas and practical reality, conceived not in a vulgar way but a
> dialectical one. It is not that the totality of things is impossible to
> grasp, it is rather that it takes a lot of serious effort to do this.
Rather
> than denying the world around you, you accept the world around you, and
> discover the contradictions and paradoxes in it, in order to find a way of
> getting on top of things, on top of the argument, in order to see the way
> ahead. When Marx polemicises against the Young Hegelians, his standpoint
is
> essentially that their thinking is arbitrary, because it occurs in a
> decontextualised way which is detached from the circumstances to which it
> really refers, and therefore lacks anything which can discipline thinking
> processes beyond "imagined" or arbitrarily "imposed" rules of thought, and
> these rules turn out to be arbitrary, an "apposition" of concepts. The
proof
> of that is a demonstration that the same premises could be interpreted as
> leading to very different conclusions, and that you can go any old which
way
> with the argument, including conclusions which are quite contrary to what
> the Young Hegelians claimed to stand for.  It was thought by the Young
> Hegelians, that Hegel had provided a kind of philosopher's stone, a
> universal method, which could be used to solve the world's problems from
> behind a writing desk and present solutions, which, if only the masses
would
> adopt them, would cure the world from whatever ills were plaguing it. It
is
> not just that this method is idealist, it is also that "the dialectic does
> no work", it is just stringing together words and concepts in order to
> arrive at any old conclusion one might wish to arrive at. It created the
> illusion that one's beliefs were soundly based on reasons, but in fact
rests
> on a false consciousness, a self-delusion, about the real forces and
motives
> behind one's own behaviour and that of others.
>
> In these postmodernist or postpostmodernist times, it is often believed
that
> these old 19th century ways of thinking are completely out of date. This
is
> not only arbitrary, because as a matter of fact we are still using many
> ideas from that time, but also because history recreates the same old
> problems anew, if the previously attempted solution was inadequate,
> unsatisfactory, one-sided, or just paltry. A lot of this postmodernist
> "discourse" is little different from what Marx and Engels wrote about in
> books like the Holy Family, the Poverty of Philosophy, The German
Ideology,
> and so on. It is a toying with concepts, a proliferation of meanings, an
> attempt to flatter with a show of erudition, a spectacle of intellectual
> gymnastics and sophistry, a sort of advertising for oneself, a negotiation
> of meaning which is only really aimed at reaching a "significant other" in
a
> meaningful way which is not really very significant at all, but an
> overconsumption of undigested knowledge divorced from context. The
> superficiality and inconclusiveness of postmodernist intellectual
> concoctions is rooted in the point of departure, namely it consists in
what
> is unique and different, rather than what people have in common, what is
> general, what is universally applicable. Then it becomes impossible to
> generalise from experience according to some rational discipline, all we
can
> do is superimpose, combine or contrast layers of meaning on each other,
but
> this does not lead to any conclusions other than those which we have a
> predilection to draw. You cannot have a science if "different things are
> just different" and if all boundaries are merely conventions. Behind this
> postmodernist picture-painting is just the fact that the contradictions
and
> complexities of capitalism have grown to absurd extremes, so that it often
> becomes difficult to affirm something without denying it the next minute.
In
> which case there is not a lot left to say, all you can do is tell a story
to
> evoke an impression of how things are now.
>
> Prof. Furedi once wrote an interesting book called "Mythical Past, Elusive
> Future", and I like that title (the book is also interesting in itself, it
> is a sort of a critical intellectual version of the movie "The Plowman's
> Lunch", which is about the machinations of Thatcherite ideologists). It
> evokes in me the idea that, that by reducing the problem of consistency to
> individual behaviour as a basis for an intersubjective negotiation of
> meaning, rather than relating the situation of the individual to something
> larger than himself in a rational way, we end up continuously re-inventing
> the past, and in re-inventing the past, thought sinks into mythology, into
> story-telling, into symbolic narrative, because there is no rational
> framework of evaluation left anymore that could generate objectivity. We
do
> what we do, but we know no longer why we do it and there is no way left of
> finding out either.  But if the past is a myth, then no cumulative process
> of learning from experience can take place either, "different things are
> just different". Without historical continuity there is no learning, only
a
> succession of discontinuous experiences. In that case, the future eludes
us
> as well, because there is nowhere to go to and no place to reach. We are
> left in a hall of mirrors, a labyrinth from which escape it impossible, an
> endless succession of reflections which are reflected in other
reflections,
> a boundless spectacle in which we can feel lost, or wander around
wondering.
>
> That would not be so bad, if it is just limited to subjective confusions
> that people have. But it is another thing altogether when this type of
thing
> begins to enclose political discourse, political debate and political
> action. The most interesting thing about the hoaxes which were perpetrated
> to justify the war against Iraq, is not that they were revealed to be
> hoaxes, but the response to those hoaxes, and the astonishing belief that
> certain elites had, that they could project this imaginary rationale for a
> seamy military operation, and get away with it. That suggests in reality
an
> incredible ability for self-delusion on the part of the perpetrators, and
on
> the part of those that believed them. The "critique" of the delusion has
to
> reveal the conditions which give rise to the delusion, and if we can make
a
> good job of that, then we can shift public opinion. In reality people
aren't
> all passive, apathetic, relativistic, and subjectivistic at all. Their
lives
> aren't arbitrary, there is a "rationality" to it, it is just that the
> mediatedness of mass communications creates rafts of possibilities for
> making it impossible for people to understand things, through ideologies
> which reduce people's confidence in their ability to know anything at all
> about what is really going on.
>
> Hope this helps,
>
> J.
>
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