Option of invading Cuba ended up on back burner

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

(This is from the Cuba-L list serve
and provides a comprehensive
summary of US-Cuban relations
in the second quarter of 2003.

(This overview puts all these big
events into a useful and complete
package. Study this one carefully.)
==========================

June 6, 2003
Cuba-L Analysis

Bush Passes Up Attack Option
Continues Third Year Reviewing Cuba Policy
By Robert Sandels

Ever since the March arrest and trial of U.S.-paid
journalists, librarians, and human rights workers, President
Fidel Castro has warned of possible U.S. military
retaliation.  President George W. Bush's much anticipated
May 20 speech said nothing about sanctions although,
according to press reports, the State Department planned to
lash out at Cuban diplomats in New York and Washington by
restricting their access to plumbers. Bush eventually
settled for the lesser punishment of expelling 14 diplomats
on unsupported charges of espionage.

The State Department warned that continued airplane
hijackings from Cuba--encouraged by the United States--would
constitute a security threat to the United States.  The
warning plus the deliberate provocations by U.S. Interests
Section chief James Cason, constituted a "pre-arranged plan"
to provoke the hijackings and use them as a justification
for a naval blockage and eventual war against Cuba, Castro
said in an interview with the Argentina newspaper Pagina 12
(5/11/03).

Whether or not the Bush administration had readied an attack
package to retaliate against Castro's retaliation for the
U.S. provocations, nothing significant has materialized.
It is fair to assume that Cason's promotion of organized
dissent in Cuba, the contraction of visa issuance at the
Interests Section, and the ongoing U.S. practices that
promote hijackings and illegal emigration have gained no new
ground for the administration among anti-Castro hawks.
But they do underscore the paucity of policy options.

Calls for military intervention

As the crackdown in Cuba unfolded, the first U.S. reaction
was an unmistakable though mostly unofficial threat of
aggression.  Larry Klayman, chairman of the right-wing
lawsuit factory Judicial Watch, said that after Saddam
Hussein, Castro "should be next on the U.S. and worldwide
hit list of dictators overdue for 'regime change.'"

Some demonstrators in Miami carried signs that read "Iraq
now, Cuba next."

Miami's El Nuevo Herald (5/14/03) columist Andres Reynaldo
wrote that we were witnessing Castro's "final chapter." He
encouraged Cuban "generals" to get rid of him.

Wall Street Journal (5/14/3) editorial writer James Taranto
prescribed the use of precision weapons to destroy the
Castro regime without violence to civilians.  He said
"intellectuals" opposing such an attack were "frauds and
idiots." While he might object to being called an
intellectual, Bush has apparently rejected shock-and-awe
bombings of Cuba.

U.S. Ambassador in the Dominican Republic Hans Hertell
said Iraq set "a very good example for Cuba."

Most government officials avoided Hertell's bombast. A
consensus began emerging before the May 20 speech that it
was time for other countries to try their hand at unseating
Castro. If only the widespread condemnation of the Cuban
crackdown might somehow start a global telluric movement to
destroy Castro, Bush could be freed to tend to more pressing
business.

The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which has
lately taken a turn toward moderation, appeared swept away
by the notion that the crackdown had internationalized
animosity toward Cuba. Dennis Hays, CANF executive vice
president, said, "We should not do anything that stops the
international outrage....It's an international problem and
now we have an opportunity for once to work with our
European and Canadian and Latin allies."

Florida Gov. Jeb Bush, the only state official with his own
foreign policy, warned Castro that Florida had plans to deal
with the expected mass exodus from Cuba and that regime
change was "the only way to bring freedom and democracy to
the country."

In what sounded like a call for a Latin American alliance of
the willing, Gov. Bush said, "We should explain to our
brothers from Latin America and other places that a regime
that totally lacks respect to human rights can't be kept in
place."

Perhaps this is what Roger Noriega, Bush's choice to replace
Otto Reich in the top Western Hemisphere post at the State
Department, had in mind when he urged "new creativity and
vigor to hasten the inevitable democratic transition on the
island."

Powell acts

Secretary of State Colin Powell said somewhat ambiguously,
"it would not be appropriate at this time...to use military
force for this particular purpose."

Instead, he announced two initiatives to deal with the Cuba
crackdown. The first was to undertake a review of Cuba
policy.

Cuba policy is always under review.  White House press
secretary Ari Fleischer said so on May 20. Consequently, the
announcement could hardly be reassuring to those on the
right who thought further review was unnecessary since the
way was open for delivering a crushing blow to the Castro
regime.

The second Powell initiative followed the emerging consensus
for internationalizing regime change.  Shifting the burden
to the Organization of American States (OAS), Powell said
members should "live up to the ideals we share and take a
principled stand for freedom, democracy and human rights in
Cuba."

Canada, Chile, and Uruguay stepped in to produce a statement
for the OAS Permanent Council.  The outcome suggested that
one of the fruits of recent changes in Latin American
leadership would not be an urge to form a regime-change
posse.  Brazil and Venezuela objected to the statement,
arguing that since the Unite States got Cuba kicked out of
the OAS 1962, it was unfair to condemn Cuba in absentia.

Canada, Chile, and Uruguay then backed away and proposed a
watered down resolution that only expressed concern about
the human rights situation in Cuba.  Less than half the
council members signed the non-binding resolution.

The outcome was similar to the vote in the U.N. Human Rights
Commission, which during the height of the crackdown,
avoided condemnation of Cuba and settled for a resolution
that did not mention human rights.  That vote passed by only
by a plurality.

Bush tinkers with sanctions

The Bush administration blunted talk of forced regime change
by floating the possibility of blocking dollar remittances
to Cuba and ending charter flights to Cuba from U.S. cities.
Rep. Lincoln Diaz-Balart (R-FL) and other hard-liners
pressed the idea on Bush. However, there was little
enthusiasm in the exile community for such drastic
sanctions, and the trial balloons failed to rise.

Instead, the administration opted for direct punishment of
Cuban diplomats in the United States, ordering the expulsion
of 14 of them on May 13.

The official reason was that they were engaging in "harmful
activities."  State Department spokesman Philip Reeker left
no doubt that by "activities deemed harmful to the United
States," the department meant spying.  "I think you're all
familiar with the record of espionage by the Cuban regime
against the United States," Reeker said.

However, The New York Times (5/14/03) reported that the
expulsions had to do with politics, not espionage.  Citing
FBI sources, the Times said the bureau had made no
recommendation to expel the Cubans, and that the order came
from the White House and the State Department.

The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs called the expulsions
"a new aggressive escalation" of provocations and "an act of
vengeance."

Bush speech is noncommittal

Administration reiterations that Cuba policy was under
review gave the impression that Bush would announce tough
actions in his customary May 20 speech.  This is the date
the United States withdrew its troops from Cuba in 1902
leaving the island a half-sovereign dependency of the United
States.

A comparison of the two speeches is instructive.  Bush
delivered his May 20 speech last year from the White House
Rose Garden then flew to Miami to repeat it before cheering
crowds.  It was a tough-sounding diatribe against Castro.

Only a careless reading of it gave much hope to those
looking for regime change in Cuba.  His call for beefing up
Radio and TV Marti was political boilerplate since these
propaganda outlets have virtually no audience in Cuba.

Bush proposed a scholarship program for Cubans, but never
pursued the idea with funding, perhaps because it is
inconsistent with his attacks on the Clinton-era
people-to-people and cultural exchanges.

In some ways, the speech was as much a relaxation of
pressure as it was bluster.  Still, Castro took the speech's
catch phrase, Initiative for a New Cuba, as a threat.

Nevertheless, the speech was out of harmony with the
Helms-Burton blueprint for destruction of the Castro regime.
Bush offered very significant concessions and no demand that
Castro step down if Cuba "begins to adopt" certain
free-market and political reforms.

In case the speech sounded too aggressive, administration
officials said it was time for flexibility in handling Cuba.
Hard-liners saw through the smoke and criticized Bush for
not announcing new sanctions and enforcement of old ones.

Stripped of rhetorical flourishes, the 2002 speech was
hardly tougher than the 2003 speech, which bears resemblance
to a brief public-service announcement.   It was a 40-second
stealth message broadcast over Radio and TV Marti from an
Air Force plane flying near Cuba and serving as a
transmitter. There was no well-photographed Rose Garden
event and no trip to Miami.

The message in its entirety read: "Today, Cubans around the
world celebrate 20 de mayo, Cuban Independence Day. On
behalf of the people of the United States, I send greetings
to the Cuban community. My hope is for the Cuban people to
soon enjoy the same freedoms and rights as we do.
Dictatorship has no place in the Americas. May God bless the
Cuban people, who are struggling for freedom. Thank you."

Both speeches coincided with periods of heightened tensions
caused in part by the immigration issue and by the U.S.
Interests Section's open promotion of dissent.

In both cases, Castro warned he might close the Interests
Section and drop out of the 1994, 1995 migratory accords.

In both cases, Castro's warnings met with rumblings from the
right about some kind of military or naval response.

In both cases, U.S. commentators interpreted Castro's
reaction as the last gasp of communism in Cuba, and
predicted that he would unleash a mass Fourth of July exodus
toward Florida to which the United States would respond with
a naval blockade.

Judging by events of the past two years, there is an inverse
relationship between the degree of strain in Cuba-US
relations and the toughness of Bush's annual blessing of
Cuban independence.  The reason may be that the exile vote
in South Florida is important only if there is a
revolutionary Cuba.  The disappearance of the Castro regime
is not of any long-term value to U.S. political
considerations.

As an administration official said, in response to exile
complaints about the speech, "We cannot meet people's
expectations on their timetable.  We will determine what we
do when it's convenient" (The New York Times 5/21/03).

Hard-liners disappointed a second time

When the anti-Castro contingent in Congress, led by Reps.
Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), learned
that there would be nothing new in this year's speech, they
recommended Bush hold a meeting with selected Miami Cubans
to fill in the public relations gap. The meeting was not
well covered by the media and the lawmakers did not attend.

The response to the speech from Cuba was a satirical
editorial in the official newspaper Granma (5/25/03)
entitled "Thank you, Fuhrer."

Rep. Robert Menendez (D-NJ) told Bush, "Shame on you for not
living up to your promises; shame on you for your
deceptions; and shame on you for playing on the emotions of
the Cuban American community."

Citing an administration official, The New York Times
(5/20/03) said that new sanctions were still possible
because the policy was still under review.  This only
increased the appearance of indecision since Bush had two
months following the crackdown to decide on a course of
action and two years since becoming president to make good
on his promises to the exile right.

While it is commonplace to say that the noisy Cuban
community in the United States wields great power in
Washington, it is also true that countervailing forces,
especially Republican export interests that favor increased
trade with Cuba, oblige Bush to manipulate the Miami Cuban
leadership with token gestures.  Thus, in 2002, it was
relatively safe for Bush to give an impression that
sanctions would escalate.  In 2003, with many voices calling
for aggression, Bush chose to give a speech mild enough that
anti-embargo Republicans in Congress might be mollified.

Relations unchanged so far

Despite the uproar over the Cuban crackdown, bilateral
relations have not changed and trade delegations from
various states continue their visits to Cuba.

The latest trade figures show that U.S. exports in March
were $18.2 million, more than double the figure for the same
time last year, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and
Economic Council.  The organization's president, John
Kavulich, said trade was proceeding normally and there were
no indications that non-commercial issues would have an
impact.

The Cuba policy Bush inherited remains essentially unchanged
and the provocations in the first months of 2003 are
beginning to look like the foreign policy equivalent of
photo opportunities.  Whatever the Cuban government might
do to blunt the Bush initiatives, it would not be permitted
to force him into risky election-season regime change in Cuba.