Re: [Critical-Realism] transitive/intransitive, cr and philosophy, etc.

["Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Brian

Sorry this has been a long time acoming: I've been having computer problems.


I agree with what you are saying to Dave E-T about the importance of the
transitive/intransitive  distinction; I would go further and add the
importance of realising that the same distinction can be and has been
characterised in different ways in different contexts.  With Tobin's
objections in mind, this is the basic reason I see contexts like Catholic
theology and Algol68 as relevant, as if you like providing (in the
statististical sense) "redundant" arguments supporting the significance of
what Roy is saying.  To adapt the old figure of speech, if one signpost
points to Rome who knows if someone has twisted it, but if all signposts
point in a coherent way to Rome that increases the likelihood that Rome
exists, is locatable and is significant.  

To try explain myself better on the points you raise:

(1) I had some difficulty expressing the remarks I made here to my own
satisfaction.  I had indeed intended independence from knowledge approach,
and my thought was that all which exists before there is a knower of it must
be independent of it. Admittedly that is a deductive proof  setting out
connections sought retroductively following insight.  

(2?)On what Bhaskar says, my copy of RTS is covered with annotations, but I
hope you will excuse the fact that as an intuitive I tend to assent to and
remember principles rather than detailed arguments, while at 70 I have
difficulty recalling words anyway.  Having already read Hanson on
retroduction and been impressed, I took the passage you mention to be about
scientific method working backwards, and this as to why it needed to.  My
critical thought was along the lines that science has evolved (starting from
discovery, to Aristotle's intuitive - tacitly retroductive - biological
classifications), with "normal" science moving on from mere discovery to
intuitive classification to trial and error assessment and medieval
application to more methodical, spelled out and sometimes deeper ways of
achieving these ends post-Bacon.  You show it is worth my revisiting,
anyway.

(3) As I see it, science is not a person and cannot "have" anything, in
particular, in light of its development, not a singular logical object. I
would characterise it as a logical process rather than an entity, with what
it is processing depending on people and circumstances.  I think Bhaskar
right on the nail with his "Achilles heel" approach, having accepted it as a
fundamental ideal 52 years ago after encountering it in J H Newman'
"Apologia Pro Vita Sua" (of course in different words: roughly "grant your
opponent all he asks and still make your point").

Thanks for your courtesy, Brian.

Dave T 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Brian
Dick
Sent: 16 June 2007 22:43
To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Critical-Realism] transitive/intransitive, cr and philosophy, etc.

Hi Dave T and Dave E-V,

Dave E-V,
The emphasis on the transitive/intransitive distinction is because we are (I
believe) now on to discussing the first section of chapter 1 of RTS, "The
Two Sides of 'Knowledge'" where Bhaskar first brings up this distinction.  I
think that it is really important to get down what Bhaskar is doing here
because he is basing his critique of classical empiricism and transcendental
idealism on the basis of their inability to sustain both dimensions
(classical empiricism denying both, transcendental idealism ignoring the
ID).

Dave T.,

I'm having a little trouble understanding the point of some of your
critique.  I'll focus on two of points that you make.

(1) I in no way see why knowers have to exist before the known if the
intransitive dimension is to be defined in terms of the independence from
the knower (not the unknown from the known--although I remember this being
brought up as an alternative transcendental strategy).  For example, in the
next section of RTS (1.2), Bhaskar argues that no adequate account of
ontology can be given independent of an account of science.  However, he is
adament about noting that the order of *analysis* (science then being)
*reverses* the real nature of dependency (or the real burden of
contingency).  That is, it is contingent that the world exists in a way that
science is possible.  However, given that scientific activity does take
place, the world must be such a way (stratified and differentiated).

(3) How can you say, at least from CR premises, that science does not have
an object?  Sure, scientists have different objectives, but given activities
that are generally regarded as scientific, such as theory construction and
experimentation, how is this problematic?  I would agree with you that what
is considered 'scientific' is socially constructed and the result of
'boundary work' (see, for example, the work of Thomas Geiryn), but this
doesn't really matter in terms of what Bhaskar is doing here--i.e., this has
to do with the social activity of science taking place in the transitive
dimension.  As Hans, I believe, pointed out, Bhaskar is carrying out an
Achille's Heel critique where he is taking on what positivism sees as its
greatest strength, e.g. analysis of scientific experiment, and showing that
its own (ontological) assumptions cannot account for this activity
intelligibly.

Best,
Brian
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