Evaluating Zyuganov

[David Johnson <djohnson@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Two interesting pieces written prior to June 16.

Fred Weir
Hindustan Times
     MOSCOW -- Even before it appeared last week, Communist
presidential candidate Gennady Zyuganov's economic programme was
the butt of ridicule and denunciation in the Russian media. After
the plan was published, officials and pundits crowded the
airwaves to warn of ruin and catastrophe if it were ever to be
implemented.
     The author of this apocalyptic document, Mr. Zyuganov, is
currently running just behind incumbent President Boris Yeltsin
to win presidential elections slated for June 16. He now stands
accused of everything from "economic illiteracy" to "re-nascent
Stalinism" in the mainstream Russian press.
     The source of the agitation is a rather mild 25-page
pamphlet that criticizes the industrial collapse and mass
impoverishment brought on by President Boris Yeltsin's four-year
old market reforms, but offers few solutions that are not
directly drawn from standard Western -- capitalist -- economic
textbooks.
     "The Zyuganov programme is straight Keynesian economics,"
says Alexander Buzgalin, a political economist at Moscow State
University. "It proposes pretty much the same set of remedies
that the United States used to get out of the Great Depression 60
years ago, or which many Third World countries employ today to
boost development of domestic industry".
     A Zyuganov government would increase social benefits and
strengthen the state's role as employer of last resort, in order
to put money into the hands of impoverished Russians and thus
boost domestic demand. It would also strengthen government
control over raw materials and strategic industry, restore the
300-year old state alchohol monopoly and employ "reasonable
protectionism" for a defined period to defend the domestic
Russian consumer market against foreign imports.
     The document warns that Russia's GNP has plunged by 40 per
cent since 1990, consumption has dropped by about half, while
capital investment currently stands at just a third of its level
five years ago.
     "Society is profoundly polarized, divided into the majority
of the poor and the minority of the super rich," it says. "The
middle class, which sets standards of consumption and ensures
social stability, has virtually disappeared. More than 60 per
cent of the people are in the low income group. At the end of
1995, 36 per cent of hired workers and more than 80 per cent of
pensioners received below the subsistence level."
     Mr. Zyuganov accuses President Yeltsin of relying heavily on
a small, corrupt elite and pressures from Western leaders and
financial institutions to determine his economic policies. He
charges that Mr. Yeltsin has signed agreements with the IMF to
pursue one economic course over the coming 3 years, while
promising the Russian people a completely different set of
policies (see below).
     "The President and the government have no social base for
changing course," Mr. Zyuganov says. "They rely on two forces:
the corrupt government bureaucracy and the heads of major
monopoly groups which have formed themselves into lobbying
clans."
     Mr. Zyuganov does not advocate any Soviet-style economic
measures. In the weeks leading up to the programme's release,
several Russian newspapers published their own versions of the
Communist economic plan -- allegedly obtained from "inside
sources" -- which supposedly showed Mr. Zyuganov preparing to
restore central planning, eliminate banking capital, control all
prices, nationalize private property down to people's garden
plots and country cottages, close the country's borders and
impose tough travel restrictions. Without missing a beat, many of
those same newspapers are now denouncing Mr. Zyuganov's actual
programme as if it advocated all those things.
     Mr. Zyuganov's plan sketches out three stages for exiting
>from Russia's profound post-Soviet economic malaise.
     Stage One (1996-1997) calls for establishing a "government
of national trust" and adopting emergency efforts to stabilize
industrial production. Stage Two (1998-2003) foresees recovery of
production and a growth of domestic industry. Stage Three (2004-
2010) sees the take-off of high-tech, or what it calls "post-
indutrial" forms of production.
     "We are committed to using the mixed economy and diversity
of forms of ownership in order to revive mass-scale solvent
demand, relaunch idle capacity, modernize production and protect
the domestic consumers." Mr. Zyuganov says. "We will do
everything we can to ensure that in the 21st century the
country's entry into the world community as an industrial power
and, subsequently, as a post-industrial power should be driven by
high-tech industries. . . We proceed from the assumption, borne
out by world practice, that in periods of structural change in
the economy and grave crises the state plays the leading role."
     Mr. Zyuganov does not reject foreign loans or capital
investment, but he does slam the Yeltsin government's dependence
on IMF credits to fund the state deficit. And he denounces the
Kremlin's willingness to sign on to IMF targets for money supply,
deficits and inflation as "unacceptably limiting the sovereignty
of Russia."
     A Zyuganov presidency would pay for its increased social
spending and boost capital investment through several proposed
measures, including improved tax collection, a tough fight
against crime and corruption, crackdown on capital flight, an
amnesty for capital that is repatriated "on the condition of its
return and distribution to the industrial sector as investment
capital", properly taxing exports (currently Russian oil and gas
companies pay far less than their share), forcing the U.S. dollar
out of circulation in Russia, and placing vodka production and
sales back under state control.
     The programme also envisages creation of a Russian State
Bank of Reconstruction and Development, to funnel state
investments into targeted industries and research projects. For
industries that create new jobs "without harming their
efficiency", there would be a range of tax breaks.
     Many observers have correctly pointed out that Mr.
Zyuganov's project is long on promises and short on specifics. It
probably greatly underestimates the degree of panic that would
accompany a Zyuganov ascent to the Kremlin, and the amount of
economic damage the Russian elite could do in its scramble to
decamp.
     Ironically, Mr. Zyuganov's programme closely resembles the
economic prescriptions of his chief rival -- President Yeltsin.
     In his own 126-page election platform, issued several days
after Mr. Zyuganov's, Mr. Yeltsin agreed his market reforms have
led to widespread economic despair but vowed to bring the country
forward to a "normal way of life" after 4 years of anguish.
     "I feel your pain, the pain of the country, but this is the
pain of a recovering organism," Mr. Yeltsin wrote. "I made
mistakes, but I know better than others how to correct them."
     Mr. Yeltsin's economic plan involves many of the same
prescriptions advocated by Mr. Zyuganov, including tax incentives
for Russian producers, war on corruption, price controls for
natural monopolies and tariff protection for domestic
manufacturers and farmers.
     "What strikes me about the platforms (of the main
contenders) is their similarity," says Viktor Kremeniuk, an
analyst at the Institute of Canada-USA Studies. "They are similar
because the problems for the voters are the same. They want more
money, they want lower prices, they want some guarantee against
unemployement, they want something to be done against crime."
     Mr. Yeltsin employs the language of currently fashionable
Western economics to present his message, which leads him to join
Mr. Zyuganov in the chasm between hope and fullfilment. It is
difficult to square Mr. Yeltsin's pledges of greater social
benefits with a stated committment to tight fiscal policy, a
balanced budget by the year 2000 and full convertibility of the
rouble.
     "Monetarism is an economic fad in the West, and the Yeltsin
government has accepted its terminology while moving away from
its harsh essence," says Mr. Buzgalin. "Yeltsin realizes his
economic policies of the past 4 years have largely failed, and he
is prepared to embrace a new economic course, even if he still
calls it the continuation of his 'reforms'."
     Mr. Zyuganov, while admitting the fight against inflation is
important, would tolerate a higher inflation rate and be prepared
to run larger budget deficits in order to fulfill his promises of
greater social benefits and support for high-tech industry.
     Mr. Yeltsin also has some strong ideological disagreements
with the Communists. The Yeltsin platform mandates private
ownership of land, while Mr. Zyuganov would ban it.
     Mr. Zyuganov calls for a legal review of some of the more
dubious privatization deals of recent years, and believes in
public ownership of raw materials, strategic industry and liquor
production. Mr. Yeltsin hints that he would slow down further
privatization, and increase state control over important sectors,
but would not re-nationalize any property.
     Many observers have warned that if Mr. Zyuganov wins, he
could be driven by his economic logic and his hard-line
colleagues into much tougher measures than those stated in his
election platform.
     By the same token, a victorious Mr. Yeltsin's policies are
hard to predict. Though the Russian press has given this little
pre-election thought, the possibility of a relieved elite taking
full license is grounds for worry.
     "If Yeltsin wins, look for an orgy of fresh corruption and
goodies being handed out to insiders," says Mr. Buzgalin.
     "It is also possible that we will see tough repressions
against the Communists. Because our elite will have had a close
call, and they will not be willing to go through this again in
the unpredictable event when Yeltsin finally leaves his
function."   END END END

*******************************************

Fred Weir
Moscow Tribune
     MOSCOW -- Hopefully it's not true, but most local and
foreign pundits claim Russia's presidential race will finally
resolve into an ugly choice between the incumbent, Boris N.
Yeltsin, and the leader of Russia's Communist Party (KPRF),
Gennady A. Zyuganov.
     Almost everyone I know adds that if it must come down to
identifying the lesser evil, that would -- sadly -- be Yeltsin.
     They're right, of course, about the lousy goods on offer.
When you come down to it, there's not much to choose between
Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Both were star pupils in the same school
and remain essentially bureaucratic authoritarians. These days
one poses falsely as a democrat; the other pretends to be a
communist.
     Like generals fighting the last war, the two rivals are
manipulating this election to sound like a replay of the epic
struggles that shook and finally destroyed the USSR. They can get
away with that kind of dangerous and misguided electioneering
because the emotions on both sides are still potent.
     But the Soviet Union is dead, the Cold War really is over,
and Russia's fate now turns on more ordinary things. It will be
enough if the country just muddles through the next few years,
manages to avoid economic collapse and further episodes of civil
war, and consolidates some sort of workable and widely-accepted
constitutional order.
     Therefore, I think it's time someone seriously made the case
for Zyuganov. I offer this without enthusiasm, and very much in
the emerging spirit of this election. That is to say, if we are
facing the future and not the past, I think him decidedly the
lesser evil:
     * Believe it or not, the Communists are more democratic.
Unlike most Russian political parties, even liberal ones, the
KPRF is not merely a cheering section for a single guru. It has
collegial leadership and at least a semblance of rank-and-file
democracy.
     If Zyuganov wins the election, it will be mostly thanks to
an army of dedicated party workers that marched out to meet the
voters, debate the issues and win trust. Hard to criticize that
on democratic grounds.
     If Yeltsin wins, it will be at least partly because he
diverted state policy into his personal re-election campaign and
stripped the national treasury to create an illusion of improving
living standards. If Yeltsin gets up to the same tricks as Our
Home is Russia did in the December election, we may look forward
to massive media manipulation, a barrage of free pro-Yeltsin
publicity arranged by pliant local officials, thinly-veiled
"cultural" events financed by the public purse and a press-ganged
military vote.
     * At least the Communists have a few principles. Zyuganov is
admittedly a consummate chameleon, capable of singing the Soviet
anthem to one audience, begging the Patriarch's holy blessing for
the benefit of another and enthusing over foreign investment with
a third. But despite the contradictions of current Communist
rhetoric, there is a sincere convergence of belief among
Zyuganov's troops on the need for more state participation in the
economy, to smooth out the market's rough edges, protect
strategic industries, rebuild social infrastructure and forge a
new national identity.
     That ought to set off a marvellous debate over the mix of
state and market economics appropriate to post-Soviet Russia.
Instead, we get the spectacle of Yeltsin peddling furiously to
overtake, and take over, his opponent's positions.
     So, compared to the present incumbent, Zyuganov is a paragon
of principled consistency. Indeed, can anyone name a single thing
-- beyond getting and keeping power -- that Yeltsin actually
stands for?
     * No one can undo Russia's social revolution. The Communists
may dabble in re-nationalization of raw materials, subsidize or
protect a few industries but they lack the nerve, or doctrinal
committment, for much else. And come to think of it, would it
make any earthly difference if Gazprom were de-privatized, except
to the handful of private individuals presently milking it? Ditto
for restoring the state vodka monopoly, one of the few successful
economic ideas in a thousand years of Russian history.
     Russia's real transformation is welling up from the
grassroots, where people have started to take responsibility for
their lives, build new homes, open businesses. It's true,
Russians are freer these days, though they probably have Mikhail
Gorbachev to thank for it rather than Yeltsin.
     Zyuganov knows perfectly well that even in the high tide of
communism the state couldn't run a proper shoe repair or fast-
food restaurant. This historic process will continue no matter
who comes to power in Moscow.
     * Russia urgently needs constitutional reform. This goes
back to the violent debates of 1993, when Yeltsin broke with the
old Supreme Soviet, contending that a parliamentary system was
too fractious and Russian tradition called for strong executive
authority. He later threw 20 tanks onto Kutuzovsky Prospekt to
clinch the argument.
     Events since have demonstrated that giving a country like
Russia a strong leader is like slipping a recovering alchoholic a
stiff shot of vodka. The brutal and mindless war in Chechnya is a
daily reminder of why no individual must ever, ever, be given the
sole authority to scrawl his signature on a scrap of paper and
set armies into motion.
     Virtually every force on Russia's political spectrum --
except, tellingly, Zhirinovsky and Yeltsin -- wants to redress
the imbalance between the branches of government, reduce the
Kremlin bureaucracy and create more parliamentary checks and
oversight powers. The Communists favour an extreme version, which
would abolish the presidency and restore legislative supremacy.
     In reality, anyone who takes over Yeltsin's office and
discovers its vast powers and prerogatives, is going to be
disinclined to give it up. Zyuganov, who is under the thumb of a
strong collective, is the only one who might conceivably make a
start.
     * Marginally better government. Who knows if the Communists
would prove less corrupt than the present crowd? But to the
extent than any of them still believe in Marxist-Leninist
ideology, it could serve to make them so. Also, since the KPRF is
a huge national organization, and controls dozens of local and
regional legislatures, a Communist president at least has a
fighting chance of getting his directives obeyed.
     * It's time for a change. If you have the feeling the
Yeltsin regime has grown increasingly senile, cranky and arrogant
over recent years, you're right. The purpose of democracy is to
give people a means to flush out the old and ring in the new. We
all want it to work in Russia, so why should we get nervous and
sweaty because it threatens to do just that?
     One final point. If Zyuganov is elected, and still wants
international investment, expertise and loans -- a certainty --
he will have to constantly prove, in a million ways, that he's
not a nasty, old-fashioned commie. We foreign journalists, who
have given Yeltsin a remarkably easy ride over the past five
years, will rediscover our Cold War instincts and be on
Zyuganov's trail like bloodhounds. And that's all to the good.
     Now try to imagine how insufferable the Yeltsinites will be
if they come roaring triumphantly back into the Kremlin after
June, having learned nothing and forgotten nothing. END END END

***********************************************
---
David Johnson
Research Director
Center for Defense Information
1500 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington DC 20005
phone: 202-862-0700
fax:   202-862-0708
email: djohnson@xxxxxxx
CDI web page:  http://www.cdi.org



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