Re: The Longest Supply Lines

["lvnadal" <lvnadal@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

From: "LaSainte" :   It seems to me that even if significantly more U.S.
troops were freed up
> from other duties (such as combat) to protect the supply convoys from
Iraqi
> attack there still would be a problem of getting sufficient supplies to
the
> U.S. combatants because the additional guards also have to eat .....

_________________________________

If I may....

This question is a vital question in that it is a reflection of the key
logistical/combat question:  how much support does it take to keep a soldier
in combat-- or a "tush in the bush," "ass in the grass."    During  Vietnam,
that number was estimated at 10:1, a tremendous demand on both combat and
logistical teams.  I don't know what the current estimate is.

In my experience supply convoys were not per se equipped with fixed ratios
of combat "guards," rather secure movement depended on previously securing
the territory on either flank of the supply line itself and creating forward
logistical bases to feed the advance elements of the battle groups.

The US, in neglecting this preparatory work, calculated a blitz to Baghdad
with relatively little resistance, but surrender and embrace from the Iraqi
population. Sherman would puke if he read the JCS plan of battle.

Secure flanks were supposed to be the grateful gift from the Iraqi
population.  Surprise!

And one more thing-- it is impossible to resupply as full strength
mechanized division in sustained combat operations solely by air.  Not even
the US could lift that much.

You might recall several months ago when the US floated a story about
dropping 50,000 airborne troops into the area around Baghdad.  Had to laugh.
That drop alone of that many troops would have taken a solid 7 days/24 hours
a day to accomplish.  Sure would have hated to be in that first hour of
drop.  Took them 8 hours to drop 1000 of the 173rd the other day, into a
non-combat area.


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