Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

["Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

But what is falsehood?  Is it true that what you think is falsehood is?  One
comes back to George's point, that in the end one has to make a decision, to
have faith in the best available hypothesis - which on the evidence (in
particular about how communication works) is not Hume's.  That Bhaskar is
trying to avoid involving science for the reasons Hans has given is however
very significant for trying to understand him. Thanks for that, Hans.

Dave 

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Ruth
Groff
Sent: 16 June 2007 03:37
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11

Yes, I agree.  Absolutely.  The first, abt how/why a transcendental argument
about experimentation doesn't work for pomo is what I said in my earlier
post.  The second is pretty much exactly what I have thought for years --
falsehood, be it error or lies.  Either works.


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Tobin
Nellhaus
Sent: Fri 15-Jun-07 7:44 PM
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
 
>             The answer to the transcendental question `what must the 
> world be like for science to be possible?'
> deserves the name of ontology.

In RTS Bhaskar presents the transcendental argument about as the launching
point, if not the lynchpin, of (what has become) critical realism.  I've
always felt that this is a great anti-positivist strategy, but a weak
anti-postmodernist one, for postmodernists of various (albeit not all)
stripes often reject notions of science, truth or knowledge as little more
than effects of social power.

Consequently there needs to be an alternative transcendental argument for
ontology that can cut through postmodernist positions.  I have occasionally
floated one which I think is viable, but I'd appreciate some direct
consideration: "What must the world be like for *error* to be possible?"

Whether or not one believes in knowledge, one has little choice but accept
error.  You think you've reached the bottom step of a ladder, but you miss
it and fall on your butt.  You think the stovetop is off and you burn
yourself.  Etc.  Any such experience forces the recognition of a difference
between mind and world, transitive and intransitive, and that the world must
at least in large part be independent of mind: realism.  Moreover, if error
is possible, then knowledge (not-error) is possible.

Thoughts?

T.

---
Tobin Nellhaus
nellhaus@xxxxxxxx
"Faith requires us to be materialists without flinching": C.S. Peirce



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