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Re: [Critical-Realism] Breaking news:Copernican breakthrough in the social sciences
There is a fundamental unity to A Critical-Realist Theory of
America for those willing to pursue it. The transfactual
mechanics of open systems in this essay can be likened in its
theoretical development to an arch whose left support is
Althusserian Marxism (underground currents, aleatory materialism,
etc.) to include it?s elitist Machiavellian connections (elitist
conspiracy theory), whose right support is the Jamesonian Marxism
(class-based political unconscious) of American culture, and
whose keystone locking the arch?s left and right supports in
place is a Bhaskarian critical realism theoretically grounded in
Newtonian terms as indicated in the paper?s introduction and
section 1 given below.
In this view, Marxism by itself fails to answer the needs of an
emancipatory program for humanity, as does the theorizing of
Althusser, Machiavelli, Jameson, and Bhaskar each taken alone.
What is needed is a broader theoretical perspective that shows in
just what way each of these and other theoreticians contribute to
a comprehensive theory of society in which humanity?s
emancipation from modernity?s capitalist noir can be achieved,
realistically and practically. This is what ?A Critical-Realist
Theory of America? is argued to point the way toward.
-----------------------------------------------
0.a What follows is a critical-realist theory of American
capitalism that social critics perhaps can employ as a guide to
political action in this 21st century. The article is very long,
but it provides a high-level Marxist (class-based) account of
capitalist hegemony in the United States that arguably answers
the question ?what next?? To which the answer given is: a
politically effective Marxism for social democracy in 21st century
America and elsewhere. The key to this effort, it will be argued,
is a systematic elaboration of Bhaskar?s philosophy of critical
realism. This essay, through its critical-realist theory of
American capitalism, explains--at a very high level of
conceptualization in terms of class struggle--the course of
American history circa 1650 to the present, and predictably
onward into the future.
0.b The theoretical basis of this Bhaskarian elaboration is a
systems theory that in one bold stroke cuts through the Gordian
knot of the causal link between structure and agency, the
solution to which to this day has been beyond the reach of
definitive philosophical analysis. Nature itself provides the
solution, whose laws in this theory of critical-realism?s (CR)
open systems are the instruments by which agents physically
control the reality in which they exist. CR ?systems theory? thus
formulated provides for the first time a rational, naturalistic
explanation of the causal connection between structure and
agency. The ability of agents to employ the laws of nature as
instruments of control in the physical world, intentionally and
with purpose, is here held to be essential to any agency that
claims to be included in ?the category of the real.? For without
this ability, one can--as the natural sciences currently assume--
only conform to the constraints imposed by structure according to
nature?s laws, blindly and wholly devoid of purpose. Lacking the
ability to employ nature?s laws as instruments of control, there
are no agents whatever in the physical world; because all there
are then are structures that constrain activity that is without
purpose, and the product of no agency whatsoever.
0.c This essay?s critical-realist theory of American capitalism
exemplifies a new, high-level application of Newtonian
principles, which previously have been employed only in closed
systems where constant junctions prevail, to qualitatively
explain high-level phenomena in CR open systems (American
economics, politics, and culture) in which constant conjunctions
do not prevail; but where the tendencies thereof nevertheless
manifest themselves over the long term (some 400 years) through a
high-level ?transfactual mechanics? of nature?s laws qua
intransitive objects. The essay thus is fundamentally concerned
with establishing the necessity for an ontological distinction
between laws of causation and associated patterns of events in
American history, thereby clarifying the generative mechanisms
and structures involved in the historical development of American
society. And key in this effort is the noveau critical-realist
premise of this essay in which:
Newton?s laws of motion, in the ?open systems? of critical
realism, form a ?transfactual mechanics? that in American history
was activated by the nation?s political unconscious.
1. CR?s transfactual mechanics
1a. The philosopher in Roy Bhaskar?s critical realism , is one
who observes what scientists are doing; and from this concludes,
obviously, that the world is such that the methods employed by
scientists tell us things about the world that are very important
to know. In critical realism the philosopher starts with the
success of the practices of modern science and explores what
these practices tell us about the world. Reasoning of this kind,
concerning what the world must be like in order that science is
even possible, which has been called second-order or
transcendental reasoning, is the domain of the philosopher. The
philosopher?s objective here is to aid the scientist, by serving
as an ?underlaborer? that assists those who are scientists by
investigating the conditions that make the successes of science
possible.
1b. Several results of the philosopher?s transcendental, second-
order reasoning in critical realism will be central to the
present essay. One, certainly, is that the world is such that
scientists are able to employ, de facto as instruments of control
in their research and in the conduct of their daily lives, laws
of nature that for all intents and purposes are objective and
exist independent of the scientist?s rational knowledge of such.
Another result of this kind of reasoning is that the ability of
humans to make a difference, as they employ nature?s laws as
instruments of control in their actions, is not self-deception
but real. And yet a third result of transcendental reasoning in
the philosophy of critical realism is knowledge that nature?s
laws, which constitute its causal powers, determine the ability
of things to act; of which humans are not the only beings to act
thusly, through the causal powers of nature?s laws employed as
instruments of control. So that, in this interpretation, the
causality of every law of nature is ultimately transfactual in
character. That is, it may or may not be active depending on the
causal powers of nature--or society--calling for its activation.
1c. Finally, a fourth aspect of critical realism, in the social
sciences, is that second-order arguments are needed for an
objective understanding of society. , , The individual and
society, both existing independently, are related like two
animals in symbiosis. Individuals as members of society are in
essence the organs of the much larger social body, which as a
whole is a primal ?social animal? that can act but does not
possess consciousness. The basic question that thus arises in the
sociology of critical realism is: how does the primitive animal
that society in effect constitutes employ nature?s laws as
instruments of control, unconsciously. Individuals presently have
little control over the society in which they live. Perhaps this
would change if there was a better understanding of just how
society as a whole, functioning in essence as a sociopolitical
primate, unconsciously employs nature?s laws as instruments of
control.
1d. It thus seems that something fundamental is missing still in
Bhaskar?s critical realism (CR); that there is yet an unstated
principle, on which CR fundamentally rests, that concerns the
causal relationship between the structure of society and the
agency of individuals. As Margaret Archer has put it, there are
two sets of causal powers: objective structures and subjective
projects, one inanimate and the other animate, which possess
different sets of emergent properties and powers. How are these
to be reconciled and harmonized? In what way can CR explain the
causal interaction of objective structures and subjective
projects? The ?first principle? that here is assumed to
accomplish this is that the laws of physics, chemistry, biology,
etc?, by which objective structures constrain subjective agents,
constitute as well the instruments through which agents carry out
their projects. Nature?s laws here, which determine the objective
structures that place constraints on the subjective projects of
agents, also are the instruments through which these agents carry
out their projects.
1e. This noveau ?first principle? of CR allows a system-theoretic
approach spelled out in terms of CR closed and open systems.
Closed systems in CR thus grounded are systems in which the
effects of human agency on the system dynamics are determined at
the outset by a predetermined system structure and initial and
boundary conditions specified. These establish the pre-conditions
of scientific analysis in closed systems, so that nature?s laws
then determine the system behavior independent of the further
actions of human agents. CR open systems, on the other hand, are
then systems in which the voluntary actions of human agents--
whether conscious or unconscious--are integral to the system
dynamics, by virtue of their purposeful employment of nature?s
laws as the instruments of subjectively-informed guidance and
control. The essential difference then, between systems in CR
that are open and closed, is whether or not--by virtue of their
employment (or not) of nature?s laws as instruments of
subjectively-informed guidance and control--human agents are
included in the system dynamics. The subjective dynamics of CR
open systems is here objectified through a ?transfactual
mechanics? of their politically unconscious generative mechanisms
and structures.
1f. In the open systems of CR in this essay, the transfactual
mechanics of their generative mechanisms, in its Newtonian form
as exemplified in the historiography of American capitalism in
Figure 1, can be defined as follows:
1. Inertia of the political unconscious: In the absence of a
motive force for change, a generative mechanism is either
motionless, in the space of its political unconscious, or moves
uniformly along a straight line in the same. The inertial forces
of the generative mechanism tending to maintain its current state
of motion include those commonly characterized as the forces of
?political correctness.?
2. Motive forces of the political unconscious: A motive force
changes that state of motion of a generative mechanism tending to
be maintained by inertial forces that include those of ?political
correctness.? The change induced is in the direction of the
force: in direct proportion to the magnitude of the force and in
inverse proportion to the mass of the generative mechanism?s
political unconscious. In its mathematical representation the
force is F = ma, or more generally F = d(mv)/dt if the mass of
the political unconscious varies.
3. Action-reaction forces of the political unconscious: The
motive force experienced by the political unconscious of
generative mechanism A is experienced by the political
unconscious of generative mechanism B as an equivalent but
opposed force pointing in the opposite direction, and vice-versa.
In it mathematical representation this is FA = - FB.
It is a basic premise of this ?transfactual mechanics? of open
systems that the social function or functions of every group is
determined by the political unconscious of one or more generative
mechanisms that conform to the above mechanics. Here, every
social group is political at bottom; no matter whether discourse
at the surface is about things conventionally labeled
?political,? ?economic,? ?cultural,? or whatever. The generative
mechanisms and structures elaborated in this essay, as a way of
explaining the transfactual mechanics of open systems, are those
of a triad of classes considered to be the ?generative
mechanisms? of American capitalism.
1g. The basic ideas of CR apply more or less directly to this
transfactual mechanics of open systems. That is, they seem to
carry over to this systems-theoretic account of CR with little or
no modification. The primary difference perhaps is the absence of
explicit references in CR concerning the employment of nature?s
laws (nature?s most basic intransitive objects), specifically as
instruments of both personal and societal control, guidance, and
knowledge production. In this transfactual mechanics, for
example, paralleling CR philosophy, a key assumption--in order
for experimental activity to be rendered intelligible--is ?that
natural mechanisms endure and act outside the conditions that
enable us to identify them[, so] that the applicability of known
laws in open systems, i.e. in systems where no constant
conjunctions of events prevail, can be sustained. The corollary
that a constant conjunction of events cannot be necessary for the
assumption of the efficacy of a law is true for this transfactual
mechanics as well.
1h. The weakness of theorizing in the natural sciences is that
nature?s laws are tied to closed systems, viz. systems where a
constant conjunction of events occurs. The consequence of this
is that neither the experimental establishment nor the practical
application of our knowledge thus garnered can be sustained in
open systems. So that once we allow for open systems, then laws
are universal only if they can be interpreted in a non-empirical
(trans-factual) way, i.e. as designating the activity of
generative mechanisms and structures independently of any
particular sequence or pattern of events. The transfactual
mechanics of this essay does this; it provides an ontological
basis for a concept of natural necessity in open systems that
exists independent of men or human activity.
1i. In this transfactual mechanics of open systems, agents carry
out their subjective projects in the material world through laws
of nature they actively engage as instruments of control--which
projects nature nevertheless does constrain structurally through
the very same laws. The physical sciences, through the ?first-
order reasoning? they employ in their study of the structural
constraints imposed by nature?s laws, methodologically omit the
subjective, transcendent I and We. It now may be time, however,
to bring subjective being back into science, through the second-
order reasoning of CR systems theory in which subjective agents
actively employ these same laws as instruments of control,
intentionally and with full purpose. ?Transcendent? here simply
refers to agents that, although constrained in what they do by
nature?s laws, nevertheless stand above and exist independent of
those laws in the sense that they actively employ the very same
laws to successfully conclude their projects.
1j. Nature?s forces and the laws that govern their operation,
those that the physical sciences have discovered, objectively
constrain the subjective projects agents seek to accomplish in
the world. According to the above principle, however, those same
agents at the same time employ, actively as instruments for
realizing projects both conscious and unconscious, the very same
laws by which they are materially constrained. Nature?s forces
and laws are precisely the means by which agents actively employ,
in reaction against the constraints imposed by structure
according to nature?s laws, to accomplish their subjective
projects. Physicists, chemists, and biologists are exemplars of
this phenomenon, who employ nature?s laws in science projects for
the purpose of furthering knowledge of the same. Engineers
similarly do this in the furtherance of technological
development.
1k. This principle can be clarified at an elementary level by
examples from daily activity. For example, holding an object in
hand, let?s say a billiard ball, the transcendent I of critical
realism can employ the law of gravity by simply letting the ball
fall to the ground, which in this hypothetical case is the
intended objective. By first holding the ball in hand, however,
the transcendent I of CR also employ nature?s laws as well, as
these are manifested physiologically in the act of holding the
ball. Along every link in the physiological chain linking the
transcendent I we each are, to whatever objective we intend,
nature?s laws are instruments employed for fulfilling the
intended purpose; which in the present hypothetical example is
simply the holding, and then letting go, of the ball so that it
falls to the ground under the force of gravity. Obviously,
countless examples of this can be entertained. The
instrumentality of natural law thereby demonstrated with regard
to our conscious efforts, however, as indicated in the
transfactual mechanics of open systems just elaborated, clearly
extends to the subterranean realm of the unconscious as well.
1l. According to this first principle, agents as we know them--
emerging out of the evolutionary processes of life--are not only
constrained in their subjective projects by nature?s material
forces and the laws thereof; they also at the same time employ
the same as instruments of control--instruments that in truth are
the only means of one?s subjective control of the physical. They
do this not only consciously in direct physical control, but
also--it is argued in the transfactual mechanics of open systems-
-indirectly through evolved, transfactual homologues of nature?s
laws, by which a transcendent coordinating ?unconscious? sustains
supporting material processes both internal and external to the
body (that material entity which is host to the unconscious).
1m. CR thus grounded, when further considered with regard to the
social order of collectives, applies to society?s economic,
political, and cultural development. Society here is dominated by
unconsciously evolved, transfactual homologues of the forces and
laws of physical systems--which function as the second-order
instruments of an unconscious that, unknown to the individual
consciousness (i.e. secretively and conspiratorially), controls a
society?s overall development. These higher-level societal forces
are considered to have historically evolved out of nature?s
lower-level forces and laws, in such a way that they may remain
mathematically similar--or perhaps in some abstract way even
formally identical--to the lower-level forces and laws of nature
discovered through the first-order reasoning of the natural
sciences.
1n. The upshot of CR systems theory thus grounded is that
applications--to ethical naturalist theory, social morphogenesis,
ontological realism, process metaphysics, and the analysis of
strategic social change to give a few examples--then can be
framed through the second-order reasoning of the social sciences,
in ways that mediate the natural and social sciences causally in
both theory and practice--perhaps the prime objective of CR
research. I develop in this essay a theory about a class-based,
Jamesonian political unconscious in American history, in the
terms of a systems theory of the political unconscious here
called the ?Transfactual Mechanics of Open Systems? (TMOS). This
essay is a high-level development and application of TMOS to
American society, on a scale of broad historical sweep in which
high-level generative mechanisms and structures in economics,
politics, and culture have created subterranean fissures in the
nation?s political unconscious that have been the source of an
always denied, but nevertheless very real, class struggle in
American history.
Fred
Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, second ed. (New York and London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1978).
Margaret S. Archer, Tony Lawson, Andrew Collier, eds. Critical Realism: Essential
Readings (London: Taylor & Francis,1998).
Roy Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. Verso. 1986.
Hans G. Ehrbar, Marxism and Critical Realism (Seminar Presentation at University of
Utah, 1998) http://www.econ.utah.edu/~ehrbar/index.htm
Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of Contemporary
Human Sciences, second ed. (New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989).
Roy Bhaskar, Andred Collier (ed.) Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of
the Contemporary Human Sciences (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999).
Andrew Sayer, Realism and Social Science (Thousand Oaks, CA; London: Sage,
2000).
Margaret S. Archer. Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Margaret S. Archer, Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
The transcendent nature of being in the science of critical realism thus founded can be
viewed as affirming the religious-spiritual viewpoint of human existence, but this issue
nevertheless remains open in the theory of this essay.
Fred Zaman <agent.redstone@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: Mervyn,
Thank you very much. I am very appreciative of the value you see in my work. I am able to respond to Yahoo mail only at home evenings and weekends, however. The email at my work blocks Yahoo mail. I can read the archives at work but cannot respond there (and should not). I am preparing a longer response that I will post later today or tomorrow.
Best regards,
Fred
Mervyn Hartwig wrote:
Hi all,
I have now had the opportunity to read the full text of Fred Zaman's 'A Critical-Realist Theory of America' and have no hesitation in announcing that I have changed my mind about it as completely as Fred changed his when he converted from postmodernism to critical realism. It puts forward a comprehensive Marxist critical realist analysis of the course of US history, underpinned by a qualitatively new CR systems-theoretical approach to the study of the sociosphere, which absents the absence in our consciousness of class struggle and a capitalist conspiracy at the level of real transfactual mechanics which has dominated America since the mid-seventeenth century, thus serving as the basis of a new and truly radical and speedy vanguard's way forward to a 'new American Revolution'.
The theory is unquestionably itself a revolutionary break-through. Fred himself has hailed it as a Copernican Revolution in the social sciences, but this is far too modest. Having effectively deconstructed Newtonian physics in his postmodernist phase (itself a truly Copernican achievement), Fred now reconstructs it as the basis of an entirely new philosophy, social theory and theory of geo-history. Only a Newton, Marx, Freud and Einstein rolled up into one could carry off such an achievement. Throw away your Bhaskar and read Zaman.
On the basis of this stunning performance we can confidently expect the meteoric rise of our man Nostromo (deep entrist) through the ranks of the United States Air Force. Critical realism will then be truly in command of the intellectual high ground. Yea!
Mervyn
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