Re: Rational Choice/Analytical M.

[Justin Schwartz <jschwart@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Sat, 13 Jan 1996, rakesh bhandari wrote:

> Note on "Left Instrumentalism: A Critique of Analytical and Rational Choice
> Marxism", a chapter from Stephen Eric Bronner's profound *Of Critical
> Theory and Its Theorists. Blackwell, 1994.
>
> This chapter follows Bronner's many chapters in which the project of
> critical theory is unfolded; based on this discussion, Bronner attempts to
> show that "(t)he claim that the proponents of analytical or rational choice
> Marxism [AM--rb] somehow continue this critical tradition is simply wrong."
> (265)  In his criticism of AM, Bronner emphasizes the absence of a
> "normative stance" which "can illuminate the 'unncecessary' character of
> existing socio-political constraints

This is very peculiar, given, for example, Roemer's own extended work in
reconstructing a neo-Marxist theory of expoiltation which is is supposed
to provide exactly such a normative basis. Or Cohen's work of the last
decade on justice and self-ownership, intended to do the same. Or Elster's
work on self-realization. Or Fisk's magnificant work on class morality and
justice. Or my own humble contributions (quite critical of Roemer) to
exploitation theory and freedom.

As to the unnecessariness of existing constraint, the establishment of
these has been the main point of much of the AM work in modelling
alternatives to capitalism, see e.g., Dave Schweickart's Against
Capitalism or Roemer's A Future for Socialism, among other works.

and call for the resolution of
> contradictions with an eye to extending both formal and substantive
> freedom." (264)  Bronner also emphasizes the absence of a serious
> discussion of the role of the subject and consciousness in terms of
> questions of alienation, cultural critique, psychological repression and
> forms of state coercion--in other words with the problem of how the
> mediated totality of advanced capitalism had threatened the integrity of
> the individual and undermined the bases of resistance. (265)

I see, and what exactly has Elster been doing all these years in
discussing adadptive preference formation, Buchanan in his treatment of
the rationality of revolution under advanced capitalist conditions, or
Przeworski in his treatment of social democracy and the decline of labor
radicalism?
 >
> At several points, Bronner recognizes important contributions by AM, but
> his criticism is very sharp, especially of the AM commitment to
> "methodological individualism"--which claims to "reinstate the very subject
> which collectivist theories have expelled."

Some AMs have this commitment.Elster does, Others don't. Cohen doesn't I
have criticized MI as trivial or obviously false in print.

 Bronner probes however the
> serious confusion over what is meant by an 'individual'.
>
> Towards that end,  he discusses "the rather elementary philosophical
> mistake" of "identifying the formally discrete entity with the subject and
> *individuation* with the "*individuality* that actually defines the
> uniqueness and experience of a given actor or person."  The argument is too
> carefully articulated to express in summary form; Bronner is concerned to
> show that by reducing the subject to an irreducible element within a
> neo-classical equilibrium framework, AM cannot adequately explain the
> constitutive role of ideology or inter-subjectivity; and that AM is forced
> to invalidate, presuppose or transvalue into intrumental action what it can
> only recognize as "irrational" factors.

Look, the use of rational choice models, which is just one set of tools in
the kit, is not a metaphysical commitment. It is a technique which can
illuminate certain things.

>
> Developing the argument, Bronner concludes "even the best thinkers of
> rational choice Marxism find themselves desperately grasping at an
> indeterminate entity--a subject that is really not a subject at all--whose
> motivations are imputed and then definitionally exhausted by an arbitrary
> mathematical game with fixed rules dependent upon a causality blind to
> issues of meaning, dignity and the will to resist." (271)
>

Once again, the confaltion of analyticalw ith rational choice Marxism.

> The result is the failure to understand revolutionary action itself, not
> only the meaningfulness of the action to the participant.  Bronner gives
> the following example: > > "Especially since its calculable short-term
economic enticements to poorer > allies were minor, the explanation of
mass support for the bourgeoisie's > struggle against the artistocracy
necessarity demands reference to a set of > normative values.  And these
derive, not from contemplative materialism, > but from the idealist
tradition and the commitment to democracy." (274) >

This is just the sort of thing Elster comes to argue in the Cement of
Society and which Fisk urges with great articulation in the State and Justice.

 > Bronner continues
that "(mass) movements are inherently infused with a > speculative sense
of purpose which differs qualitatively from one to > another, and from
this it only follows that a basic perversion of the > historical
understanding iwll take place when fascism is analyzed within > the same
game theoretical frame of reference as, say, the action of those > now
nearly forgotten Chinese students in Tiananmen Square.

It may not be possible to explain revolutions game-theortically. Buchanan
has argued that this is so. If he's right, that is an insight of AM, that
revolutions require a different set of motivations. Why is that a
criticism of AM?

 Indeed the >
refusal to delineate that difference or the ways in which divergent >
ideologies impact on the constitution of social reality will have itself >
have political implications." >

Who so refuses?

> Bronner concludes: "Because the old
guarantees are dead, a willingness to > address the conditions for
political judgement has become crucial.  But > insofar as it denies the
speculative moment, that is precisely what > rational choice Marxism
cannot do.  Its back turned on the need to > articulate any 'practical
criterion,' which might inform socialist or > progressive politics, the
failure of this new trend in Marxism to serve as > a critical philosophy
is precisely what undermines its presentions to > provide a general
theory." (275) >

I don't know what this means. What I get out of it is that if we think
that people every behave like rational choice theoretic agents, we must
think that they always do, and that no alternative that suggests itherwise
is possible. This is absurd.

> For my part, I don't think the question of political
judgement can be > discussed without the value-theoretical analysis of the
limits of reformist > politics and of the "economic law of motion." In
other words, the question > of political judgement is not only a
speculative or a purely normative > matter matter, and it is significant
that while Bronner notes that it is > well-known that rational choice
Marxists have never engaged Marx's value > theory, as explicated and
developed by II Rubin and Rosdolsky and Mattick > (278-9),

Well, analytical Marxists have engaged Marx's theiry of value in depth.
The best work is by Gil Skillman, an economist at Wesleyan, who is also
critical of Roemer. As to Mattick or Rubin, Gil tells me that sympathetic
economists find Rubin suggestive but resistant to extension and
development. Hoawrd and King, some more AM economists, talk about efforts
to develop or critique Rubin in theie History of Marxian Economics, vol. 2.

 Bronner himself
does not discuss anywhere the importance of > Mattick's work as to the
question of political judgement, especially as to > the evaluation of what
Lukacs called "the pacifists and humanitarians of > the class struggle."
(see below) > > While the normative content of critical theory is not to
be denied, the > most important element for correct political judgement
can only be > awareness of the failure to act decisively-- that is,
theoretical > knowledge of the the law of accumulation and the tendency
towards > catastrophe and barbarism (Luxemburg, Lukacs, Grossmann,
Mattick).  > >

I'm far from clear what this means. Why does AM condemn us to be
temporizing Hamlets? Is the worry that if we strive to be clear and
intellectually honest we will want to be nice to the bourgeoisie? (Dave,
you see what I mean about the "class traitor" rhetoric?)

 In his chapter "Class Consciousness" in *History and Class
Consciousness*, > Lukacs argued: > > *Only the consciousness of the
proletariat can point to the way that leads > out of the impasse of
capitalism.* As long as this consciouness is > lacking, the crisis remains
permanent, it goes back to its starting point, > repeats the cycle until
after infinite sufferings and terrible detours the > school of history
completes its education and confers upon it the > leadership of
mankind....The pacifists and humanitarians of the class > struggle whose
efforts tend whether they will or no to retard this lenghty, > painful and
crisis-ridden processes would be horrified if they could but > see what
sufferings they inflict on the proletariat by extending this > course of
education..." (76) > >

I like Lukacs a lot, but how exactrly does AM retard the development of
the class consciousness of the proletariat in a way that, say, the
writings of Lukacs advance it? Incidentally, you will be horrified to hear
that I have a paper in which I argue that Lukacs' model of the development
of class-cs of the prolet is rational choice model, although quite
different from the one suggested by Elster or Buchanan (obviously, since
their methodologically individualistic models can't produce class
consciousness. Elster has come to acknowledge this.)

 I surely agree with Bronner that rational choice
has an important role to > play in the determination of the obstacles
threatening the realization of > internationalist, egalitarian and
democratic aims.

Bless us!

 And Bronner is > doubtless right to argue that "it is
impossible to justify a commitment to > such concerns" from the standpoint
of AM.  >

Why?

 > But the central theoretical question remains the consequences
of failing to > advance such aims in a revolutionary manner, and the more
well-understood > the barbaric consequences are, as predicted by
value-theoretical analysis, > perhaps the more willing people will be
transcend their short-term material > interests, qua rational actors, to
overcome those obstacles, uncovered by > rational-choice theorists.

Right, Please note the concession: the rational choice theorists have
something to teach us after all, namely the nature of the obstacles we
have to overcome. Surely that is not nothing!

> > I
have enjoyed my readings in critical theory, but this is the time to make
> available all of Grossmann's and Mattick's writings.  They will help to
> shorten the course of education.  Especially when people of the
brilliance > of Bronner take to explicating them.  > > rakesh > > > > > >

>From your account, Bronner's brilliance is not manifested in his critique
of aanlytical Marxism.

--Justin




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