Re: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.

["Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Ruth, John, Meryn, all

With my wife rushing me, trying to get out, I missed this and cobbled up my
follow-up of John:-

>I personally have been taking a view more like John's (which is consistent
with the context), that MECHANISMS are structures which in the social
context comprise primarily paths [of least action] WHICH WE TEND TO FOLLOW,
including mental path selectors like linguistic and ritual symbols and
conventions.

If the objective is to define powers etc rather than characterise
mechanisms, then I would argue that in everyday usage 'power' is a rate of
[unspecified] action, 'powers' are a capability of performing specific
actions, and 'causal powers' are specific powers of causing [in whatever
way] others to act.  We agree capabilities may not be exercised.

This discussion has helped me clarify my thoughts, anyway!

Best

Dave  

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ruth
Groff
Sent: 19 June 2007 00:41
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Powers,processes, etc.

Hi John, all,

I don't mean to sound like a broken record, but the main people who are
theorizing these things (i.e, causal powers, processes, etc.) with
specificity are those working in philosophy of science and metaphysics,
writing about dispositions.   The literature, broadly, is called "scientific
essentialism," although not everyone writing in the area is, technically
speaking, a scientific essentialist (a category that involves one's postion
regarding kind-essences).  Names to look for are: Bird, Mumford, Ellis,
Molnar, Chravartty.

Brian Ellis' book, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE: A GUIDE TO THE NEW ESSENTIALISM
(Queen's-McGill) (Acumen, in the UK), is a good intro for non-philosophers.
His SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM (Cambridge) is a good intro for if you want a
little bit more technical.

In Mervyn's defense, I don't see any way to avoid the abstraction.  I mean,
in talking about these things philosophically, we're asking things like
"What *is* a power, after all?" not "How does this particular thing x, which
is powerful, work?"   Isn't this so?

A causal mechanism, I think you could say without getting into too much
argument, is, at a minimum, the display of a dispositional property.  A
dispositional property is a capacity that something has, which capacity may
or may not be exercised.

It would be fantastic if, eventually, people wanted to read and think more
together on this issue; I personally think that it is the ontological crux
of RB's position in RTS, as I've said, and the most interesting thing going
in the contemporary literature.  But in terms of the horizon of RTS, since
one of the things that we are doing is attending to that, the main thing to
note is just how wildly different even an only vaguely theorized notion of a
causal mechanism (or "powerful particular," from Harre and Madden) is from
the ontology assumed by Hume, and the account of "laws" and "explanation" to
which the Humean ontology gives rise.  Think Hempel.

r. 

As always, I don't mean to sound terse or snooty; I'm just trying to be as
precise as possible.

Warmly,
Ruth  




-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Kitching,
John W
Sent: Mon 18-Jun-07 6:38 PM
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List; Continuation of the Spoon
Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface
 


Hello Mervyn

This definition, I think, highlights the difficulty of offering a digestible
answer to the unconvinced. 
The language will seem abstract for some.
Combining Dave E-Vs and your own remarks, mechanisms can be processes,
powers & tendencies.
Yet RB distinguishes powers & tendencies in RTS ch1.
Also: how do these notions relate to structures?
These issues are important if we are to argue clearly for CR against its
critics.

Apologies for harping on interminably about mechanisms but it seems
fundamental to me to be clear about how the real domain is to be
distinguished from the actual & the empirical. People, I think, find it easy
to understand events & experiences as being different layers of reality
(though, of course, they might not describe it in this way). The level of
the real, I think, being less obvious needs more argument/elaboration.

Regards.

john


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Mervyn
Hartwig
Sent: Sun 6/17/2007 06:58
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface
 
Hi Brian

Here is a I think very useful definition of a generative mechanism from an
excellent article forthcoming in Journal of CR 6(2) November 2007:

A Method for Social Ontology
Iterating Ontology and Social Research
BY
Dave Elder-Vass
 

 

(hi Dave -- I hope you don't mind my posting this appetiser):

 

"Causal mechanisms are processes that depend upon interactions between the
parts {of emergent wholes}, interactions that only occur when those parts
are organised in the particular relations that constitute them into wholes
that possess this emergent property.[1] Although emergent properties, and
thus real causal powers, can therefore be explained, they cannot be
explained away. They exist only when the relevant type of whole exists,
hence they are causal powers of this type of whole and not of its parts."



----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

[1] See, for example, Walter Buckley, Sociology and Modern Systems Theory
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967) p. 42; Mario Bunge, The
Sociology-Philosophy Connection (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), ch.
2.

 

As I understand it a generative (or causal) mechanism may be a causal power
(a potential that may be exercised or not) or a tendency (a causal power set
in motion) or both.


If you don't like the 'mechanism' in 'generative mechanism' you can always
substitute (depending on context) causal power/ potential, dispositional
property, tendency, etc.

Mervyn

----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian Dick" <briandick51@xxxxxxxxx>
To: <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Saturday, June 16, 2007 5:24 PM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface


> Hi Louis,
> 
> As John pointed out, this statement came in the context of our discussion
of
> how to talk to our colleagues about CR, who either are not familiar with
> critical realism or already critical of it (even if they don't completely
> understand it).  When mentioning the term 'generative mechanism' it is
often
> difficult to express its exact meaning (such as the powers and
liabiltiies,
> the ways of acting, of things) and what it does not refer to (i.e., some
> form of mechanical determinism, which others not familiar with CR
sometimes
> seem to assume that it might).  This becomes an even greater difficulty
when
> one begins to describe social relationships as generative mechanisms.
> 
> As my proposals of 'generative thingamabob' and 'generative thingamajig'
> indicate, I was speaking partially with tongue in cheek.  So, sure, one
may
> be trying to get a colleage to smell a very sweet flower, but they are
much
> more likely to actually smell the flower if its called a rose, rather than
a
> fart blossom.
> 
> Best,
> Brian
> 
> 
> How can a mere terminological change address a substantive issue?  It
> implies that there was not a substantive issue for you, just that you
> did
> not care for the lingo.  So you are fine with the concept itself but
> feel
> that rose would smell sweeter under a different name?
> 
> Louis Irwin
> 
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> Subject: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface
> 
> Hi John,
> 
> I've always found the notion of 'generative mechanism' problematic
> because
> of its (mechanical) connotations.  I think that this becomes an even
> bigger
> problem when we move on to the analysis of society where social
> relations
> become central.  That is, mechanisms seem to point to a more substantive
> interpretation rather than relational (in Sewell's terminology).  Of
> course,
> this is not what Bhaskar is arguing, but for others who do not
> understand
> what is meant by the term it can lead to some confusion.
> 
> I'm not completely sure what would be a better alternative.  Here are
> some
> ideas: 'generative apparatus', 'generative actants' (too Latourian?),
> 'generative process', 'generative thingamabob' :)  (Oh, and 'generative
> thingamajig').
> 
> Brian
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