Re: The materialist road...

[davidmci@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (David McInerney)]

Thursday, 12 February 1996,  Jukka Laari wrote:

>Thanks, David,
>
>for your long and clarifying posts on your interests. I'd like to
>comment in general.

Ditto.  Your reply is pretty long too!


>First of all, I'm concerned of the lack of the category of subject.

I don't think I was advocating ditching the category of the subject (small
s, the subject of subjectivization, as in Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze,
Lacan, Zizek, etc.) only the category of the Subject (big S, the Subject of
idealist philosophy -- a peculair version of which does appear in Lacanism
and in Hegel -- but more on that below).

>If you were a sociologist (like me) wondering 'social structures' and
>'structures of social practices', then it wouldn't be disappointing at
>all. I'm used to it. But your concern seems to be politics: what kind of
>beings are those who do politics? (Yeah, we all do it in a sense...)

Absolutely.  As I suggested in my piece, we need a new way of thinking
about subjects and subjectivization, not that of interpellation.  That's
why I suggested that, following Poulantzas's lead, we should reject that
theory and engage with Foucault, Deleuze et. al. *in a materialist, Marxist
way.*

(For Chris, who raised the issue of what is interpellation, very
schematically it is the hailing of the subject by the Subject, and the
recognition of the subject of the Subject's call.  This is a terribly
abstract way of putting it, I agree.  But it gets to the heart of the
problem.  This is that this theory presupposes the Subject -- which
elsewhere Althusser rejects -- and makes the ideological state apparatus
(ISA) the Subject.  This is really quite awful and produces all the
problems vis-a-vis political agency that Jukka is alluding to.  It
basically presupposes the guarantee of the reproduction of the mode of
production.  The notion of guarantee and of Subject should be instantly
recognisable as pertaining to bourgeois-juridical ideology -- i.e. idealist
and therefore non-Marxist)

>On
>what ground do people (we) act? How ideology works? How 'interpellation'
>happens, what happens in human body at the moment of 'interpellation'?
>That is, there ought to be some general assumptions (hopefully some
>specific ones, too) concerning humans, ones which doesn't reduce us
>humans into reflex-like mechanisms but leaves room for act(ion)s.

I don't think we are going to discover the answers to the first two
questions -- (1)"on what ground we act?",  (2) "how does ideology work?"
through the concept of interpellation.  But your concerns are valid ones --
I just don't think Lacanism has the answers (and believe me, I've looked!).

>I grew up in a quite 'orthodox' marxist-leninist cultural or ideological
>environment and here the question of 'subject' was and still seems to be
>hot issue. But then again, we are 'hegelians' nearly by nature.

What are you saying here Jukka?  Hegelianism is "human nature"?  Jeez!

<cut>
>Besides, these [Marxist theories, theories in general]
>are in a sense products of human practices, or at least 'social
>structure' is mode of (collective) action - I mean 'structure' as
>'habit' or 'habitual action'.

Are you using Bourdieu's concept of "habitus" here?  Please elaborate.  I
don't know enough about this.

>'Explaining' human action by structures
>and ideologies only is just 'social idealism', how 'materialistic' it
>may seem to be.

This is exactly what "interpellation" ends up doing.  One of the reasons
why I rejected it.

>Is it Pierre Macherey who has insisted this, can anyone
>remember? I think that we can take Deleuze's theories as one example of
>an effort of going beyond that kind of idealism.

I can't remember.  But I think you are correct about Deleuze. We must
approach his work critically though.  Jon's paper on Deleuze-Guattari's
theories of fascism is a good starting point.

>So, I take it granted that there is one burning question: How one is
>supposed to start intentionally 'mass movement' both in theory and in
>practice, if one can't make sense his or her 'actors' or 'agents' who
>are supposed to do a revolution or two?

A major problem that ist true.  Lacanism can't help us here either.

>And yes, Althusser and
>althusserians obviously tried to answer that question. Results just
>aren't particularly convincing. As is clear in the case of Screen you
>mentioned: they weren't capable of explain how films affect or
>'interpellate' us. They just hypothesized something that had to be
>showed. That's shallow.

Yep.

>You mentioned Slovenian lacanism (Zizek & al) and said them to be
>neo-hegelians and idealists. Yes, there seems to be strong idealist
>tendencies. But at least they have tried to get rid off of simplistic
>solutions.

They try very hard, its true.  But they are trapped in a blind-alley.  I've
read _Tarrying With The Negative_, _The Sublime Object of Ideology_, _For
They Know Not What They Do_, _Metastases of Enjoyment_ , _The Spoils of
Freedom_ and a wealth of obscure papers by Zizek, Salecl, etc.  From cover
to cover.  Not to mention practically the entire Laclau corpus!  Closely.
I thought it was the shit.  Then I woke up to myself.  That's why I had to
"go public" with my confession-atonement on the list.

>I think there are two problem areas on which they're worth
>studying among some other non-marxist theories in order not to make same
>marxist mistakes again and again: question of subject (both in relation
>to structures and ideology and to action) and the question of value of
>Hegel. These are interrelated.
>
>Concerning the first one, I tend to believe at the moment that Slovenians
>are trying to show how avoid 'mechanistic' and 'deterministic'
>conceptions of subject without falling into voluntarism (that's
>simplistically said). That they are doing by their quite unorthodox and
>dim syntheses of Lacan and Hegel. I don't have guts to go into this
>business on this list. (Greetings to Chris...)

"dim"  Is this an example of parapraxis, Jukka?  Heh heh heh.  They are ver
unorthodox in many ways with Hegel, but also very perceptive.  Unlike the
hegelian marxists and Feuerbach, who looked everywhere for a Subject (Man,
the proletariat) of History, Hegel and the Slovenian clique see the process
itself as the Subject.  They retain the notion of a Goal, but this is
internal to the process itself.  Althusser recognised as much in his later
papers on Hegel ('Marx's Relation to Hegel', 'Lenin Before Hegel', 'Remark
on the category of 'process without a Subject or Goal').  The Slovenes, in
so far as they are former Althusserians, recognise this and reject
Althusser's materialist conclusion.  Hegel of course was not an
Althusserian, nor did he answer Althusser's critique in advance (as Zizek
cheekily suggests) -- just as Marx was not an Analytical Marxist (sorry
Justin, I can't buy into this!).  The Slovenian clique are happy to
collapse the Goal into the Subject, so that the process becomes the
self-fulfilling Goal.

>What comes to Hegel-problem: Effort to show how reference to Hegel's
>logic of essence might clarify traditional problems with ideological (I
>prefer that expression) is most welcome. Disappointment comes when it
>comes clear that Slovenians are unable to show ideology-theoretical
>'Aufhebung' of ideology. I thought that was the whole aim of the
>enterprise. To be exact: They are hinting at it in several instances by
>references to psychoanalytical practice: just as we can supposedly to get
>in touch with our 'traumatic experiences' - that, according to
>Slovenians, are the hard core of human subject, 'cause of the subject',
>to put it bluntly - on shrink's couch and thereby to get rid off of
>them, we should likewise grasp that and how we are ideological beings in
>order to pass that stage. (Sorry metaphories, I'm in hurry) That's not
>enough.

See my comments on Hegel and the Slovenian Lacanians above.

>References to Hegel's logic are important also because in these it is
>possible to grasp what has been one major problem with ideology theory:
>unarticulatedness & generality. I mean that ideology is seen as general,
>'universal' 'factor', and at the same time very particular:

I'm lost, please explain this.

>Dominique Lecourt said in one late seventies interview (here in Finland)
>that Foucault is of great importance to marxism.

Do you have an English translation of this (hope upon hope)?

>Yes, one has to remind
>only Foucault's jokes on ideology ('what materialistic is with ideology
>theory?'). Let's forget several discourse analyses that have been
>practiced during last 15-20 years and concentrate for awhile on how
>Foucault tried to replace marxist ideology theory by his archeologies
>and genealogies. I think that could be fruitful because of Foucault's
>fresh empiricism (when compared to i-theories). And I think that would
>show drastically both the difference between essentially philosophical
>(general) theory of ideology and more object-sensitive, empirical
>foucaultian discourse analysis, and the need to get these 'levels'
>together and clarify dimensions of this 'theory' (ideological as
>necessary, general, perhaps even 'hidden' feature, which gets manifested
>in several discourses or whatever).

As I suggested in my piece, I think that an engagement with Foucault is
going to be more productive than one with Lacanism.  Do you think so?  I
don't see Zizek as being "object-sensitive" at all.  Quite the opposite!  I
have often used the metaphor of "sausage-factory" to describve his approach
to any given object, as a matter of fact!

>I've tried to read Slovenians in that way instead of throwing their
>books and journals straight into trashcan.

If I hadn't spent so much money purchasing the entire collection of their
drivel in English, I'd almost be tempted to throw it into the trashcan.
There may be gems to be found in there somewhere, but I am sure that the
stuff is so obscure that only hard-core masochists or Lacanophiles would
bother.

>In sum: I don't mean to present 'subject' as the most crucial theoretical
>category, nor I mean to accept idealism which eagerly reminds us when we
>forget that humans not only react but act. Category of subject is,
>rather, social-theoretically like a prism, which both concentrates and
>reflects several issues in theories. Lack of that concept in social
>philosophic theory shows rather interest of social engineering than any
>kind of 'emancipatory' interest.

Your reasons for your interest in Lacanism are all good ones, I just don't
think it will provide the answers you seek, and that you'll have more
success elsewhere.

>That's why I hesitate to trash Althusser - he's the one who opened us
>the view into ideological in all its generality and in relation to
>'subject'.

True.  I hope you are not suggesting that *I* have trashed Althusser!!!

>Besides, earlier I didn't realized that Althusser really knew
>Hegel (though in a French way); few weeks ago I looked something by
>Althusser and was amazed how sharply and pointedly he criticized Hegel -
>target was in Logic, actually, but reference was without any
>bibliographical references so reader has to be familiar with Hegel to
>some degree in order to get the message.

Was that 'Marx's relation to Hegel'?  A fine work.

>Unfortunately he never truly
>clarified (as far as I know) meaning of that kind of passing remarks.
>That makes him in my eyes pretty sloppy theoretician.

One of the best pieces on ideology -- one that is not dependent upon
interpellation -- is his 'The Transformation of Philosophy' (in _Philosophy
and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists_).  The title essay is
great too -- and all the papers that come after it (i'm not too keen on the
earlier pieces though).

Thanks for your (long) reply Jukka.


Mr. David McInerney,
Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences,
The Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., AUSTRALIA  0200.
e-mail: davidmci@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ph: (06) 249 2134; fax: (06) 249 3051




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