Goodbye to the Good Friday Agreement

["James Daly" <james.irldaly@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Material on the present Anglo-Irish situation -- JD.

Goodbye to the Good Friday Agreement
John McAnulty
21st May 2003

http://members.lycos.co.uk/socialistdemocracyie/Homepage.htm

The April cancellation of elections to the local Stormont assembly in
the North of Ireland marks a significant new stage in the decay of
British plans to bring about a settlement of the Irish question on
their terms. The indefinite suspension followed an earlier temporary
suspension of elections and the dramatic closure, in October last
year, of the local Stormont assembly itself including the dissolution
of the executive amid a mass police raid on the parliamentary offices
of Sinn Fein.

The Good Friday agreement, signed five years ago, was presented as
Britain withdrawing gracefully from the direct rule of its colony in
the North of Ireland, handing over to a process of co-operation
between local politicians and between the colonial structure in the
North and the formally independent Southern state. In practice the
British kept appearing from behind the comic-opera façade of the
Stormont assembly to make further demands on the republican leadership
and giving further concessions to their local supporters in the
Unionist party, who demanded redefinition of the terms of the Good
Friday Agreement.

The move to suspend and collapse the local structures make it crystal
clear that all the claims of a new democratic dispensation in Ireland
are false and that the old colonial structures, supported by religious
sectarianism, remain in place. Just how comic-opera the Good Friday
structures are is indicated by the fact that over 100 elected
representatives and a full cabinet representing all the major local
parties were needed to rule just under 1.5 million people - and were
replaced in an instant by three British labour party backbenchers!

But the April events do not represent the collapse of the Good Friday
agreement. That collapsed finally with the collapse of the executive.
They represent something much more significant - the stillborn death
of Good Friday mark two. This collapsed before it was launched,
despite the personal involvement of George Bush and Tony Blair and
despite repeated, and ever more desperate, attempts by the republican
leadership to indicate its total support for the new state
institutions and willingness to disband the IRA. The fact of this
collapse led Lord Kilcooney, aka John Taylor, notorious weathervane of
the unionist leadership, to predict that it would be a generation
before a new Stormont assembly would reconvene.

Sectarian privilege

It was the same Lord Kilcooney who pointed out the fatal flaw in the
original deal, signed 5 years ago. This agreement, drawn up by the
British and the Dublin government, saw the Irish bourgeoisie follow an
earlier de facto recognition of the Northern colony with a de jure
recognition. A few cosmetic all-Ireland committees were draped around
this legal shift and the nationalists were promised places in a
power-sharing coalition in a new local parliament. British rule in
Ireland was to continue, sectarianism was to continue. The major shift
was that nationalists, completely excluded from political power in the
old Stormont regime preceding the troubles, were to have their share
of sectarian privilege. The republicans, militarily at a dead end and
moving towards a more right-wing and nationalist orientation decided
to support this and claim victory.

Kilcooney remarked dryly that the Unionists were willing to share
power in a revamped Northern colony but of course, he went on, it
could not be equal amounts of power. The point was unanswerable. There
really is no point to sectarianism if it is to be an equality of
sectarian privilege.

The British pinned their hopes on 'moderate' middle class unionism led
rather unconvincingly by the arch-bigot David Trimble. The problem
here was that the Trimble wing never had a programme of reaching an
accommodation with nationalism. Their argument was that it was through
the structures of the GFA that they would best be able to defend their
sectarian privileges, either totally crushing and humiliating the
republicans and/or forcing them from the government. The republicans
were well aware of Trimble's position, but believed that the British
would punish the unionists if they broke the structures of the
agreement. In any case they believed that the nationalist family of
the Irish capitalist parties and of Irish America would hold the
British to their word.

The British saw things differently. If the North was to remain a
colony to ensure capitalist stability in Ireland., it would need to
continue to base itself on sectarian privilege and on a mass unionist
base. Their job was to placate unionism - by bending the agreement to
the right and even to the extent of turning a blind eye to open
campaigns of sectarian intimidation by loyalist paramilitaries. The
unionists demanded, and got, the destruction of IRA weapons by the
republican leadership. All this did was to embolden the even more
reactionary forces to the right of Trimble. It became clear that only
the public and unconditional surrender of the IRA and its immediate
disbandment would save the agreement. In the absence of this the
agreement collapsed.

The British role

However the nature of the collapse indicated that the republican
analysis and republican strategy had collapsed also.

Good Friday mark one failed because of Unionist protest at allegations
of continued IRA activity - mostly intelligence gathering. In fact
this activity did not break the terms of the Good Friday agreement,
based on an IRA ceasefire. These ceasefire activities kept the IRA
ticking over and helped prevent discontent, but had absolutely no
political significance. Given the level of penetration by British
intelligence and, more importantly, the abandonment of the republican
programme by the leadership, there was absolutely no prospect of that
activity leading to a new conflict.

The Unionist protests were in fact simply cynical ploys to add a new
element to the agreement - the demand for disbandment. They lacked any
moral dimension. At the same time that they demanded IRA disbandment
the Trimble group were part of an organisation called the Loyalist
commission. Its task was to provide political cover for armed
sectarian attacks by the Loyalist groups.

The big shock to Republican strategy was the British response. The
police raid on Sinn Fein's parliamentary offices kicked away the
illusions of a parliamentary democracy with the same efficiency as a
few careless kicks demolish a sandcastle. It served dramatic notice
that the British would not negate their history in Ireland and
suddenly play a progressive role, that the British supported Unionist
demands, that Sinn Fein would have to do a great deal more if they
wanted to preserve the pretence of power and that the demand for IRA
disbandment would be the starting point for future negotiations to
establish a new agreement. In a visit to Belfast Tony Blair spelt it
all out. The promises of the Good Friday agreement, supposedly set in
stone, were now conditional on the unconditional surrender of the
republicans. The final blow came when Sinn Fein's friends in the
nationalist parties North and South and their friends in Washington
all lined up to lash out and demand capitulation.

GFA mark 2 fails

Sinn Fein offered no resistance. The period from October to March was
spent in carefully crafting these conditions. The collapse of the
negotiations at least allows the Irish working class to see the nature
of the deal. At their centre was to be an IRA declaration that they
would surrender arms, run down background activities and were moving
towards disbandment and that Sinn Fein would unambiguously support the
structures of the new state by joining the Policing Board. In case
this was not enough Dublin and London would establish a commission
that would oversee the winding down of the IRA and punish Sinn Fein if
the military wing showed any sign of activity.

At first this was described as a 'deal breaker' by Sinn Fein but like
so many other republican positions this was quietly dropped. The
reward, spelt out in a joint declaration by London and Dublin, would
be a reduction in military levels. Some border watchtowers would be
demolished, and the British army would be reduced to 'only' 5000
soldiers and 14 bases - subject of course to their being absolutely no
resistance. The sectarian colonial structures at Stormont would be
re-established, repressive legislation would be redrafted - not to
meet human rights demands but to allow nationalist influence on
various boards and quangos. There would be some further pretence at
cosmetic reform of the police and that a small number of 'On the
Runs' - republicans still wanted by the British - would be allowed to
return home under extraordinarily humiliating circumstances. They
would be tried by a commission on the allegations put forward at the
time they left, a sentence would be imposed and they would then be
released on licence - subject to imprisonment at the whim of the
British administration.

There were however some worrying signs. A first attempt to make the
deal at a summit led by Blair and Irish Taoiseach Bertie Aherne ended
in disarray when the Unionist parties walked out. The final deal was
crafted, only to be torn away from the fingernails of the Sinn Fein
leadership as they made lunge after desperate lunge to meet British
terms.

The republicans were told that the IRA statement, carefully worded so
that it would read surrender to the British and yet be sold to the
republican base, was insufficient and unclear. Desperately Gerry Adams
stepped forward to provide that clarity - that is to define the terms
of surrender in words provided by the British. The British responded
by declaring that this was real progress - if only Gerry had used the
word 'will' instead of 'should'. Adams provided the missing word, but
this was not enough. It was now necessary to list in detail all the
activities that the republicans would now abjure. "What part of
absolutely no activity do you not understand?", asked Adams. But by
now it was clear that no words would be enough.

The reality that had now dawned was that the unionist opposition to
sharing power with Sinn Fein was absolute. There were no conditions to
meet because there were no conditions under which the Trimble wing of
unionism could enter elections and propose a coalition government with
Sinn Fein that would not lead to his defeat and a large majority for
anti-agreement forces in his own party and for the rejectionist, and
even more bigoted, Paisleyite Democratic Unionist Party. Even bearing
Gerry Adam's head on a spike, Trimble was bound to be defeated. The
Unionists would not share power with Sinn Fein and even hints that
they would share power with nationalists if Sinn Fein were excluded
seemed distinctly shaky.

Under these conditions the British role became what it was in the fall
of GFA 1 - to pull the plug, defend unionism and condemn the
republicans for not giving enough.

Back to the drawing board

However this is not a re-run of the October collapse. This is not yet
another suspension of the cardboard executive or postponement of the
elections and no amended GFA 3 waits in the wings. The indefinite
postponement of the elections in the North is in fact their
cancellation. With the elections goes much of the structure and
political content of the Good Friday Agreement. There will be no
Autumn election because the agreement itself contains provision for a
review that must take place then. After 5 years, surrounded by the
ruins of GFA 1 and GFA 2, the review will inevitably become
negotiation for a completely new settlement.

The outline of that settlement should be clear. Good Friday has fallen
twice to the right under the weight of Unionist bigotry. On both
occasions the British have provided cover and blamed republicanism.
Irish nationalism and US imperialism stand foursquare with Britain.
Britain will chair the new negotiations and set the agenda. Only one
conclusion is possible. The weakness of the Good Friday Agreement was
that it was too radical! It gave nothing to Irish democracy, but that
nothing was too much! Any new arrangement must shift away from
coalition structures. There may be a greater shift of power towards
direct British patronage and appointed committees, where the Unionists
are better able to ensure that they maintain the lions share of
sectarian privilege. The republicans will be made an offer they can't
refuse - a more humiliating surrender and less reward for it. To some
extent that shift has already begun. The British are going ahead with
a promise to dismantle a few watchtowers in South Armagh that they no
longer need. There are behind the scenes talks about the legislation
involving 'On the Runs'. The British will press the republicans to
give full support to the new police and join the Policing Board.

The most immediate sufferers will be the republicans. The British can
continue to reward them but they cannot give them the rewards they
really need. Only parliamentary seats and ministerial positions in the
North can hide the absolute collapse of their strategy of reform and
give momentum to the only tactic they have left - to use their
Northern electoral success to propel themselves to greater electoral
success in the formally independent
26 counties. In any case the 'Stakeknife' story of a high-level
informer in the IRA leadership shows that conditions are now much more
hostile for the republicans.

However the outlook in the longer term is ominous for the British.
Negotiating a new agreement and making it work will depend on a
capitulation to unionist sectarianism by the nationalists that will be
difficult to sell. A settlement, if it is established at all, will
depend for its operation on the absence of any largescale resistance.
No amount of bribery seems sufficient to keep the thugs in the various
loyalist groups at bay.

********************************************

JD --As an analysis the above is devastatingly accurate. But the
statement ends with a prognosis which seems a bit disarticulated from
the analysis [hence my comments in square brackets]:

However the outlook in the longer term is ominous for the British.
[What the hell does that mean? Westminster is going to come to some
harm?] Negotiating a new agreement and making it work will depend on a
capitulation to unionist sectarianism by the nationalists that will be
difficult to sell. [It is not a question of the British and the
loyalists' selling, but of their making an offer that can't be
refused.] A settlement, if it is established at all, will depend for
its operation on the absence of any largescale[effective] resistance.
[What are the chances of that?] No amount of bribery seems sufficient
to keep the thugs in the various loyalist groups at bay. [Who's
trying?]

*********************************

Two questions to Philip, and the second also to Michael Keaney.
1.  Where are the "ordinary Prods" who are not an enemy to
Republicans?
2.  When is Britain going to "exit" and leave behind a united Ireland?

Notes to questions.
1) Remember Trimble's sneer when Adams and McGuinness took their rooms
in Westminster: "How are they going to sell that as a step towards a
united Ireland?"

2) Danny Morrison's approach may be oriented too much to military
rather than political thinking, hence his analysis that Britain is
trying to turn what was a military stalemate into a surrender by the
IRA.  But Philip's dismissal of his complaint is too cavalier.
Britain has allowed the loyalists -- I make no distinction between the
ex-Vanguard (UDA front) Trimble, hero of (as his Medal spelled it) the
* Seige * of Drumcree (Portadown's Garvaghy Road) and other unionist
thugs -- to redefine the situation from being a peace process to being
a choice of Cabinet by a "democratic" First Minister (forgetting that
the "majority (one-party) rule" six county entity was set up by
violence).  This degeneration was not politically a priori inevitable
or even predictable, in the way Philip claims.  But it was in fact
built into the disgraceful approach of Tony Blair who lied to the
British House of Commons when he sold the agreement by giving an
undertaking that the Republicans would have to disarm before joining
the executive (which was not part of the agreement).  Interviewed the
day after the all-night session in which the agreement was signed the
cowardly bully revealed which side he was on when he said " It was
exhausting.  I said to Gerry Adams 'You're not leaving this building
until you sign that document!' "

3) Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/northern_ireland/2983040.stm
Published: 2003/06/11 20:16:05 GMTBBC Report : Ahern meets with
loyalist body

*A meeting between the Loyalist Commission and the Irish Prime
Minister Bertie Ahern has been described as a "useful building
exercise". * The taoiseach met members of the commission, which was
set up to provide political analysis for the paramilitary groups and
includes members of the main loyalist paramilitary groups, unionist
politicians and the clergy, at an undisclosed location in Dublin. The
Church of Ireland primate Robin Eames arranged and attended
Wednesday's talks. An Irish Government spokesperson said there had
been a "frank exchange of views". In a statement, Mr Ahern said the
Irish Government was determined to develop its relations with loyalism
and unionism. He reiterated that both governments had made it clear
that all ongoing paramilitary activity had to stop. Mr Ahern referred
to what he called the "economic and social circumstances of a number
of loyalist areas" and said that measures to support community
development in those areas is something that deserved support and
required more attention.

Meanwhile, the Progressive Unionist Party has rejected the British and
Irish Governments' Joint Declaration to advance the Northern Ireland
political process.

'Unacceptable surrender'

A delegation led by party leader David Ervine expressed its view to
the government during a meeting with the Secretary of State Paul
Murphy on Wednesday. As a party closely linked to the loyalist Ulster
Volunteer Force, the PUP are concerned about the implications of the
government's plan to set up a monitoring body to oversee paramilitary
activity in the province. During Wednesday's meeting with Mr Murphy,
the party raised concerns about Irish involvement in triggering any
complaint to the body. Mr Ervine argued that it was "an unacceptable
surrender of UK sovereignty". "There is a serious suggestion of
removal of at least one item of sovereignty for inclusion to the Irish
Government," he said. "That is unacceptable, it is not for
negotiation. "The British Government are inclined to want monitors
almost to abdicate the responsibility that is their own. "They are the
sovereign government and they should behave as a sovereign government
and under no circumstances hive off to any other authority the
responsibility of ensuring that elements of the law in Northern
Ireland are open to UK citizens."

The former deputy leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Lord
Kilclooney, has also expressed his opposition to Irish involvement in
the proposed monitoring body. Lord Kilclooney said the monitoring body
proposal would let Dublin "put its toe through the door of the
Stormont Assembly".

It is a line of argument very similar to that being advanced by Lagan
Valley MP Jeffrey Donaldson. The anti-Agreement Ulster Unionist has
threatened to quit the party unless the governments' proposals are
rejected at an emergency meeting of the party's ruling council next
week. The joint declaration was given to the parties in March in an
attempt to move the political process forward in Northern Ireland. The
document included five annexes dealing with security normalisation,
policing and justice, human rights and equality, on-the-run
paramilitaries and mechanisms to verify and monitor any deal. Northern
Ireland's devolved administration was suspended last October amid
allegations of IRA intelligence gathering in the Stormont government.

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