An alternative to war with Iran?

["Fred Feldman" <ffeldman@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The following item, which follows my comments, was sent to me by John
Enyang.

It is very interesting to note the awareness of some proimperialist
analysts that Iran represents a MUCH tougher nut to crack militarily
and politically than Saddam's regime, because of the character and
consequences of the 1979 revolution. Many of these consequences are
still in existence.  Even though a bourgeois repression and
stabilization have taken place in Iran, the counter-revolution has
been far less complete that the crushing defeats, depoliticization,
demoralization and disorganization of lthe Iraqi masses by the
Baathist regime.

Still Washington seems to be preparing an Iraq-style military assault
on Iran -- though perhaps this will be limited at first to attempting
to seize the oil producing Arab area of Khuzistan, and fostering
opposition to the regime in Kurdistan.  Reliance on relatively popular
antigovernment forces in Azerbaijan or Kurdistan, or on the
democratic-rights protestors in the cities and campuses has the same
problem that the proposals to rely on the Kurds and Shiites had in the
war drive against Iraq.  It does not open the road to decisively
overturning the gains of the anti-imperialist revolution and
decisively shifting the structure of social relations in favor of US
imperialism. And such radical shifts seem to be the objectives of  US
(not just Bush) policy in the Middle East.

That is why Bush Sr. backed Saddam against the Kurds and Shiites after
the Gulf War, once the US rulers had decided that a march on Baghdad
was too risky at that point.  The conflict with the Shiites today in
Iraq, and the conflict with the Kurdish people that lies ahead if and
when the occupation is consolidated in the rest of Iraq, indicates
that Bush Sr. was on the right track from the imperialist point of
view.  The fact that only the disintegration and capitulation of
Saddam's forces in the Baghdad area put a stop to the military
resistance in the Shiite regions shows that Bush Jr. did not follow a
different course in pursuing the war against Iraq to its present
conclusion.

Will the forces Beeman is looking to back the imposition of a reliable
U.S. client regime in Iraq, which cannot be done without U.S. military
backing?  Time will tell, but it is important to remember that the
Iraqi invasion of Iran was opposed by the masses in Arab Khuzistan,
the Iranian Kurds, and the people of Iranian Azerbaijan, despite
expectations to the contrary in Washington, Paris and Baghdad, and
despite the brutal repressions of the Khomeini regime. Sandra Mackey's
The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation presents some
interesting historical arguments to support her view that Iran is more
integrated nationally than many other semicolonial countries (aside
from the Kurds, of course), even though there is real national
oppression by the Persian bourgeoisie and real national conflicts.
Pro-indepependence forces were not strong in Azerbaijan during the
revolution or afterwards.  Ayatollah Shariatmadari identified himself
with the broader liberal democratic opposition in the country, never
suggested independence, and supported Iran against Iraq.

I also question the attractiveness of ex-Soviet Azerbaijan to Iranian
Azerbaijanis.  The decadence, corruption, and antidemocratic character
of the Stalinist-origin regime, and their growing subordination to US
imperialism makes the Aliyev regime a poor model for the aspirations
of Iranian Azerbaijanis.  Frankly, I think that Iranian Azerbaijan
probably exercises a stronger political pull on the ex-Soviet area
than the other way around.  There were indications of this in the
mobilizations that occurred on the ex-Spvoiet side at the time of the
collapse of the Soviet Union.

I really appreciate getting this kind of information.
Fred Feldman





Fred,

Following your comments on Iran, you may be interested to read this.

je


http://www.dailystar.com.lb/opinion/07_06_03_c.asp

Rumblings afoot in  Azerbaijan

Washington officials continue to look for a way to dislodge the
clerical
leadership of Irans Islamic Republic. The latest ploy may be to
inflame
passions in the most politically active part of Iran-Azerbaijan.
Administration officials have been meeting quietly with Mahmoud Ali
Chehregani, who heads the Southern Azerbaijan National Awakeness
Movement
which is operating inside Iran. Although, according to the Washington
Times, defense officials emphasized their meetings were not aimed at
supporting or encouraging a change in Irans government, it is hard to
believe such an assertion.

It is now no secret that the Bush administration would like to see
regime
change in Iran. However, military planners know that an Iraq-style
invasion could not win in a military conflict with Iranian troops.
Therefore the most satisfactory strategy for the White House hawks
will be
to try to find an indigenous resistance movement and provide it with
financial, possibly logistical, support and hope for the best.
Chehregani seems ideal. He is an academic (a linguist), and a
charismatic
figure. He was a popular Parliament representative from Azerbaijan,
elected with 600,000 votes. He was imprisoned three years ago for his
strong protests against the Islamic regime, but freed with the help of
Amnesty International and a letter from UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan.

More important, he espouses a secular, democratic government for Iran.
Azerbaijan is fertile ground for a new Iranian political movement. It
has
traditionally been the part of Iran with the loosest connections to
Tehran. Although culturally Iranian, the majority of its population
speaks
Azeri - a Turkic language. Armenian, Assyrian and Kurdish communities
make
up significant minority populations in the region

Over the past century, four major anti-government movements have begun
from Azerbaijan, starting with Irans constitutional revolution in
1905.
Azerbaijanis also claim to have started the Islamic revolution of
1978-9.
Its independent spirit was exploited by the Soviet Union immediately
after
World War II. Azerbaijanis also tried to set up an independent Peoples
Republic of Azerbaijan in 1945. For a short period, they succeeded.
Then
the Soviet Union tried to convert it into a communist republic. The
United
States intervened at that time, and the Iranian state took the
extraordinary measure of using the World Court in the Hague to get the
Soviets to withdraw.

Ever since this period, the Iranian central state has kept a wary eye
on
the Azerbaijanis. Under the shah, publication in Azeri and other
minority
languages was repressed, and although there has been some relaxation
of
this policy, publication and school instruction in Azeri is
discouraged.

Under the Islamic Republic, chief resistance to the form of government
espoused by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was Ayatollah Shariatmadari,
who
had extensive support in Azerbaijan. When Khomeini held a referendum
on
the kind of government Iranians were to choose, he gave voters only
one
choice: an Islamic republic with the chief Ayatollah as head.
Shariatmadari lobbied for wider choice, and his followers rioted and
occupied the Tabriz radio station. Eventually, Shariatmadari was
arrested
and stripped of his religious credentials, leaving Azerbaijanis deeply
resentful of this action.

The idea of independence for Azerbaijan is still alive. Chehregani was
welcomed warmly in the former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. It is
known
that the citizens of that country would welcome reunification with
Iranian
Azerbaijan, something the Iranians do not favor.

Chehregani has also espoused a government for Iran that would be a
federation, somewhat like the United States or Germany, where
individual
states would have a degree of autonomy.

Still, President Aliyev of the Republic of Azerbaijan is 80 years old
and
in poor health. He collapsed suddenly on June 3. Although few people
expect much change in that nation upon his passing (his son is being
groomed for the presidency), one never knows.

The United States is interested in the developments in Azerbaijan not
only
because of the possibility of launching regime change from an Azeri
platform, but because of something much more important - oil.
Azerbaijan lies just between the great Caspian oil fields, and the oil
fields of northern Iraq. The transport of Caspian oil is one of the
great
economic puzzles of modern times. If Iranian Azerbaijan were to take a
sharp turn toward the United States, a new pipeline linking the
Caspian
fields with the Iraqi oil delivery system would be constructed in a
trice.

The schemes for transforming Iran now seem to be proliferating: using
the
Mujahideen Khalq (the anti-Iranian government terrorist group in
Iraq),
restoring the monarchy, direct military intervention. With so many
plans
in play, can anyone doubt that one of them, at least, will eventually
be
activated? Stay tuned.

William O. Beeman (William_beeman@xxxxxxxxx) teaches anthropology and
is
director of Middle East Studies at Brown University. He is author of
Language, Status and Power in Iran, and two forthcoming books: Double
Demons: Cultural Impediments to US-Iranian Understanding; and Iraq:
State
in Search of a Nation.