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Re: Kosovo and "the Jewish Question"




>This article is problematic, not in terms of the analysis of Kosovo and
>Yugoslavia but in terms of the author's condemnation of all ethnic
>nationalism. What would he say about radical black nationalism or the
>struggles of indigenous peoples for self determination?
>
>Michael Yates

The main problem with the article, which is fairly endemic in much of the
discussion about self-determination for Kosovo, is that it is detached from
the question of what this has to do with socialism. The author John
Rosenthal is a philosophy professor, so his arguments tend to center on
logical fallacies, particularly what he sees as a danger of 'reductio ad
absurdum' in defining the rights of a nationality. If Kosovo deserves
independence, why not establish similar rights for the Serbs inside its
borders? Etc., etc.

What's needed is a deeper engagement with Marxism, not philosophy or logic.

Another serious problem is that very little work is being done today to
undestand the "national question" in the context of contemporary society,
politics and economics on a global scale. Most of the positions taken by
our Trotskyist brethren are simply lifted from whole cloth out of Lenin's
writings from 1917-1921. The argument goes that since Lenin said that
oppressed nations have the right to self-determination, Marxists are
obligated to support that demand. Further, since Lenin said that the Soviet
Union had to break with the Czarist past, all nationalities within its
borders had the right to secede. This latter argument serves as the
lynchpin in the case against Milosevic.

The problem is that Lenin wrote these articles in the context of global
politics in 1917-1921. The reality was that imperialism retained direct
control over vast sections of the world. The British flag flew over India,
a nation of some hundreds of millions. All of Africa, except Ethiopia, was
divided into colonies. Although Marxists had always opposed colonialism, it
was Lenin's contribution to theorize the revolutionary socialist dynamic of
anticolonial struggles. Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution
complemented Lenin's ideas on the importance of national liberation
struggles. But in either case, the fight for socialism was uppermost in
their minds.

On the Soviet Union itself, Lenin also did not detach the question of
self-determination from the fight to preserve the new state from capitalist
attack--its most important imperative. This meant that he was wiling to
compromise on the national question when it clashed with the broader need
to defend socialism. As E.H. Carr points out, the Bolsheviks signed a
treaty with Turkey that effectively sacrificed the national
self-determination demands of the Armenians just to relieve pressure on the
southern front.

Since Trotsky is considered the guardian of Leninist rectitude by his
followers, it is important to understand that when it came to a similar
clash between the need to defend the Soviet state and defend the right for
self-determination, he was cautious not to sign a blank check as was too
often the case with respect to Kosovo by his followers.

Specifically, Trotsky called for "A united, free, and independent workers'
and peasants' Soviet Ukraine." In other words, he qualified his support for
secession in class terms. The constellation of Trotskyist and
post-Trotskyist groups, all of whom approach Milosevic as a latter-day
Stalin neglected to apply a similar class criterion with respect to the
national aspirations of Kosovo.

Fresh thinking on all of these questions is necessary. Perhaps the sine qua
non is to put all of the tracts by Lenin and Trotsky back on the bookshelf.
There are a number of new realities. To begin with, formal independence is
the rule across the entire planet so classical fights for independence are
exceptions to the rule. East Timor, Ireland, Palestine and the Kurdish
struggle come to mind.

In nearly every other case, what you are dealing with are demands that are
not made on imperialism but on very weak "peripheral" states like
Yugoslavia or Nigeria and a dozen other African nations. When imperialism
was applying immense pressures on Yugoslavia during the 1980s, secessionist
demands were inevitably a function of a desire to break with what was seen
as a doomed economic project. Perhaps the clearest expression of the
political and economic framework can be found in a surprisingly candid May
12, 1990 Los Angeles Times article. Reading it carefully, you will have no
difficulty understanding why war broke out very rapidly:

====
COMMUNIST VICTORY IN SERBIA MAY SIGNAL START OF
YUGOSLAV BREAKUP

Communism's sweeping election victory in Serbia may have eased fears of a
military coup, but it sets up what observers say is a worst-case-scenario
for durable peace and Yugoslav unity.

The only hope for avoiding a breakup of the federation was for Serbia to
elect a democratic president or a Parliament willing to negotiate a more
equitable relationship with Slovenia and Croatia. Yugoslavia's two most
prosperous republics plan to secede unless they are granted economic and
military autonomy. . .

"If the results are such that the opposition has failed even to win a
majority in the Assembly, then it means the end of Yugoslavia," said a
senior Western diplomat.

The choice of Milosevic and what amounts to hard-line communism isolates
Serbia, the largest republic, from four other Yugoslav states that have
elected center-right governments and set about repairing the economic
damage inflicted by half a century of Marxism. . .

Vuk Draskovic, the [nationalist] movement's presidential contender, won
only 17% of the vote, according to the partial returns.

The bearded novelist, who had been considered a strong challenger to
Milosevic, was visibly shaken by the loss and denounced the electorate for
choosing "bondage and Bolshevism" over the democracy and economic reform
championed by his anti-Communist movement. . .

Milosevic has refused to negotiate a realignment of relations within the
federation or to reduce the economic burdens placed on the two northern
republics [in other words, he demanded that Croatia and Slovenia continue
to pay their fair share for economic development in Kosovo].

Now that Socialist rule has been legitimized in Serbia, the northern
republics will more easily win backing from the West for their secession
efforts, since there is no hope of uniting democratic and Communist
governments, he said.

"It's the worst thing that could have happened for Yugoslavia as a nation,"
he concluded. "What can we say to the West now? Only that Serbs are still
stupid."

Western diplomats agreed that the Socialist victory will accelerate the
secession efforts but noted that the victors now have to prove they can
correct colossal economic mistakes of their own making.

An official with Yugoslavia's largest bank, who did not want to be
identified, said Serbia has recently run up debts in excess of $4 billion.

"The Communists raised workers' salaries to create an atmosphere that
everything was fine in the republic," said Dejan Lucic, Belgrade leader of
the Serbian Renewal Movement. "But the money is not there to cover those
debts, and there's not going to be any help from the West for a Communist
government." [Raising workers salaries was a distinct no-no in 1990, as
the decade of "neoliberalism" was being launched.]

Several opposition figures said they hope that Serbia would be financially
isolated by the West, to hasten what they expect to be broad disenchantment
with the Milosevic leadership within the next few months. ["Financially
isolated" is a euphemism for economic sabotage.]

"There will have to be new elections soon," predicted Mihailo Mladenovic,
president of the Serbian Royalist Bloc. "Yugoslavia is bankrupt -- Serbia
as well -- and we can't expect help from anyone because we have already
squandered our credit." [New elections? This, I would remind comrades is
exactly what was said about Nicaragua, if the FSLN had won rather than
Chamorro. Although it was poorly understood at the time, the attack on
Nicaragua and Yugoslavia were driven by the same imperative to roll back
communism.]

Diplomats and opposition figures said they worry that Serbia, and
Yugoslavia by extension, was headed for a "Bulgaria scenario."
Disillusionment with the elected Socialists in Bulgaria mounted in the
months after the June election there, eventually bringing down the
government in late November.

Yugoslavia will face the additional pressure of its most prosperous
republics trying to bolt from the federation, undermining any hope of
economic recovery.

Slovenia plans a referendum on secession on Dec. 23, which is expected to
gain at least 80% support and set the independence juggernaut in motion.

Slovenia and Croatia, Yugoslavia's two most prosperous republics, have said
they plan to secede unless they are granted economic and military autonomy.
Slovenia plans a referendum on secession on Dec. 23. It is expected to gain
at least 80% support, which could start the wheels of the independence
movement turning.



Louis Proyect
Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org/





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