Road Map Discussions Continue

["D OC" <donaloc@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Published APRN - 12th September

Not on APRN 'International Highlights' Website though so I'll post my
original copy.

Looking Beyond the Road Map ? The Discussion Continues

Le Domhnall Ó Cobhthaigh.

Declan Kearney opened debate about the nature and conditions of Republican
struggle following on from the thinking contained in the Road Map document
in a Speech featured in An Phoblacht 29th August. As the leader claimed, it
was a thought-provoking article and was a valuable beginning to a more
comprehensive appraisal and analysis of the tasks in hand. We must be able
to combine the necessity of ?building political strength? and the need to
?protect the revolutionary integrity of the struggle in this lengthy
transitional phase?. To summarise, we are concerned with the basic political
question of how to ?advance to state power within a National Democracy?.

The piece argues that the need to build towards seizing state power will
require us to make suitable and conditioned compromises in order to
maximalise our strategic advantage. This is something which most Sinn Féin
activists probably have accepted and need not delay us at this stage.
Indeed, the article examines and raises the possibility of assuming roles in
the oversight of the Six County policing Service (should one come about
through the fulfilment of ?legislative, political and practical conditions?)
and the possibility that ?with growing political strength and?according to
the right strategic circumstances, the party may face the prospect of
sitting in coalition government? in the Free State.

While this may disturb some Republicans, this is precisely the challenge
which we may be faced to meet if we are to successfully build sufficient
political strength to gain full state power in the long-term. As such, I
cannot agree with ultra-leftist? criticisms of any form of involvement in a
coalition ? as you might hear from the fringe parties. Indeed, one has only
to look to the example of Cuba in 1959 to see a revolutionary power making a
strategic decision to engage in what were clearly only ?transitional?
arrangements with Bourgeois elements.

Having said that, my difficulty lies in the fact that the article left
unexplored the absolutely critical issue of defining and analysing ?the
right strategic circumstances? or exactly what is constituted by the meeting
of ?legislative, political and practical conditions? for involvement with
the Northern Police Boards. In a sense, the latter issue is clarified since
the party has adopted a very explicit model for acceptable policing
structures and will require the decision of an Ard Fhéis to reverse it.
Indeed, our involvement in any Government would be predicated by a decision
by a Special Delegates conference on the subject. Therefore both issues will
be determined by the party as a whole.

However, these are legalistic considerations and what is clear is that the
decision must be fought and won in the minds of Republican Activists. The
key issue, I feel, is that we return to the concrete circumstances in which
a decision to enter a coalition or the policing boards must be made and
attempt to dissect the factors which will determine precisely the correct
strategic line.

I choose to restrict myself to analysis of our involvement in a coalition,
given the ability of others within the party to better assess the nature of
any decision about entry onto Policing Boards.

In regard to involvement in Government, two key factors appear to be of
?core? or primary significance (although other ?external? factors will also
play a role): these are the implications of involvement in a coalition for
the growth of political strength, and our organisational capabilities to
deal with the realities of struggle in a coalition Government. In a sense,
these are inter-related, however nowhere in the speech was the possibility
raised that involvement in Government with a neo-liberalist/ mainstream
party might actually result in a loss of confidence from those layers of
Irish society which look to Sinn Féin as representatives of those ignored
for over 80 years within the State. Involvement in Coalition Government in
the twenty-six counties will also necessitate further difficult
compromises ? something which Declan will no doubt admit ? yet no analysis
is offered of the implications of such a political profile in the nature of
people attracted to the party or ability of the party to offer itself as the
radical alternative to Partitionist Labour was considered. In essence, we
might find the sustenance of a ?radical core? of policies extremely
difficult in the face of the policies which we were implementing. This, of
itself, is not a concrete argument against involvement in a coalition but is
certainly a pointer towards the sort of organisational forms which we would
need to adopt if we were to avoid the sort of annihilation experienced by
parties like the PCF in France which attempted coalition with a neo-liberal
Socialist Party.

The second key factor is entirely related to this, and I believe would
largely determine the success of any coalition (along with factors such as
the objective economic circumstances in which we entered Government). This
factor is the ability of the party to push effectively and visibly for
realistic alternatives to the neo-liberal consensus that passes for
Government in the Free State just now. As perhaps the most effective manner
of assessing this factor, consideration must be paid towards experiences
within Stormont, which would be a microcosm of what we might expect in
Leinster House.

I would be the first to admit points which Declan claims such as the
importance of such Governmental forms as ?training camps to skill up our
personnel? and in learning the ?craft of efficient Government? ? although (I
assume) this means not in some neo-Thatcherite manner but rather in the form
of defending public services. We need to complement such ?positive? impacts
with an assessment of the negatives ? mostly related to our organisational
weakness, the parallel organisational strength of our opposition and their
access to a wholly neo-liberalist host of Civil Servants, the nature of
anti-Republican hegemony within the media and the need to fully democratise
the decision-making processes within our policy response units. These
factors need a merciless analysis in order to clarify precisely the forms
and structures which we will need to put in place in order to really play a
radical role in Government. As such they are the first hurdle to pass in
order to consider such a move and would then need to be complemented with an
objective analysis of both popular opinions, trends and wider global
factors. It is my opinion that we are very far away from having such a party
or movement. Involvement in Government without this would, far from pushing
?these institutions to their democratic and radical limits?, involve us
being swallowed whole by the mainstream parties and their state.

I anticipate that Declan would agree with my outline of a ?self-assessment?;
indeed, he notes that we need to focus on ?integrating all aspect of the
struggle and ensuring we put in place structures that can carry the weight
of our work?. However, without seeking to apportion blame in the slightest,
I believe that we have failed to do this adequately in Stormont. Our base
remains outside the loop of decision-making except in the most ad-hoc
manner; things are changing but very slowly ? involvement in politics in the
much sharper Free State political world will not be so forgiving of such
prolonged difficulties. We may only get one shot at involvement in
Government as a precursor to building towards state power and unity ? to
date, we have been lucky as we have sailed the wind of the popularity of the
Peace Process and what appears to be an irreversible trend towards greater
unity ? such arguments will mean less in a Free State concerned with the
failure of a chaotic and unsustainable economic development policy
predicated on attracting Foreign Direct Investment.

As a final remark, I would like to comment on the risks of adopting entirely
the sort of strategic thinking applied by the ANC. Currently, in South
Africa black people living in townships are being sent to jail because they
dare to connect illegally to newly privatised water mains. The powerful
interests within the country have subverted the opportunities offered by
overthrow of Apartheid. Indeed, it might be argued that the ANC?s advice to
?stay ahead of his or her opponents by seizing the strategic initiative? has
lead them to adopting wholesale the neo-liberal agenda of their opponents ?
an agenda which can offer nothing in terms of really addressing poverty.
Indeed, such thinking characterises the British New Labour political
leadership, which have stayed ahead of the Tories by adopting their
policies. It is the concern that this outcome may arise from an
inappropriate adoption of a similar strategy which must be addressed by a
fruitful discussion on Republican Strategy beyond the Road Map and towards
full State Power.


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