Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>]

Mervyn--

> One can readily suggest in turn that the infant's whatever that she alone
> exists comprises genuine knowledge (she exists) and error (she's not
> alone).

Just two questions.  Are you aware that this says, "I think, therefore I 
am"?  Second, do you believe that this Cartesian thesis is correct?

Tobin


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Friday, June 22, 2007 3:54 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11


> Hi Tobin, Jan
>
> One can readily suggest in turn that the infant's whatever that she alone
> exists comprises genuine knowledge (she exists) and error (she's not
> alone).
> On the basis of non-error + error, but not of error alone, she makes
> further
> real and erroneous discoveries...
>
> I accept btw Archer's stuff on the primacy of practice, i.e. I'm not
> saying
> that knowledge derived from socialisation necessarily plays any role here.
> As you know, Archer theorises the emergence of personal emergent powers on
> that basis, chief of which is self-consciousness (reflexivity), personal
> identity and then social identity. I'm not sure, Jan, that knowledge is
> one
> of these ('an ability'); I see it rather as an outcome of other abilities
> deployed in the world.
>
> Mervyn
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 10:33 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>
>
>> Hi Mervyn--
>>
>>> Since all knowledge on your fallibilistic account is provisional, imo
>>> you
>>> are being inconsistent when you then turn around and say that knowledge
>>> and
>>> provisionally accepted propositions are different. Of course some are
>>> more
>>> provisional than others.
>>
>> That some propositions are more provisional than others is the point: as
>> I
>> said, all propositions are not created equal.  There's a significant
>> epistemological difference between saying "All available evidence
>> indicates
>> that the sun consists mainly of hydrogen" and "As a sheer guess, Mervyn's
>> maternal grandfather's middle name was George."  It doesn't make sense to
>> call both propositions "knowledge."  Likewise, the fallibilism of the
>> former
>> theory is not the same as the fallibilism of the latter.  There's no
>> inconsistency: these are different animals.
>>
>>> Imagines? First she believes it to be true that she's the only thing in
>>> existence, and then she arrives via trial and error at a corrected
>>> provisional truth, that the bar exists besides herself.
>>
>> Imagines, believes, hypothesizes, conjectures, whatever: the point is
>> that
>> propositions of this type can't reasonably be called knowledge.  Is the
>> belief in talking frogs knowledge?
>>
>>> Your phrase 'The world isn't what I supposed' secretes a provisional
>>> positive epistemic conclusion, that besides herself the bar exists.
>>
>> Which *is* an epistemic gain, in fact the crucial one to my argument, so
>> I'll correct my previous analysis.  I'll still maintain however that not
>> all
>> errors lead to an epistemic gain.  However, my central point is in your
>> own
>> phrasing: it's a conclusion, not a premise.
>>
>> T.
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----- 
>> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
>> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 5:41 AM
>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>
>>
>>> Hi Tobin
>>>
>>> Since all knowledge on your fallibilistic account is provisional, imo
>>> you
>>> are being inconsistent when you then turn around and say that knowledge
>>> and
>>> provisionally accepted propositions are different. Of course some are
>>> more
>>> provisional than others.
>>>
>>>> In the case of the newborn's mind, she needs only to
>>>> imagine "I'm the only thing in existence," but then bumps her arm into
>>>> the
>>>> crib and concludes, "Well, apparently that's not right."
>>>
>>> Imagines? First she believes it to be true that she's the only thing in
>>> existence, and then she arrives via trial and error at a corrected
>>> provisional truth, that the bar exists besides herself. No-one is saying
>>> that correcting error is unimportant, but it's by no means the only
>>> thing
>>> involved here.
>>>
>>>> When you said in your earlier email that the arguments from the
>>>> possibility
>>>> of knowledge and from the possibility of error are the same
>>>
>>> I haven't said that. What I've said is that both the possibility of
>>> error
>>> and the possibility of non-error are involved in the transcendental
>>> derivation of a mind-independent world from human intentionality, and
>>> that
>>> while correlative (you can't do it with one alone), the two are
>>> precisely
>>> not the same.
>>>
>>>> For my argument, you don't even have to have epistemic gain -- you only
>>>> have
>>>> to say "The world isn't what I had supposed."  You can then proceed to
>>>> a
>>>> different and possibly stupider hypothesis.
>>>
>>> Your phrase 'The world isn't what I supposed' secretes a provisional
>>> positive epistemic conclusion, that besides herself the bar exists.
>>>
>>> Time to move on, I think.
>>>
>>> Mervyn
>>>
>>
>>
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