Turkey's modern pashas

[Louis Proyect <lnp3@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Le Monde diplomatique
-----------------------------------------------------

September 2000

MILITARY WITH POLITICAL POWER

Turkey's modern pashas
_________________________________________________________________

In August Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, former head of the
constitutional court, refused to ratify the government decree authorising
the immediate dismissal of civil servants suspected of sympathising with
Kurdish 'separatists' or Muslim 'fundamentalists'. His veto was seen as a
challenge to the military high command, who bear down on the country's
political system and are not used to this sort of resistance.

by ÉRIC ROULEAU *
__________________________________________________________________

In any democratic country the spectacle of former conspirators celebrating
the anniversary of their coup would be, to say the least, unusual. But
about 20 former Turkish officers commemorated the 40th anniversary of the
"democratic revolution" of 27 May 1960 with various events that seemed so
ordinary the local media paid almost no attention. The officers solemnly
laid a wreath on Atatürk's tomb. In his capacity as president of the 1961
Constitution Foundation, Numan Esin, a former army captain and now a
successful business leader, organised a public conference. The gathering
was the occasion for eulogistic speeches, vibrant with pride and nostalgia,
followed by a typically republican banquet - fraternal, congenial and
militant - culminating in a round of patriotic songs featuring about 100
civil and military personalities, all well over retiring age.

This would come as a surprise only to those unfamiliar with Turkey's
culture, where the armed forces have always played a key role in politics,
under both the Ottoman empire and the republic. The troops of the Sublime
Porte, and particularly the Janissaries before the 19th century, did not
hesitate to assassinate, overthrow or enthrone sultans. In some cases they
intervened to uphold privileges and, less frequently, to promote progress.

At the end of the first world war General Kemal Atatürk drew on the support
of part of the armed forces to oust the incumbent rulers and, in 1923, he
founded a resolutely modern republic. Of the 10 presidents who have
succeeded him as head of state, six have been high-ranking members of the
military. Ever since "radical" young officers seized power in May 1960
Turkey has undergone a series of military conspiracies and coups, the most
recent of which, in February 1997, was referred to as "virtual". Twenty
"recommendations" by the general staff were enough to put an end to the
coalition government headed by an Islamist, Necmettin Erbakan. In a rush of
enthusiasm, some of the Turkish media started deferentially calling their
heroes - the high-ranking officers - "pashas", a title reserved for
generals at the time of the empire (1).

Pashas of the "left" and "right" have repeatedly meddled in the politics of
the republic, invoking Kemalism as a justification. Since Atatürk died in
1938 the term has been used incessantly: in successive constitutional
documents drawn up by the military, in the laws based on them, in political
speeches, in the oath sworn by the president of the republic, by members of
parliament, by judges and leading civil servants. Any opinion or initiative
concerning foreign or internal policy must comply with the real or
imaginary concepts and wishes expressed by the founder of the republic.

Atatürk was a pragmatic man, a visionary and statesman, who frogmarched
Turkey into the developed world, drawing his inspiration from both the
French revolution and the state organisations of contemporary totalitarian
powers. It would consequently be a mistake to see Kemalism as an ideology.
Had this been the case, his successors would not have reversed some of the
main tenets of his policy. For instance, they replaced his one-party system
with a multi-party regime, relinquished state control of the economy in
favour of market forces, came to the defence of Turkish minorities abroad
(in Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece and elsewhere) and supported Muslim peoples
(in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, etc.). This ran counter to the principle
established by Atatürk that the republic should at all costs avoid
defending Turkish, let alone Muslim, citizens of other countries. Above
all, the "father of the Turks" banned anyone serving in the armed forces
from involvement in public affairs (2).

Atatürk's successors nevertheless decided to transform him into a
figurehead, after eliminating anything they felt was outdated or
troublesome. They turned Kemalism into a state dogma, retaining exclusive
rights on its interpretation. They were thus able to define government
systems and political conduct as it suited them - and sanction anyone who
contested their power. The dogma, couched in simple terms but conveniently
vague in content, is presented as an absolute value. It can be summed up in
a few words: integrity of national territory, unity of the nation, and a
secular republic. These are honourable principles that everyone is sure to
support, but only the army may act as their guardian.

The officer corps, which carries out its will, is a typically elite group
(3). Candidates for a military career are taken in hand at adolescence,
undergoing a strict selection process before receiving intensive training
in special schools. The ministry of education has no control over what they
are taught. In addition to their military training, cadets attend
undergraduate courses in history, political science, economics, sociology
and a range of foreign languages.

Officers in the regular army earn much higher salaries than civil servants
of comparable rank. They shop in cut-price army stores, qualify for special
terms on mortgages, and take their holidays in hotels and clubs reserved
exclusively for them.

A virtual coup

The 1982 constitution, currently in force, was drawn up by the generals who
seized power two years earlier and institutionalised the political power of
the armed forces. The National Security Council, sometimes referred to as a
shadow government, meets once a month. It comprises six members from the
military - five generals and one admiral, in full dress uniform - and five
civilian leaders (4). The council is empowered to submit its views - in
practice, orders - to the government on questions of "national security".
According to a recent memorandum issued by the general staff, "practically
everything in public life is related to national security", both in foreign
and internal policy (5).

The council's deliberations, and sometimes even its decisions, are kept
secret. The Islamist leader, Necmettin Erbakan, signed his government's
death sentence in February 1997 when he asked parliament to approve the
council's 18 "recommendations" for eradicating "religious reaction". His
mistake was to have pretended not to understand that this was an ultimatum
paving the way for the "virtual" coup. He had obviously forgotten that
under the Ottoman Empire sultans knew when their time was up when the
Janissaries overturned their cauldrons to show their anger.

Power of the pashas

The constitution grants the armed forces a degree of autonomy that no
democratic state would tolerate (6). The chief of general staff takes
precedence over the ministry of defence and all the other members of the
government. The prime minister comes first in order of protocol but wields
less real authority in the most sensitive areas. Amongst other things, the
chief of general staff decides appointments and promotions within the armed
forces, supervises internal and external security, decides defence policy,
and manages the production and purchase of arms, the cost of which does not
appear in the state budget.

It was quite by chance, for instance, that we learnt from Defense Week of
14 February 2000 that modernisation of the armed forces would cost about
$70bn over the next 15 years. Traditionally the budget for the army's
running expenses (alluded to very briefly, despite the fact that it
accounts for one third, or more, of state revenue) is approved without
debate, by acclamation. The entire assembly then addresses its
"congratulations" and "good wishes" to the head of general staff.

The constitution, and the corresponding laws, give the general staff direct
or indirect control over higher education and most of the judiciary.
Misdemeanours and crimes against the state are handled by the state
security courts, with high-ranking military on the bench until recently.
Legislators, university rectors, public prosecutors and judges are required
to comply with the limited definition of freedom that appears in the
preamble to the constitution: "no protection shall be afforded to thoughts
or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, [...] Turkish
historical and moral values, [...] the principles, reforms and modernism of
Atatürk."

Article 13 provides a more detailed definition of these values: "The
indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national
sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general peace,
the public interest, public morals and public health". Article 14 goes one
step further, "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution
shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of
the State with its territory and nation." The courts will not only punish
acts, but also reprehensible "thoughts or opinions". Article 130 goes so
far as to stipulate that "scientific research and publication" may be
banned by university deans if contrary to the values quoted above (7). The
electoral law, promulgated just after the 1982 constitution, and all the
laws covering political parties, professional bodies and unions, contain
restrictions that supposedly comply with Kemalist dogma.

The political power of the pashas would not be so deeply rooted if it did
not also draw on substantial economic and financial resources (8). The army
owns a vast holding, called Oyak, consisting of about 30 large companies
involved in manufacturing, distribution and exports in sectors as varied as
cars, cement, food, pesticides, oil, tourism, insurance, banking, property,
supermarkets and high technology. These companies employ about 30,000
people directly, as well as giving work to partner companies. One of the
group's star performers, Oyak-Renault, boasts an annual production capacity
of 160,000 cars (9).

Oyak, which is one of the top three or four holdings in Turkey, is
generously funded. It takes a mandatory 10% of the salary of all members of
the armed forces and reaps the profits from its own companies, reputed to
be some of the most profitable in the country. This is hardly surprising
for Oyak is exempted from all taxes and duties, a privilege that other
organisations in the private sector no doubt view as unfair competition.

Major companies have, however, learnt to live with this arrangement, for
Oyak has involved them in its activities, by interest and design. Taha
Parla, a professor at Bosphorus University, has studied the subject and
identified several powerful holdings among Oyak partners, including those
belonging to the Koç and Sabanci families, known as the "emperors" of
industry and trade, and the Taskent family, the "barons" of merchant
banking. Private companies also give retired senior officers management
jobs, as a reward for past services and a way of maintaining connections
with officers in the regular army. In this way an tripartite alliance has
been sealed between the military elite, big business (in Turkey and abroad)
and state bureaucracy.

The TSKGV (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation), which also belongs to the
army, is Oyak's sister organisation. It comprises about 30 industrial
companies that enjoy the same privileges as Oyak. The foundation
concentrates exclusively on arms production, employs roughly 20,000 people
and provides work for tens of thousands of other workers in subcontracting
companies. Over 80% of revenue is paid into a fund thought to amount to
several tens of billions of dollars. As Parla points out, this is an
original way of accumulating (military) capital other than what is accrued
by the (civilian) private sector.

The triumvirate formed by the army, big business and state bureaucracy is
protected by a battery of constitutional and legal provisions. Its
influence increases when the balance of political power leans in its
favour, when opposition in society declines, or when - as has been the case
in recent years - politicians are increasingly discredited. Under these
circumstances the political parties, parliament, government and media
merely acquiesce when the military disregard the rule of law.

They made no objection, for instance, when the pashas refused to show
parliament the texts of agreements with Israel. Nor did they react when
Turkish forces launched a massive incursion - without informing the
government - into northern Iraq to fight Kurdish nationalists belonging to
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party). Nothing was said when the pashas vetoed
a postponement of the elections, despite the support of a majority of
members of parliament. Similarly, the military met no opposition when they
halted attempts to suppress articles in the penal code contrary to human
rights or blocked enquiries into scandals (notably into particularly
repugnant aspects of the fight against the Kurds) that might have tarnished
the reputation of the armed forces. Appearances are saved, for these
injunctions generally take the form of "views" or "wishes" expressed by a
member of the general staff, which of course does not preclude less subtle
forms of pressure behind the scenes.

Two major problems have conveniently replaced the ones that once gave the
army an excuse to play a leading role in public life. The cold war threats
of the Soviet Union and communism have given way to fear of "Islamic
fundamentalism" and "Kurdish separatism" - both of which confirm the
legitimacy and popularity of the pashas, as the accredited defenders of
secularism and the republic's territorial integrity.

The disastrous war in Kurdistan

The PKK combatants certainly bolstered the official line by taking up arms
to obtain an independent Kurdish state in the south-eastern provinces of
Turkey and continuing to proclaim their Marxist-Leninist values. The PKK,
led by Abdullah Öcalan (known as Apo), subsequently gave up its most
extreme demands. In recent years, it has made numerous offers to negotiate
federal status, self-government, or a democratic process securing basic
rights for the Kurds. It has even declared unilateral truces, but on each
occasion its efforts have been ignored or presented as a trap (10). Kurdish
and Turkish intellectuals who supported recognition of just their cultural
rights ended up in court accused of "separatism" or "conspiring with the PKK".

As a result, the war started in 1984 continued for 15 years, until Apo was
arrested in Kenya in February last year. It brought a succession of
atrocities, perpetrated by both sides, the destruction of about 2,000
Kurdish settlements, the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of their
inhabitants, mass arrests, torture, and assassinations committed by "death
squads" very probably sponsored by the state, itself infiltrated by
organised crime.

The war was pointless - doing nothing to solve the Kurdish problem --and
disastrous in several respects. Not only did it have a negative impact on
civil liberty, but its cost, estimated at $150bn, jeopardised economic
development and living standards. Above all, far from "cementing national
unity", it widened the gulf between Kurds and Turks.

Fear of the 'fundamentalists'

The conflict with the PKK is not unconnected with the one opposing the army
and the Islamists. In the aftermath of the 1980 putsch a campaign was
launched against the far-left, to which the PKK belonged, but at the same
time positive signals were made to the Islamist movement, which was seen as
a rampart against communism. Religious instruction was made compulsory in
state primary and secondary schools, and the pro-Islamist Refah Partisi
(Welfare Party) was legalised. With its first election successes in
1994-95, the very same party became the main enemy.

Two paradoxes make it difficult to understand the conflict. The first one
concerns the meaning of the word "secular" in Turkey. It does not mean the
separation of religion from state, but rather its integration and control
by the authorities, which may even use it for their own ends (11). The
department of religious affairs, generously funded by a state budget,
manages, amongst other things, 500 secondary schools (imam hatip) that are
separate from ordinary state schools and intended to train future imams. In
practice they provide a religious education for hundreds of thousands of
future civil service and private sector executives.

The same state-funded organisation has built thousands of mosques, at
taxpayers' expense, with the overall aim of promoting an "enlightened" form
of Islam in line with Kemalist principles - an undertaking that has proved
distinctly dubious. In a similar vein, a person's religion must be
mentioned on their identity card despite the fact that the constitution
states that, "No one shall be compelled [...] to reveal religious beliefs
and convictions." Is the state taking over Islam, as those who defend the
system maintain, or Islam taking over the state, as its opponents suggest?

Another major paradox is the precise nature of the "Islamist" party that is
accused of all manner of ills - now the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
which succeeded Refah, outlawed after the "virtual" coup in 1997. The type
of party set up by Erbakan with Refah is anything but fundamentalist.
Erbakan is a political veteran and a long-standing member of parliament; on
two occasions he served as vice-president of the council of ministers - in
right and leftwing coalition governments. The party certainly has Muslim
leanings - after the fashion of Christian Democrats in western Europe - but
it supports the republic, defends French-style secular principles - in the
words of its founder - as well as parliamentary pluralism and human rights.

Fazilet fills the gap in the political spectrum due to the destruction of
the left after decades of repression (12) and claims to defend the poor,
workers, lower middle classes in the towns and country, but particularly
Anatolian and Muslim inhabitants of outlying parts of Turkey. In addition,
Fazilet contests - admittedly only implicitly - the army's political power
and the refusal to recognise the identity of the Kurds, who vote massively
for the party each time a pro-Kurdish formation is prevented from running.
Clearly the issues at the root of the confrontation between Fazilet and the
military have nothing to do with the defence of secularism.

It is easy enough to see why the general staff thinks the threats to the
republic - namely the joint demands of the Anatolians and Kurds - are not a
thing of the past, despite the rout of the PKK and Fazilet's defeat at the
last elections. These persistent threats also explain why the competent
authorities have done nothing to initiate the democratisation that the
European Union has been demanding for years, and specifically at the
Helsinki summit last year. But Turkey must comply with the so-called
Copenhagen criteria within five years. Only then can the negotiations for
its admission to the EU really start (13). The task will be particularly
arduous, always assuming that it is undertaken seriously, for it will
involve carrying through a revolution to dismantle a solidly established,
tightly knit state system.
_________________________________________________________________

*Journalist

(1) See Panayotis Gavras, "The role of the military in Turkish society", a
thesis submitted to the Department of Near Eastern studies at Princeton
University, April 1989.

(2) With one exception, for the chief of staff was entitled to attend
cabinet meetings.

(3) See Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel. An anatomy of the Turkish armed
forces, published by I.B.Tauris, London, 1991. This unique field study of
the armed forces reveals some of what goes on behind the scenes.

(4) For the military, the chief of general staff, commanders of the army,
navy, air forces and police, and a general acting as the secretary general
of the council (this last, however, cannot vote); on the civilian side, the
president of the republic, prime minister and the ministers of defence,
foreign affairs and the interior. In the case of a 5:5 vote, the president
of the republic has the casting vote. Chief of General Staff Huseyin
Kivrikoglu recently said that he had no objection to introducing "even 100
civilians to the Security Council if that is the wish of the EU" since its
decisions are taken "not by the majority of votes but by consensus".

(5) Los Angeles Times, 9 March 2000.

(6) See the paper by Umit Sakallioglu, lecturer at Bilkent University,
Ankara, entitled "The anatomy of the Turkish military's autonomy",
published in Comparative Politics, New York, vol. 29, n°2.

(7) It will therefore come as no surprise that no Turkish authors have
published works or university theses providing an overall analysis of the
army's role in politics. This is undoubtedly due to the lack of
transparency and the prudence of academics.

(8) Taha Parla, "Mercantile militarism in Turkey 1960-1998" in New
Perspectives on Turkey, Istanbul, autumn 1998.

(9) Oyak, which stands for Ordu Yardumlasma Kurumu (armed forces pension
fund), was founded in January 1961 by the people that led the coup in May
1960. Its industrial and commercial activities took off after the 1980
putsch thanks to economic deregulation.

(10) See Kendal Nezan, "No justice for the Kurds", and Michel Verrier, "The
Kurdish people put on trial", Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, March
and June 1999 respectively.

(11) Umit Sakallioglu: "Parameters and strategies of Islam-State
interaction in Republican Turkey", an essay published by the Journal of
Middle East Studies, Cambridge (United Kingdom), n° 28, 1996. The author
explains that Atatürk first used Islam for his own ends when he declared a
jihad in support of the war of national liberation against the Allies and
the Ottoman Empire. The aim was to rally Anatolian notables, religious
leaders and the peasants to his cause.

(12) See Wendy Kristianasen, "Secular Turks search for reform", Le Monde
diplomatique, English edition, February 1999.

(13) See Niels Kadritzke, "Greece's earthquake diplomacy", Le Monde
diplomatique, English edition, June 2000.

Translated by Harry Forster


Louis Proyect
Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/