Re: [Critical-Realism] thoughts, ideas and action

["Mark Johnson" <johnsonmwj1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Loius,

I think we can get too hung-up on questions about intentionality (how
can you know it, anyway - particularly 'genuine' intentionality?!).

It strikes me that the real point is to get a deeper insight into the
living process of our 'whole selves' with the explicit purpose of
taking greater control of that process. In other words, empower
ourselves through synergising dispositions, instruments, concepts,
philosophies, etc. to increase our capacity to act. I strongly believe
this is only achievable with models (and certainly not language) - I
use one called the Viable System Model.

Regarding the 'realm of possibility', there's a big difference to
thinking something's possible and it actually being possible: it's the
same difference as between the weather forecast and the actual
weather. Weakness of the will is something we perceive in ourselves
often in the form of 'regret' that we could have done something - but
it's probably not true that we could. Counsellors are trained to deal
with that sort of thing. What do they do? The short answer is "they
put things in perspective". Done well, that perspective would situate
the original 'weakness of will' within a larger organisational
framework (and may suggest organisational improvements! - if only
Mervyn had had a fork-lift truck to hand, the dog might have ... no, I
don't want to get into that!)

Cheers,

Mark

On 12/9/07, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> Mark,
>
> A comment on "Weakness of the will may simply be the absence of the
> appropriate disposition to act".  Isn't that in fact a truism, rather than
> an insight into weakness of will?  Isn't an intention to act a disposition
> to do so, almost by definition?
>
> The general problem with weakness of will is this: How is it even
> conceivable that one has a genuine intention yet fails to act on it? One
> response might be: Well, if you failed to act on it, then you did not have a
> GENUINE knowledge.  Yet our experience does not accord well with that
> response: we all feel that there are times in which we genuinely intended to
> do something yet failed to take action even though there was no external
> obstacle.
>
> It seems to me that the organization issue has to do with one's capability
> of carrying out an intention: an alleged intention to do something that is
> beyond my means probably should not be counted as a genuine intention.  But
> the problem with weakness of will occurs when the action is within the realm
> of possibility.
>
> Please note I am just laying the issue out, I'm not taking a position.
>
> Louis
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Mark
> Johnson
> Sent: Saturday, December 08, 2007 9:01 PM
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] thoughts, ideas and action
>
> You also have to have the 'technical disposition' (i.e. skill, instruments
> to hand, etc) to express yourself through writing at the appropriate moment.
> The organisation of these practical things is, I suspect, more fundamental
> than we often give it credit for. Instruments are not transparent vehicles
> of communication - they are causal factors in the process - I think of
> Beethoven's notebooks... Weakness of the will may simply be the absence of
> the appropriate disposition to act - in other words, a lack of appropriate
> organisation.
>
> Also, where is the intentionality? in the head? Many artists would disagree
> - technical, instrumentally-driven action, the enacting of routine habits,
> etc can be a prelude to engaged critical reflection. Hence Picasso's famous
> "I do not seek, I find". I bet there are quite a few philosophers who work
> like that too.
>
> Mark
> On Dec 8, 2007 11:23 PM, Louis Irwin <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Melanie,
> >
> > Quite apart from CR, it's not just the thought that you will write a
> > sentence that could even tempt one to think it causes you to write -
> > it is the intention to do so. Even so, we all know that we form
> > intentions that we don't fulfill or even try to.  In  philosophy there
> > is the problem of "weakness of will" (aka "incontinence", "akrasia")
> > that has a long history back to Aristotle.  Some philosophers think
> > that intentions have to cause the actions that lead to fulfillment (or
> > at least attempts at fulfillment)
> > -
> > otherwise you could not properly be said to have the intention.
> > Others think there are gaps between intentions and actions.  John
> > Searle has a discussion in his book "Rationality in Action".
> >
> > Louis
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> > m.mcdonald.10@xxxxxxxxxx
> > Sent: Friday, December 07, 2007 11:22 PM
> > To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] thoughts, ideas and action
> >
> > Hey there, I have a small query.
> >
> > I am having a bit of trouble reconciling two different things that
> > Bhaskar has written about the relationship between thoughts, ideas, and
> action.
> >
> > In The philosophy of meta-Reality Volume 1: creativity, love and
> > freedom (Vol. 1), Bhaskar writes about how "the paradigm of thinking
> > leading to action is false" (footnote 18, page 82). I think the main
> > point of this argument is that at some level of determinacy action
> > must be spontaneous and 'unthought', and in leading to this point he
> > argues that 'the thought of the action is not the cause of the
> > action'. And yet in his article 'On the Ontological Status of Ideas',
> > Bhaskar argues that ideas are real because they are causally
> > efficacious (1997 p.143).
> >
> > Let me try to illustrate my point.
> >
> > I can have the thought "I will write a sentence to illustrate my
> > point", which (from my perspective) actually  causes me to write a
> > sentence to illustrate my point. Of course, the actual act of typing
> > the sentence may be spontaneous and unthought, but without the initial
> > thought or idea to write it, I really don't think I would have written
> > it. In this sense, my thought or idea was causally efficacious, and
> > yet in the philosophy of meta-Reality Bhaskar seems to be suggesting
> > that thoughts do not cause action. Can you see what I am getting at?
> > How do I reconcile this?
> >
> > Perhaps there is a subtle difference between what Bhaskar refers to
> > when he speaks of 'thoughts' and the act of 'thinking', and what he
> > refers to when he speaks of 'ideas'. I seem to use the words 'thought'
> > and 'idea' interchangeably, for example, "I had a thought" or "I had
> > an idea", in this respect, my referent for both 'thought' and 'idea'
> > are the same. And yet, it appears that this may be different for Bhaskar.
> >
> > Hmmm, any ideas or thoughts?
> >
> > thanks,
> > Melanie
> >
> > Melanie McDonald
> > PhD Candidate
> > School of Education
> > Southern Cross University
> > Lismore 2480 Australia
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