Analytical Marxism

[davidmci@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (David McInerney)]

 Fri, 12 Jan 1996, Justin wrote:

 >On Fri, 12 Jan 1996, David McInerney wrote:
>
<cut>
>  What do you mean by "norms"??  These aren't those norms of
>> bourgeois social scientific practice that AMs keep apealling to?
>
>The norms of "bourgeois" social science have to be evaluated on their
>merits, not on the basis of the political views of their users. If you
>have some better norms that logical consistency, explicitness about your
>premises, respect for empirical evidence, explanatory power, theoretical
>unification, and other "bourgeois" virtues, I'd like like to hear about
>them.

No Justin, I think these are all to be considered as features of good
theoretical work and/or concrete analysis.  My point was rather that the
AMs seem to adopt the empiricist methodology popular in bourgeois social
science.  As I think I made clear in my other posts, texts (either
intrinsic or extrinsic to the "Marxist canon") should be evaluated in the
same way -- i.e. from a materialist position.  This is basic to Marxism.
Now I'm no philosopher of science (unlike Althusser, Suchting, and
Lecourt). I can't state succinctly the materialist approach.  But I guess I
can cite a passage from Althusser's most extended treatment of the subject
of empiricism (which should give some indication -- oops, my
Althusserianism is showing again!).  Althusser speaks of two elements of
what he calls the "spontaneous philosophy of ther scientists" (SPS) that
exist in contradiction with each other:

"A.  An element of internal, 'intra-scientific' origin which we shall call
ELEMENT 1.  In its most 'diffuse' form, this element represents
'convictions' or 'beliefs' stemming from the experience of scientific
practice itself in its everyday immediacy: it is 'spontaneous'.  If it is
elaborated philosophically, this element can naturally take the form of
Theses.  These convictions-Theses are of a materialist and objectivist
character.  They can be broken down as follows: (1) belief in the real,
external and material existence of the *object* of the scientific
knowledge; (2) belief in the existence and objectivity of the *scientific
knowledges* that permit knowledge of this object; (3) belief in the
correctness and efficacy of the procedures of scientific experimentation,
or *scientific method*, capable of producing scientific knowledge.  What
characteristizes these convictions-Theses is that they allow no room for
the philoosphical 'doubt' that calls into question the validity of
scientific practice; that they avoid what we have called the 'question of
right', the question of the right to existence of the object of knowledge,
of knowledge of that object, and of scientific method.

B. An element of external, 'extra-scientific' origin which we shall call
ELEMENT 2.  In its most diffuse form, this element too represents a certain
number of 'convictions' or 'beliefs' that can be elaborated in
philosophical Theses.  It is, of course, *related* to scientific practice
itself, but does not originate in it.  On the contrary, it is a reflection
*on* scientific practice by means of philosophical Theses elaborated
*outside* this practice by religious, spiritualist or idealist-critical
'philosophies of science' manufactured by philosophers or scientists.  It
is characteristic of the 'convictions-Theses' of Element 2 that they should
subordinate the experience of scientific practice to Theses, and therefore
to 'values' or 'instances', that are external to it and which, by
exploiting the sciences, uncritically serve a certain number of objectives
pertaining to practical ideologies.  In appearance, they are as spontaneous
as the first set: in fact, they are highly elaborated and can be considered
'spontaneous' only because their dominance makes them immediately
'obvious'.  To speak only of this case, in the nuance of their formulation
they bear the trace of the 'question of right', which can take on many
forms: a calling into question of the external material existence of the
*object* (replaced by *experience* or *experiment*); a calling into
question of the objectivity of scientific knowledges and of theory
(replaced my *'models'*); a calling into question of scientific method
(replaced by 'techniques of validation'); or an emphasis on the 'value of
science', the 'scientific spirit', its exemplary 'critical value', etc."
(Louis Althusser, _Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the
Scientists_, trans. W. Montag, Verso, London, 1990, pp. 132-133)

Empiricism is a variety of SPS, and the dominant one in social science.
Pragmatism, a variant on it, is the doubting Thomas that believes that this
guarantee of the validity of experience cannot be assured.  This is the
postmodern tendency, which you allude to in the folowing paragraph:

<cut>
>Why is it inconsistent to treat the work of a great economist like Ricardo
>with the immense respect Marx does treat it while at the same time
>critiquing its ideological limitations? Must someone's work by all
>ideology or not at all? Your Althusserianism is showing here. It's not as
>if Ricardo was a vulgar apologst whose work was devoid of scientific
>merit, like Harold Demsetz, whose defense of private property we are about
>to take up in my Property law class and of which I spent the afternoon
>writing a savage critique.

I didn't say Ricardo was any of those things.  But what is the significance
of Marx's critique of Ricardo?  Surely there is something in it.  Yes, my
Althusserianism is showing here.  I think that Althusser's account of
Marx's critique of Ricardo (see _Reading Capital_) is not without merit.
Althusser shows how the concept of surplus-value remains unthinkable for
Ricardo, while Marx, who has adopted a proletarian standpoint in philsophy
by this time, is able to push Ricardo's argument further.  A more
appropriate question is, perhaps, how can Roemer, Bardhan et. al. be so
dismissive of Marx's critique and simply run backwards to Ricardianism?
There may be reasons why we should reject the LTV.  But does this mean
rejecting Marx's critique of bourgeois economics?  I feel that the reality
expressed by the concept "surplus-value" remains as unthinkable for Roemer
and Bardhan as it does for Ricardo.  If so, then their "Marxist"
credentials just flew straight out the empiricist window.  Or am I wrong?

>> I actually think that the ethic of appealling to the norms of the bourgeois
>> academy is the defining aspect of AM.
>
>I find this very strange after your rather pleasant post explaining how
>Marxists can learn from and find their work enriched by all sorts of
>nonMarxists and even anti-Marxists like Foucault, etc. Why not Weber or
>Stiglizt or Giddens? Once again, I ask, what is the alternative to
>carefully argued, empirically grounded research?

There is no real alternative Justin, I just depends on how you approach it.
If Althusser's Element 1 is there in the empirical research of these
bourgeois theorists, then we should strive to find it and articulate it in
a materialist way.  Their theoretical theses of course express material
realities too -- it would be idealist to claim otherwise.  As Althusser was
fond of repeating, "philosophy is the class struggle in theory".  So these
theses would have a political content.  The trouble is that they always
claim that their theses have a validity that is universal and apolitical.
But this idealist stance is itself political.  Would you agree?

>> Sorry to always be so negative about AM Justin -- I guess it's good to have
>> people on the list that you can discuss AM with though, even if they always
>> seem to disagree.  Please let me know if I am just being irritating.
>
>Oh, this stuff is mild compared a lotof the stuff one hears, e.g., from
>Ellen Wood. ("Class traitor!" etc.)
>
>--Justin

I can practice being like that if it would make you happy.  Here goes:
"capitalist roader! imperialist running dog!  lackey! flunkey!"  Oh, its no
good, I've run out of Maoist terms of abuse.  Oh, here's some more:
"revisionist! Trotskyist! Krushchevite!"  Or how about "Social fascist!"
All this sloganeering is tiring me, I'll have to stop.


Mr. David McInerney,
Political Science Program, Research School of Social Sciences,
The Australian National University, Canberra, A.C.T., AUSTRALIA  0200.
e-mail: davidmci@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; ph: (06) 249 2134; fax: (06) 249 3051




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