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Re: [Critical-Realism] Quick on Popper and falsification
Hi Ruth
No. Popper overlooks that in order to demonstrate just one falsifying
instance of an empirical invariance, some proposition within some
theoretical framework has to be accepted, i.e. be regarded as
non-conjectural (this has been my epistemological point to Tobin); and that
this depends upon the unconditional predictions that Popper himself roundly
condemned in his attacks on empiricism, i.e. the counter-instance can't be
regarded as holding unless you have warrant for holding that it will show up
on all similar experiments - so the problem of induction is not resolved,
nor is it resolvable within an actualist framework.
NB. CR fallibilism is by no means the same as Peirceian
fallibilism/Popperian falsificationism, and by my last post I'd started to
think that Tobin must think it is. CR doesn't proceed just by eliminating
the false, but more fundamentally by discovering the true.
Mervyn
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 6:28 PM
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Quick on Popper and falsification
Hi Mervyn,
You know, I don't any longer think that Popper has that problem on his own
terms. That is, he does, as you say, accept a conception of law as
generalization. As such, laws, he thinks, can't be conclusively established
(this because of the decisive blow he thinks Hume has delivered to
inductionand), and must therefore always only be viewed fallibilistically,
as conjectures. On his own terms, though, refutation doesn't have the same
problem. This, I think, because with refutation it doesn't matter if,
philosophically, you can't (because of the induction problem) know that
you'll get the same refutation-constituting event on the 610th try. It only
takes one instance of an x not being y to disprove the law "For all x, y,"
or "All x's are y."
No?
I mean for Popper, given the configuration of his own thinking.
r.
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- Thread context:
- Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11, (continued)
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