The materialist road...

[Jukka Laari <jlaari@xxxxxxxxx>]

Thanks, David,

for your long and clarifying posts on your interests. I'd like to
comment in general.

First of all, I'm concerned of the lack of the category of subject.

If you were a sociologist (like me) wondering 'social structures' and
'structures of social practices', then it wouldn't be disappointing at
all. I'm used to it. But your concern seems to be politics: what kind of
beings are those who do politics? (Yeah, we all do it in a sense...) On
what ground do people (we) act? How ideology works? How 'interpellation'
happens, what happens in human body at the moment of 'interpellation'?
That is, there ought to be some general assumptions (hopefully some
specific ones, too) concerning humans, ones which doesn't reduce us
humans into reflex-like mechanisms but leaves room for act(ion)s.

I grew up in a quite 'orthodox' marxist-leninist cultural or ideological
environment and here the question of 'subject' was and still seems to be
hot issue. But then again, we are 'hegelians' nearly by nature. In a way
or another several marxist theories (incl. Althusser's) has been
criticized because they failed to explain human action, except in a very
general way via concepts of structure or ideology. There's nothing wrong
with these concepts, it's just that they're not enough. Besides, these
are in a sense products of human practices, or at least 'social
structure' is mode of (collective) action - I mean 'structure' as
'habit' or 'habitual action'. 'Explaining' human action by structures
and ideologies only is just 'social idealism', how 'materialistic' it
may seem to be. Is it Pierre Macherey who has insisted this, can anyone
remember? I think that we can take Deleuze's theories as one example of
an effort of going beyond that kind of idealism.

So, I take it granted that there is one burning question: How one is
supposed to start intentionally 'mass movement' both in theory and in
practice, if one can't make sense his or her 'actors' or 'agents' who
are supposed to do a revolution or two?  And yes, Althusser and
althusserians obviously tried to answer that question. Results just
aren't particularly convincing. As is clear in the case of Screen you
mentioned: they weren't capable of explain how films affect or
'interpellate' us. They just hypothesized something that had to be
showed. That's shallow.

You mentioned Slovenian lacanism (Zizek & al) and said them to be
neo-hegelians and idealists. Yes, there seems to be strong idealist
tendencies. But at least they have tried to get rid off of simplistic
solutions. I think there are two problem areas on which they're worth
studying among some other non-marxist theories in order not to make same
marxist mistakes again and again: question of subject (both in relation
to structures and ideology and to action) and the question of value of
Hegel. These are interrelated.

Concerning the first one, I tend to believe at the moment that Slovenians
are trying to show how avoid 'mechanistic' and 'deterministic'
conceptions of subject without falling into voluntarism (that's
simplistically said). That they are doing by their quite unorthodox and
dim syntheses of Lacan and Hegel. I don't have guts to go into this
business on this list. (Greetings to Chris...)

What comes to Hegel-problem: Effort to show how reference to Hegel's
logic of essence might clarify traditional problems with ideological (I
prefer that expression) is most welcome. Disappointment comes when it
comes clear that Slovenians are unable to show ideology-theoretical
'Aufhebung' of ideology. I thought that was the whole aim of the
enterprise. To be exact: They are hinting at it in several instances by
references to psychoanalytical practice: just as we can supposedly to get
in touch with our 'traumatic experiences' - that, according to
Slovenians, are the hard core of human subject, 'cause of the subject',
to put it bluntly - on shrink's couch and thereby to get rid off of
them, we should likewise grasp that and how we are ideological beings in
order to pass that stage. (Sorry metaphories, I'm in hurry) That's not
enough.

References to Hegel's logic are important also because in these it is
possible to grasp what has been one major problem with ideology theory:
unarticulatedness & generality. I mean that ideology is seen as general,
'universal' 'factor', and at the same time very particular:

Dominique Lecourt said in one late seventies interview (here in Finland)
that Foucault is of great importance to marxism. Yes, one has to remind
only Foucault's jokes on ideology ('what materialistic is with ideology
theory?'). Let's forget several discourse analyses that have been
practiced during last 15-20 years and concentrate for awhile on how
Foucault tried to replace marxist ideology theory by his archeologies
and genealogies. I think that could be fruitful because of Foucault's
fresh empiricism (when compared to i-theories). And I think that would
show drastically both the difference between essentially philosophical
(general) theory of ideology and more object-sensitive, empirical
foucaultian discourse analysis, and the need to get these 'levels'
together and clarify dimensions of this 'theory' (ideological as
necessary, general, perhaps even 'hidden' feature, which gets manifested
in several discourses or whatever).

I've tried to read Slovenians in that way instead of throwing their
books and journals straight into trashcan.

In sum: I don't mean to present 'subject' as the most crucial theoretical
category, nor I mean to accept idealism which eagerly reminds us when we
forget that humans not only react but act. Category of subject is,
rather, social-theoretically like a prism, which both concentrates and
reflects several issues in theories. Lack of that concept in social
philosophic theory shows rather interest of social engineering than any
kind of 'emancipatory' interest.

That's why I hesitate to trash Althusser - he's the one who opened us
the view into ideological in all its generality and in relation to
'subject'. Besides, earlier I didn't realized that Althusser really knew
Hegel (though in a French way); few weeks ago I looked something by
Althusser and was amazed how sharply and pointedly he criticized Hegel -
target was in Logic, actually, but reference was without any
bibliographical references so reader has to be familiar with Hegel to
some degree in order to get the message. Unfortunately he never truly
clarified (as far as I know) meaning of that kind of passing remarks.
That makes him in my eyes pretty sloppy theoretician.

Yours, Jukka Laari


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