fw: [FI-P] iv324 Philippines

["Alan Bradley" <alanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

SOME NOTES ON THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL SITUATION
(August 2000)

***This is the first of the three parts of Some Notes on the National
Situation.  This was delivered by a representative of the RPMP Leadership
in the last National RPMP Youth and Students Conference somewhere in the
Visayas.
The Second part deals with the current Political Spectrum in the country
and the Third Part deals with the Urgent Tasks of the RPMP based on the
current situation.***


Introduction

        The Philippines today, is seriously plagued by economic and political
crisis.  These two have symbiotically affected each other causing the
intensification of the crisis by the day.  The economic situation has been
very bleak, seeing no light at the end of the tunnel, until the end of the
year.  The Mindanao crisis has been playing a major role in the
intensification of the national crisis.  The handling of the Estrada
Administration of the situation has even caused more problems than a short
or long term solution.  There has never been time, in the country's history
(except in the last days of the dictatorship) that considerable number of
the ruling class acted as one in questioning the capacity of a current
Administration to effectively govern.  Even the church hierarchy (both the
Catholic and the Protestant) has been consistently raising questions and
more and more resistance in the methods of Estrada in handling  the affairs
of the nation, especially the Mindanao problem.!
  Obviously, the US policy makers have been on guard on the causes and
effects of the continuous thinning out of the support of the masses to the
Estrada Administration.  The recent survey result of the Social Weather
Station saying that Estrada's popularity has increased from negative to
positive thirteen percent is not indicative enough of the genuine
sentiments of the masses.  In fact, it was temporarily caused by his
military method/solution of the Mindanao problem  the actual impact of
which will be concretely felt after the government and the AFP have
"captured" all the camps of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Since the latter has already converted its strategy from the
conventional/positional warfare into guerrilla and highly mobile warfare.

        It is on this basis that the US masters have been sending overt and 
covert
signals and moves to seriously warn the Estrada Administration to shape up
or a major shake up will definitely happen.  It is on this context that the
Estrada's visit to the US, should be fully understood.

        Meanwhile, the broadest section of the masses, especially the workers,
peasants, semi-proletariat and even the rank and file of the private and
public servants have been the hardest hit of such crisis.  The impact of
the program of globalization making the government more and more helpless
except and more repressive, has caused a continuing increase
 in unemployment and underemployment (contractualization,
subcontractualization?.)  Land conversions have continuously displaced the
peasants and the agricultural workers adding to the number of millions of
reserved labor force and creating a situation of vulnerability of
exploitation by the employers.

        The converging effects of globalization policies on privatization,
liberalization and de-regularization have caused the continuous trade
deficit, devaluation of the country's currency and increase in the rate of
inflation.

        The economic fundamentals which made the country withstood the Asian
Financial Crisis in the second half of 1997 have been weakened by the
mismanagement.  Such phenomenon has made the Philippine economy as one of
the weakest  in East Asia.

        The current situation in the country provides an excellent opportunity 
for
all progressive and revolutionary groups and Parties to be with the masses
in their struggle for social reforms.  Genuine revolutionary group or Party
can provide correct political leadership on the mass struggle, the
direction of which is to further weaken the machineries of the reactionary
state and its main patron, the US imperialist.

        The present condition in the country is favorable for raising the
democratic and anti-imperialist struggle into a higher level.

        The role of the working class,  the peoples and the other sectors within
and outside the country should be defined. Their capacity to lead and
influence the direction of the struggle should be built up.  Strong
linkages to genuine international movement should be strengthened as well.

A.      Some Trends in the Economic and Political Developments in the Country.

1.      Two years after Estrada was elected into the presidency, there has been
no clear, coherent and comprehensive program on economic development in the
country.  His slogans from day one up to the present of providing food
security, shelter, job security and livelihood have remained in words.
These are evident in the July 24, 2000 State of the Nation Address where
Estrada again for the second time repeated the same slogans,  this time
packaging them in the Mindanao context e.g. making Mindanao the food basket
of the country having a fresh start from Mindanao, etc.

1.1.    The economy is currently mismanaged from top to bottom. Almost all the
cronies during the Marcos period are back to power regaining/reclaiming
their lost or sequestered businesses and opportunities.  Today, they have
not only got back their businesses and wealth, they have even expanded
them, thanks to Estrada's presidency.  These neo-cronies have already
monopolized almost all the vital industries in the country from plastic,
food and beverages, real estate, communication, water and electricity and
transportation to banking.  They have even dared to manipulate the stock
market thru inside trading but they did it without finisse that they were
exposed immediately.  (The case of Best World Resources where close friends
of Estrada were involved in the manipulation of the stock market in the
country.)  Such blatant economic mismanagement of the economy has been the
main reason for the big decrease of the investment inflow.  As of June this
year, investment was worth US$500 !
million only came in compared to $1 billion worth in the same period last
year.  At the end of the first week of August 2000, the investment inflow
decreased up to seventy percent (70%) ? US$300 millions ? the lowest in the
year.  This means that the investors (foreign and local) have lost their
confidence of fair play in our stock market.

        Locally, this phenomenon makes the other members of the ruling elite not
favored by Estrada and even the church hierarchy to cry foul?" the playing
field in business is not level".  Even international institutions
controlled by the capitalists like the ADB and World Bank have criticized
the Estrada administration for not providing a climate for fair business
dealing hence not attracting new business players in the country.
Moreover, in the study made by the above mentioned banks, it shows that in
the Philippines, the gap between the rich and the poor has been widening.
Concretely, the same study says that in the Philippines fifteen (15)
families control fifty five percent (55%) of the country's businesses.

        This is the worst situation compared to other Asian countries as shown 
in
the following:

Japan              - sixty (60) families control 2% of the business
Singapore    - twenty (20) families control 25% of the business
Taiwan         - twenty five (25) families control 20% of the
                        business
Indonesia     - fifteen (15) families control 40% of the business
Thailand      - twenty (20) families control 57& of the business

1.2.    Globalization policies such as deregularization, privatization and
liberalization have created excellent opportunities for these families to
expand their businesses to about all types/sector of business almost
without limit thus putting out the small and medium industries out of the
game.  Almost all of them (15) have even expanded beyond the national
boundaries without a problem with a little help from their friend in the
presidency.

2.      There is a continuous downtrending of the economy as shown in the
following indicators:

2.1.    Gross National Product (GNP) ? The government has been targeting a
4.5% growth for this year.  As of July 2000 the so-called economic experts
of the Estrada Administration has been saying that the maximum that the
country's GNP this year will be at 3.9%.  Considering the almost 2% annual
growth rate of the country's population and the big role played by the
exported human resources in the economy, the so-called 3.9% GNP growth rate
will mean almost nothing.  In real terms, this means an almost zero growth
rate of the Philippine's economy this year.

2.2.    Continuous Devaluation of the peso, now (month of August) the current
currency exchange (between the peso and the dollar) flauctuates between
Php44.60 to Php45.50 to a dollar.  Economic analysts are saying that before
the end of the year (2000) the exchange rate will go nearer to Php50.00 to
a dollar.

The government attributes this to the following reasons:

a)      Capital outflow has been heavy because higher interest rate in other
countries are becoming attractive.
b)      Devaluation of the currency attracts more foreign investors
c)      It encourages more remittances from Overseas Filipino Contract Workers
to their families for the much needed dollars.

In real terms, the continuous devaluation of the peso means an automatic
allocation from the annual budget to the payment of a bigger interest of
the debt instead of allocating more on social services and peoples'
welfare.

In concrete terms of economic activities, the devaluation of the pesos
against the dollar means increase in the prices of  importated materials
for production.  This is worst because almost all the manufacturing
enterprises in the country are dependent on the imported raw materials in
doing their businesses.  Higher prices of goods produced locally can only
be the option of these small and medium enterprises or actually they can
close shops.  The first option will always put the local businesses at the
mercy of the foreign competitors which can always have a lower price and
the second option will trigger a domino effect which means increase in
unemployment.

2.3.    The inflation rate has been steadily increasing, based on
the conservative estimate of the government.  The inflation rate as of July
2000 is 4.3% compared to 3.9% last July of 1999.  The bases used by the
government for the increase of the inflation rate do not yet include the
effects caused by continuous or monthly increase of prices of the petroleum
products and the impact of the devaluation of the pesos as against the
dollar.

        The purchasing power of the peso has been decreasing rapidly.  In less
than a year's time it decreased into almost five (5) centavos which means
that a product worth Php100.00 last year costs Php105.00 this year.

        Worst still is that almost all the prices of basic goods have increased
while the basic salaries of the workers from both the urban and rural areas
have not increased at all.

        It is estimated that the country's inflation rate will reach a double
digit before the end of the year because of the abovementioned reasons.

2.4.    As of the month of July 2000, the unemployment rate has
 reached 13.9% and it is still increasing by the day.

 In the more than thirty (30) million labor force in the country,
 almost 14% of these are unemployed or almost seven (7) millions of the
working age do not have work.  At the rate where the small and medium
businesses are closing shop and the onesided employment policies of
globalization, the number of unemployed will surely increase.  Added to
this is half a million (500,000) labor force from the rank of the students
and the out of school youth who have reached the employable age.

Since only a small number of this new labor force can be absorbed by the
country's economy, they  add to the unemployment rank and become part of
the available reserve force of the country who  become potential victims of
exploitation of employers within and outside the country.

Moreover, as of the first week of August, there are more than ten thousand
(10,000) workers who have been on strike because of unfair labor practices
of the employers who are usually favored by the Government and the
Philippine military.  The above-mentioned workers were later on laid off by
their companies.

Presently, twenty two (22%) percent of the labor force is underemployed,
which means that they work on rotation,  undertimed and therefore
underpaid.

2.5.    More than 30% of the total population of the country is classified as
living below the poverty line.  This refers to those who can not afford the
basic necessities of life,  e.g. food, shelter, clothes, health, etc.

        This means that out of the more than seventy (70) million of the 
country's
population, almost eighteen (18) million of the are living in a subhuman
condition. In fact in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
57.9% of the people are living miserably or below the poverty line.

        It is therefore, not circumstancial that it is in this region where 
there
is an ongoing war between the Government and the MILF and other
revolutionary groups.  Obviously, there are socio-economic reasons for the
revolutionary groups or the MILF to easily thrive in the region.  However,
instead of addressing the problems, the government opted for an all out
war.

2.6.    As of July 2000, the country's budgetary deficit has reached sixty
seven (67) billions of pesos which already exceeded the Php60 billions set
by the IMF/WB as a limit or as manageable.

The extra (surplus) expenses are incurred by the government to  finance its
total war policy in Mindanao or to be exact in the area of  ARMM ? the
highest percentage of people living below the poverty line.  Billions of
pesos have also been lost  by the government thru widespread graft and
corruption.  In fact, even government officials themselves are admitted
that between 10 ? 20% of the total  government budget  were lost because of
the graft and corruption practices within the government.

3.      The cracks within the ruling class have crystallized.

Those who are not identified with the Estrada administration have been
clearly discriminated from the favored few ? usually identified from the
big Chinese Taipans.  The latter have been favored on the basis of their
contributions to the 1998 Presidential elections.  On this basis, these
Taipans dared to manipulate the policies of the government against their
rivals (local or foreign).  They even dared to have an inside trading of
the stock exchange market.

3.1.    Obviously, even within the circle of the Estrada Administration,
intense rivalries and intrigues can be already observed.

So we have the group identified with Ronaldo Zamora ? the current Executive
Secretary, Robert Aventajado, the current Economic Adviser of the President
and the Secretary of the Flagship Projects of the Administration, Domingo
Siazon ? the current Foreign Affairs Secretary and head of Cabinet Cluster
E ? the group of the Executive which handles the National Security Affairs
of the country.  We can identify under the Siazon group the militarist
group with the Estrada Administration e.g. Secretary Orlando Mercado ?
Defense, Secretary Alexander Aguirre ? the National Security Adviser and
General Angelo Reyes, the current Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP).

        Rivalries and intrigues amongst these groups can be seen in their 
methods
and approaches in handling for instance the Mindanao crisis and the
Economic problems affecting the country.  Oftentimes, the President is
helpless in these infightings which are at the expense of the welfare of
the people.

3.2.    To date, the Ruling Party ? the Lapian ng Masang Pilipino or LAMP, has
not been consolidated.  At the most, their unity is symbolic because of
their symbolic head ? the President.  So it is very dependent on the
patronage of the President for its life or for its death.  It has not
launched a congress since the 1998 national elections.

The situation of the current Speaker of the House of Representative ?
Congressman Manuel Villar can be a case in point here.  During the 1998
elections, he, together with around sixty (60) representatives supported
President Estrada even if they belonged to the Lakas Party ? the ruling
Party at that time.  But since they have not had any congress yet, (the
current Ruling Party) the Speaker and sixty (60) of the representatives do
not have a Party.

In fact, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the Ruling Party.
The President will just call his lieutenants from the Senate and the House
of Representatives if he wants them to support his proposed bills.

3.3.    A new and revitalized coalition is emerging with the former Ruling
Party ? LAKAS as the core.  The coalition is identified with the former
President Fidel Ramos.  As such it is seen as still having influence and
connection with the current power brokers and from the disfavored business
groups.  It has even been observed that the coalition still maintains
connections with top military officials of the current Administration.  It
is believed that even the former President Corazon Aquino has been joining
the group in some of its activities.

The current Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) is an
official of the LAKAS Party.  However, she has been seen to be playing with
her Party as well as with the "Ruling Party".  Concurrently, she is also
the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
Often times she justifies her pro-Administration position because of her
being the head of the DSWD.

However, as the national and local elections are coming closer (2001) her
position will be manifested and exposed.  That's why she has to make clear
her positions in major issues otherwise she will end up with no political
party and machinery to launch her presidency.

3.4.    Estrada's methods and styles of governance is best described as a
combination of the traditional political patronage before the Martial Law
period (pre 1972) and the authoritarian Marcos style.

        Almost unlimited favors are given to those who are supportive of his
presidency and his projects.  He can even lend the institution of his
office for his friends' benefits.  In return, his friends (read as cronies)
will do almost anything to please their Patron.  Oftentimes, the President
understands the national interests as the interests of his cronies.

        However, for those who dare to cross those path or oppose his projects
will suffer the consequence.  Even those who did not support his presidency
in 1998 elections are still made to suffer the consequence of their act.
This means that if you are in business, chances are, you are going to lose
your business or if you are in politics, your province or constituencies
will suffer as well.

        Estrada's styles of governance is too personalistic.  He wants to get
things done "hands on".  He does not need a Political Party as a partner in
governance.  He wants to show especially to the masses that he is
personally with them through thick and thin.  That's why when he declared
the all out war policies in Mindanao, he was there, wearing a fatigue
uniform with his soldiers.  Now, he wants to be there in Mindanao to
personally see that rehabilitation and development works are implemented.
This can have positive points but as in the concrete events, whenever he is
not around, his men and women can not do anything.

3.5.    People who are both identified and not identified with the camp of the
Estrada Administration have been floating/entertaining ideas that the
current administration cannot possibly finish his term due to the
convergence of events ? the economic crisis has become uncontrollable, the
Mindanao problem  has intensified and the international situation provides
excellent condition for the Estrada's ouster.

Hence, the above-mentioned people have been preparing for the mid-term
scenario.  Talks of having a coup is not without basis.  It might take
different forms like constitutional, extra-constitutional, physical or
their combination.  The US imperialist can play a decisive role here.

3.6.    Estrada's principal patron, the US ? has been seriously questioning
the capacity of Estrada to continue and effectively govern.  According to
reliable sources, Estrada has been given up to September this year to shape
up or ship out.  It is in this context then that the latter's working visit
to the US last July 25 to August 4 should be understood.

        Estrada has to personally assure the US policy makers and the US 
President
that all is well and going fine in the Philippines.  That the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA) has been fully implemented.  That the all out war
policy in Mindanao is in consonance with the war against the Camp of the
number one enemy of the United States of America ? the Islamic
Fundamentalists and the Muslim Extremists ? hence the "capture" of all the
camps of the MILF has not only been a moral thing to do but ideologically
justified.  That if the US will continue to support the Estrada
administration, it can be the best ally of the US in the East Asian Area.

        That the issue of the toxic problem in the former US bases in the 
country
has not been raised during the talks with Clinton is not accidental.  And
that the age-old problem of the Filipino War Veterans of equal compensation
with their American counterparts are essentially left out, is not a
manifestation of Estrada's memory lapses either.

        The Estrada's mission is how to please the US President and the policy
makers at all costs.  Hence, they reported and asked only things which
their patron would want to hear.

        One important thing that the Estrada delegation did not put into
consideration though is that the Clinton Democratic Party is only up to
November this year.  Things are showing that the Republican Party with Bush
on their Presidential Candidate is winning the election.  The rule of the
game will surely be difficult.

        Aside from the loans for war materials and food aid for Mindanao, what 
the
Estrada's mission in the US got are the agreements for future investment in
the country.  Political stability, however, will be considered by these
American investors before they start their business in the country.

        Meanwhile, the US might have been convinced by Estrada to give him 
another
chance, at least up to May 2001 without a coup bothering him around.

3.7.    One thing is sure, the USI has been very concerned of how things are
unfolding in the Philippines and the role of the present Administration is
playing.  The former does not want an "Edsa Type" or a "Marcos Exit type"
of surprises because this can jeopardize its paramount interests in the
region.  The USI does not want that if the Estrada Administration falls, it
falls alone.  Its interests should be secured by the next favored
Administration.  It is in this connection that the other political
groupings from the ruling class have been preparing and presenting
themselves as the best alternatives.

4.      The Role of the Mindanao Crisis in the Intensification of the Crisis in
the Country.

In the second State of the Nation Address of the President last July 24,
2000, the war in Mindanao and its development had occupied almost thirty
(30%) percent of the President's prepared speech.  In fact, he promised to
have a fresh start of his second year of Presidency in Mindanao.  It is
believed that Estrada has his popular rating improved because of his all
out war policy in Mindanao.

        However, the current phase of war in Mindanao mainly between the AFP and
the MILF can be on a long term, detrimental to the country's political and
economic situation in general.  It can drain the already scarce and
depleted resources of the government by not only engaging in a very
unproductive military expenditures but also very destructive military
adventures.

        History has proven many times that the solution of the Mindanao problem
can not be military but comprehensive political settlement between the Moro
people led by the MILF and the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.  The settlement includes the concrete answer to the right to
self-determination of this minority nationality which will be mutually
discussed and agreed upon by both parties and the peoples of Mindanao.

4.1.    The "all out war" policy of the Estrada Administration against the
MILF has put him in a political quick sand ? where the more he makes the
move, the more he sinks deeper.

The AFP's conquest of the main camp of the MILF's Camp Abubakar has
definitely not ended the war in Mindanao, unless the main objective of the
"all out war" of President Estrada is just conquering all the MILF camps
and not defeating their cause.

        Currently, it has been the MILF dictating the phase and the terms of 
war,
having converted itself into a highly mobile guerilla force.  This has
resulted into heavy casualties from the AFP.  Estrada and his militarist
advisers and generals know by this time that it has reached a situation
where the war it has initiated will have no victors, only loosers.  Now it
tries to adapt the typical militarist approach confronted with a strong
guerilla force like the MILF ? that is the program to clear, hold,
consolidate and develop the area including Camp Abubakar.  This program on
approach has been proven ineffective by the Communist Party of the
Philippines and its New Peoples' Army in the mid-eighties and early
nineties.

        The AFP strength will be spread out thinly and cannot maintain its
clearing or occupying of so many areas at the same time.  That's why the
Estrada's administration is trying its best to revive the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU).  This kind of paramilitary units have
been banned for a long time because of their rampant human rights violation
against the civilian populace.  Now, those militarist generals of Estrada
have been creating a situation in Mindanao to justify the revival of the
CAFGUs like blaming the MILFs of all the attacks against the civilians
without even bothering to conduct or wait for the results of the
investigation.

        President Estrada is planning to station thirty five thousand (35,000) 
of
the CAFGUs in Mindanao.  Their role is to maintain certain areas against
the attack of the MILF. According to Estrada and his generals, using the
CAFGU's  is the cheapest way to continue his all out war.

        The biggest irony of it all is that the government and the AFP
propagandists has been bragging about the already defeated, demoralized,
splintered and leaderless MILF after the "capture of the main camp
(Abubakar). And yet,  the same propagandists within the direct intervention
of the President Estrada, are moving heaven and hell to make the congress
approval of the revival of the CAFGUs. In fact, they can not anymore wait
for the congress to act on it.   They have recruited and deployed several
thousands of CAFGUs in Mindanao.

        Opposition to the revival of CAFGUs has been widespread coming  from the
legislators (opposition parties), the church, human rights movements and
the business sectors. Estrada's response to them are more harassments
tagging them as MILF supporters and therefore should be arrested and
persecuted.

        The shadows of a fascist regime is already falling upon the peoples of
Mindanao.  We expect to have more on this in the coming months, especially
when the Special or Emergency Power which Estrada has been asking from the
Congress is approved.

        In fact, one has only to look at what had happened last July 24, 2000
during the peoples' demonstration and protests against the State of Nation
Address of the President.  The demonstrators were dispersed in a very
fascist manner as if the country is under a martial rule.

        Leaders were arrested and many of the demonstrators were physically
assaulted by the police.

        The current handling of the Mindanao crisis has concretely shown or
exposed the different factions within the Estrada's Administration having
completely different methods and approaches.  They have completely
disagreed on dealing with the MILF (at least at the initial stage ? up to
the last quarter of 1999) in particular and the handling of peace and
development in general.  Totally disregarding historical events and
lessons, the military approach has prevailed in solving the non-military
problems of Mindanao.  It is as if we are seeing history repeating itself
(devoid of learnings and lessons) when the fascist regime of Marcos trying
to defeat the MNLF in the early seventies thru military means.  The methods
employed by Marcos has forced the MNLF to internationalize their struggle.
The Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) had effectively intervened and
Marcos retreated bringing with him the national pride.  The war with the
MNLF have never been the same again until the R!
amos administration effectively neutralized the MNLF's leadership and
obtained its honorable surrender with the same OIC as its witness.

        Now, President Estrada and his generals do not know what to do with the
MNLF.  For them, it's already a spent force underestimating the capacity of
the OIC to revive it possibly together with the MILF.  The OIC has a
historical and important role with the MNLF and the Bangsa Moro struggle.
In fact, it (OIC) identified its foreign policies and projects with it.

        In the recent OIC ? IFMC (International Foreign Ministers' Conference) 
in
Kuala Lumpur last July 2000, it warned both the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and the MILF to stop the war in Mindanao.  This started
the internationalization of the struggle of the Moro led by the MILF.

        And the President's men, not all of them were in favor of having 
Alexander
Aguirre (National Security Adviser) as the head of the government's
delegation in Kuala Lumpur.

4.3.    The "all out war" approach of the Estrada's administration against the
MILF and which in a later stage it also declared against the Communist
Party of the Philippines and New People's Army (after the peace talks have
bogged down) has been a recycled "total war" approach of the Aquino Regime.

Events are showing that the similarities are not just circumstancial.
             Such approach can only be afforded by popular presidents.  They 
have
             to do it, thinking that they have or will have the support of the
masses.
             In such approach, one can easily see the active role (covert or
overt)
             of the agents of the US Imperialist- principal patron of both
presidents.
             On the part of the US, this is to ensure that their interests in 
the
country
             and in the region will not be jeopardized or threatened.

4.4.    The AFP has mobilized more than five (5) divisions (out of the
total eight (8) divisions which the country has) of the Army, All of the
marines (3 to 4 brigades), the elite scout rangers and all the PNP already
deployed in the regions affected and more than twenty (20) thousand CAFGUs
of the total thirty five thousand (35,000) CAFGUs they plan to deploy in
Mindanao.  As of July 2000, the AFP has already released more than twenty
thousand (20,000) high powered firearms/rifles to the civilians, mostly
Christian vigilantes.

        More heavy weaponry are expected to be deployed in Mindanao with the
US$110 million dollar military loan which Estrada had begged from his US
sponsors in the last Presidential working visit to the USA.

        The MILF has deployed more than four (4) divisions of the BIAF in the
Central Mindanao area.  This is still excluding their armed militias or the
Internal Security Force which are deployed in all municipalities they have
influenced.

        At present, these big formations have been regrouped into smaller
formations in order to be highly mobile while effectively conducting their
guerilla warfare.

        When the fall or capture of their main Camp (Abubak'r) is becoming
eminent, they have timely transferred their valuable military hardware and
equipment into far and safer grounds.  In fact, they only left a token
force to delay the final assault of the main Camp.

        The government has been spending (on the average) twenty million pesos
daily on its war efforts against the MILF.  This means that since March up
to June this year, the government had already spent almost Php2.5 billions,
bigger than the annual budget of some departments.

        Now, it has been pressuring the Congress to augment its (military) 
budget
of another Php1.4 billion.

        in contrast, the MILF/BIAF has only their firm commitment and religious
obligation to answer the call of JIHAD ? the "Holy" War to defend their
Homeland.  their five years' plan for consolidation, expansion and
self-reliant efforts in foods, logistics, finance and military hardware has
been paying off.  These efforts had been boosted by the arrival of three
(3) shiploands of high caliber weapons (machine guns and mortars).  Their
homemade RPGs (Rifle Propelled Grenade) have been very effective.  Each
squad of the BIAF (Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces) has been assigned with
one RPG.

        The BIAF has continued to produce the revised version of the RPG like 
the
RPG 6 and RPG 8.  This time in a guerilla manner and in the improvised
factories in the different guerilla camps.

4.5.    In terms of military strategies, the AFP has been prepared/trained
directly by the US  (thru the VFA or Visiting Forces Agreement) confront
the BIAF in a conventional (positional) warfare.  Thus, the actual planting
of the Philippine Flag after they "capture" an MILF/BIAF is more than
symbolic.  It has been an integral part of such strategy.

        In the actual field battle ? the US thru its agents provide the AFP
with satellite photos of the camps and the movements of the MILF/BIAF.  And
every platoon leader of the main force of the AFP has a GPS (Global
Positioning System) to guide their movements and directions.

        On the other hand, in guerilla warfare, there is no defined battle 
ground
or front or camps.  The guerilla selects the time and place of its attack
and surely the satellite will have to produce hundreds of photos to monitor
the movements of the guerilla.

        As early as the fist quarter of this year, the MILF/BIAF has decided to
change its strategy from positional/conventional to highly mobile guerilla
warfare.  Their slogan of "victory or martyrdom" has been practiced not in
defending their camps but in defending their cause and the whole areas of
the Bangsamoro.

4.6.    Now, the battlefield of the ongoing war between the AFP and the
MILF/BIAF has been expanded into the international front.  The positive
attention given by the latest ICFM of the OIC in Kuala Lumpur has
implicitly put the MILF into a belligerent status and equal to that of the
GRP.

The seemingly joint efforts of the GRP delegation and the MNLF led by
        Governor Nur Misuari have maybe delayed the formal process of
        recognition of the MILF as observer in the OIC.  The OIC resolution of
        1977 (also in Kuala Lumpur) stated that it recognizes the MNLF as the
        sole and legitimate representative of the Moro people.  Since then, the
        MNLF sits as an observer in all the OIC meetings.

                The OIC is obligated to consummate this process with the MNLF.
        Its decision (July 2000) of sending a Committee of Six plus two to 
observe

and assess the peace agreement signed by the GRP and the MNLF in 1996 will
be part of such process.  Surely this Committee of Eight will not
turn their eyes and ears away from the destruction of lives and properties
in the MILF areas by the GRP's AFP.

        International pressures and interventions from the member countries of 
the
OIC in favor of the MILF will not be farfetched in the coming months.

4.7.    The move of Estrada in setting the deadline for peace talks with the
MILF last June 30,2000 will now be best understood by the abovementioned
events.  First, to pre-empt MILF's positioning in the July OIC's meeting.
Second, to please and solidify his hold and influence on the militarist
faction of his administration in order to remove the basis of the deadline
of the US Imperialist on September.  And thirdly, to consummate the first
and second points, he pursued his July-August working visit to the USA to
personally assure the US policymakers that he can handle the situation in
the country and in Mindanao in particular.

He needed the "all out war" to weaken the MILF in its bargaining
        position in the OIC.  But above all he needed the all out war to 
increase
        his popularity net rating because at the early state the government
        propagandists were successful in packaging the MILF as the "bad guy".

At present, Estrada wants this situation to continue because he lays down
three impossible conditions to continue the peace talks with the MILF.
First, the MILF will drop its secessionist bid.  Second, the MILF will stop
all its atrocities and criminal activities.  And third, the MILF will lay
down their arms.

In the second week of August, this year, the Government thru its Department
of Interior and Local Government has issued a directive setting aside an
amount of Php9 millions for the capture of Salamat Hashim (Php5 million)
the MILF Chair, Al Haj Murad (Php3 million) the MILF Vice Chair for
Military Affairs and Eid Kabalu (Php1 million) the current MILF Spokesman.

With these conditions and directive, one can't help but think whether
Estrada knows what he is talking or he does not want the peace talks to
continue because he now begins to believe the lines of his own propaganda ?
that the MILF is already a spent force.

And as expected, the MILF has a big laugh at these conditions and
directive.  Succintly, this attitude can be described by this? so what is
there to talk about if we follow Estrada's conditions?

At present, the deadline has not been formally extended.  The MILF on their
part is saying that if peace talks will continue, there should be no
pre-conditions.

4.8.    The intensification of the so-called "Muslim-Christian" conflict
can easily be traced to the overt and covert activities instigated by the
psy ops machineries of the AFP.  A case in point here is an attempt to
intrigues among the MILF/BIAF leaders and rank and file or with the Moro
masses in general by a Moro Engineer from a prominent clan in Maguindanao
province thru the use of the Shites tradition of Islam as against the Sunni
tradition which is practiced by most of the Moro masses and the MILF.  And
since he (Engineer) is trying to promote a more conservative tradition of
Islam, he does not have difficulties in packaging this so as to sow the
seeds of intrigues not only among the Moro but also between the Moro and
the Christians.  He tries to picture a situation that it will always be
impossible for the Moro-Muslim to live peacefully with the Filipino
Christians ? His military handler (case officer) is based in Camp Aguinaldo
? the main headquarter of the AFP.

        Recently, series of ambushes and massacres were inflicted on the
Christians in Mindanao and the AFP is always quick to pinpoint the MILF as
the perpetrators.  The usual reason they give is that they were done by the
Moro-Muslims and therefore they must be MILF.  And what usually follows is
that, the Christians want arms to protect themselves from the Moro.  And
the government is always ready and benevolent to provide them with arms.

        There is even a governor in one of the provinces of Mindanao who is 
saying
that the MILF is doing these ambushes and massacres of the Christians to
push the Christians to retaliate and therefore also massacre the Muslims
and therefore, the OIC will have justification to intervene in behalf of
the MILF.  By the way, this governor is very much identified as an avid and
consistent anti-Moro.  He is even identified as supporter of the Maneros
(Kumander Bukay); the priest killer and organizer of a Christian vigilantes
which is famous for eating the liver of their Muslim victims.

        The same governor is the one who provided the Estrada Administration
supposedly a list of those local government officials who have been
supporting the MILF.  This prompted Estrada to order an arrest of those
people.  As a result, these is now witch-hunting and harassments of local
officials especially those who disagree with the all out war policy of
Estrada and the local opponents of the Government.

        Added to this, the governor wants Estrada to approve the deployment of
three thousand five hundred (3,500) CAFGUs in his province to protect
supposedly themselves from the MILF.  It should be noted however, that the
next elections is fast approaching and the governor will be faced with a
stronger opponent coming from the "Ruling Party".  (The governor belongs to
the LAKAS  Party ? an opposition party).  He wants therefore the CAFGU, to
be his local private army.

        And as a result of this kind of packaging, one can see that almost all 
the
towns of Mindanao (aside from the abovementioned governor's province).  The
Christians have organized and armed themselves against the so-called enemy
? the MILF.

4.9.    The re-appearance of the Abu Sayyaf almost at the time when Estrada
and his generals have started their "all out war" in Mindanao was not
accidental.  Aside from the instrumental role of the agents of the AFP in
the founding of this extremist and terrorist group, it has been playing a
direct and active role in creating an anti-Moro/Muslim sentiments and the
Christians.  Thus again justifying the arming of themselves to protect
themselves against the Moro.

Initially, the AFP and its handlers of propaganda machineries had been
successful in packaging and projecting that the Abu Sayyaf and the MILF are
not dissimilar.

Now, that this scheme has been explosed, the Abu Sayyaf has been
concentrating on the anti-social activities like kidnapping for ransom.
They have been successful in this activity in projecting themselves not
only nationally but also internationally and reaping a harvest of more than
two hundred million pesos.

The kidnappings of the Abu Sayyaf have indeed contributed a lot in the
deterioration of the national economy and therefore lead one to think
whether their AFP handlers have lost their control over this extremist and
criminal group or these are still part of the whole plan to project the
unreasonableness of the Moro people to the whole world.

The kidnappings have been done with total impunity and ransom have been
paid openly, although it seems that only the government negotiators do not
know about the ransom.  Kidnappings have been done in different stages with
different sets of people involved in the process.  The process includes a
part of negotiation, keeping the hostages, liaisoning, etc. Ransom money is
divided based on the participation of local government officials and
military in the whole process is not impossible as shown in the past, they
too get their own share of the ransom money.

This explains why there is no attempt from the negotiators (headed by a
cabinet level personality) as well as local and civil and military
officials to cordon the area so that only one set of kidnap victory are
held in one place.  Practically, the victims or potential victims are, as
if, presenting themselves to the Abu Sayyaf by going to their Camp.

The handling of the Abu Sayyaf and its kidnapping activities, is a
reflection of how the Estrada Administration is governing or managing the
affairs of the country.  Graft and Corruption do not select the place and
kind and time within the present government.

4.10.   The proliferation of peace initiatives and movements in and outside
Mindanao have in the main, neutralized to a certain degree, the intrigues
and animosities among and between the Muslims and the Christians.

Problems have been experienced on the level of establishing genuine
        broad alliance among the different political groups.

                But in the main, the RPMP leadership in Mindanao has provided
        political leadership in these initiatives and movements.  Even the
        Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) has never genuinely initiated
        (at least in the early stage) a comprehensive plan for peace 
mobilizations
        aside from the media offensives that they have been doing.

                With regards to other political groups, some of them have shown
        strong tendency of using the situation for money making activities.

4.11.   As things stand now, the Estrada Administration is facing converging
problems heightened by the Mindanao situation.  He has been under pressure
from within and outside the government and even by his patron to decisively
face the problems and take an honorable exit in Mindanao.

His signing of Executive Order 261, creating the Mindanao
        Coordinating Committee has met strong opposition from within his group
        and more so from his critiques. The more he makes a smokescreen of
        fast tracking the economic development, the more he is exposed of his
        real intent in Mindanao and the manner in which he handles the issues of
        peace and development.  He does not need an emergency power to fast
        track or hasten development in any part of the country.  Even if his
inten-
        tion is to bypass former President Ramos and Misuari's SPCPD, all the
        more that he can do this more effectively when he does not expose
        himself.

                This month, the OIC will send a Committee of six plus two to do 
the
fact finding mission on how the 1996 Peace Agreement between the MNLF and
the GRP has fared.

        Definitely, the agenda on the MILF will not be excluded from this
fact finding mission.

4.12.   The MILF leadership is proposing that the next round of peace talks
will be held in a neutral country which was rejected immediately by the GRP
representatives.

The MILF made mention about the government's harassments and
        crackdown as reason for insisting that the peace talks will be held
outside
        the country.  The GRP tries to project an image of being on top of the
        situation in the talks  and wants to issue a safe conduct pass to the
        MILF negotiators.

                At present, the GRP has not responded to the no pre-conditioned
        peace talks put forward by the MILF.

                It is a political stand still.

Meanwhile, the international initiatives of the MILF has been reaping a
bountiful harvest.  The implicit belligerent status accorded it
        by the IFCM-OIC in Kuala Lumpur will surely be maximized.  Based on
        this, the MILF can even set up a government in exile in any of the
        friendly members of the powerful OIC.  When this happens, the problems
        faced by the Estrada Administration will be worst than the one faced by
        the Marcos dictatorship.  The only difference is, he can not do a Marcos
        (declaring Martial Law) without facing a neo-EDSA reaction from the
        people.  And definitely, Estrada will not have a Hawai to go because the
        agents of the USI will not even dare to let him reach nearer to such or
        similar situation.




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