Re: Reply to Richard Fidler [was Re: 3. Peron]

["Richard Fidler" <rfidler@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Well, that was quite a blast: American SWP, Moreno, vanguard parties,
permanent revolution and tutti frutti.... I decided to cool down for a day
before attempting this answer. Too bad Lou didn't do the same.

Let's see if there's any substance in Lou's rejoinder.

I'll deal with Bonapartism last, since that may be a substantive point
(although I'm not even sure about that).

On Perón's anti-imperialism. Lou's proof of Perón's "standing up to
imperialism" is that when the U.S. Ambassador, Braden, falsely charged he
had fascist affinities, Perón ran an election campaign on the slogan "Braden
or Perón". Good for Perón, I say. He knew how to turn a dishonest
imperialist attack on him to his advantage. It yielded a solid electoral
majority. But nationalist demagogy is hardly persuasive evidence of an
anti-imperialist program. The PRT document I cited noted a number of things
Perón did following that election that were consistent with U.S. interests
and strategy in the region. So at best we can say he was inconsistent in his
anti-imperialism. Any argument there?

The PRT's critiques of Perón's nationalizations, agrarian reform and
industrial strategy are "one-sided", says Lou. Yes, that is one side, and an
important aspect to any informed balance sheet. Again, is there any argument
here?

Now, what's all this craziness about "Moreno"? Lou's keyboard goes faster
than his brain, sometimes.

I published a document by the PRT. As I stated in my introductory note, this
was the PRT led at the time by Roberto Santucho and Daniel Pereyra. For the
uninformed (which apparently includes Lou, to my surprise) this group, also
known as the PRT-Combatiente after the name of their newspaper, was the
official section of the Fourth International in Argentina. Nahuel Moreno,
whom Lou seems to think is the author of this document, was in fact the main
leader of another PRT, the PRT-Verdad, a "sympathizing organization" of the
Fourth International. The two PRTs differed sharply on many questions. For
example, the PRT-C favoured a strategy of urban guerrilla warfare while the
PRT-V saw a democratic opening developing in the late 1960s and early 1970s
in Argentina through the massive working-class uprisings then shaking some
of Argentina's major cities (Rosario, Córdoba, etc.) and favoured legal
action wherever possible. The two groups also apparently differed in their
respective analyses of Peronism, as we shall see.

As an organization engaged in armed actions, the PRT-C was contending
directly with the Montoneros, a left Peronist formation with a somewhat
similar guerrilla strategy. In fact, the article I scanned to the list was
clearly directed to answering the Montoneros' positions in support of
Peronism. And as it happens the Peronists - first Perón himself, then his
widow Isabel - resumed the presidency of the country a few years later.

At the time this text was written (early 1970s), Lou and his U.S. Socialist
Workers Party were allied with Moreno's PRT in the FI's factional struggles,
which may explain Lou's idée fixe about Moreno. Although I too supported
Moreno on the issues such as the g-war strategy then being debated, I think
the PRT's views on Perón and Peronism merit some consideration, as do
Moreno's (which I did not publish on this list). So what does it all come
down to?

In his reply to me, Lou has done us the favour of quoting an alleged
analysis by Moreno of the 1945 coup against Perón. I say "alleged" because
Carlos (Alternative), in a separate post, has alerted us that the alleged
quote is in fact a misquote. But let's pretend for a moment it was
authentic:

"On October 17 the workers' movement was mobilised, not on anti-imperialist
or anti-capitalist slogans, but in order to maintain bourgeois order,
represented by the army and police and to free Peron [the shouts: long live
Peron, death to Braden !] hardly mattered... This was not an
anti-imperialist mobilisation, but one carried out by the police and the
army officers, and nothing more... There was no working class initiative nor
opposition to the capitalist regime, nor struggle nor conflict with it. It
was, therefore, not a workers' mobilisation...October 17 represented the
culmination of this offensive and the beginning of another one..."

Now, that would seem to back Lou's charge about Moreno's "sectarian
hostility to Peron". But how does it compare with the PRT-C author's
analysis of the same events? Well, here is what the document I cited said:

"On October 17, 1945, Bonapartism gave the signal for a mass mobilization to
support its leader against the right wing of the military government which
was bending to the pressures of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. But the
working class, by taking to the streets of Buenos Aires and all cities of
the hinterland, threw its own class weight into the political arena

"Therein lies one of the most explosive contradictions of Peronism: the
class origin of this base. Even without struggling for its own historic
goals, the working class deeply suffused Peronist ranks and left its imprint
on many measures of the Bonapartist government."

A bit cryptic, we can all agree. But it does suggest a fundamentally
different assessment of the events, with the PRT-C taking a far more
sympathetic stance, recognizing the anti-imperialist nature of the
mobilization, the crucial role of the working class, and the influence this
had even on the "Bonapartist" government. Above all, it recognized the
contradictory nature of Peronism as a social movement. Clearly, these guys
don't agree with Moreno (or at least the "Moreno" quoted by Lou, and
amalgamated with me).

Obviously, Lou did not read what I published very carefully. In fact, he
probably didn't read it at all. Instead, he just wasted our time with his
diatribe against "verbal radicalism" etc., etc.

Now, on Bonapartism. Let's ignore the silly jab about the "American SWP ...
with respect to Chavez". (Really, Lou, you've got to get over some of your
hang-ups.)

Lou asks: "What are the political implications" of using the Bonapartist
analogy. Does it mean calling for Perón's (or Chávez's) revolutionary
overthrow? Now that's a good question, and it deserves a serious answer.

Well, of course, any regime that can be characterized as "bourgeois" - and
we all agree, I think, that Perón's could be given that class
characterization - should be overthrown and proletarian rule instituted in
its place. Immediately. But that observation doesn't tell us what really
needs to be done now, given the existing relationship of class forces in a
given social formation; that is, it doesn't tell us anything about the way
in which the great gettin'-up morning will or can come about. Calling the
regime "Bonapartist" doesn't, either, of course.

The specific problem in underdeveloped, semicolonial or dependent countries
(call them what you will) is that, as countries oppressed by imperialism,
their bourgeois governments have particular features that must be taken into
account by revolutionaries as they develop their strategy. For example, such
regimes tend to be relatively unstable, caught between the conflicting
pressures of imperialism and the mass movements (workers and peasants) who
are thrown into anti-imperialist action at frequent intervals. These
regimes, if they are not open military dictatorships in the service of
imperialism, usually rely on populist demagogy and nationalist measures in
order to win support from the masses while at the same time seeking to curb
and control the mass movement.

Trotsky (excuse me for invoking his name, but I think his thoughts can be
relevant now and then) initially invoked the concept of Bonapartism (by
analogy with Marx's devastating critique of the regime of Louis Bonaparte in
mid-19th century France) to describe the early Stalinist regime in the USSR,
as a regime based on the preceding exhaustion of the masses:

"The Bonapartist regime can attain a comparatively stable and durable
character only in the event that it brings a revolutionary epoch to a close;
when the relationship of forces has already been tested in battles; when the
revolutionary classes are already spent but the possessing classes have not
yet freed themselves from the fear: will not tomorrow bring new convulsions?
Without this basic condition, that is, without a preceding exhaustion of the
mass energies in battles, the Bonapartist regime is in no position to
develop."
("The Only Road," in The Struggle Against Fascism in Germany, New York:
Pathfinder, 1971, p.256)

Later, he came to apply the term to the sui generis bourgeois regimes of
backward countries. For example, writing in 1939:

"In the industrially backward countries, foreign capitalist plays a decisive
role. Hence the relative weakness of the national bourgeoisie in relation to
the national proletariat. This creates special conditions of state power.
The government veers between foreign and domestic capital, between the weak
national bourgeoisie and the relatively powerful proletariat. This gives the
government a Bonapartist character of a distinctive character. It raises
itself, so to speak, above classes. Actually, it can govern either by making
itself the instrument of foreign capitalism and holding the proletariat in
the chains of a police dictatorship, or by maneuvering with the proletariat
and even going so far as to make concessions to it, thus gaining the
possibility of a certain freedom toward the foreign capitalists. The present
policy [of the Mexican government] is in the second stage; its greatest
conquests are the expropriations of the railroads and the oil industries.

"These measures are entirely within the domain of state capitalism. However,
in a semicolonial country state capitalism finds itself under the heavy
pressure of foreign private capital and of its governments, and cannot
maintain itself without the active support of the workers. That is why it
tries, without letting the real power escape from its hands, to place on the
workers' organizations a considerable part of the responsibility for the
march of production in the nationalized branches of industry."
("Nationalized Industries and Workers' Management", Writings 1938-1939 p.
326.)

And in 1940, he added:

"The governments of backward, i.e., colonial and semi-colonial countries, by
and large assume a Bonapartist or semi-Bonapartist character; and differ
from one another in this, that some try to orient in a democratic direction,
seeking support among workers and peasants, while others install a form
close to military-police dictatorship. This likewise determines the fate of
the trade unions. They either stand under the special patronage of the state
or they are subjected to cruel persecution. Patronage on the part of the
state is dictated by two tasks which confront it: first, to draw the working
class closer thus gaining a support for resistance against excessive
pretensions on the part of imperialism; and, at the same time, to discipline
the workers themselves by placing them under the control of bureaucracy."
 ("Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay")

Trotsky's particular concern, as the above quotations indicate, was with the
special problems such regimes presented to the workers' movement, the trade
unions for example. But of course these regimes presented special challenges
to proletarian revolutionists who sought ultimately to overthrow them.

Trotsky himself did not have a lot to say about the concrete responses
required by such situations. (How could he, as an exile unable to play an
active role in a national party?) The revolutionary movement in Latin
America (not just the Trostkyists!) has had a rich experience, however, in
working within the broad workers movement in many countries - an experience
far more extensive than is indicated in Lou's offhand comment that the
Trotskyists have "been - with the exception of Hugo Blanco - a minor factor
in Latin American politics". (We could debate at length the role and
influence of Trotskyists and other revolutionists at various points in the
history of Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and even Argentina. But that's not my
intention here.)

But Trotsky was very clear on the political stance to adopt toward concrete
anti-imperialist actions by such regimes. He was an unconditional defender
of the Cárdenas government's nationalization of the railways and the oil
industry, for example, in the face of a vicious campaign by British and U.S.
capital.

In any event, some Marxists analyzing the nature of the Latin American
regimes and social formations have found the Bonapartist analogy helpful. To
cite only one example, which is known to Lou since he rightly praised this
book to the skies not so long ago: Adolfo Gilly, in his book The Mexican
Revolution (Verso, 1983), originally published in Spanish as La revolución
interrumpida. Take another look, Lou, at Gilly's analysis of both the
Obregón and Cárdenas regimes, and note the parallels - and differences -
with the PRT's analysis of Perón's "Bonapartism":

"Obregón came forward to establish bourgeois power on a new political basis.
Consistent with his whole trajectory during the revolution, he understood
that the development of a new bourgeoisie required certain concessions to
the masses within a tightly controlled framework. At the same time, it would
be necessary to lean on the masses in order to confront both imperialism and
the forces of restoration, as well as the inevitable alliance between the
two.

"Although the old landowners did not forfeit most of their property,
remaining -at least until the Cárdenas period- the economically strongest
sector of the bourgeoisie, they were definitively excluded from power. For
its part, the industrial bourgeoisie was then a weak force, torn between the
mass of imperialist investment and state-controlled holdings. At the
political level, it seemed completely tied to the old, pre-revolutionary
regime.

"This accounts for the peculiar character of Obregón's Bonapartism, which
rested politically on the instrument of the Mexican Army, and socially on
mass union organizations under the control of a bureaucracy tied to the
state apparatus. It combined features of both classical post-revolutionary
Bonapartism and the sui generis Bonapartism of the bourgeoisie in backward
countries. ...

"Nevertheless, the regime would remain a prisoner of the revolution and its
working-class and peasant base: its weakness from birth prevented it from
developing an independent class base, which could only have been attained
through an alliance with representatives of the old regime. The play of
bourgeois parliamentary parties, characteristic of capitalist democracy,
died in Mexico; and although a parliament continued to exist in name, it did
not play any role in national politics. The extreme concentration of
presidential power is not a sign of strength, but an indication that the
socially weak regime cannot sustain legal, parliamentary struggles between
rival bourgeois sectors and parties. It has to place itself completely in
the hands of a supreme presidential arbiter: that is the essence of the
Bonapartist form of government."

Gilly's analysis of the class forces involved in the Cárdenas period --- the
"second ascending phase of the Mexican Revolution"--- is richly informed by
his understanding of the internal contradictions of that government.
Cárdenas, building on the limited conquests of the first revolution, was
much more radical than Péron: his indeed was a revolutionary nationalist and
anti-imperialist government. Not only did he nationalize the railways and
oil industry, he carried out an extensive land distribution, created a
network of nationalized industries and conducted a foreign policy sharply at
odds with that of the United States in a number of respects.

But again, his strength came from the support of the workers movement. And
in the end, it was Cárdenas' success in corralling and controlling the
labour movement - through Lombardo Toledano, a direct agent of the Soviet
bureaucracy - that prevented that movement from proceeding further than
Cárdenas' brand of state capitalism. Gilly (in La revolución interrumpida):

[translation] "Lombardo Toledano, thus, provided all the arguments and all
the politics with which to surbordinate the workers movement, the CTM and
the trade unions to the bourgeois state under the guise of supporting
Cardenas' anti-imperialist policy. While it was indeed correct for the trade
unions to support Cardenas' anti-imperialist measures and nationalizations,
it was also necessary for them to maintain their own workers program and
preserve their independence from the state apparatus. All Lombardo
Toledano's and his clique's efforts were directed to precisely the opposite
purpose. It was under his protection and leadership that the school of
trade-union charro bureaucrats of the ilk of Fidel Velázquez, Jesús Yuren
and Fernando Amilpa was trained and fastened its jailer's grip on the
Mexican labor movement, a grip that has lasted to this day. Lombardo was the
true father of charrismo."

And that indeed is the meaning of "Bonapartism". In the sense we are using
it here, it refers to a particular type of class rule in dependent
countries. It has many variants, of course. And you can give it another name
if you wish (the historical analogy with mid-19th c. France may have worn
thin by now). But the phenomenon is real, and it poses a real dilemma, a
challenge for revolutionists in the Third World, faced by regimes that are
able to manipulate the nationalist, anti-imperialist sentiments of the
masses to win political support and credibility and steer a course of action
that preserves capitalist property and privilege, and with it imperialist
domination. Understanding this phenomenon is essential to working out an
alternative line of march within the mass movements.

And, need I add, a thorough understanding of it will avoid the likelihood of
reaching such misleading conclusions as the one by Lou that prompted this
exchange in the first place: >>... [Perón] embarked on a strongly leftist
and pro-labor path. ... he challenged all the old dominant classes in
Argentina and promoted the class interests of the workers and the nascent
industrial bourgeoisie. <<

One final comment. In his reply to Carlos, Lou says the "theory" of the
Permanent Revolution... is a sterile proclamation that unless a revolution
is socialist, it can not succeed. This theory is usually advanced from afar.
Very afar."

I wonder if Lou can point to a revolution that is not socialist and that has
"succeeded" in overthrowing imperialism. And how does he feel about the
mature conclusions of the Cuban revolutionaries he rightly exalts, who, in
the Second Declaration of Havana, stated: Socialist revolution or a
caricature of revolution.

Richard Fidler


~~~~~~~
PLEASE clip all extraneous text before replying to a message.