Re: [Critical-Realism] transcendental naturalism at Essex

["Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Thanks for these Phil.  I am so jealous of you UKers.


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of pohanlon03@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wed 20-Jun-07 9:30 AM
To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Critical-Realism] transcendental naturalism at Essex
 
Dear listers, this is something critical realists ought to be aware of

http://www.essex.ac.uk/philosophy/tpn/

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00311.x

thanks
Phil




On Jun 20 2007, critical-realism-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
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>    1. Re: Powers,processes, etc. (Mervyn Hartwig)
>    2. Re: rts2-11 (Tobin Nellhaus)
>    3. Re: rts2-11 (Tobin Nellhaus)
>    4. Re: Powers,processes, etc. (Dave Taylor)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2007 23:28:45 +0100
> From: "Mervyn Hartwig" <mh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <000d01c7b2c1$39b27f20$0200000a@DJC3CP0J>
> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1";
> 	reply-type=original
> 
> Hi Dave,
> 
> I didn't read this very closely at first because I took exception to the 
> implication that only Christians (here, you and George) would likely 
> understand about "seeing through a glass darkly". On looking again, I see 
> that it's making fundamentally similar points to Bwanika, and my response 
> to Bwanika. I particularly like the bit about the automatic recognition 
> of error being necessary for the appearance that there is no error, and I 
> agree that much that passes for dialogue in academia is one-upmanship. 
> But I'm not a correspondence theorist and I don't hope to find 'a point 
> of view on reality which doesn't need or attract further criticism'. Even 
> the religious point of view nowadays accepts the necessity and 
> desirability of ongoing criticism, doesn't it?
> 
> Mervyn
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2007 3:41 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> 
> 
> > Mervyn et al
> >
> > I've been refecting on the possible approach to truth via error, and 
> > what George says here about convergence (which I agree with) makes up 
> > my mind. The issue is not the possibility of error, though, it is the 
> > possibility of RECOGNISING error, which is what is built into computers 
> > and one aspect of their programming. In fact it is the possibility of 
> > AUTOMATICALLY recognising error, which is needed to become aware that 
> > there appears to be NO error and that (maybe) one has found the truth. 
> > IMO it is not about true CORRESPONDENCE between an object and its 
> > representation, it is about true COHERENCE between the parts of an 
> > object not yet "seen" clearly enough to represent accurately, and in 
> > the case of actual vision, recognised by less than optimal sharpness of 
> > focus. George at least will understand what I mean when I refer to 
> > "seeing through a glass darkly".
> >
> > Is "creative dialogue", then, what it appears to be in competitive 
> > academedia: distinguishing and justifying one's own position by 
> > criticising the alleged failings of "rival" views? (I have in mind not 
> > just Hume's fortune-seeking but logical positivist G E Moore's savage 
> > criticism of J S Mill). Or is it criticising our own as well as 
> > everybody else's views, not for the sake of it but in the hope of 
> > finding and (by creative - elegant and well as accurate - use of 
> > language) socially converging on, a point of view of reality which 
> > doesn't need or attract further criticism: that we can get on and use 
> > for the purpose for which it was intended?
> >
> > Dave
> >
> > -----Original Message----- From: 
> > critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
> > Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 19 June 2007 13:19 To: Continuation of the Spoon 
> > Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> >
> > Hi George
> >
> > First, my name isn't Merv.
> >
> > Second, I'm not counter-critiquing creative dialogue. On the contrary. 
> > I'm simply saying that it's going on, and let's hear no more of the 
> > libel that CR eschews it.
> >
> > Third, how can there be creative dialogue if there's convergence?
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: <gdemetrion@xxxxxxx>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2007 12:22 PM
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> >
> >
> >> "But in terms of the horizon of RTS, since one of the things that we 
> >> are doing is attending to that, the main thing to note is just how 
> >> wildly different even an only vaguely theorized notion of a causal 
> >> mechanism (or "powerful particular," from Harre and Madden) is from 
> >> the ontology assumed by Hume, and the account of "laws" and 
> >> "explanation" to which the Humean ontology gives rise. Think Hempel."
> >>
> >> Ruth,
> >>
> >> Thanks for the insight and resources on scientific essentialism, the 
> >> later term in particular which has gotten bad press in postmodern 
> >> circles. Both Popper and Dewey, too, critique essentialism even as 
> >> both move well beyond Hume as well as positivism. Dewey speaks a lot 
> >> about potentiality which perhaps is not too different from the notion 
> >> of generative mechanisms which may or may not be realized in any given 
> >> context. In that he is moving toward ontology even as he tends to 
> >> focus on the immanence of the potentially transcendent which becomes 
> >> "created" out of what happens; what causal mechanisms are 
> >> operationalized in any given context.
> >>
> >> Thus related to Merv's counter-critique of calls for more creative 
> >> dialogue among various schools of philosophy, the critical issue in my 
> >> view is greater convergence among closely related schools of thought; 
> >> hence, the need for convergence (and not just an emphasis on 
> >> distinctions) between critical pragmatism, critical realism, and 
> >> critical rationalism particularly in their common postpositivist 
> >> mediating outlook in which truth as a "regulative ideal" grounds all 
> >> of their epistemologies. It is this, I believe, which distinguishes 
> >> their common outlook from both positivism and postmodernism--a 
> >> mediating postpositvism. My objective here is less to critique 
> >> critical realism in that for the most part critical pragmatism and 
> >> critical rationalism have not engaged each other to any significant 
> >> way even as there has been some good discussion between early 
> >> pragmatism and the American critical realism of the early 20th century 
> >> reviewed from the bias of pragmatism in David Hildebrand's (2003) 
> >> Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism. A related text edited by John Shook 
> >> (2003) one of the foremost pragmatic philosophers of the contempoary 
> >> era Pragmatic Naturalism & Realism is highly sophisticated in the 
> >> range of philosophical discourse it incorporates. There is some brief 
> >> reference to Bhaskar in one of the essays, but nowhere in this highly 
> >> important text is critical realism as a school of philosophical 
> >> thought engaged in the effort to explore the relationship between 
> >> naturalism and realism.
> >>
> >> So the shoe that fits applies to many feet. The issue is not to point 
> >> figures as this problem is grounded in the history of the development 
> >> of the academic disciplines where specialization, in itself a highly 
> >> desirable trait
> >>
> >> Thus when I think of Bhaskar's claim that critical realism is the 
> >> most adequate philosophy has taken on aura of mystification of its own 
> >> which in many significant ways has the pragmatic effect of 
> >> short-circuiting the search for truth at a high level of 
> >> interdisciplinary discourse, particularly among related schools of 
> >> thought where a critical search for convergences has a great deal to 
> >> offer, including that of putting differences into more balanced 
> >> perspective
> >>
> >> George Demetrion
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> Critical-Realism mailing list
> >> Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> >> http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:28:02 -0400
> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <C7257873F252459AA55ED27CFF233411@Gargantua>
> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1";
> 	reply-type=original
> 
> Hi Louis--
> 
> >              I doubt that Tobin intended to express the optimism of 
> > such a guarantee, but I thought others might read it that way.
> 
> Exactly. I don't see error as *necessarily* leading to knowledge or 
> truth at all, as my examples of "That particular flame was being mean" 
> and my tongue in cheek comment about dating both suggest. Mostly error 
> succeeds error succeeds error -- the production of knowledge takes a hell 
> of a lot of work. Likewise, people certainly do commit errors in orther 
> to cover up other errors (althoguh that's at a sociological level that 
> isn't my immediate subject). For the most part, I view the extent of our 
> knowledge as a tiny dot in the midst of a vast if not infinite universe 
> of our utter ignorance. So it seems to me that the shoe in fact is on the 
> other foot: the idea that *knowledge* (not simply hypotheses, beliefs or 
> intentions) is the necessary background to error is triumphalist.
> 
> Tobin
> 
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message ----- 
> From: "Louis Irwin" <louisirwin9@xxxxxxx>
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 11:49 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> 
> 
> > Tobin wrote: "I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs 
> > can be categorized as knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my 
> > specific argument, which is *strictly* that error can only occur if 
> > there's a real world that exists independently of our minds, which 
> > gives us realism and off we go. It doesn't matter whether there's 
> > knowledge of any sort first: all that matters for my particular 
> > argument is that error is possible. If one admits that it is, then the 
> > ontological argument follows."
> >
> > The very concept of making an error is incoherent except in relation 
> > to a concept of getting things right. That's a standard response in 
> > philosophy to a skeptic who claims that everything we believe is in 
> > error. But if we (perhaps only some, not all) were brains in vats 
> > [sorry for not rehearsing this - think "The Matrix"] with a concept of 
> > error (and even a thorough understanding of CR), then indeed our 
> > concept of error would presuppose a concept of an external world, in 
> > the way Tobin suggests. Moreover, there would be an external world (the 
> > vats, etc.), so realism would be true - but that would be rather cold 
> > comfort, at least for those brains in vats, since the real world would 
> > be quite different from what they believed about it. And their "beliefs 
> > about the real world" would not even count as beliefs ABOUT the real 
> > world.
> >
> > Note that I am NOT suggesting that such a possibility would undermine 
> > the veracity of our beliefs - that would be a fallacious argument in 
> > favor of skepticism, but I am not making that argument. I am simply 
> > claiming that a concept of error does not guarantee that the inferred 
> > reality accords with our beliefs about reality. I doubt that Tobin 
> > intended to express the optimism of such a guarantee, but I thought 
> > others might read it that way.
> >
> > Louis Irwin
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Tobin
> > Nellhaus
> > Sent: Monday, June 18, 2007 8:09 PM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> >
> > Hi Jan--
> >
> > We may be working with different concepts of knowledge, in which case 
> > we're probably talking past each other. I recognize your points, and 
> > might be persuaded on some. But in general I've come to resist the 
> > application of the term "knowledge" -- or much worse, "information" -- 
> > to cover more and more of what goes on in our heads. For example, in 
> > art or cultural theory, the question sometimes arises whether art is a 
> > form of information or knowledge, and like pretty much everyone else I 
> > used to say "Of course!" (I'm in theater studies.) But now I view that 
> > claim as a defensive reaction
> >
> > which accepts computer processing (or similar systems) as the best 
> > model of the mind. Knowledge and information are certainly part of what 
> > goes into making art, but that doesn't mean that art simply *is* 
> > knowledge. Hence I *agree* that (for example) it doesn't make sense to 
> > call the revision of a poem or musical score a matter of "correcting 
> > errors," transcription mistakes aside, although sometimes that may 
> > indeed be the proper concept ("it doesn't make sense for this character 
> > to do such-and-such," "this scene
> >
> > takes the play in the wrong direction," that sort of thing).  Actually I
> > can't see how you could have imagined I'd say that revisions are all 
> > matters
> >
> > of correcting errors, that doesn't follow from what I've said. So we 
> > apparently agree on some of the limits to what can appropriately be 
> > called error, and likewise you may be more amenable to some of my 
> > position than you
> >
> > suggest.
> >
> > In any case, interesting as questions of the definition and extent of 
> > the term "knowledge" are, they aren't actually to the point. The only 
> > issue I was driving at was that there are alternative transcendental 
> > arguments for realism (*specifically* realism: not necessarily 
> > materialism, the correspondence theory of truth, etc etc, even if those 
> > might be consequent upon realism), and that one is the condition of 
> > possibility for error. Whether error must be contingent upon prior 
> > knowledge of some type is obviously debatable -- I agree that it *does* 
> > require some sort of conscious
> >
> > or unconscious hypothesis or belief ("all eggs are white," "this table 
> > will
> > hold the weight of my arm," "I'm the only thing in the universe," 
> > whatever).
> >
> > I for one wouldn't say that all hypotheses and beliefs can be 
> > categorized as
> >
> > knowledge, but it really doesn't matter for my specific argument, 
> > which is *strictly* that error can only occur if there's a real world 
> > that exists independently of our minds, which gives us realism and off 
> > we go. It doesn't matter whether there's knowledge of any sort first: 
> > all that matters
> >
> > for my particular argument is that error is possible. If one admits 
> > that it
> >
> > is, then the ontological argument follows.
> >
> > One other comment:
> >
> >>                     And at minimum, in normal circumstances, a
> >> mistake always leads to some (new) knowledge, viz. not to repeat that
> >> mistake.
> >
> > Apparently you haven't dated recently....
> >
> > Cheers,
> >
> > T.
> >
> > ---
> > Tobin Nellhaus
> > nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
> > "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Tue, 19 Jun 2007 20:03:27 -0400
> From: "Tobin Nellhaus" <nellhaus@xxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <5A9CF4C5F4774CC8A395FFDD190C49BD@Gargantua>
> Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed; charset="iso-8859-1";
> 	reply-type=original
> 
> Hi Mervyn--
> 
> > But imo it isn't an alternative. The main CR transcendental argument 
> > for the reality of a mind-independent world is that it's a condition of 
> > possibility of human intentionality (in RTS as exemplified in 
> > scientific experimentation), and specifically of the capacity for 
> > 'referential detachment', which clearly includes the capacity to get 
> > our acts of reference wrong as well as right. Seems to me you're only 
> > saying something new if you can show that the derivation can be made 
> > from the possibility of error alone, which seems very undialectical: I 
> > think Jan's right in insisting that they're two sides of the same coin 
> > - correlatives, the one presupposing the other.
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> 
> 
> Okay, let me get this straight: error presupposes knowledge, and 
> knowledge presupposes error, therefore dialectically speaking they don't 
> form alternatives which makes them really the same thing. And since truth 
> can only be understood in the context of lies, and lies in the context of 
> truth, lies are truth. And because war can only be understood in the 
> context of peace and vice versa, war is peace. Likewise slavery is 
> freedom ... how very Orwellian .... This sort of reasoning is unlike you, 
> Mervyn.
> 
> Error requires *some* sort of cognitive background (such as, yes, an 
> intention to "get things right"), but subsuming all possible cognition 
> into "knowledge" is absurd! You can have error without *ever* achieving 
> knowledge. Error reveals the *possibility* of knowledge, but whether it 
> actually leads to knowledge is entirely contingent (and in practice, 
> infrequent). Consequently it's logically coherent to deny that we 
> actually have knowledge, without denying we have error. Thus in fact it 
> *is* possible to make an argument from the possibility of error alone. 
> The situation is parallel to the role of absence and negativity in 
> ontology. Seriously, Mervyn, you of *all* people! No joke, I'm startled.
> 
> > To be fair to Tobin, he's not saying that error is a possible solution, 
> > only
> > that the possibility of error provides an alternative argument for the
> > reality of a (relatively or absolutely) mind-independent world.
> 
> Thank you for this, which is both accurate and on point.
> 
> T.
> 
> ---
> Tobin Nellhaus
> nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
> "Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 01:28:10 +0100
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID: <002401c7b2d1$e1df8660$4001a8c0@DAVE>
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"
> 
> Thanks, Mervyn.  
> 
> You are right, of course, about the need for on-going criticism, 
> especially because new people keep needing to be made aware of the same 
> criticisms. I wrote that bit from the point of view of a practical 
> individual, needing to reach decisions sufficiently reliably to be put 
> into practice.
> 
> About this being accepted even about religion nowadays, as long ago as 
> 1908, Chesterton in his own way said much the same thing as you: "If you 
> want a post to stay white you have to keep painting it".
> 
> I didn't intend the "implication" you read, and in fact still don't see it
> is there, but sorry for any offence given.  I was referring to my own lack
> of knowledge rather than anyone else's.
> 
> Best
> 
> Dave
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Mervyn
> Hartwig
> Sent: 19 June 2007 23:29
> To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> 
> Hi Dave,
> 
> I didn't read this very closely at first because I took exception to the 
> implication that only Christians (here, you and George) would likely 
> understand about "seeing through a glass darkly". On looking again, I see 
> that it's making fundamentally similar points to Bwanika, and my response 
> to Bwanika. I particularly like the bit about the automatic recognition 
> of error being necessary for the appearance that there is no error, and I 
> agree that much that passes for dialogue in academia is one-upmanship. 
> But I'm not a correspondence theorist and I don't hope to find 'a point 
> of view on reality which doesn't need or attract further criticism'. Even 
> the religious point of view nowadays accepts the necessity and 
> desirability of ongoing criticism, doesn't it?
> 
> Mervyn
> 
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'" 
> <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2007 3:41 PM
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> 
> 
> > Mervyn et al
> >
> > I've been refecting on the possible approach to truth via error, and 
> > what George says here about convergence (which I agree with) makes up 
> > my mind. The issue is not the possibility of error, though, it is the 
> > possibility of RECOGNISING error, which is what is built into computers 
> > and one aspect of their programming. In fact it is the possibility of 
> > AUTOMATICALLY recognising error, which is needed to become aware that 
> > there appears to be NO error and that (maybe) one has found the truth. 
> > IMO it is not about true CORRESPONDENCE between an object and its 
> > representation, it is about true COHERENCE between the parts of an 
> > object not yet "seen" clearly enough to represent accurately, and in 
> > the case of actual vision, recognised by less than optimal sharpness of 
> > focus. George at least will understand what I mean when I refer to 
> > "seeing through a glass darkly".
> >
> > Is "creative dialogue", then, what it appears to be in competitive 
> > academedia: distinguishing and justifying one's own position by 
> > criticising the alleged failings of "rival" views? (I have in mind not 
> > just Hume's fortune-seeking but logical positivist G E Moore's savage 
> > criticism of J S Mill). Or is it criticising our own as well as 
> > everybody else's views, not for the sake of it but in the hope of 
> > finding and (by creative - elegant and well as accurate - use of 
> > language) socially converging on, a point of view of reality which 
> > doesn't need or attract further criticism: that we can get on and use 
> > for the purpose for which it was intended?
> >
> > Dave
> >
> > -----Original Message----- From: 
> > critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
> > Mervyn Hartwig Sent: 19 June 2007 13:19 To: Continuation of the Spoon 
> > Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> >
> > Hi George
> >
> > First, my name isn't Merv.
> >
> > Second, I'm not counter-critiquing creative dialogue. On the contrary. 
> > I'm simply saying that it's going on, and let's hear no more of the 
> > libel that CR eschews it.
> >
> > Third, how can there be creative dialogue if there's convergence?
> >
> > Mervyn
> >
> >
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: <gdemetrion@xxxxxxx>
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Sent: Tuesday, June 19, 2007 12:22 PM
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.
> >
> >
> >> "But in terms of the horizon of RTS, since one of the things that we 
> >> are doing is attending to that, the main thing to note is just how 
> >> wildly different even an only vaguely theorized notion of a causal 
> >> mechanism (or "powerful particular," from Harre and Madden) is from 
> >> the ontology assumed by Hume, and the account of "laws" and 
> >> "explanation" to which the Humean ontology gives rise. Think Hempel."
> >>
> >> Ruth,
> >>
> >> Thanks for the insight and resources on scientific essentialism, the 
> >> later term in particular which has gotten bad press in postmodern 
> >> circles. Both Popper and Dewey, too, critique essentialism even as 
> >> both move well beyond Hume as well as positivism. Dewey speaks a lot 
> >> about potentiality which perhaps is not too different from the notion 
> >> of generative mechanisms which may or may not be realized in any given 
> >> context. In that he is moving toward ontology even as he tends to 
> >> focus on the immanence of the potentially transcendent which becomes 
> >> "created" out of what happens; what causal mechanisms are 
> >> operationalized in any given context.
> >>
> >> Thus related to Merv's counter-critique of calls for more creative 
> >> dialogue among various schools of philosophy, the critical issue in my 
> >> view is greater convergence among closely related schools of thought; 
> >> hence, the need for convergence (and not just an emphasis on 
> >> distinctions) between critical pragmatism, critical realism, and 
> >> critical rationalism particularly in their common postpositivist 
> >> mediating outlook in which truth as a "regulative ideal" grounds all 
> >> of their epistemologies. It is this, I believe, which distinguishes 
> >> their common outlook from both positivism and postmodernism--a 
> >> mediating postpositvism. My objective here is less to critique 
> >> critical realism in that for the most part critical pragmatism and 
> >> critical rationalism have not engaged each other to any significant 
> >> way even as there has been some good discussion between early 
> >> pragmatism and the American critical realism of the early 20th century 
> >> reviewed from the bias of pragmatism in David Hildebrand's (2003) 
> >> Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism. A related text edited by John Shook 
> >> (2003) one of the foremost pragmatic philosophers of the contempoary 
> >> era Pragmatic Naturalism & Realism is highly sophisticated in the 
> >> range of philosophical discourse it incorporates. There is some brief 
> >> reference to Bhaskar in one of the essays, but nowhere in this highly 
> >> important text is critical realism as a school of philosophical 
> >> thought engaged in the effort to explore the relationship between 
> >> naturalism and realism.
> >>
> >> So the shoe that fits applies to many feet. The issue is not to point 
> >> figures as this problem is grounded in the history of the development 
> >> of the academic disciplines where specialization, in itself a highly 
> >> desirable trait
> >>
> >> Thus when I think of Bhaskar's claim that critical realism is the 
> >> most adequate philosophy has taken on aura of mystification of its own 
> >> which in many significant ways has the pragmatic effect of 
> >> short-circuiting the search for truth at a high level of 
> >> interdisciplinary discourse, particularly among related schools of 
> >> thought where a critical search for convergences has a great deal to 
> >> offer, including that of putting differences into more balanced 
> >> perspective
> >>
> >> George Demetrion
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> >
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> >
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> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
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> 
> End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 32, Issue 104
> *************************************************
> 

-- 
Reality leaves a lot to the imagination. - John Lennon.


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