[Critical-Realism] conscious and unconscious intentions

["gerard walmsely" <gerardwalmsley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Melanie

you said: I have always assumed that intentions were conscious, and so this
idea that intentions
can be unconscious has made a significant contribution to my developing
understanding.

Unconscious intentions is basic Freudianism and you probably were aware of
this phenomena from your own interpersonal interactions, but perhaps didn't
realise it, because of the technical language that these discussions are
framed in.  This is often the problem with philosophy that makes simple and
everyday things seem abstruse.  We often know a lot more than we think and
philososphy has a knack of mystifying common sense.

GW




On 10/16/07, critical-realism-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx <
critical-realism-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
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> Today's Topics:
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>   1. intentional agency (m.mcdonald.10@xxxxxxxxxx)
>   2. Truth Vs. Reality? (Brad Rose)
>   3. Re: Truth Vs. Reality? (Ruth Groff)
>   4. Re: intentional agency (Dave Taylor)
>   5. Re: Truth Vs. Reality? (Dave Taylor)
>   6. Re: intentional agency (Mervyn Hartwig)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 10:51:32 +1000
> From: m.mcdonald.10@xxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] intentional agency
> To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Message-ID: <f8abc25d864.471497b4@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>
> Hello!
>
> I have finally got my hands on a copy of Dialectic (hooray!) and at the
> moment I am trying to grapple with the concept of intentional
> agency. What I have understood so far is that 'intentions' are the reasons
> for actions. In Dialectic Bhaskar distinguishes between the
> "real reasons for action (which may be more or less unconscious, and to a
> greater extent ideologically formed) and mere ex post or
> pre-rehearsed rationalizations" (DPF p.164). I have always assumed that
> intentions were conscious, and so this idea that intentions
> can be unconscious has made a significant contribution to my developing
> understanding.
>
> In Reflections on meta-Reality Bhaskar writes: "nothing which was an event
> or was happening to a human being or which stemmed
> from such an event or happening and occured in the world could be said to
> be an action unless it was intentional We are only in the
> world of human agency, as distinct from instinctual or mechanistic
> behaviour, when ideas charged with emotions and prompted
> by our volition or will, generate, that is actually produce, enact
> (paradigmatically, but not only) a change in the material world" (RMR
> p.236).
>
> I am now trying to establish definitions for the following terms:
> instinctual behaviour, mechanistic behaviour, spontaneous behaviour,
> and intentional behaviour, and to understand the interconnections between
> them. I was just wondering if anyone could help me out
> by pointing me in the direction of some seminal works that explore these
> differences? (page numbers would be greatly appreciated!)
>
> Thanks,
> Melanie
>
> Melanie McDonald
> PhD Candidate
> School of Education
> Southern Cross University
> Lismore 2480 Australia
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 2
> Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2007 21:23:03 -0400
> From: "Brad Rose" <bradrose1@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
>        <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <003601c80f93$19b96a10$1f12fea9@IBMKCMA0M2>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Dear List Members.
>
> OK this is a pretty elementary question:  What is the relationship between
> reality (the real) and truth?  Is the truth (or perhaps simply, 'truth' sans
> the article, "the") an idea or a representation (ideational, linguistic,
> etc.) of how things 'really' are, how things (active, unfettered mechanisms)
> work in the world and therefore a representation of the true?  Can 'truth'
> be fairly characterized primarily as a representation of the mechanisms and
> processes that are real?  Or is truth, perhaps, something more fundamental
> than a mere representation (a proxy) for the real?  Maybe these ('truth' and
> 'the real') are mere synonyms and are therefore interchangeable, and I am
> just a bit thick.  Apologies in advance for the naive question.  Thanks for
> clarifications.
>
>
> Brad Rose
> bradrose1@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to
> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged
> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other
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>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 3
> Date: Mon, 15 Oct 2007 21:34:52 -0400
> From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
>        <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID:
>        <B1F450220E9A2F4B95928016406A4D363A78D0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
>
> Brad,
>
> There is no agreed upon answer to this question, let alone to the answer
> to the follow-up question, viz., what its definition would be, depending
> upon whether you think think that the term means (a) reality; (b) knowledge;
> or (c) a norm of some sort, which applies to or governs the making of
> claims.
>
> Below, you go back and forth between (a) and (b).  Much of the
> philosophical debate, though not all of it, goes back and forth between (b)
> and (c).  Those influenced by Hegel are a notable exception, Platonists in a
> weird way too.  I'm not sure abt Spinoza.
>
> For starters you might want to look at the relevant entries in the CR
> Dictionary.  I did the one just called "Truth," but there are others too.
>
> In haste,
> Ruth
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Brad Rose
> Sent: Mon 15-Oct-07 9:23 PM
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
>
> Dear List Members.
>
> OK this is a pretty elementary question:  What is the relationship between
> reality (the real) and truth?  Is the truth (or perhaps simply, 'truth' sans
> the article, "the") an idea or a representation (ideational, linguistic,
> etc.) of how things 'really' are, how things (active, unfettered mechanisms)
> work in the world and therefore a representation of the true?  Can 'truth'
> be fairly characterized primarily as a representation of the mechanisms and
> processes that are real?  Or is truth, perhaps, something more fundamental
> than a mere representation (a proxy) for the real?  Maybe these ('truth' and
> 'the real') are mere synonyms and are therefore interchangeable, and I am
> just a bit thick.  Apologies in advance for the naive question.  Thanks for
> clarifications.
>
>
> Brad Rose
> bradrose1@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to
> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged
> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or other
> use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by persons
> or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received
> this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any
> computer.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 4
> Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 10:18:39 +0100
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] intentional agency
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <000b01c80fd5$8a8aebf0$4001a8c0@DAVE>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Melanie
>
> I don't know about "refer you to seminal books", I've had to work out the
> distinctions you are referring to for myself.  Here's my version.
>
> The brain has four major components, more or less orgnaised as such: the
> underlying [chemical] emotional "operating system" (the hypothalamus at
> the
> top of the brain stem); the input/output system (the hypocampus?
> coordinating sense/muscle network), the intuitive visual/tactile memory
> (right cortex) and the indexical sound/language memory (left
> cortex).  Given
> time, all four work can together, but your four types of behaviour
> correspond in order to the decision-making process getting no further than
> the organ mentioned.
>
> In other words, instinctual behaviour by the input/output is triggered
> automatically by default emotional reactions (this is dangerous or nice).
> Learned skills to which the emotional system is accustomed are allowed to
> occur mechanistically (automatially) without interference by the emotional
> operating system.  If the system is not actually doing something the
> senses
> and memory are flipping about looking for something to do, and spontaneous
> behaviour occurs when something comes up which is emotionally attactive.
> Intentional behaviour occurs when a motivated  action is not intuitively
> remembered from automatically doing it and a goal has to be defined in
> order
> to index the visual memory to trigger an uninhibited action, i.e. it has
> to
> be thought at least about if not necessarily through.
>
> There is, as I see it, also a link between these mental processes, the
> levels of Bhaskar's scientific ontology (if the "deep" is resolved into
> structural type indexing of the active dual-controlled input/output
> mechanism), and the levels of logical reference in ALGOL-68 scientific
> language.
>
> Hope that helps.
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> m.mcdonald.10@xxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: 16 October 2007 01:52
> To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] intentional agency
>
> Hello!
>
> I have finally got my hands on a copy of Dialectic (hooray!) and at the
> moment I am trying to grapple with the concept of intentional
> agency. What I have understood so far is that 'intentions' are the reasons
> for actions. In Dialectic Bhaskar distinguishes between the
> "real reasons for action (which may be more or less unconscious, and to a
> greater extent ideologically formed) and mere ex post or
> pre-rehearsed rationalizations" (DPF p.164). I have always assumed that
> intentions were conscious, and so this idea that intentions
> can be unconscious has made a significant contribution to my developing
> understanding.
>
> In Reflections on meta-Reality Bhaskar writes: "nothing which was an event
> or was happening to a human being or which stemmed
> from such an event or happening and occured in the world could be said to
> be
> an action unless it was intentional We are only in the
> world of human agency, as distinct from instinctual or mechanistic
> behaviour, when ideas charged with emotions and prompted
> by our volition or will, generate, that is actually produce, enact
> (paradigmatically, but not only) a change in the material world" (RMR
> p.236).
>
> I am now trying to establish definitions for the following terms:
> instinctual behaviour, mechanistic behaviour, spontaneous behaviour,
> and intentional behaviour, and to understand the interconnections between
> them. I was just wondering if anyone could help me out
> by pointing me in the direction of some seminal works that explore these
> differences? (page numbers would be greatly appreciated!)
>
> Thanks,
> Melanie
>
> Melanie McDonald
> PhD Candidate
> School of Education
> Southern Cross University
> Lismore 2480 Australia
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 5
> Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 11:06:36 +0100
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <000c01c80fdc$3cfa2f70$4001a8c0@DAVE>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Brad,
>
> I agree with Ruth there is no agreed upon answer to this.  One is partly
> implied in Bhaskar's levels, i.e. it is a criterion or way of measuring
> which is different for each level, e.g. in mainstream terms,
> correspondence
> of empirical observations with a mathematical function or graph, and
> coherence of systems of correspondence-type truths observed in different
> contexts.
>
> As I see it, what the mainstream is missing is that Aristotle's truths are
> actually formal: a syllogism (or since Shannon a "real" as against
> "linguistic" logic device) is true in the pragmatic sense that its
> "mechanism" works; the LOGIC is true. It doesn't actually make its
> categorical premises true, but if they are true, performing syllogistic
> logic operations on it will not add any falsehood.  This leaves the issues
> of whether categorical or type distinctions are true in the sense of
> absolutely distinct, this being technically familiar in the language of
> true
> right angles (up is absolutely distinct from across); or true in the
> senses
> of being adequately true (as in toleranced fits); or true so far as we can
> see (the subjective limit of reliability).  But there is also dynamic
> versions  of language and measures and distinction, giving rise to
> questions
> like whether a system is truly closed, or adequately close given on-going
> and even increasing ability to make corrections (as in course setting and
> steering on a ship, adequate to bring one within sight of harbour).  The
> nearest I can get to answering your query directly is that such truths
> occur
> in real as well as linguistic situations.
>
> In mainstream economics the assumption is made that the natural world and
> people and property and commodities are NOT distinct [types] but
> equivalent;
> and unequivocally, this is FALSE. Using the same logic mechanism for all
> of
> them does NOT work.
>
> Best
>
> Dave
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ruth
> Groff
> Sent: 16 October 2007 02:35
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
>
> Brad,
>
> There is no agreed upon answer to this question, let alone to the answer
> to
> the follow-up question, viz., what its definition would be, depending upon
> whether you think think that the term means (a) reality; (b) knowledge; or
> (c) a norm of some sort, which applies to or governs the making of claims.
>
> Below, you go back and forth between (a) and (b).  Much of the
> philosophical
> debate, though not all of it, goes back and forth between (b) and (c).
> Those influenced by Hegel are a notable exception, Platonists in a weird
> way
> too.  I'm not sure abt Spinoza.
>
> For starters you might want to look at the relevant entries in the CR
> Dictionary.  I did the one just called "Truth," but there are others too.
>
> In haste,
> Ruth
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Brad Rose
> Sent: Mon 15-Oct-07 9:23 PM
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Truth Vs. Reality?
>
> Dear List Members.
>
> OK this is a pretty elementary question:  What is the relationship between
> reality (the real) and truth?  Is the truth (or perhaps simply, 'truth'
> sans
> the article, "the") an idea or a representation (ideational, linguistic,
> etc.) of how things 'really' are, how things (active, unfettered
> mechanisms)
> work in the world and therefore a representation of the true?  Can 'truth'
> be fairly characterized primarily as a representation of the mechanisms
> and
> processes that are real?  Or is truth, perhaps, something more fundamental
> than a mere representation (a proxy) for the real?  Maybe these ('truth'
> and
> 'the real') are mere synonyms and are therefore interchangeable, and I am
> just a bit thick.  Apologies in advance for the naive question.  Thanks
> for
> clarifications.
>
>
> Brad Rose
> bradrose1@xxxxxxxxxxx
>
>
> The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to
> which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged
> material. Any review, transmission, re-transmission, dissemination or
> other
> use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon this information by
> persons
> or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you
> received
> this in error, please contact the sender and delete the material from any
> computer.
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> Message: 6
> Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2007 11:09:40 +0100
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] intentional agency
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>        <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID:
>        <mailman.2.1192557602.20881.critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Content-Type: text/plain;       charset="us-ascii"
>
> Hi Melanie
>
> Try Moll, I. (2004) 'Psychology, biology and social relations', Journal of
> Critical Realism 3 (1) and follow up some of the references, esp. by
> Searle.
>
> I think the really important thing to grasp re what Bhaskar is saying is
> that human agency/intentional action is *stratified* (biologically based
> drives/ unconscious/ preconscious/ conscious) and is always mediated by
> some
> kind of reflexive monitoring; see DPF 164-7 and Figure 2.30).  Thus there
> is
> no *purely* instinctual or mechanical human behaviour, and spontaneous
> action (e.g. driving) is always the exercise of a capacity acquired via a
> learning process involving reflexive monitoring. Intentional action is the
> genus and all the various forms or action  are its species. Think
> vertically
> and holistically about it, not horizontally and extensionally
> (instinctual/
> mechanistic/ spontaneous/ intentional as discrete).
>
> Don't know if that helps.
>
> Mervyn
>
> PS. DPF will be available from Routlledge early next year.
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> m.mcdonald.10@xxxxxxxxxx
> Sent: 16 October 2007 01:52
> To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] intentional agency
>
> Hello!
>
> I have finally got my hands on a copy of Dialectic (hooray!) and at the
> moment I am trying to grapple with the concept of intentional
> agency. What I have understood so far is that 'intentions' are the reasons
> for actions. In Dialectic Bhaskar distinguishes between the
> "real reasons for action (which may be more or less unconscious, and to a
> greater extent ideologically formed) and mere ex post or
> pre-rehearsed rationalizations" (DPF p.164). I have always assumed that
> intentions were conscious, and so this idea that intentions
> can be unconscious has made a significant contribution to my developing
> understanding.
>
> In Reflections on meta-Reality Bhaskar writes: "nothing which was an event
> or was happening to a human being or which stemmed
> from such an event or happening and occured in the world could be said to
> be
> an action unless it was intentional We are only in the
> world of human agency, as distinct from instinctual or mechanistic
> behaviour, when ideas charged with emotions and prompted
> by our volition or will, generate, that is actually produce, enact
> (paradigmatically, but not only) a change in the material world" (RMR
> p.236).
>
> I am now trying to establish definitions for the following terms:
> instinctual behaviour, mechanistic behaviour, spontaneous behaviour,
> and intentional behaviour, and to understand the interconnections between
> them. I was just wondering if anyone could help me out
> by pointing me in the direction of some seminal works that explore these
> differences? (page numbers would be greatly appreciated!)
>
> Thanks,
> Melanie
>
> Melanie McDonald
> PhD Candidate
> School of Education
> Southern Cross University
> Lismore 2480 Australia
> _______________________________________________
> Critical-Realism mailing list
> Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
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