Re: [Critical-Realism] Breaking news:Copernican breakthrough in the social sciences

[Fred Zaman <agent.redstone@xxxxxxxxx>]

  A Critical-Realist Theory of America, in the simplest terms, is 
  simply an elaboration of American history--in the terms of Marx, 
  Althusser, Machiavelli, Jameson, and Bhaskar--based on the 
  following CR systems-theoretic thesis: In the ?open systems? of 
  critical realism, Newton?s laws of motion form a ?transfactual 
  mechanics? that is ?activated? by the ?generative mechanisms? of 
  society?s ?political unconscious.? What is it about this thesis 
  that my critics feel is so abhorrent that they can only (1) reply 
  in flaming rhetoric, or (2) steadfastly maintain a code of 
  silence by simply refusing to discuss its content objectively and 
  rationally?
   
  One answer that immediately comes to mind is a fear of being 
  attacked by the academy?s numerous ?Sokalites,? aka the thought 
  police of positivist science. Newtonian mechanics seemingly is 
  held by physicists to be restricted a priori to classical 
  physics; and any effort to further extend its conceptual domain, 
  into the social sciences as a qualitative theory of social order 
  for example, is to be attacked by the Sokalites immediately--
  indeed viciously so in an all out war against legitimizing any 
  post-positivist perspective of science. It matters not that the 
  physical sciences are themselves seeking a ?theory of 
  everything,? in the reductionist terms of their own choosing. The 
  attitude--and demonstrated behavior--of the positivist ?hard 
  sciences? is that the social sciences had better know their place 
  in this regard, or there will be hell to pay. And this it seems 
  may be driving the list?s ?code of silence? regarding the above 
  ?renegade? CR thesis.
   
  Another reason for the opposition may be that the transition from 
  CR philosophy to CR systems theory made possible, by the above CR 
  thesis, requires obtaining a somewhat different academic ?skill 
  set? than that now possessed by the list critics; which the essay 
  ?A Critical-Realist Theory of America? indeed provides a tutorial 
  for--for those hardy souls willing to make the transition from CR 
  philosophy to a more scientifically-based systems theory. This 
  transition will require the abandonment (or at least 
  marginalization) of much of the traditional-type philosophical 
  analysis (such as that now ongoing on the CR list), on the 
  grounds that it is largely irrelevant to the future of CR based 
  on the above systems-theoretic approach; and much more emphasis 
  given in the way of a philosophically-grounded but nevertheless 
  strong systems-theoretic form of analysis.
   
  Yet a third reason for the critics? opposition might be due 
  simply to the idea that CR is in principle only a philosophy of 
  science, so that any attempt to make it into something more--such 
  as a systems theory--is futile and a fundamental mistake of 
  category. It is true, however, that the theory of American now 
  called a critical-realist theory was developed completely 
  independent of CR philosophy, and that only recently has its 
  connection to CR philosophy been recognized. There was no attempt 
  to transform CR into something more, only the recognition that CR 
  is connected in a fundamental way to something that is far more 
  than just a philosophy of science.
   
  The current philosophizing of CR is in essence the default 
  position necessitated by the absence of a more scientific, 
  systems-theoretic approach to CR analysis; which position will be 
  given up as CR systems theory overcomes its opposition and 
  becomes more widely known. The essay ?A Critical-Realist Theory 
  of America? shows quite clearly that it will be such development, 
  of CR systems theory rather than the present rehashing of its 
  underlying philosophy ad infinitum, that is most important; 
  because it is a coherent, unified systems theory that will be the 
  future enabler of CR in diverse applications.
   
  The borderlands between the natural and social sciences, it 
  seems, if the academy?s Sokalites have their way, will only be 
  colonized by physical and biological theorists--not by renegade, 
  post-positivist social theorists. The borderlands between the 
  natural and social sciences, however, is precisely the domain of 
  critical-realist philosophy. The above thesis provides a 
  qualitative foundation for a future critical-realist colonization 
  of the physico-social borderlands through CR systems analysis.
   
  If, however, the above thesis truly is wrong, then let my critics 
  objectively refute it through reasoned analysis, without the 
  flaming they?ve employed in the past. I think it is safe to 
  assume that, if they do not do this, it is simply because they 
  are unable to do it, objectively without the rhetoric of the 
  past. These folks will then, it seems, simply continue to 
  philosophize, philosophize, philosophize; for they apparently are 
  unable to see either the possibility of or value in developing a 
  comprehensive, rational systems theory of CR.
   
  Fred


Fred Zaman <agent.redstone@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:  

There is a fundamental unity to A Critical-Realist Theory of 
America for those willing to pursue it. The transfactual 
mechanics of open systems in this essay can be likened in its 
theoretical development to an arch whose left support is 
Althusserian Marxism (underground currents, aleatory materialism, 
etc.) to include it?s elitist Machiavellian connections (elitist 
conspiracy theory), whose right support is the Jamesonian Marxism 
(class-based political unconscious) of American culture, and 
whose keystone locking the arch?s left and right supports in 
place is a Bhaskarian critical realism theoretically grounded in 
Newtonian terms as indicated in the paper?s introduction and 
section 1 given below.

In this view, Marxism by itself fails to answer the needs of an 
emancipatory program for humanity, as does the theorizing of 
Althusser, Machiavelli, Jameson, and Bhaskar each taken alone. 
What is needed is a broader theoretical perspective that shows in 
just what way each of these and other theoreticians contribute to 
a comprehensive theory of society in which humanity?s 
emancipation from modernity?s capitalist noir can be achieved, 
realistically and practically. This is what ?A Critical-Realist 
Theory of America? is argued to point the way toward.

-----------------------------------------------

0.a What follows is a critical-realist theory of American 
capitalism that social critics perhaps can employ as a guide to 
political action in this 21st century. The article is very long, 
but it provides a high-level Marxist (class-based) account of 
capitalist hegemony in the United States that arguably answers 
the question ?what next?? To which the answer given is: a 
politically effective Marxism for social democracy in 21st century 
America and elsewhere. The key to this effort, it will be argued, 
is a systematic elaboration of Bhaskar?s philosophy of critical 
realism. This essay, through its critical-realist theory of 
American capitalism, explains--at a very high level of 
conceptualization in terms of class struggle--the course of 
American history circa 1650 to the present, and predictably 
onward into the future.

0.b The theoretical basis of this Bhaskarian elaboration is a 
systems theory that in one bold stroke cuts through the Gordian 
knot of the causal link between structure and agency, the 
solution to which to this day has been beyond the reach of 
definitive philosophical analysis. Nature itself provides the 
solution, whose laws in this theory of critical-realism?s (CR) 
open systems are the instruments by which agents physically 
control the reality in which they exist. CR ?systems theory? thus 
formulated provides for the first time a rational, naturalistic 
explanation of the causal connection between structure and 
agency. The ability of agents to employ the laws of nature as 
instruments of control in the physical world, intentionally and 
with purpose, is here held to be essential to any agency that 
claims to be included in ?the category of the real.? For without 
this ability, one can--as the natural sciences currently assume--
only conform to the constraints imposed by structure according to 
nature?s laws, blindly and wholly devoid of purpose. Lacking the 
ability to employ nature?s laws as instruments of control, there 
are no agents whatever in the physical world; because all there 
are then are structures that constrain activity that is without 
purpose, and the product of no agency whatsoever.

0.c This essay?s critical-realist theory of American capitalism 
exemplifies a new, high-level application of Newtonian 
principles, which previously have been employed only in closed 
systems where constant junctions prevail, to qualitatively 
explain high-level phenomena in CR open systems (American 
economics, politics, and culture) in which constant conjunctions 
do not prevail; but where the tendencies thereof nevertheless 
manifest themselves over the long term (some 400 years) through a 
high-level ?transfactual mechanics? of nature?s laws qua 
intransitive objects. The essay thus is fundamentally concerned 
with establishing the necessity for an ontological distinction 
between laws of causation and associated patterns of events in 
American history, thereby clarifying the generative mechanisms 
and structures involved in the historical development of American 
society. And key in this effort is the noveau critical-realist 
premise of this essay in which:

Newton?s laws of motion, in the ?open systems? of critical 
realism, form a ?transfactual mechanics? that in American history 
was activated by the nation?s political unconscious.

1. CR?s transfactual mechanics

1a. The philosopher in Roy Bhaskar?s critical realism , is one 
who observes what scientists are doing; and from this concludes, 
obviously, that the world is such that the methods employed by 
scientists tell us things about the world that are very important 
to know. In critical realism the philosopher starts with the 
success of the practices of modern science and explores what 
these practices tell us about the world. Reasoning of this kind, 
concerning what the world must be like in order that science is 
even possible, which has been called second-order or 
transcendental reasoning, is the domain of the philosopher. The 
philosopher?s objective here is to aid the scientist, by serving 
as an ?underlaborer? that assists those who are scientists by 
investigating the conditions that make the successes of science 
possible.

1b. Several results of the philosopher?s transcendental, second-
order reasoning in critical realism will be central to the 
present essay. One, certainly, is that the world is such that 
scientists are able to employ, de facto as instruments of control 
in their research and in the conduct of their daily lives, laws 
of nature that for all intents and purposes are objective and 
exist independent of the scientist?s rational knowledge of such. 
Another result of this kind of reasoning is that the ability of 
humans to make a difference, as they employ nature?s laws as 
instruments of control in their actions, is not self-deception 
but real. And yet a third result of transcendental reasoning in 
the philosophy of critical realism is knowledge that nature?s 
laws, which constitute its causal powers, determine the ability 
of things to act; of which humans are not the only beings to act 
thusly, through the causal powers of nature?s laws employed as 
instruments of control. So that, in this interpretation, the 
causality of every law of nature is ultimately transfactual in 
character. That is, it may or may not be active depending on the 
causal powers of nature--or society--calling for its activation.

1c. Finally, a fourth aspect of critical realism, in the social 
sciences, is that second-order arguments are needed for an 
objective understanding of society. , , The individual and 
society, both existing independently, are related like two 
animals in symbiosis. Individuals as members of society are in 
essence the organs of the much larger social body, which as a 
whole is a primal ?social animal? that can act but does not 
possess consciousness. The basic question that thus arises in the 
sociology of critical realism is: how does the primitive animal 
that society in effect constitutes employ nature?s laws as 
instruments of control, unconsciously. Individuals presently have 
little control over the society in which they live. Perhaps this 
would change if there was a better understanding of just how 
society as a whole, functioning in essence as a sociopolitical 
primate, unconsciously employs nature?s laws as instruments of 
control.
1d. It thus seems that something fundamental is missing still in 
Bhaskar?s critical realism (CR); that there is yet an unstated 
principle, on which CR fundamentally rests, that concerns the 
causal relationship between the structure of society and the 
agency of individuals. As Margaret Archer has put it, there are 
two sets of causal powers: objective structures and subjective 
projects, one inanimate and the other animate, which possess 
different sets of emergent properties and powers. How are these 
to be reconciled and harmonized? In what way can CR explain the 
causal interaction of objective structures and subjective 
projects? The ?first principle? that here is assumed to 
accomplish this is that the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, 
etc?, by which objective structures constrain subjective agents, 
constitute as well the instruments through which agents carry out 
their projects. Nature?s laws here, which determine the objective 
structures that place constraints on the subjective projects of 
agents, also are the instruments through which these agents carry 
out their projects.

1e. This noveau ?first principle? of CR allows a system-theoretic 
approach spelled out in terms of CR closed and open systems. 
Closed systems in CR thus grounded are systems in which the 
effects of human agency on the system dynamics are determined at 
the outset by a predetermined system structure and initial and 
boundary conditions specified. These establish the pre-conditions 
of scientific analysis in closed systems, so that nature?s laws 
then determine the system behavior independent of the further 
actions of human agents. CR open systems, on the other hand, are 
then systems in which the voluntary actions of human agents--
whether conscious or unconscious--are integral to the system 
dynamics, by virtue of their purposeful employment of nature?s 
laws as the instruments of subjectively-informed guidance and 
control. The essential difference then, between systems in CR 
that are open and closed, is whether or not--by virtue of their 
employment (or not) of nature?s laws as instruments of 
subjectively-informed guidance and control--human agents are 
included in the system dynamics. The subjective dynamics of CR 
open systems is here objectified through a ?transfactual 
mechanics? of their politically unconscious generative mechanisms 
and structures.

1f. In the open systems of CR in this essay, the transfactual 
mechanics of their generative mechanisms, in its Newtonian form 
as exemplified in the historiography of American capitalism in 
Figure 1, can be defined as follows:

1. Inertia of the political unconscious: In the absence of a 
motive force for change, a generative mechanism is either 
motionless, in the space of its political unconscious, or moves 
uniformly along a straight line in the same. The inertial forces 
of the generative mechanism tending to maintain its current state 
of motion include those commonly characterized as the forces of 
?political correctness.?

2. Motive forces of the political unconscious: A motive force 
changes that state of motion of a generative mechanism tending to 
be maintained by inertial forces that include those of ?political 
correctness.? The change induced is in the direction of the 
force: in direct proportion to the magnitude of the force and in 
inverse proportion to the mass of the generative mechanism?s 
political unconscious. In its mathematical representation the 
force is F = ma, or more generally F = d(mv)/dt if the mass of 
the political unconscious varies.

3. Action-reaction forces of the political unconscious: The 
motive force experienced by the political unconscious of 
generative mechanism A is experienced by the political 
unconscious of generative mechanism B as an equivalent but 
opposed force pointing in the opposite direction, and vice-versa. 
In it mathematical representation this is FA = - FB.
It is a basic premise of this ?transfactual mechanics? of open 
systems that the social function or functions of every group is 
determined by the political unconscious of one or more generative 
mechanisms that conform to the above mechanics. Here, every 
social group is political at bottom; no matter whether discourse 
at the surface is about things conventionally labeled 
?political,? ?economic,? ?cultural,? or whatever. The generative 
mechanisms and structures elaborated in this essay, as a way of 
explaining the transfactual mechanics of open systems, are those 
of a triad of classes considered to be the ?generative 
mechanisms? of American capitalism.

1g. The basic ideas of CR apply more or less directly to this 
transfactual mechanics of open systems. That is, they seem to 
carry over to this systems-theoretic account of CR with little or 
no modification. The primary difference perhaps is the absence of 
explicit references in CR concerning the employment of nature?s 
laws (nature?s most basic intransitive objects), specifically as 
instruments of both personal and societal control, guidance, and 
knowledge production. In this transfactual mechanics, for 
example, paralleling CR philosophy, a key assumption--in order 
for experimental activity to be rendered intelligible--is ?that 
natural mechanisms endure and act outside the conditions that 
enable us to identify them[, so] that the applicability of known 
laws in open systems, i.e. in systems where no constant 
conjunctions of events prevail, can be sustained. The corollary 
that a constant conjunction of events cannot be necessary for the 
assumption of the efficacy of a law is true for this transfactual 
mechanics as well.

1h. The weakness of theorizing in the natural sciences is that 
nature?s laws are tied to closed systems, viz. systems where a 
constant conjunction of events occurs. The consequence of this 
is that neither the experimental establishment nor the practical 
application of our knowledge thus garnered can be sustained in 
open systems. So that once we allow for open systems, then laws 
are universal only if they can be interpreted in a non-empirical 
(trans-factual) way, i.e. as designating the activity of 
generative mechanisms and structures independently of any 
particular sequence or pattern of events. The transfactual 
mechanics of this essay does this; it provides an ontological 
basis for a concept of natural necessity in open systems that 
exists independent of men or human activity.

1i. In this transfactual mechanics of open systems, agents carry 
out their subjective projects in the material world through laws 
of nature they actively engage as instruments of control--which 
projects nature nevertheless does constrain structurally through 
the very same laws. The physical sciences, through the ?first-
order reasoning? they employ in their study of the structural 
constraints imposed by nature?s laws, methodologically omit the 
subjective, transcendent I and We. It now may be time, however, 
to bring subjective being back into science, through the second-
order reasoning of CR systems theory in which subjective agents 
actively employ these same laws as instruments of control, 
intentionally and with full purpose. ?Transcendent? here simply 
refers to agents that, although constrained in what they do by 
nature?s laws, nevertheless stand above and exist independent of 
those laws in the sense that they actively employ the very same 
laws to successfully conclude their projects. 

1j. Nature?s forces and the laws that govern their operation, 
those that the physical sciences have discovered, objectively 
constrain the subjective projects agents seek to accomplish in 
the world. According to the above principle, however, those same 
agents at the same time employ, actively as instruments for 
realizing projects both conscious and unconscious, the very same 
laws by which they are materially constrained. Nature?s forces 
and laws are precisely the means by which agents actively employ, 
in reaction against the constraints imposed by structure 
according to nature?s laws, to accomplish their subjective 
projects. Physicists, chemists, and biologists are exemplars of 
this phenomenon, who employ nature?s laws in science projects for 
the purpose of furthering knowledge of the same. Engineers 
similarly do this in the furtherance of technological 
development.

1k. This principle can be clarified at an elementary level by 
examples from daily activity. For example, holding an object in 
hand, let?s say a billiard ball, the transcendent I of critical 
realism can employ the law of gravity by simply letting the ball 
fall to the ground, which in this hypothetical case is the 
intended objective. By first holding the ball in hand, however, 
the transcendent I of CR also employ nature?s laws as well, as 
these are manifested physiologically in the act of holding the 
ball. Along every link in the physiological chain linking the 
transcendent I we each are, to whatever objective we intend, 
nature?s laws are instruments employed for fulfilling the 
intended purpose; which in the present hypothetical example is 
simply the holding, and then letting go, of the ball so that it 
falls to the ground under the force of gravity. Obviously, 
countless examples of this can be entertained. The 
instrumentality of natural law thereby demonstrated with regard 
to our conscious efforts, however, as indicated in the 
transfactual mechanics of open systems just elaborated, clearly 
extends to the subterranean realm of the unconscious as well.

1l. According to this first principle, agents as we know them--
emerging out of the evolutionary processes of life--are not only 
constrained in their subjective projects by nature?s material 
forces and the laws thereof; they also at the same time employ 
the same as instruments of control--instruments that in truth are 
the only means of one?s subjective control of the physical. They 
do this not only consciously in direct physical control, but 
also--it is argued in the transfactual mechanics of open systems-
-indirectly through evolved, transfactual homologues of nature?s 
laws, by which a transcendent coordinating ?unconscious? sustains 
supporting material processes both internal and external to the 
body (that material entity which is host to the unconscious).

1m. CR thus grounded, when further considered with regard to the 
social order of collectives, applies to society?s economic, 
political, and cultural development. Society here is dominated by 
unconsciously evolved, transfactual homologues of the forces and 
laws of physical systems--which function as the second-order 
instruments of an unconscious that, unknown to the individual 
consciousness (i.e. secretively and conspiratorially), controls a 
society?s overall development. These higher-level societal forces 
are considered to have historically evolved out of nature?s 
lower-level forces and laws, in such a way that they may remain 
mathematically similar--or perhaps in some abstract way even 
formally identical--to the lower-level forces and laws of nature 
discovered through the first-order reasoning of the natural 
sciences.

1n. The upshot of CR systems theory thus grounded is that 
applications--to ethical naturalist theory, social morphogenesis, 
ontological realism, process metaphysics, and the analysis of 
strategic social change to give a few examples--then can be 
framed through the second-order reasoning of the social sciences, 
in ways that mediate the natural and social sciences causally in 
both theory and practice--perhaps the prime objective of CR 
research. I develop in this essay a theory about a class-based, 
Jamesonian political unconscious in American history, in the 

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