Re: Timor

["Clinton Fernandes" <cfer@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

The Indonesian military insisted (as did Mr O'Lincoln) that there be no
Australian intervention.  So did the Spartacists.  Are these interesting
bedfellows - the TNI, O'Lincoln and the Spartacists - guilty by association?

Just because some Australian Marxists - and an overwhelming majority of the
Australian and East Timorese populations - took a view similar to
Ramos-Horta on one issue, they are not hitched to his gravy train in
perpetuity.

When the Timorese were pleading for foreign intervention, it was distasteful
to see people opposing their pleas from the comfort of Sydney and Melbourne.
Those who opposed the deployment of troops to East Timor would have more
credibility if they opposed it while living in East Timor, facing impending
annihilation by the TNI.  Then, their denunciations of "Australian
imperialism" would sound convincing - as well as make memorable last words.

The Australian public that demanded an end to the suffering of the East
Timorese is also opposed to a war against Iraq.  They can distinguish
between the two, even if Mr O'Lincoln cannot.

Mr O'Lincoln's asserts that the Australian ruling class "decided a direct
intervention was needed to stabilise East Timor".  He provides no evidence
for this assertion.

The fact is that Howard was panicked into lobbying the US for diplomatic
cover by the sheer size and intensity of public outrage.  Evidence follows.

1.  On 7 September, when the burning of Dili was already underway, the
Australian government established the East Timor Policy Unit within
Australian Defence Headquarters.  It was headed by Mike Scrafton,
Director-General Regional Engagement Policy and Programs in International
Policy Division of ADHQ.    Its role was to provide political-military
guidance and policy support to the Minister for Defence and the Defence
Executive.  The hurry with which it was set up is best illustrated by the
fact that it did not have a room of its own to meet in; it was set up in a
temporary conference room, and required external infrastructure to function
(See Dr. Alan Ryan's studies of the period).

2.  The Performance Audit into the Management of ADF Deployments to East
Timor concluded that Defence 'could not provide evidence that formal
planning for [a multilateral operation] began until later in 1999
(Australian National Audit Office 2002:28) . Defence faced a number of
constraints.  The main ones were:

The actual nature and size of the military operations to be undertaken were
not clear until shortly before deployment.

The number, size and force capability to be provided, and the support
required, by the non-Australian troop contributing nations were not known
until after the deployment had started.

International considerations and concerns regarding the security of
classified information in Defence constrained the distribution of
information required by functional areas for detailed planning and
anticipatory action before the military deployment. (ANAO 2002:34)

3.  The Post Operations Report by HQ INTERFET hinted at the problems
encountered by military planners: The constraints in Defence's planning
effort 'caused almost a reverse planning sequence where the tactical and
operational levels were forced to plan with limited strategic guidance' (HQ
INTERFET Post Operations Report 2000).

4.  More strategic guidance was not forthcoming until as late as 17
September (only three days before troops went in), when the
interdepartmental East Timor Policy Group was formed (DFAT's publication "An
Australian Policy Challenge": 142-3).  Known as the Taylor Committee, after
its chairman, it coordinated whole-of-government advice to the Government on
East Timor.

5.  The Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Air Marshal Doug Riding was
dispatched on an emergency trip through South East Asia from 14 to 18
September to solicit troop contributions from regional forces.  As Ryan
remarks, this trip 'occurred in a vacuum'; the UN Security Council met in
the evening and early morning of 14-15 September 1999 and Riding was in
Malaysia when Resolution 1264 was agreed to.  Thus, 'it was not at all clear
what form the command structure of INTERFET would take' (Ryan 2000:42).

6.  The Australian government's initial reaction to the Indonesian campaign
of state-sponsored terror was surprise and paralysis.

7.  The immediate US reaction to the ethnic cleansing campaign was that it
was not contemplating military intervention.  It signalled the Indonesians
that there would not be any meaningful US opposition to their actions in
East Timor, although they would need to act quickly to take the heat out of
the issue.

a.  US Ambassador to Indonesia, Stapleton Roy met President Habibie but said
that 'the topic of armed peacekeepers was not discussed':

That was not the purpose of our discussion.  It was to explore any ideas
that could be helpful.  We were not there to make a proposal for armed
peacekeepers.  We were there to explore how to assist Indonesia with its
responsibility to maintain a good security environment there and how the
international community could be more helpful. (Bronwyn Curran, 'Timor
Peacekeeping', Voice of America, 5 Sep 99, 1116 hrs LOC/1516 UTC, #2-253475)

b.  At the regular Pentagon briefing on 7 September 1999, spokesman Kenneth
Bacon talked about 'regrettable and unfortunate problems in East Timor'.  He
said that the US position was clear: 'We are going to continue to encourage
the Indonesian authorities to provide security.  Second, we are going to
await the report of the UN survey team, and when we have that information in
hand, we'll decide what to do'. (Susan Ellis, 'US expects Indonesia to
protect people of East Timor', USIS Washington File, US Information Agency,
7 Sep 99.)

c.  National Security Adviser Sandy Berger also signalled the Indonesians
that although they had to wind up operations quickly, the US would not
intervene:

My daughter has a very messy apartment up in college, maybe I shouldn't
intervene to have that cleaned up.  I don't think anybody ever articulated a
doctrine which said that we ought to intervene wherever there's a
humanitarian problem.

8.  The Australian public was outraged at what it saw and demanded
intervention to save the East Timorese.  Kerry Myers, Letters Editor at the
Sydney Morning Herald, noted that the public response 'was quite
overwhelming:

Readers were shocked, angered, saddened, appalled by the terrible, terrible
story. But what was almost palpable was the frustration and impotence
expressed by so many.  Correspondents wanted something, anything, done to
relieve the suffering they were exposed to through daily news reports from
Dili.  And there appeared nothing much they could do at all.  Letters
attacked the government, specifically the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister, for what the writers saw as hand-wringing inaction. And as the
week wore on there was the chilling realisation that there was to be no
rescue for the East Timorese.

9.  Downer recalled that 'people were ringing up, crying over the phone, we
had more calls on that issue than I've ever had in my life on anything'
(Greenlees and Garran 2002:245).

10.  The public was doing much more than 'ringing up' and 'crying over the
phone'; the union movement swung into action, dramatically increasing the
pressure on the government.  See http://workers.labor.net.au/31/  for
example.

11.  Realising for the first time the seriousness of its own position in the
electorate, the government finally did what it could have done months ago -
work with the US to exert pressure on Indonesia to allow peacekeepers in.
Contrary to its earlier claims, four days of diplomatic pressure is all it
took for Indonesia to agree to foreign troops.  The earlier US stance was
based on its calculation that it 'must put its relationship with Indonesia,
a mineral-rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concern
over the political fate of East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of
800,000 people that is seeking independence'.  The public bitterness and
official dismay at the reluctance of the US to respond to Australian
requests meant that a reappraisal of the relationship would be inevitable
unless something was done.  Warned that the alliance was in jeopardy, the
Clinton administration acted swiftly.  As a senior official said, "We don't
have a dog running in the East Timor race, but we have a very big dog
running down there called Australia and we have to support it" (Peter
Hartcher in the Australian Financial Review).

12.  Wednesday 8 September 1999 was the day that serious diplomatic
initiatives began.  The Clinton cabinet made an in-principle decision to
support a peace-keeping operation.  To that end, its official pronouncements
on the East Timor situation carried a hint of menace towards Indonesia.

a.  Defence Secretary William Cohen warned that 'the international community
has a number of levers we can pull on.  There are serious economic
consequences to be sure'.

b.  State Department spokesman James Rubin also reminded his audience that:

Indonesia's relations with the international community, including the United
States, are at risk here... we do spend tens of millions of dollars on
economic development directly with the Indonesian Government and, obviously,
the Indonesian government receives substantial billions of dollars in
support pursuant to an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. The
International Monetary Fund has indicated it is closely monitoring the
situation in East Timor. (US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing #
118, 8 Sep 99, 12:37 pm.)

c.  Aware of the power of the TNI, the US leadership ensured that its
messages went to the right address.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Hugh Shelton telephoned Wiranto several times during the week
after the announcement of the referendum result.  The message was also
delivered in person - Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-In-Chief of the US
forces in the Pacific, spoke to General Wiranto in Jakarta on 8 September
1999.   Greenlees and Garran (2002: 243-244), quoting Admiral Blair, do not
'characterize what went on', but Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering
revealed that Blair informed Wiranto that the US was suspending its military
ties with Indonesia. (Statement by Under-Secretary of State Thomas Pickering
to the US Congress, reported by Paul Wolfson, Voice of America, 9 Sep 99, #
2-253673, 1734 LOC/2134 UTC.)
13.  For the Australian government, the coincidental timing of the APEC
meeting in Auckland was crucial.  Scheduled for the weekend of 11-12
September 1999, it allowed for intensive lobbying of the US President, who
would be attending.  In days leading up to the APEC meeting, the US's
warnings became unmistakable.

a.  On 9 September, just before leaving for New Zealand, Clinton warned that
'if Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite - it must invite -
the international community to assist in restoring security'... it would be
a pity if the Indonesian recovery were crashed by this'.  (Bill Clinton,
Statement on East Timor, 9 September 1999.  Emphasis in the original).
Later, in a refueling stop at Hickham Air Force Base in Hawaii, he was
briefed on the East Timor situation by Admiral Dennis Blair, who had
recently met Wiranto.  Then, while aboard Air Force One en route to
Auckland, Clinton issued his strongest statement yet, accusing the TNI of
direct involvement: 'It is clear the Indonesian military is aiding and
abetting the militia violence. This is simply unacceptable'.

b.  The TNI could read the writing on the wall.  In a visit to Dili on 11
September, Wiranto acknowledged as much when he said, "We cannot rule out
the possibility of accelerating the arrival of the peace-keeping force".

14.  Finally, in an emergency debate in the UN Security Council on 12
September 1999, US envoy Richard Holbrooke warned Indonesia that it faced
'the point of no return in international relations' if it did not accept an
international peacekeeping force.

15.  Indonesia's resistance ended within hours.  On 12 September 1999,
Habibie emerged from a special Cabinet meeting, stood alongside Wiranto and
made a nationwide announcement of the decision to allow a UN force into East
Timor.  Wiranto's presence beside Habibie sent a clear signal that the TNI
was aligned with the decision.

That is how and why Howard sent troops in - the struggles of activists,
haemorrhage inside the system, public outrage and a panicked government.
Hardly the stuff of imperialism.

CF



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