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Re: [Critical-Realism] thoughts, ideas and action



Melanie,

Quite apart from CR, it's not just the thought that you will write a
sentence that could even tempt one to think it causes you to write - it is
the intention to do so. Even so, we all know that we form intentions that we
don't fulfill or even try to.  In  philosophy there is the problem of
"weakness of will" (aka "incontinence", "akrasia") that has a long history
back to Aristotle.  Some philosophers think that intentions have to cause
the actions that lead to fulfillment (or at least attempts at fulfillment) -
otherwise you could not properly be said to have the intention.  Others
think there are gaps between intentions and actions.  John Searle has a
discussion in his book "Rationality in Action".

Louis


-----Original Message-----
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Sent: Friday, December 07, 2007 11:22 PM
To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Critical-Realism] thoughts, ideas and action

Hey there, I have a small query. 

I am having a bit of trouble reconciling two different things that Bhaskar
has written about the relationship between thoughts, ideas, and action.

In The philosophy of meta-Reality Volume 1: creativity, love and freedom
(Vol. 1), Bhaskar writes about how "the paradigm of thinking leading to
action is false" (footnote 18, page 82). I think the main point of this
argument is that at some level of determinacy action must be spontaneous and
'unthought', and in leading to this point he argues that 'the thought of the
action is not the cause of the action'. And yet in his article 'On the
Ontological Status of Ideas', Bhaskar argues that ideas are real because
they are causally efficacious (1997 p.143). 

Let me try to illustrate my point. 

I can have the thought "I will write a sentence to illustrate my point",
which (from my perspective) actually  causes me to write a sentence to
illustrate my point. Of course, the actual act of typing the sentence may be
spontaneous and unthought, but without the initial thought or idea to write
it, I really don't think I would have written it. In this sense, my thought
or idea was causally efficacious, and yet in the philosophy of meta-Reality
Bhaskar seems to be suggesting that thoughts do not cause action. Can you
see what I am getting at? How do I reconcile this? 

Perhaps there is a subtle difference between what Bhaskar refers to when he
speaks of 'thoughts' and the act of 'thinking', and what he refers to when
he speaks of 'ideas'. I seem to use the words 'thought' 
and 'idea' interchangeably, for example, "I had a thought" or "I had an
idea", in this respect, my referent for both 'thought' and 'idea' are the
same. And yet, it appears that this may be different for Bhaskar. 

Hmmm, any ideas or thoughts?

thanks,
Melanie

Melanie McDonald
PhD Candidate
School of Education
Southern Cross University
Lismore 2480 Australia
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