Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?

[Howard Engelskirchen <howarde@xxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Tobin,

Thanks very much for your comment on the term 'semio-causal'; I take 
confidence in your use of it!

I always thought it was a shame that mercury, which has all the 
characteristics that make other metals money -- homogeneity, infinite 
divisibility, etc.  --, was not used instead of gold and 
silver.  That would have been a ready way to solve unpleasant 
concentrations of wealth for the reasons you describe -- an 
altogether preferable substitute to the burdensome, not to say 
unappetizing, project proposed in some progressive quarters: "Eat the Rich."

For the substance of the question, I would not interpret it in this 
way.  Primarily the discussion here has been about causation.  Causal 
transformation is the work of causal structures.  Thought is not a 
causal structure for the reasons given -- it must engage ordinary 
causal mechanisms.  Philosophers, even post modern ones, have no 
special ways to influence the world with their thinking, for 
example.  As causal mechanisms we are a complete package acting 
meaningfully and muscularly.  So I don't think you can separate 
ignorance out.  (I hasten to add here, just so the comment is not 
misunderstood by others, insofar as action is human action, ordinary 
causal mechanisms must engage semiotic ones.)

But we say reasons are causes -- well then can't we approach 
ignorance in the same way insofar as it engages ordinary causal 
mechanisms?  Here I'd be inclined to track Ruth's line of 
approach.  Whenever we act we do so on the basis of a set of 
representations and understandings that necessarily leave an infinite 
amount of information about the world out -- we've learned to 
abstract, we have no epistemic access, we intentionally or 
negligently ignore, etc.  How we understand belief formation and the 
'fixation of belief' on the basis of which we act is a deeply 
important question and one that I'm sure we could understand much, 
much more fully.  But we act on the basis of a set of formed beliefs 
that set the causal structure we are in motion.  That's the because 
that causes.

Thanks, Tobin!

A related sidenote to Mervyn:

yes, indeed, I do take the scandalous position that thought to 
thought 'causation' is misnamed causation.  What happens between us 
thought to thought is semiosis.  Without more there is no causal 
transformation of the world -- a prerequisite for conversation about 
causation.  You persuade me it would be good to have a breeze.  Your 
influence becomes causally efficacious when I open the 
window.  Philosophers form their ideas by the exchange of views -- 
Lenin was influenced by Marx.  But philosophers have only interpreted 
the world -- thought to thought -- the point however is to change 
it.  That takes engaging ordinary causal mechanisms.  As Lenin understood.

howard





At 09:02 PM 12/8/2007, you wrote:
>Hm, is it?  I can act on the basis of knowing that I'm ignorant about
>something (e.g., when driving around a blind corner I may be a little
>cautious because there could be another car coming), but is that the same as
>acting where I don't even know I'm ignorant (say, singing in the shower,
>unaware that the neighbors can hear)?  I can probably accept that some sort
>of belief is operative (to fill the vacuum, so to speak), for instance in
>the latter example that nobody can hear me singing.  But in that case, isn't
>my ignorance (that someone can in fact hear me) itself operative, in a
>manner that's distinct from my belief?  Certainly if I ceased to be
>ignorant, I might act on the new knowledge, perhaps by taking singing
>lessons.  What I'm thinking (and I'm by no means certain, but it seems to
>make sense) is that there are two semio-causal factors: the absence of
>knowledge; and the belief that "covers" for it, of which there may be all
>sorts of possibilities.
>
>Put differently, ignorance may perhaps always be "enclosed by" or "attached
>to" some sort of belief (I won't swear to that either), but I don't see how
>ignorance *itself* is a type of belief.
>
>(By the way, "semio-causal" a great term, Howard.)
>
>Thanks,
>
>Tobin


Sorry for poking into this after being distracted, so I'm not entirely sure
I'm following the argument.  I'd like to clarify for myself what you're
saying by offering a thought experiment rather different from Mervyn's dog.

So: as you may know, during the Renaissance some doctors prescribed
"quicksilver" as a medical treatment.  Quicksilver of course is mercury,
which is highly poisonous; it's a miracle any patients survived.  My
question is this: the patients would not have ingested mercury had it not
been for their doctors, but did the doctors do this strictly because they
possessed a (false) theory about mercury's medicinal powers, or was their
ignorance of its true effects also causal?  More generally, is it in fact
correct to say "They did this *because* they didn't know better"?

As I look at it, the question has to be interpreted in terms of (open,
partial) totalities, what might be called holistic causality, so I would
answer that in this case an absence (ignorance) did have its own causal
powers.  People sometimes do things *because* they don't know better,
sometimes even when they've been told better.  That leads me to ask two
further questions: (1) Is it correct to approach the question in this
holistic manner? and (2) *If* it is, could the holistic approach used for
this instance be generalizable, in particular to non-human causation?  And
there may be a third, namely whether holistic analysis could be correct but
nevertheless perhaps I'm interpreting my own example incorrectly.

Thanks,



>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
><critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: Saturday, 08 December 2007 6:34 PM
>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?
>
>
>Yes, I understand that.  I suggested that ignorance is in fact a species of
>belief, and so is generically efficacious in the same sense that other kinds
>of belief are.
>
>r.
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Tobin
>Nellhaus
>Sent: Sat 08-Dec-07 6:24 PM
>To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?
>
>Hi Ruth--
>
>No, my question isn't about the causal powers of true vs false beliefs: I'm
>asking whether ignorance (the absence of knowledge) can itself be considered
>a causal power.
>
>Thanks,
>
>Tobin
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
><critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: Saturday, 08 December 2007 5:58 PM
>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?
>
>
>Hi Tobin,
>
>I'm seriously deferring to Howard and to Louis on this, but for what it's
>worth, I think that I'd say, at first blush anyway, re: your experiment,
>that there is no difference *in kind,* with respect to *the sense in which*
>beliefs are efficacious (please read this carefully, everybody, so that the
>level of abstraction is clear; I am NOT saying that false beliefs are as
>efficacious as true ones, vis-a-vis given objectives), between true beliefs
>and false or non-relevant beliefs.  But I could be wrong.
>
>r.
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Tobin
>Nellhaus
>Sent: Sat 08-Dec-07 4:34 PM
>To: Critical Realism
>Subject: [Critical-Realism] Causal de-onts: a thought experiment?
>
>Hi Howard--
>
>Sorry for poking into this after being distracted, so I'm not entirely sure
>I'm following the argument.  I'd like to clarify for myself what you're
>saying by offering a thought experiment rather different from Mervyn's dog.
>
>So: as you may know, during the Renaissance some doctors prescribed
>"quicksilver" as a medical treatment.  Quicksilver of course is mercury,
>which is highly poisonous; it's a miracle any patients survived.  My
>question is this: the patients would not have ingested mercury had it not
>been for their doctors, but did the doctors do this strictly because they
>possessed a (false) theory about mercury's medicinal powers, or was their
>ignorance of its true effects also causal?  More generally, is it in fact
>correct to say "They did this *because* they didn't know better"?
>
>As I look at it, the question has to be interpreted in terms of (open,
>partial) totalities, what might be called holistic causality, so I would
>answer that in this case an absence (ignorance) did have its own causal
>powers.  People sometimes do things *because* they don't know better,
>sometimes even when they've been told better.  That leads me to ask two
>further questions: (1) Is it correct to approach the question in this
>holistic manner? and (2) *If* it is, could the holistic approach used for
>this instance be generalizable, in particular to non-human causation?  And
>there may be a third, namely whether holistic analysis could be correct but
>nevertheless perhaps I'm interpreting my own example incorrectly.
>
>Thanks,
>
>T.
>
>---
>Tobin Nellhaus
>nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
>"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
>
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