Post-Iraq, is Beijing turning on N Korea?

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

China: Fed Up With North Korea?

By David M. Lampton

Wednesday, June 4, 2003 Washington Post; Page A27

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10491-2003Jun3?language=prin
ter

President Bush's just-concluded meeting with Chinese President Hu
Jintao
in Evian, France, came at a critical juncture in the U.S. effort to
build a multilateral coalition to deal with North Korea's drive for
nuclear weapons. Hu's cautious yet constructive stance in Evian shows
that Beijing is angry at North Korea for precipitating a crisis and
fearful of what war or breakdown in that country could mean for China.

What a difference a few months make. Last November, after personally
hearing what several of China's most senior leaders had to say about
the
North Korean nuclear program and U.S. policy, I felt that Beijing was
unduly complacent. Today, China is nearly apoplectic about Kim Jong
Il's
behavior. Chinese leaders already have increased cooperation with
Washington and are debating the merits of still more extensive
cooperation.

Six months ago, China's most senior leaders seemed concerned but not
alarmed by North Korea's stated nuclear intentions. The formulation
they
employed was that they "preferred" not to see a nuclear North Korea --
a
far cry from the American bottom line that such capabilities were
absolutely unacceptable. The general Chinese line was that Kim
probably
was bluffing, that U.S. intelligence might not be accurate and that
China had an overriding interest in peace and stability along its
borders. Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans streaming into
northern
China, fleeing war or societal collapse induced by U.S. pressure, was
what Beijing feared. (One can speculate, too, that Beijing was
preoccupied with its leadership transition.)

But in March China sent its most senior diplomat, Qian Qichen, to
Pyongyang to deliver the message that North Korea was to knock off its
gratuitous provocations and start talking to Washington. Reinforcing
the
point, Beijing interrupted the flow of oil to dependent, hungry and
cold
North Korea. Shortly thereafter the North Koreans agreed to meet in
Beijing with Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly.

Since that disquieting April meeting, a stream of knowledgeable
Chinese
has been coming to Washington to let it be known that Beijing is
thinking outside the previous box. Among the more tantalizing though
not
yet mainstream suggestions is that "regime change" in Pyongyang might
be
the least of a multitude of evils.

What accounts for Beijing's hardening attitude? Quite simply, North
Korea has jeopardized fundamental Chinese interests. And this comes on
top of a list of grievances extending back a half-century -- all of
which makes for a situation in which Beijing has had it with Kim.

The extent of the threat to Chinese interests became evident in the
April meeting in Beijing among China, the United States and North
Korea.
There, North Korea asserted that it had nuclear weapons and said it
might conduct a "physical demonstration" or export them. The threat of
export was off the charts for both the Americans and Chinese. This
jolted and embarrassed Beijing. As one Chinese visitor put it to me
recently, "North Korea really is a rogue nation! . . . They might sell
[nuclear material] even to the Hui," a minority people often accused
of
"separatism" in western China. "They are a destabilizing force in all
Northeast Asia."

For the first time the Chinese apparently see that they could be the
victims of proliferation. Further, nuclear proliferation around
China's
borders likely wouldn't stop with Pyongyang. It would spread to South
Korea, then possibly Japan, and perhaps Taiwan. China would face
nuclear
regimes at all points of the compass.

Moreover, China's trade and economic interests with South Korea far
exceed those with North Korea. While North Korea sucks up about
one-third of China's foreign aid budget, Seoul is a major direct
investor in China. Finally, a principal Chinese objective is to avoid
destabilizing friction with the United States; Beijing understands
that
Washington is deadly serious about the North Korean nuclear problem.

Chinese anger at Pyongyang is exacerbated by a long, unhappy history.
It
starts with the North Korean effort to obscure China's role in saving
the regime in the Korean War, proceeds to North Korea's execution of
cadres thought to have links with China and moves on to its lies to
Beijing about its nuclear ties to Moscow in the 1970s and its 1998
missile test over Japan, which sparked Tokyo's cooperation with
Washington on missile defense. The sad tale concludes with anger that
Pyongyang proceeded to establish a special economic zone near China's
border despite Beijing's explicit opposition.

China's North Korea policy is under strenuous debate and remains
unsettled. Nonetheless, the range of things Beijing is considering is
striking, including ratcheting up economic pressure on the North.
Beyond
the aforementioned discussion of "regime change," some Chinese also
are
rethinking how many refugees they might be able to accommodate. Even
some in the military, an organization in which affinity for Pyongyang
seems to run deepest, are wondering how far to go in supporting North
Korea.

Though no responsible Chinese wants a war in North Korea, China might
end up sitting on the sidelines if conflict breaks out, much as it did
during the U.S. invasion of Iraq -- as long as Chinese security
interests in the post-conflict situation are respected.

What does Washington need to do to see Chinese policy move in a more
supportive direction? First, U.S. policy must have Japanese and South
Korean support. It needs to hold out the possibility of cooperation
with
Pyongyang if the North moves in a positive direction, as well as the
certainty of negative outcomes should the North continue on its
present
course. Beijing will not get out ahead of South Korea and Japan.
Second,
through talks with North Korea, Washington must establish for all to
see
whether Kim Jong Il will trade his nuclear programs for the regime's
future security and a more normal relationship with the international
community.

The writer is director of China studies at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies and at the Nixon Center.

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