Indonesia (fwd)

[edysuk@xxxxxxxxxx (Edy Sukrisno)]

Hi!
I was about to unsub*scribe this list when I noticed that some people started
talking about Indonesia.  I'd like to forward this posting for those who are
interested in the riot taking place July 27 in Jakarta.  I hope that this is
not too long.  Since I live in Indonesia (although far from the capital),
I'd better not to talk much first.  Who knows this list is also under the
surveillance of the military.  This cowardly attitude is shared by most
Indonesian.  Being a leftist is a "sin" in our country.

Best wishes,

Edy Sukrisno - Indonesia


>Date: Sun, 4 Aug 1996 17:12:31 -0400 (EDT)
>From: apakabar@xxxxxxxxx
>Subject: IN/POL: Analysis of the Situation in Jakarta
>To: apakabar@xxxxxxxxx
>Sender: owner-indonesia-l@xxxxxxxxxxx
>Precedence: bulk
>X-UIDL: 985c2aa76fc838a6a376d5cd20438fc7
>
>INDONESIA-L
>
>
>ANALISA SITUASI DI JAKARTA, OLEH "RIZAL ALIH":
>
>
>Introduction: After the Dust Settles in Jakarta....
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>"Zaman gara-gara sudah datang," (The chaotic era has come; E.S) one
observer wrote several years ago,
>and now his words appear both premature and prophetic, especially
>after last weekend's dramatic protests in Jakarta. Long accustomed to
>benign foreign media neglect and an image of unshakeable stability,
>the Suharto regime has suddenly found itself subject to growing
>international attention, criticism, and concern. With the Jakarta
>stockmarket tumbling and even US government officials publicly
>cautioning the Suharto regime to exercise restraint vis-a-vis the
>protesters, Indonesia has entered a new era of visible `crisis'.
>Zaman transisi memang sudah datang. Atau belum? (Has transitional era come
or not?;E.S)
>
>The course of events that led up to the storming of PDI headquarters
>on July 27 is by now common knowledge, at least to readers of these
>postings. As the dust settles in Jakarta, however, it is time to step
>back and assess the `fall-out', in terms of its short- and medium-
>term significance for oppositional forces in Indonesian society and
>for factional politics within the regime. What follow below are some
>very general and somewhat speculative comments based on the limited
>information available (to this analyst) at this time. These meager
>comments, it is hoped, might generate further discussion and debate.
>
>Reactions: Opposition Divided, On the Defensive, Derailed?
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>Against the backdrop of this past week's blitz of government
>propaganda and arrests, oppositional forces appear to be divided
>and on the defensive. Those figures and organisations designated as
>"Leftist" scapegoats for last week's protests in Jakarta are
>currently under siege, due to the wave of repression. Not only are
>the leaders of these organisations in detention or underground; their
>offices, publications, and activities have been shut down by police
>and military forces. No doubt numerous other opposition figures and
>organisations are now nervously awaiting accusations of guilt by
>association that will likewise curtail their ability to operate in
>the upcoming months.
>
>Meanwhile, ousted PDI chief Megawati Soekarnoputri has remained on
>the defensive, appearing hesitant to contest the government's version
>of last week's events or to mobilize her followers on the streets of
>Jakarta. Indeed, she, along with the new government-backed PDI chief
>Soerjadi and five other PDI parliamentarians, has been summoned for
>questioning on Monday (August 5) by Jakarta police authorities, a
>move approved by President Suharto himself.
>
>In fact, Megawati's strategy at this stage appears to be to avoid
>identification with the allegedly `Leftist' elements of the
>opposition, to abstain from popular mobilization in the streets, and
>to adhere to the very narrow -- and rapidly narrowing -- parameters of
>political activity permitted by the regime. Thus, instead of taking
>her grievances to the streets of Jakarta, she is confining her
>struggle to the courts, suing the government for its interference in
>internal PDI affairs and for its engineering of her ouster from the
>PDI leadership.
>
>Similar tactics have been adopted by Megawati's close ally Abdurrahman
>Wahid (better known as `Gus Dur'), leader of the 20-30 million-strong
>Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the single largest non-governmental Islamic
>organization in the country. Wahid has abstained from mobilizing his
>many followers and expressed dismay at the violent turn of events
>last week. He is reported to have claimed that some 100 PDI members
>were killed during the protests and to have rejected the government's
>account of the course of last week's events. Significantly, however,
>Wahid has also been reported as urging that people not be `provoked'
>by `irresponsible' elements, and Nahdlatul Ulama (which actively
>participated in the violent destruction of the Partai Komunis
>Indonesia in the mid-1960s) appears to have joined with other Islamic
>organizations in the country in condemning the PRD for its `PKI-like
>tactics'.
>
>So far, the government seems to have succeeded in dividing the
>opposition, between a cluster of figures and groups condemned for
>their alleged Leftist orientation and disruptive tactics, and a more
>acceptable -- and accommodating -- group tolerated but effectively
>demobilized. This division not only exacerbates potential lines of
>cleavage between various opposition groups who have worked in loose
>coalition in recent years, but also plays on class tensions within
>Indonesian society, by heightening middle-class and business distrust
>of those student activists and labor union groups concerned with
>issues of social injustice and inequality in the country.
>
>In this context, the prospects for oppositional activity in upcoming
>months appear extremely bleak. If recent court cases are any guide,
>Megawati's law suit is unlikely to prosper, and thus her chances of
>participating in the 1997 elections remain fairly remote. Even if
>Megawati's ex-PDI followers and Wahid's NU remain in alliance, it is
>unclear how effectively they can channel their efforts through the
>extremely narrow parameters of political participation provided by
>the Suharto regime.
>
>However, perhaps the medium-term benefits of this strategy will
>outweigh its short-term limitations. In the upcoming months, Megawati
>will pursue her court case, and if dismissed by the courts, she and
>NU's Wahid can conceivably back a boycott of the 1997 elections. By
>abstaining from mass mobilization and absenting themselves from the
>polls, these opposition figures can retain considerable symbolic and
>moral capital in order to influence the process of succession to
>Suharto at a later stage. However, in order to do so effectively, they
>will have to find allies within the regime itself, especially within
>the Army.
>
>
>Reactions: Suharto and the Generals Adopt Bunker Mentality?
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>Meanwhile, the Suharto regime's harsh response to the popular protests
>of last week has demonstrated its resolve and its internal solidity
>in the face of domestic opposition and international attention. To
>date, no high-ranking government official or military officer has
>openly indicated displeasure at the regime's handling of last week's
>protests or promoted a `softer' line vis-a-vis the opposition. Whilst
>some top cabinet officials -- most notably the Defense Minister,
>(Ret.) General Edy Sudrajat -- have refrained from involving
>themselves publicly in the subsequent wave of anti-opposition
>propaganda and repression, military officers in charge of key Army
>commands in Jakarta have been at the forefront of the government's
>response to the protests.
>
>In this context, the extent of internal regime tension and dissent
>remains shrouded in mystery, open only to rumor and speculation.
>Well known retired Army generals who still enjoy some influence
>among the active officer corps are reported to be highly skeptical of
>the government's claims of a "Leftist" PRD-led conspiracy behind the
>protests, and disgusted by the government's clumsy intervention in
>the PDI. According to some sources, moreover, Suharto himself is
>extremely displeased with the military's handling of recent events
>and eager to dismiss top Army officers involved, once a `decent
>interval' has elapsed and media attention has subsided.
>
>Against this backdrop, the implications of recent events for next
>year's elections and for the succession to Suharto remain unclear.
>Nonetheless, recent developments and persistent rumors tend to
>suggest the following conclusions:
>
>    *   The government's crackdown on the opposition will severely
>        restrict the possibility of a Megawati-led PDI playing a
>        `spoiler' role against Suharto in the 1997 elections. At best,
>        Megawati and NU's Wahid will be able to mount a credible
>        boycott campaign.
>
>    *   Disgruntled elements in the military lack a leader to rally
>        behind in the top Army ranks and are left without a party
>        vehicle to use to influence the elections in 1997 and the
>        choice of president and vice-president in 1998.
>
>    *   President Suharto has come to be seen as relying heavily on --
>        and leaning heavily towards -- a few key family members and
>        trusted allies in the Army.
>
>    *   While overreliance on such a narrow base has obvious longer-
>        term dangers, recent events have confirmed the loyalty of the
>        Army to the Palace for the foreseeable future.
>
>    *   The President's favorite daughter, Tutut, has been promoted
>        to a leadership position in Golkar, the government party, and
>        (especially since her mother's death) is increasingly seen as
>        Suharto's closest confidant and potential political heir.
>
>    *   Tutut is known to enjoy close personal relations with the
>        current Army Commander, General Hartono, who is rumored to
>        be both in line to replace the current Armed Forces Chief,
>        and under consideration for the vice-presidential slot in
>        1998.
>
>    *   The president's son-in-law (by another daughter), Army General
>        Prabowo, has recently been promoted to head a major special
>        forces command in Jakarta, and his military academy classmates
>        and other allies are likewise entrenched in key Army positions
>        in the capital. Prabowo, whose fast-track career has been the
>        focus of considerable media attention, has made no secret of
>        his ambitions.
>
>    *   Prabowo, who has been rapidly promoted up through the ranks,
>        was -- along with his buddies -- prominently involved in
>        the suppression of last week's protests. If Suharto does
>        undertake an early reshuffle of the top Armed Forces commands,
>        Prabowo (and his allies) would likely benefit from yet another
>        set of early career advances, further solidifying his hold
>        over key Jakarta garrisons but also further incurring
>        resentment among the ranks.
>
>
>Conclusion: After a Dry Season, A Harvest to be Reaped?
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>In this context, a period of uneasy calm may return to Jakarta over
>the next year. Faced with strict censorship, surveillance, and other
>`security' measures, oppositional forces will be divided -- between
>those designated as "Leftist trouble-makers" and driven underground or
>into inactivity, and those, like Megawati and Wahid, who pursue very
>low-key, legalistic avenues of protest. Without a Megawati-led PDI
>to attract votes away from Golkar, and without Army figures of stature
>to contest the Palace, Suharto should be able to stage-manage the
>1997 elections and the 1998 presidential and vice-presidential votes
>as well.
>
>That said, the longer-term implications of this unfolding scenario
>are considerably more complex. If Suharto succeeds in elevating his
>daughter Tutut, her ally Hartono, and her brother-in-law Prabowo to
>positions of greater authority, then his solutions to the questions
>of his choice for the vice-presidency and for the succession will
>become far more apparent to all parties concerned. In this context,
>resentment within the ranks of the Army -- and renewed linkages with
>opposition figures of proven `reliability' such as Megawati and Wahid,
>as well as key retired Army officers -- may begin to crystallize in
>due course.
>
>In sum, the government has undertaken a major crackdown against what
>now constitutes a visible `opposition', in response to mass protests
>in Jakarta last week. The opposition appears divided, on the
>defensive, and derailed from its efforts to broaden the realm of
>popular participation in Indonesian politics. The Army leadership
>remains in solidly pro-Suharto hands, with little outward signs of
>tension between the top military commands and the Palace, and no high-
>ranking officers daring to display public dissatisfaction the
>government's handling of the protests or open sympathy with
>opposition figures like Megawati. In this context, the upcoming months
>are likely to be a dry season for the opposition, but with the
>narrowing of the regime's base -- both in society and in the Army --
>the longer-term prospects for popular -- and military -- contestation
>of a Suharto-engineered succession may in fact be enhanced.
>
>





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