Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Tobin

Since all knowledge on your fallibilistic account is provisional, imo you
are being inconsistent when you then turn around and say that knowledge and
provisionally accepted propositions are different. Of course some are more
provisional than others.

> In the case of the newborn's mind, she needs only to
> imagine "I'm the only thing in existence," but then bumps her arm into the
> crib and concludes, "Well, apparently that's not right."

Imagines? First she believes it to be true that she's the only thing in
existence, and then she arrives via trial and error at a corrected
provisional truth, that the bar exists besides herself. No-one is saying
that correcting error is unimportant, but it's by no means the only thing
involved here.

> When you said in your earlier email that the arguments from the
> possibility
> of knowledge and from the possibility of error are the same

I haven't said that. What I've said is that both the possibility of error
and the possibility of non-error are involved in the transcendental
derivation of a mind-independent world from human intentionality, and that
while correlative (you can't do it with one alone), the two are precisely
not the same.

> For my argument, you don't even have to have epistemic gain -- you only
> have
> to say "The world isn't what I had supposed."  You can then proceed to a
> different and possibly stupider hypothesis.

Your phrase 'The world isn't what I supposed' secretes a provisional
positive epistemic conclusion, that besides herself the bar exists.

Time to move on, I think.

Mervyn



----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 11:43 PM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11


> Hi Mervyn--
>
>>      But in order to demonstrate the existence of error (assumed in
>> your premise) you have to accept (however provisionally, etc.) that
>> some proposition is not erroneous.
>
> No problem with this -- *provided* all propositions aren't conflated with
> knowledge.  Jan was arguing, at least for a while, that such conflation is
> acceptable, e.g. on 18 June: "Either complete newborns make errors because
> they possess knowledge, or complete newborns do not make errors because
> they
> do not possess any knowledge."  I'm arguing that one can't equate
> propositions and knowledge, and that *provisional* propositions
> (hypotheses
> etc) are all that's needed to make my case.  One might say, all
> propositions
> are not created equal.  In the case of the newborn's mind, she needs only
> to
> imagine "I'm the only thing in existence," but then bumps her arm into the
> crib and concludes, "Well, apparently that's not right."  (Whether the
> mind
> of a newborn is a tabula rasa is irrelevant for the philosophical
> argument.)
> When you said in your earlier email that the arguments from the
> possibility
> of knowledge and from the possibility of error are the same, you accepted
> the equation of all propositions (including provisional ones) as
> knowledge.
> If you're backing away from that, then we've come to an agreement.
>
> Hi Ruth--
>
> Thanks for the restatement of my argument.  Just a couple of small
> corrections:
>
>> To recognize error you don't have to have now got it right; you only
>> have to believe that your present belief is sounder than the previous
>> one.
>
> For my argument, you don't even have to have epistemic gain -- you only
> have
> to say "The world isn't what I had supposed."  You can then proceed to a
> different and possibly stupider hypothesis.
>
>> But as to what those ontological imlications are, I still disagree.  I
>> don't
>> think that you get materialism out of it, only externally given
>> structure.
>> Which is to say, objective idealism sustains error too.
>
> No, I haven't argued that my transcendental argument also leads to
> materialism, I haven't pursued that line of thought at all, so I draw no
> conclusions.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Tobin
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 1:14 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>
>
>> Hi Tobin
>>
>> Logically, in order to demonstrate a mistake epistemologically some
>> proposition within some theoretical framework must be accepted, i.e., be
>> regarded as non-conjectural.
>>
>> This is notoriously one of the problems of Popperian falsificationism
>> (for
>> which science progresses not by discovering the true but by eliminating
>> the false), which I take it you're not espousing (another problem is its
>> Humean conception of a law)?
>>
>> Yes, I know this is not the same as your transcendental derivation of
>> mind-independent reality from the pure possibility of error alone. But in
>> order to demonstrate the existence of error (assumed in your premise) you
>> have to accept (however provisionally, etc.) that some proposition is not
>> erroneous.
>>
>> Mervyn
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----- 
>> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
>> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
>> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 12:28 AM
>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>
>>
>>> Hi Louis--
>>>
>>>>              I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>>>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that
>>>> way.
>>>
>>> Exactly.  I don't see error as *necessarily* leading to knowledge or
>>> truth
>>> at all, as my examples of "That particular flame was being mean" and my
>>> tongue in cheek comment about dating both suggest.  Mostly error
>>> succeeds
>>> error succeeds error -- the production of knowledge takes a hell of a
>>> lot
>>> of
>>> work.  Likewise, people certainly do commit errors in orther to cover up
>>> other errors (althoguh that's at a sociological level that isn't my
>>> immediate subject).  For the most part, I view the extent of our
>>> knowledge
>>> as a tiny dot in the midst of a vast if not infinite universe of our
>>> utter
>>> ignorance.  So it seems to me that the shoe in fact is on the other
>>> foot:
>>> the idea that *knowledge* (not simply hypotheses, beliefs or intentions)
>>> is
>>> the necessary background to error is triumphalist.
>>>
>>> Tobin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message ----- 
>>> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx>
>>> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
>>> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>>> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 11:49 PM
>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>>
>>>
>>>> Tobin wrote: "I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs
>>>> can
>>>> be
>>>> categorized as knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific
>>>> argument, which is *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a
>>>> real
>>>> world that exists independently of our minds, which gives us realism
>>>> and
>>>> off
>>>> we go.  It doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first:
>>>> all
>>>> that matters for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If
>>>> one
>>>> admits that it is, then the ontological argument follows."
>>>>
>>>> The very concept of making an error is incoherent except in relation to
>>>> a
>>>> concept of getting things right.  That's a standard response in
>>>> philosophy
>>>> to a skeptic who claims that everything we believe is in error.  But if
>>>> we
>>>> (perhaps only some, not all) were brains in vats [sorry for not
>>>> rehearsing
>>>> this - think "The Matrix"] with a concept of error (and even a thorough
>>>> understanding of CR), then indeed our concept of error would presuppose
>>>> a
>>>> concept of an external world, in the way Tobin suggests.  Moreover,
>>>> there
>>>> would be an external world (the vats, etc.), so realism would be true -
>>>> but
>>>> that would be rather cold comfort, at least for those brains in vats,
>>>> since
>>>> the real world would be quite different from what they believed about
>>>> it.
>>>> And their "beliefs about the real world" would not even count as
>>>> beliefs
>>>> ABOUT the real world.
>>>>
>>>> Note that I am NOT suggesting that such a possibility would undermine
>>>> the
>>>> veracity of our beliefs - that would be a fallacious argument in favor
>>>> of
>>>> skepticism, but I am not making that argument.  I am simply claiming
>>>> that
>>>> a
>>>> concept of error does not guarantee that the inferred reality accords
>>>> with
>>>> our beliefs about reality.  I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>>>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that
>>>> way.
>>>>
>>>> Louis Irwin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
>>>> Tobin
>>>> Nellhaus
>>>> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 8:09 PM
>>>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>>>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>>>
>>>> Hi Jan--
>>>>
>>>> We may be working with different concepts of knowledge, in which case
>>>> we're
>>>> probably talking past each other.  I recognize your points, and might
>>>> be
>>>> persuaded on some.  But in general I've come to resist the application
>>>> of
>>>> the term "knowledge" -- or much worse, "information" -- to cover more
>>>> and
>>>> more of what goes on in our heads.  For example, in art or cultural
>>>> theory,
>>>> the question sometimes arises whether art is a form of information or
>>>> knowledge, and like pretty much everyone else I used to say "Of
>>>> course!"
>>>> (I'm in theater studies.)  But now I view that claim as a defensive
>>>> reaction
>>>>
>>>> which accepts computer processing (or similar systems) as the best
>>>> model
>>>> of
>>>> the mind.  Knowledge and information are certainly part of what goes
>>>> into
>>>> making art, but that doesn't mean that art simply *is* knowledge.
>>>> Hence
>>>> I
>>>> *agree* that (for example) it doesn't make sense to call the revision
>>>> of
>>>> a
>>>> poem or musical score a matter of "correcting errors," transcription
>>>> mistakes aside, although sometimes that may indeed be the proper
>>>> concept
>>>> ("it doesn't make sense for this character to do such-and-such," "this
>>>> scene
>>>>
>>>> takes the play in the wrong direction," that sort of thing).  Actually
>>>> I
>>>> can't see how you could have imagined I'd say that revisions are all
>>>> matters
>>>>
>>>> of correcting errors, that doesn't follow from what I've said.  So we
>>>> apparently agree on some of the limits to what can appropriately be
>>>> called
>>>> error, and likewise you may be more amenable to some of my position
>>>> than
>>>> you
>>>>
>>>> suggest.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, interesting as questions of the definition and extent of
>>>> the
>>>> term "knowledge" are, they aren't actually to the point.  The only
>>>> issue
>>>> I
>>>> was driving at was that there are alternative transcendental arguments
>>>> for
>>>> realism (*specifically* realism: not necessarily materialism, the
>>>> correspondence theory of truth, etc etc, even if those might be
>>>> consequent
>>>> upon realism), and that one is the condition of possibility for error.
>>>> Whether error must be contingent upon prior knowledge of some type is
>>>> obviously debatable -- I agree that it *does* require some sort of
>>>> conscious
>>>>
>>>> or unconscious hypothesis or belief ("all eggs are white," "this table
>>>> will
>>>> hold the weight of my arm," "I'm the only thing in the universe,"
>>>> whatever).
>>>>
>>>> I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can be
>>>> categorized
>>>> as
>>>>
>>>> knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific argument, which
>>>> is
>>>> *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real world that
>>>> exists
>>>> independently of our minds, which gives us realism and off we go.  It
>>>> doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first: all that
>>>> matters
>>>>
>>>> for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If one admits
>>>> that
>>>> it
>>>>
>>>> is, then the ontological argument follows.
>>>>
>>>> One other comment:
>>>>
>>>>>                     And at minimum, in normal circumstances, a
>>>>> mistake always leads to some (new) knowledge, viz. not to repeat that
>>>>> mistake.
>>>>
>>>> Apparently you haven't dated recently....
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> T.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> Tobin Nellhaus
>>>> nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
>>>> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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