US Turns to the Taliban; other developments

[John M Cox <coxj@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

             US Turns to the Taliban
             By Syed Saleem Shahzad
             The Asia Times

             Saturday 14 June 2003

             KARACHI - Such is the deteriorating security situation in
Afghanistan, compounded by the return to the
           country of a large number of former Afghan communist refugees,
that United States and Pakistani
           intelligence officials have met with Taliban leaders in an
effort to devise a political solution to prevent the
           country from being further ripped apart.

             According to a Pakistani jihadi leader who played a role in
setting up the communication, the meeting
           took place recently between representatives of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the US Federal
           Bureau of Investigation and Taliban leaders at the Pakistan Air
Force base of Samungli, near Quetta.

             The source told Asia Times Online that four conditions were
put to the Taliban before any form of
           reconciliation can take place that could potentially lead to
them having a role in the Kabul government,
           whose present authority is in essence limited to the capital:

              Mullah Omar must be removed as supreme leader of the Taliban.

              All Pakistani, Arab and other foreign fighters currently
engaged in operations against international
              troops in Afghanistan must be thrown out of the country.

              Any US or allied soldiers held captive must be released.

              Afghans currently living abroad, notably in the United States
and England, must be given a part in the
              government - through being allowed to contest elections -
even though many do not even speak their
              mother tongue, such as Dari or Pashtu.

             Apparently, the Taliban refused the first condition point
blank, but showed some flexibility on the other
           terms. As such, this first preliminary contact made little
headway. It is not known whether there will be
           further meetings, but given the fact that the reason for staging
the talks in the first place remains
           unchanged, more contact can be expected.

             The channels for the contact have been set up by Taliban who
defected when the government collapsed in
           Kabul, and fled to Pakistan, where they were sheltered in ISI
safe houses. Now these defectors, working
           with Pakistani jihadis who know how to approach the Taliban
leadership, are acting as go-betweens.

             The backdrop to the first meeting is an ever-increasing
escalation in the guerrilla war being waged
           against foreign troops in Afghanistan. Small hit-and-run attacks
are a daily feature in most parts of the
           country, while face-to-face skirmishes are common in the former
Taliban stronghold around Kandahar in
           the south.

             According to people familiar with Afghan resistance movements,
the one that has emerged over the past
           year and a half since the fall of the Taliban is about four
times as strong as the movement that opposed
           Soviet invaders for nearly a decade starting in 1979.

             The key reason for this is that the previous Taliban
government - which is dispersed almost intact in the
           country after capitulating to advancing Northern Alliance forces
without a fight - is backed by the most
           powerful force in Afghanistan: clerics and religious students.

             For centuries, these people were the most respected segment of
Afghan society, and before 1979 they
           never participated in politics. On the contrary, their role was
one of reconciliation in conflicts. During the
           Afghan resistance movement against the USSR, things changed, and
clerics threw their weight behind the
           mujahideen struggle, but, with a few exceptions, such as Maulana
Yunus Khalis, they were not in
           command.

             With the withdrawal of the Soviets and the emergence of the
Taliban in the early 1990s, though, the
           situation once again changed. The Taliban, taking advantage of
the power struggles among bitterly divided
           militias in Kabul, consolidated themselves into an effective
political movement led by clerics and in 1996
           seized power in Kabul. A part of their success also lay in the
fact that initially Afghans, especially Pashtuns
           who make up the majority of the country, were reluctant to take
up the gun against clerics.

             Now, in the renewed guerrilla war against foreign troops, it
is the clerics who are calling the shots. For
           instance, Hafiz Rahim is the most respected cleric in the
Kandahar region, and he commands all military
           operations from the sanctuary of the mountainous terrain.

             The US forces have employed maximum air support and advanced
technology in an attempt to curtail
           attacks, but without the help of local Afghan forces they are
unable to track down Hafiz Rahim, who to
           date has targeted US convoys scores of times. The United States
has admitted a few deaths, while the
           Taliban claim they have killed many more than the official
numbers state. For funds, the Taliban use money
           looted from the central bank before they abandoned Kabul,
estimated in excess of US$110 million, in
           addition to money received from Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda.

             At the same time, famed warlord Gulbbudin Hekmatyar has joined
the resistance after returning from
           exile in Iran. His Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (HIA) is the most
organized force in Afghanistan, and its
           participation has added real muscle to the resistance. Many top
slots in the Kabul administration are
           occupied by former HIA members who, although they were once
anti-Taliban, are loyal to the Islamic
           cause and anti-US. Also, several provincial governors and top
officials are former HIA commanders. They
           are suspect in the eyes of the Americans, but because of their
huge political clout it is impossible to remove
           them.

             With this groundswell of support - even if in places it is
only passive - and with Kabul's influence
           restricted to the capital, the Americans and their allies will
remain vulnerable targets, let alone be in a
           position to restore any form of law and order. It is in
situations like this, argue most experts on
           Afghanistan, that traditionally insurrections begin in the
Afghan army against foreign administrators.

             This is not the end of the problems. More than 2 million
Afghan refugees, according to the United Nations
           High Commissioner for Refugees, have returned to Afghanistan
from countries all over the world, including
           India, Russia, Cambodia, Malaysia, Zimbabwe and Central Asian
countries. Many of them belonged to
           communist factions during and after the Soviet invasion, while a
number of their counterparts remained and
           now hold positions in Kabul.

             At present, Kabul is divided into two main factions. The first
is pro-US, which is represented by the US
           and allied troops and those loyal to President Hamid Karzai. The
second is pro-Russian and pro-Iranian,
           represented by Defense Minister General Qasim Fahim and his
Northern Alliance forces. Although the
           camps are cooperating at present, they are silently building
their support bases to make a grab for full
           power once the present interim administration runs its course, a
process that is due to begin in October
           with a loya jirga (grand council).

             In this respect, every returned or returning former "communist
comrade" is important, for should the
           Northern Alliance faction develop sufficient critical mass, it
would come as no surprise if its leaders openly
           forged an alliance with the resistance movement.

           (In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material
is distributed without profit to those who
           have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included
information for research and educational
           purposes)