[Critical-Realism] transitive/intransitive, cr and philosophy, etc.

["Brian Dick" <briandick51@xxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Dave T and Dave E-V,

Dave E-V,
The emphasis on the transitive/intransitive distinction is because we are (I
believe) now on to discussing the first section of chapter 1 of RTS, "The
Two Sides of 'Knowledge'" where Bhaskar first brings up this distinction.  I
think that it is really important to get down what Bhaskar is doing here
because he is basing his critique of classical empiricism and transcendental
idealism on the basis of their inability to sustain both dimensions
(classical empiricism denying both, transcendental idealism ignoring the
ID).

Dave T.,

I'm having a little trouble understanding the point of some of your
critique.  I'll focus on two of points that you make.

(1) I in no way see why knowers have to exist before the known if the
intransitive dimension is to be defined in terms of the independence from
the knower (not the unknown from the known--although I remember this being
brought up as an alternative transcendental strategy).  For example, in the
next section of RTS (1.2), Bhaskar argues that no adequate account of
ontology can be given independent of an account of science.  However, he is
adament about noting that the order of *analysis* (science then being) *
reverses* the real nature of dependency (or the real burden of
contingency).  That is, it is contingent that the world exists in a way that
science is possible.  However, given that scientific activity does take
place, the world must be such a way (stratified and differentiated).

(3) How can you say, at least from CR premises, that science does not have
an object?  Sure, scientists have different objectives, but given activities
that are generally regarded as scientific, such as theory construction and
experimentation, how is this problematic?  I would agree with you that what
is considered 'scientific' is socially constructed and the result of
'boundary work' (see, for example, the work of Thomas Geiryn), but this
doesn't really matter in terms of what Bhaskar is doing here--i.e., this has
to do with the social activity of science taking place in the transitive
dimension.  As Hans, I believe, pointed out, Bhaskar is carrying out an
Achille's Heel critique where he is taking on what positivism sees as its
greatest strength, e.g. analysis of scientific experiment, and showing that
its own (ontological) assumptions cannot account for this activity
intelligibly.

Best,
Brian
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