critical-realism
mailing list archive
[ Other Periods
| Other mailing lists
| Search
]
Date:
[ Previous
| Next
]
Thread:
[ Previous
| Next
]
Index:
[ Author
| Date
| Thread
]
Re: [Critical-Realism] PON question
- To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] PON question
- From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 5 Dec 2007 08:14:32 -0500
- Thread-index: Acg3NqSX9B6wcbVxSNiPRqarCw4E+AACS420
- Thread-topic: [Critical-Realism] PON question
Hi Gerard,
No, I think he's saying there that Winch divides it up this way:
n.s.: Humean constant conjunction
s.s.: meanings (a certain kind of intelligible connection)
whereas he, RB divides in up this way:
n.s.: real mechanisms (a different kind of intelligible connection)
s.s.: real mechanisms, including meanings construed as mechanisms
I argued against the account of meaning in PON, suggesting that meanings are not best understood simply as a sub-species of efficient cause.
Ruth
-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of gerard walmsely
Sent: Wed 05-Dec-07 7:01 AM
To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Critical-Realism] PON question
Dear Listers
This is a bit off topic but important imo.
In PON Bhaskar says: "Winch, it will be remembered, wants to demonstrate an
essential identity between philosophy and social science on the one hand,
and a fundamental contrast between social and natural science on the other.
When one examines the arguments for such a contrast one finds that they
reduce to just two. The first is an argument to the effect that constant
conjunctions are neither sufficient nor even necessary for social scientific
explanation, which is achieved instead by the discovery of intelligible
connections in its subject-matter. This may be granted. But the required
contrast is only generated if one assumes that the discovery of intelligible
connections in its subject matter is not equally the goal of natural
scientific explanation."
Can anyone say, does Bhaskar mean by this that "intelligible connections"
ARE the goal of natural scientific explanation (as opposed to causal
explanation), and if so, how do intelligible connections for a critical
realist in this respect differ, if at all, from the types of intelligible
connection aimed at by Winch (which I believe are conceptual)? Would
Bhaskar be committed to a view that nature is intelligible *in
itself*here? Can anyone offer any coment about that?
Best
GW
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
_______________________________________________
Critical-Realism mailing list
Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
[ Other Periods
| Other mailing lists
| Search
]