Re: ON INDEPENDENCE OF TINY NATIONAL GROUPS

["Nestor Miguel Gorojovsky" <gorojovsky@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

En relación a Re: ON INDEPENDENCE OF TINY NATIONAL GROUPS,
el 11 Mar 00, a las 19:11, Louis Proyect dijo:

>
> Jared, the KDE [...] present a very schematic analysis which
> puts a minus where the imperialists put a plus. This is not very
> dialectical.

Sure not. But it is not a bad first approach. The only reason why one
should be careful here, usually, is that the imperialists do not
always clearly discern their interests, or that the issue at stake is
not a crucial one.

I usually find the rule of thumb a good one. And in this particular
case, it is IMHO quite good indeed.

Not without a reason, American geopolitics is still based on the
Mackinderian statement that a huge Eurasian power will be the only
truly possible way out of world domination by "seafaring empires",
that is, Anglo Saxon imperialism (e.g.,  British Commonwealth
yesteryear and American imperialim today).

The disruption and tearing away of the Caucasus, its transformation
into a new Balkan area, is one of the main goals of imperialists, and
of the Anglo Saxon imperialists in particular.  A first hand account
will stress the economic interest, access to oil reserves in
particular.  But there is a more strategic trend that underscores the
whole move. If there were not oil, the general policy would be the
same one.

This trend has to do with containment of Russia (see that I am not
speaking of the Soviet Union, but of Russia as a geopolitical
entity).  The old policy of Great Britain that contained the Czar all
along the Ottoman, Iranian and Afghan border is still alive, more
alive than ever, and it has been considerably reinforced after the
downfall of the House of Stalin.

This South Eastern border of the Russian territory (as watched from
Moscow) has been a hot frontier since, at least, the late 18th.
Century. The greatest achievements of the British imperialists were
obtained during the short period when, due to the October Revolution,
the influence of Russia in the South seemed to fade down. Since at
the same time the Ottoman Empire died for good, the whole area of the
Caucasus, Armenia, Kurdistan, Azerbaijan (one should remember that
Azerbaijan extends both to the North and to the South of the Iranian
border, BTW), and the Transcaspian northern fringes of Iran and
Afghanistan became a hothouse for statelet design and creation.

One of the saddest consequences of all this was the murderous
creation of an Armenian republic during the aftermath of World War I.
The Armenians, who played in the vast extension of the Mediterranean
Ottoman empire a role similar to that of Jews in Medieval Europe
(that is, they were essentially an interloping people, though their
transformation into a "class people" was not completed because they
did not fully abandon their homeland), were supported by British
imperialism in order to have a "free" tiny national Armenian state to
ensure good access to the Caspian oil but ALSO AND IN MY OPINION
ESSENTIALLY to have a British (or at least Anglo-French) protected
"nation" acting as a wedge pointed to the Caucasus.

Both the victory of the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus and the
strengthening of Turkish power in the Eastern borderlands of their
now almost exclusively Anatolian state made this Armenian
independence a short lived (and in the second case, murderously
elliminated) experience. But it was to show a trend.

I need not recall the host of frontier skirmishes and conflicts waged
between Russia and England on Iran and Afghanistan. Britain was
always keen not to allow Russia to extend towards the sea, but also
NOT TO ALLOW THE INDIAN PEARL OF THE EMPIRE TO BE
THREATENED BY RUSSIA (a threat that in a sense the Indian bourgeoisie
found very profitable and helped them follow a relatively independent
path during the 60s, by the way). The support to the Afghan "Freedom
Fighters" under Rambo/Reagan was not of a different intention and
even symbolism.

So that any move for independence (particularly if this independence
cannot be held by resort to the area's internal strengths) in the
Caucasus area is of a vital disruptive interest for Western
imperialists. The social and economic origin of current Chechen
"separatism" is, by the way, absolutely linked to the emergence of
the roguish Russian bourgeoisie (roguish bourgeoisie being
pleonastic, I resort to the adjective, however, because in this trend
the Russians were admirable). Mark Jones has fully explained that the
power of the Chechen gangs was one of the mainstays of the Maffia in
Moscow and elsewhere, and it is these same gangs that constitute the
core of the Chechen "national leadership" today. They were kicked
away from business in Moscow, and then they sought a new kind of
business taking advantage of their geopolitic situation as the main
door to the Caucasus, as well as from the fact that the oil pipe
lines from Baku traverse Chechnya on their road to the Northwest.
In this business they found themselves rapidly wooed by the American
imperialists.

Against this, no matter what class is represented in power, ANY
(repeat ANY) Russian government must fight. Putin is not precisely
the guy I would like to drink a beer with, granted. But he is not
Yeltsin. He is the candidate that the Yeltsinites have found in order
to put a stop to Ziuganov. What has he done? He has decided to pave
his road to power on the Chechen issue, which is a reactionary way to
follow Russian popular interest, but a way to do it anyhow. He has
gained popularity for his management of the Chechen war.

Would we, as socialists, have preferred another management? Certainly
so. But there is no socialist alternative at sight in Russia today,
revolutionary socialist I mean. What is left, then?  A Yeltsinite
(that is, pro-imperialist) candidate who has to demonstrate that he
is less pro-imperialist than Yeltsin. He will certainly not re-
socialize Russian economy, he will not put the oligarchs to the
shooting wall, nor will he turn Russia into a beacon of world
revolution. But Russian people and the Russian intelligentsia, as
represented by Putin (yes, I have a feeling that he represents the
intelligentsia somehow), have seen what happenned in Yugoslavia, and
did not like it at all.

They have thus began to deploy a policy of Eurasian containment, so
to say. Putin represents the most reactionary side of this
containment, certainly, and the one I do loathe most. But he is NOT a
direct representative of the oligarchs and imperialism. He is more of
a transitional man, of a transactional candidate.

And the Chechens?  Well, they have put all their money on the
alliance with the West, the STRATEGIC alliance I mean. In this sense,
even Putin is more progressive than them. In this sense, I disagree
deeply with Louis when he states that

>
> It is most glaringly apparent in their interpretation of the Chechnya
> war, which has Putin in the same beleagured status as Milosevic and
> the Chechens acting as cats paws. This has absolutely no validity.

It is not necessary to be in the same status as Milosevic to be
forced to confront Western imperialism or their business partners.
Milosevic is the "weak" one, and Putin the "strong" one, but both are
answering aggressions fueled or directly acted by Western
imperialism. What the West is trying to prevent in the Caucasus is
the strengthening of the Eurasian front that has faintly began to
become visible after that blunder of all blunders, the bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade. We shall end our lives pointing to that
particular place and moment, and saying "there is where all this
began".

Louis Pr says that

> During the siege of Grozny, the United States approved a 1/2 billion
> dollar loan that supposedly would be held back because of excesses by
> the Russian army. The reason that the loan went through is that it was
> earmarked for relief for Russian miners who would lose their jobs in
> the course of a privatization orchestrated by the Kremlin in
> association with western investors. As I have pointed out in my "New
> Interventions" article, Milosevic became persona non grata after he
> refused to participate in similar schemes in Yugoslavia.

In my opinion, he is loosing sight of what is essential here. Putin
is not "persona non grata", certainly. But his Chechen war is
accepted by the West as the minor of two evils, facing the situation
in Russia. The fact that he was not openly demonized by this implies,
among others, that the Western powers know that he is not popular
among progressives in the way a non-Satanized Milosevic would have
been, and that one must pamper today's Quisling. But the domestic
price to be paid in Russia in order for this Quisling to be effective
is to wage a victorious war against the -so to say- minor allies of
the West. You have a great ally in Putin, and a minor ally in the
Chechens. Then, silence on Putin's war in the Caucasus, or just a
mild demonization.

>
> The other thing to keep in mind is that Clinton has always been
> supportive of Russian domination of Chechnya. During the 1994 war,
> Clinton likened Yeltsin to Lincoln, as somebody fighting to preserve
> the unity of his republic. When Milosevic sent his army into Kosovo,
> Clinton likened him to Hitler.

Again, the comparison does not seem to hold in my own view. Clinton
was supporting Yeltsin not because his war was less unpalatable than
Milo's war, but because Yeltsin was a good servant and Milo an
independent Yougoslav ruler.

This is, at least, what I would call a Third World view of these
issues.





Néstor Miguel Gorojovsky
gorojovsky@xxxxxxxxxxx