Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Tobin

Logically, in order to demonstrate a mistake epistemologically some proposition within some theoretical framework must be accepted, i.e., be regarded as non-conjectural.

This is notoriously one of the problems of Popperian falsificationism (for which science progresses not by discovering the true but by eliminating the false), which I take it you're not espousing (another problem is its Humean conception of a law)? 

Yes, I know this is not the same as your transcendental derivation of mind-independent reality from the pure possibility of error alone. But in order to demonstrate the existence of error (assumed in your premise) you have to accept (however provisionally, etc.) that some proposition is not erroneous.

Mervyn








----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List" <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Wednesday, June 20, 2007 12:28 AM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11


> Hi Louis--
> 
>>              I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that way.
> 
> Exactly.  I don't see error as *necessarily* leading to knowledge or truth 
> at all, as my examples of "That particular flame was being mean" and my 
> tongue in cheek comment about dating both suggest.  Mostly error succeeds 
> error succeeds error -- the production of knowledge takes a hell of a lot of 
> work.  Likewise, people certainly do commit errors in orther to cover up 
> other errors (althoguh that's at a sociological level that isn't my 
> immediate subject).  For the most part, I view the extent of our knowledge 
> as a tiny dot in the midst of a vast if not infinite universe of our utter 
> ignorance.  So it seems to me that the shoe in fact is on the other foot: 
> the idea that *knowledge* (not simply hypotheses, beliefs or intentions) is 
> the necessary background to error is triumphalist.
> 
> Tobin
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx>
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 11:49 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> 
> 
>> Tobin wrote: "I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can 
>> be
>> categorized as knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific
>> argument, which is *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real
>> world that exists independently of our minds, which gives us realism and 
>> off
>> we go.  It doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first: all
>> that matters for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If one
>> admits that it is, then the ontological argument follows."
>>
>> The very concept of making an error is incoherent except in relation to a
>> concept of getting things right.  That's a standard response in philosophy
>> to a skeptic who claims that everything we believe is in error.  But if we
>> (perhaps only some, not all) were brains in vats [sorry for not rehearsing
>> this - think "The Matrix"] with a concept of error (and even a thorough
>> understanding of CR), then indeed our concept of error would presuppose a
>> concept of an external world, in the way Tobin suggests.  Moreover, there
>> would be an external world (the vats, etc.), so realism would be true - 
>> but
>> that would be rather cold comfort, at least for those brains in vats, 
>> since
>> the real world would be quite different from what they believed about it.
>> And their "beliefs about the real world" would not even count as beliefs
>> ABOUT the real world.
>>
>> Note that I am NOT suggesting that such a possibility would undermine the
>> veracity of our beliefs - that would be a fallacious argument in favor of
>> skepticism, but I am not making that argument.  I am simply claiming that 
>> a
>> concept of error does not guarantee that the inferred reality accords with
>> our beliefs about reality.  I doubt that Tobin intended to express the
>> optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that way.
>>
>> Louis Irwin
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Tobin
>> Nellhaus
>> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 8:09 PM
>> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
>> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
>>
>> Hi Jan--
>>
>> We may be working with different concepts of knowledge, in which case 
>> we're
>> probably talking past each other.  I recognize your points, and might be
>> persuaded on some.  But in general I've come to resist the application of
>> the term "knowledge" -- or much worse, "information" -- to cover more and
>> more of what goes on in our heads.  For example, in art or cultural 
>> theory,
>> the question sometimes arises whether art is a form of information or
>> knowledge, and like pretty much everyone else I used to say "Of course!"
>> (I'm in theater studies.)  But now I view that claim as a defensive 
>> reaction
>>
>> which accepts computer processing (or similar systems) as the best model 
>> of
>> the mind.  Knowledge and information are certainly part of what goes into
>> making art, but that doesn't mean that art simply *is* knowledge.  Hence I
>> *agree* that (for example) it doesn't make sense to call the revision of a
>> poem or musical score a matter of "correcting errors," transcription
>> mistakes aside, although sometimes that may indeed be the proper concept
>> ("it doesn't make sense for this character to do such-and-such," "this 
>> scene
>>
>> takes the play in the wrong direction," that sort of thing).  Actually I
>> can't see how you could have imagined I'd say that revisions are all 
>> matters
>>
>> of correcting errors, that doesn't follow from what I've said.  So we
>> apparently agree on some of the limits to what can appropriately be called
>> error, and likewise you may be more amenable to some of my position than 
>> you
>>
>> suggest.
>>
>> In any case, interesting as questions of the definition and extent of the
>> term "knowledge" are, they aren't actually to the point.  The only issue I
>> was driving at was that there are alternative transcendental arguments for
>> realism (*specifically* realism: not necessarily materialism, the
>> correspondence theory of truth, etc etc, even if those might be consequent
>> upon realism), and that one is the condition of possibility for error.
>> Whether error must be contingent upon prior knowledge of some type is
>> obviously debatable -- I agree that it *does* require some sort of 
>> conscious
>>
>> or unconscious hypothesis or belief ("all eggs are white," "this table 
>> will
>> hold the weight of my arm," "I'm the only thing in the universe," 
>> whatever).
>>
>> I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can be categorized 
>> as
>>
>> knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific argument, which is
>> *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real world that exists
>> independently of our minds, which gives us realism and off we go.  It
>> doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first: all that 
>> matters
>>
>> for my particular argument is that error is possible.  If one admits that 
>> it
>>
>> is, then the ontological argument follows.
>>
>> One other comment:
>>
>>>                     And at minimum, in normal circumstances, a
>>> mistake always leads to some (new) knowledge, viz. not to repeat that
>>> mistake.
>>
>> Apparently you haven't dated recently....
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> T.
>>
>> ---
>> Tobin Nellhaus
>> nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
>> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
>>
>>
>>
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