[Critical-Realism] transitive/intransitive distinction

["Brian Dick" <briandick51@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Dave, all,



I think that you bring up some good points, that aren't completely clear in
Bhaskar's discussion in that section.  Ruth will probably do a better job at
this, but I'll take a shot at it.



I think that its good to keep in mind that Bhaskar is setting up these
categories with regard to an adequate account of science (RTS2: 17), not
necessarily distinguishing between those objects that are independent of
human activity and those that aren't (although this is part of the
distinction in the natural sciences).



That is, the intransitive objects of science are those objects that exist
independently of the scientific activity per se, not necessarily human
activity (as in the case of the social sciences).  Thus, what makes an
object 'intransitive' in the social sciences, is its independence from the
social scientific activity itself, not human activity in general.  The same
holds true with the natural sciences, although the intransitive objects here
are not only independent of the particular scientific activity, but of all
human activity.  (I think that Bhaskar is perhaps overemphasizing this in
his analysis of the natural sciences because one of his main points of
attack is on the 'empistemic fallacy').  However, while the objects of
social science exist independently of the scientific activity (social
phenomena would, and has, continue to exist without science), they do not
exist independently of human activity.  This is where Bhaskar (PON) brings
in his various limitations on naturalism, activity dependence being an
ontological one.



However, this brings up the difficulty of maintaining the distinction in a
second order inquiry such as a sociology of knowledge, or sociology of
sociology.  In such an inquiry, what are the transitive and intransitive
objects?  Here is my take.  In a first order sociological inquiry, the
objects of the transitive dimension are the previous knowledge materials
(paradigms, studies, theories, concepts, academic practices, etc.), while
the objects of the intransitive dimension are the actual social phenomena
that exists independently of the social scientific activity (social
relationships, norms, culture, etc.).  (I think 'exists independently' gets
a little messy here because although the social phenomena may be dependent
upon scientific activity in general (let's say secretaries in soc
departments), it is independent of the *particular* scientific activity that
is taking place).



Now, in a second order inquiry, such as a sociology of knowledge or
sociology of sociology, the objects of the transitive dimension now become
the previous knowledge materials of other second order inquiries (so the
writings of Marx, Durkheim and Mauss, Mannheim, Roberts, Scheler, Gouldner,
Bourdieu, etc.), while the intransitive objects of the inquiry are the
various knowledge materials of the first order inquiries of social
phenomena.



Finally, I've never been too impressed with Benton's critique of Bhaskar,
which, if I'm thinking of the same thing as you are, is reprinted in the
*Critical Realism: Essential Readings* book.  It just seems to me that
Benton is either being unfair or misunderstanding what Bhaskar is doing, but
that has just been my impression.



All the best,
Brian
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