Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?

["Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>]

Hi Howard--

Yes, I entirely agree that thought can only be causal through materiality. 
For what it's worth, I think that's part and parcel of its nature as an 
emergent activity or domain.

You do realize, of course, that if mercury were used as money instead of 
gold, it would bring a whole new meaning to phrases like "the money just 
slipped out of my hands" and "he drained his bank account" ... and liquidity 
in general.  And as the name of the metal indicates, it comes and goes oh so 
fast.  Quick silver, indeed....

Anyway!  Allow me to push on the question somewhat further.  I'll focus on 
these two points:

>             Whenever we act we do so on the basis of a set of
> representations and understandings that necessarily leave an infinite
> amount of information about the world out -- we've learned to
> abstract, we have no epistemic access, we intentionally or
> negligently ignore, etc.

and

> I don't think you can separate ignorance out.

I think you're right on both points -- but it's crucial to follow through on 
their implications.

Regarding the former, yes, it is precisely by leaving out large parts of the 
world that we obtain definitions.  For this and related reasons, RB argues 
that all determination is negation (DPF 240).  But leaving out large parts 
of the world (or even information about it) is a form of absenting.

Regarding the latter, I wasn't saying that ignorance is a wholly isolatable 
"entity" (so to speak).  The idea I'm testing is this:

>>Put differently, ignorance may perhaps always be "enclosed by" or 
>>"attached
>>to" some sort of belief (I won't swear to that either), but I don't see 
>>how
>>ignorance *itself* is a type of belief.

Put differently, one can separate ignorance out *analytically*, even though 
one *can't* separate it out materially.  This is akin to Archer's argument 
that individuals and society are analytically distinct, even though 
individuals are social and society is comprised of individuals (she calls 
this "analytical dualism").  Society and individuals have different 
properies and interact, but neither of them can exist without the other. 
Her distinction implies, among other things, that if you're going to analyze 
individuals, you can't leave out society, and vice versa.  To fend off a 
possible misunderstanding, I'm *not* saying that the relationship between 
beliefs and ignorance is the *same* as the one between society and 
individual -- I'm simply saying that one can make analytical distinctions in 
other areas.

So when you say that I can't separate ignorance out, my reply is that I 
don't think you can either (or at least, that's the argument I'm exploring). 
As you know, all knowledge is fallible.  As various arguments can 
demonstrate, we don't have direct access to the world outside the mind (for 
one thing, thought can only be causal through material means; for another, 
we can only know via signs), consequently we can never have absolute 
certainty.  In effect, all knowledge carries ignorance (ignorance of its 
absolute correctness).  And in that respect ignorance can itself be causal; 
for instance, I don't know causes rust, which provides a motivation for 
doing experiments in order to find out (there might be additional 
motivations, of course, but ignorance has to be among them).  So if you're 
going to analyze knowledge, you can't leave out ignorance, and vice versa.

Finally, while one can certainly believe that one is ignorant of something, 
I really don't see how something that in fact you don't know can itself be a 
belief.  If I don't know what causes rust, how can that be the basis of a 
belief?  I can believe that rust exists, that a cause exists, and that I can 
do things which will allow me to discover the cause, but how can I believe 
in its real cause when I'm ignorant of it?  So I don't believe that I can 
believe that ignorance is a species of belief.  Believe you me!

I also don't believe Ruth was pissy, whatever she believes.  I hope she 
feels relieved.

Thanks,

Tobin


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Howard Engelskirchen" <howarde@xxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" 
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Sunday, 09 December 2007 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?


> Hi Tobin,
>
> Thanks very much for your comment on the term 'semio-causal'; I take
> confidence in your use of it!
>
> I always thought it was a shame that mercury, which has all the
> characteristics that make other metals money -- homogeneity, infinite
> divisibility, etc.  --, was not used instead of gold and
> silver.  That would have been a ready way to solve unpleasant
> concentrations of wealth for the reasons you describe -- an
> altogether preferable substitute to the burdensome, not to say
> unappetizing, project proposed in some progressive quarters: "Eat the 
> Rich."
>
> For the substance of the question, I would not interpret it in this
> way.  Primarily the discussion here has been about causation.  Causal
> transformation is the work of causal structures.  Thought is not a
> causal structure for the reasons given -- it must engage ordinary
> causal mechanisms.  Philosophers, even post modern ones, have no
> special ways to influence the world with their thinking, for
> example.  As causal mechanisms we are a complete package acting
> meaningfully and muscularly.  So I don't think you can separate
> ignorance out.  (I hasten to add here, just so the comment is not
> misunderstood by others, insofar as action is human action, ordinary
> causal mechanisms must engage semiotic ones.)
>
> But we say reasons are causes -- well then can't we approach
> ignorance in the same way insofar as it engages ordinary causal
> mechanisms?  Here I'd be inclined to track Ruth's line of
> approach.  Whenever we act we do so on the basis of a set of
> representations and understandings that necessarily leave an infinite
> amount of information about the world out -- we've learned to
> abstract, we have no epistemic access, we intentionally or
> negligently ignore, etc.  How we understand belief formation and the
> 'fixation of belief' on the basis of which we act is a deeply
> important question and one that I'm sure we could understand much,
> much more fully.  But we act on the basis of a set of formed beliefs
> that set the causal structure we are in motion.  That's the because
> that causes.
>
> Thanks, Tobin!
>
> A related sidenote to Mervyn:
>
> yes, indeed, I do take the scandalous position that thought to
> thought 'causation' is misnamed causation.  What happens between us
> thought to thought is semiosis.  Without more there is no causal
> transformation of the world -- a prerequisite for conversation about
> causation.  You persuade me it would be good to have a breeze.  Your
> influence becomes causally efficacious when I open the
> window.  Philosophers form their ideas by the exchange of views -- 
> Lenin was influenced by Marx.  But philosophers have only interpreted
> the world -- thought to thought -- the point however is to change
> it.  That takes engaging ordinary causal mechanisms.  As Lenin understood.
>
> howard
>
>
>
>
>
> At 09:02 PM 12/8/2007, you wrote:
>>Hm, is it?  I can act on the basis of knowing that I'm ignorant about
>>something (e.g., when driving around a blind corner I may be a little
>>cautious because there could be another car coming), but is that the same 
>>as
>>acting where I don't even know I'm ignorant (say, singing in the shower,
>>unaware that the neighbors can hear)?  I can probably accept that some 
>>sort
>>of belief is operative (to fill the vacuum, so to speak), for instance in
>>the latter example that nobody can hear me singing.  But in that case, 
>>isn't
>>my ignorance (that someone can in fact hear me) itself operative, in a
>>manner that's distinct from my belief?  Certainly if I ceased to be
>>ignorant, I might act on the new knowledge, perhaps by taking singing
>>lessons.  What I'm thinking (and I'm by no means certain, but it seems to
>>make sense) is that there are two semio-causal factors: the absence of
>>knowledge; and the belief that "covers" for it, of which there may be all
>>sorts of possibilities.
>>
>>Put differently, ignorance may perhaps always be "enclosed by" or 
>>"attached
>>to" some sort of belief (I won't swear to that either), but I don't see 
>>how
>>ignorance *itself* is a type of belief.
>>
>>(By the way, "semio-causal" a great term, Howard.)
>>
>>Thanks,
>>
>>Tobin
>
>
> Sorry for poking into this after being distracted, so I'm not entirely 
> sure
> I'm following the argument.  I'd like to clarify for myself what you're
> saying by offering a thought experiment rather different from Mervyn's 
> dog.
>
> So: as you may know, during the Renaissance some doctors prescribed
> "quicksilver" as a medical treatment.  Quicksilver of course is mercury,
> which is highly poisonous; it's a miracle any patients survived.  My
> question is this: the patients would not have ingested mercury had it not
> been for their doctors, but did the doctors do this strictly because they
> possessed a (false) theory about mercury's medicinal powers, or was their
> ignorance of its true effects also causal?  More generally, is it in fact
> correct to say "They did this *because* they didn't know better"?
>
> As I look at it, the question has to be interpreted in terms of (open,
> partial) totalities, what might be called holistic causality, so I would
> answer that in this case an absence (ignorance) did have its own causal
> powers.  People sometimes do things *because* they don't know better,
> sometimes even when they've been told better.  That leads me to ask two
> further questions: (1) Is it correct to approach the question in this
> holistic manner? and (2) *If* it is, could the holistic approach used for
> this instance be generalizable, in particular to non-human causation?  And
> there may be a third, namely whether holistic analysis could be correct 
> but
> nevertheless perhaps I'm interpreting my own example incorrectly.
>
> Thanks,
>
> 

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