Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Mervyn, Tobin et al

Have we not just moved from "error" (e.g inaccuracy of perception) to
"mistake" (i.e. misclassification of a percept in terms of concepts, perhaps
as a result of inaccurate perception)?

So Hume inaccurately observed the factors in his observation of events like
billiard ball impacts and mistakenly concluded that one could not rely on
their being a cause (not seeing the alternative possibility of his concept
of "cause" requiring restatement).  Taking this as Mervyn's "given", he
proceded to deduce Berkeley's position that one could not rely on there
being an external world causing one's perceptions.

Newton [despite what someone asserted without references recently] had in
fact changed the concept of "cause" from being about change (e.g. velocity)
to being about change of change (e.g. acceleration).  Hume failed to grasp
this and so failed to account for his own ability to experimentally change
the changes he was perceiving.  Despite his assertions that he was drawing
the inevitable conclusions of Newtonian science he was in fact still
interpreting the world and its "laws" through the axioms of Aristotelian
physics, Aristotelian logic and Cartesian graphs, more familiar not only to
himself but to to the readers he hoped to attract.  Why then should anyone
believe him, unless they, too, have failed to understand Newtons' axioms
(referentially detached abstractions from previous perception) of the
conservation of energy, broadcast action and fluxion logic?

There are an indefinite number of ways in which one could convey the meaning
I have just expressed. IMHO RTS is one of the better ones.  Hume was wrong;
the effectiveness of experimentation demonstrates the openness of causal
systems.

Doubtless my critics will say I am wrong.  Okay, then, let us see their
interpetation of the situation RTS is drawing our attention to.

Best

Dave



-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Mervyn
Hartwig
Sent: 20 June 2007 18:14
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

Hi Tobin

Logically, in order to demonstrate a mistake epistemologically some
proposition within some theoretical framework must be accepted, i.e., be
regarded as non-conjectural.

This is notoriously one of the problems of Popperian falsificationism (for
which science progresses not by discovering the true but by eliminating the
false), which I take it you're not espousing (another problem is its Humean
conception of a law)? 

Yes, I know this is not the same as your transcendental derivation of
mind-independent reality from the pure possibility of error alone. But in
order to demonstrate the existence of error (assumed in your premise) you
have to accept (however provisionally, etc.) that some proposition is not
erroneous.

Mervyn








----- Original Message -----
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 12:28 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11


> Hi Louis--
> 
>>              I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that
way.
> 
> Exactly.  I don't see error as *necessarily* leading to knowledge or truth

> at all, as my examples of "That particular flame was being mean" and my 
> tongue in cheek comment about dating both suggest.  Mostly error succeeds 
> error succeeds error -- the production of knowledge takes a hell of a lot
of 
> work.  Likewise, people certainly do commit errors in orther to cover up 
> other errors (althoguh that's at a sociological level that isn't my 
> immediate subject).  For the most part, I view the extent of our knowledge

> as a tiny dot in the midst of a vast if not infinite universe of our utter

> ignorance.  So it seems to me that the shoe in fact is on the other foot: 
> the idea that *knowledge* (not simply hypotheses, beliefs or intentions)
is 
> the necessary background to error is triumphalist.
> 
> Tobin
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx>
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 11:49 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> 
> 
>> Tobin wrote: "I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can 
>> be
>> categorized as knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific
>> argument, which is *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real
>> world that exists independently of our minds, which gives us realism and 
>> off
>> we go.  It doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first:
all
>> that matters for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If
one
>> admits that it is, then the ontological argument follows."
>>
>> The very concept of making an error is incoherent except in relation to a
>> concept of getting things right.  That's a standard response in
philosophy
>> to a skeptic who claims that everything we believe is in error.  But if
we
>> (perhaps only some, not all) were brains in vats [sorry for not
rehearsing
>> this - think "The Matrix"] with a concept of error (and even a thorough
>> understanding of CR), then indeed our concept of error would presuppose a
>> concept of an external world, in the way Tobin suggests.  Moreover, there
>> would be an external world (the vats, etc.), so realism would be true - 
>> but
>> that would be rather cold comfort, at least for those brains in vats, 
>> since
>> the real world would be quite different from what they believed about it.
>> And their "beliefs about the real world" would not even count as beliefs
>> ABOUT the real world.
>>
>> Note that I am NOT suggesting that such a possibility would undermine the
>> veracity of our beliefs - that would be a fallacious argument in favor of
>> skepticism, but I am not making that argument.  I am simply claiming that

>> a
>> concept of error does not guarantee that the inferred reality accords
with
>> our beliefs about reality.  I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that
way.
>>
>> Louis Irwin
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Tobin
>> Nellhaus
>> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 8:09 PM
>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>
>> Hi Jan--
>>
>> We may be working with different concepts of knowledge, in which case 
>> we're
>> probably talking past each other.  I recognize your points, and might be
>> persuaded on some.  But in general I've come to resist the application of
>> the term "knowledge" -- or much worse, "information" -- to cover more and
>> more of what goes on in our heads.  For example, in art or cultural 
>> theory,
>> the question sometimes arises whether art is a form of information or
>> knowledge, and like pretty much everyone else I used to say "Of course!"
>> (I'm in theater studies.)  But now I view that claim as a defensive 
>> reaction
>>
>> which accepts computer processing (or similar systems) as the best model 
>> of
>> the mind.  Knowledge and information are certainly part of what goes into
>> making art, but that doesn't mean that art simply *is* knowledge.  Hence
I
>> *agree* that (for example) it doesn't make sense to call the revision of
a
>> poem or musical score a matter of "correcting errors," transcription
>> mistakes aside, although sometimes that may indeed be the proper concept
>> ("it doesn't make sense for this character to do such-and-such," "this 
>> scene
>>
>> takes the play in the wrong direction," that sort of thing).  Actually I
>> can't see how you could have imagined I'd say that revisions are all 
>> matters
>>
>> of correcting errors, that doesn't follow from what I've said.  So we
>> apparently agree on some of the limits to what can appropriately be
called
>> error, and likewise you may be more amenable to some of my position than 
>> you
>>
>> suggest.
>>
>> In any case, interesting as questions of the definition and extent of the
>> term "knowledge" are, they aren't actually to the point.  The only issue
I
>> was driving at was that there are alternative transcendental arguments
for
>> realism (*specifically* realism: not necessarily materialism, the
>> correspondence theory of truth, etc etc, even if those might be
consequent
>> upon realism), and that one is the condition of possibility for error.
>> Whether error must be contingent upon prior knowledge of some type is
>> obviously debatable -- I agree that it *does* require some sort of 
>> conscious
>>
>> or unconscious hypothesis or belief ("all eggs are white," "this table 
>> will
>> hold the weight of my arm," "I'm the only thing in the universe," 
>> whatever).
>>
>> I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can be categorized

>> as
>>
>> knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific argument, which
is
>> *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real world that exists
>> independently of our minds, which gives us realism and off we go.  It
>> doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first: all that 
>> matters
>>
>> for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If one admits that

>> it
>>
>> is, then the ontological argument follows.
>>
>> One other comment:
>>
>>>                     And at minimum, in normal circumstances, a
>>> mistake always leads to some (new) knowledge, viz. not to repeat that
>>> mistake.
>>
>> Apparently you haven't dated recently....
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> T.
>>
>> ---
>> Tobin Nellhaus
>> nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
>> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
>>
>>
>>
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