Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Tobin, Jan

One can readily suggest in turn that the infant's whatever that she alone 
exists comprises genuine knowledge (she exists) and error (she's not alone). 
On the basis of non-error + error, but not of error alone, she makes further 
real and erroneous discoveries...

I accept btw Archer's stuff on the primacy of practice, i.e. I'm not saying 
that knowledge derived from socialisation necessarily plays any role here. 
As you know, Archer theorises the emergence of personal emergent powers on 
that basis, chief of which is self-consciousness (reflexivity), personal 
identity and then social identity. I'm not sure, Jan, that knowledge is one 
of these ('an ability'); I see it rather as an outcome of other abilities 
deployed in the world.

Mervyn


----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" 
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 10:33 PM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11


> Hi Mervyn--
>
>> Since all knowledge on your fallibilistic account is provisional, imo you
>> are being inconsistent when you then turn around and say that knowledge
>> and
>> provisionally accepted propositions are different. Of course some are 
>> more
>> provisional than others.
>
> That some propositions are more provisional than others is the point: as I
> said, all propositions are not created equal.  There's a significant
> epistemological difference between saying "All available evidence 
> indicates
> that the sun consists mainly of hydrogen" and "As a sheer guess, Mervyn's
> maternal grandfather's middle name was George."  It doesn't make sense to
> call both propositions "knowledge."  Likewise, the fallibilism of the 
> former
> theory is not the same as the fallibilism of the latter.  There's no
> inconsistency: these are different animals.
>
>> Imagines? First she believes it to be true that she's the only thing in
>> existence, and then she arrives via trial and error at a corrected
>> provisional truth, that the bar exists besides herself.
>
> Imagines, believes, hypothesizes, conjectures, whatever: the point is that
> propositions of this type can't reasonably be called knowledge.  Is the
> belief in talking frogs knowledge?
>
>> Your phrase 'The world isn't what I supposed' secretes a provisional
>> positive epistemic conclusion, that besides herself the bar exists.
>
> Which *is* an epistemic gain, in fact the crucial one to my argument, so
> I'll correct my previous analysis.  I'll still maintain however that not 
> all
> errors lead to an epistemic gain.  However, my central point is in your 
> own
> phrasing: it's a conclusion, not a premise.
>
> T.
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Thursday, June 21, 2007 5:41 AM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>
>
>> Hi Tobin
>>
>> Since all knowledge on your fallibilistic account is provisional, imo you
>> are being inconsistent when you then turn around and say that knowledge
>> and
>> provisionally accepted propositions are different. Of course some are 
>> more
>> provisional than others.
>>
>>> In the case of the newborn's mind, she needs only to
>>> imagine "I'm the only thing in existence," but then bumps her arm into
>>> the
>>> crib and concludes, "Well, apparently that's not right."
>>
>> Imagines? First she believes it to be true that she's the only thing in
>> existence, and then she arrives via trial and error at a corrected
>> provisional truth, that the bar exists besides herself. No-one is saying
>> that correcting error is unimportant, but it's by no means the only thing
>> involved here.
>>
>>> When you said in your earlier email that the arguments from the
>>> possibility
>>> of knowledge and from the possibility of error are the same
>>
>> I haven't said that. What I've said is that both the possibility of error
>> and the possibility of non-error are involved in the transcendental
>> derivation of a mind-independent world from human intentionality, and 
>> that
>> while correlative (you can't do it with one alone), the two are precisely
>> not the same.
>>
>>> For my argument, you don't even have to have epistemic gain -- you only
>>> have
>>> to say "The world isn't what I had supposed."  You can then proceed to a
>>> different and possibly stupider hypothesis.
>>
>> Your phrase 'The world isn't what I supposed' secretes a provisional
>> positive epistemic conclusion, that besides herself the bar exists.
>>
>> Time to move on, I think.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>
>
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