Re: [Critical-Realism] Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 32, Issue 86

[pohanlon03@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

I agree on what John said. But also, as I think Dave was suggesting, the 
intransitive may only be relatively so, and not absolutely. But I think the 
additional point I would like to make is that "intransitive" does not 
necessarily equate to "mind-independent". I think Bhaskar draws mostly on 
Kant's attempted proof of the objective nature of experience as expressed 
in the Second Analogy section of the Critique; the intelligibility of our 
fleeting representatons presupposes something permanent against which they 
can be identified as transitory. BUT, Kant later realised as expressed in 
the Refutation of Idealism, that this was not sufficient to prove the 
existence of objectivity, as the required permanent element could 
conceivably be just another representation, albeit relatively enduring 
against the more fleeting ones. Thus, Bhaskar only proves with this that 
there are degrees of transitoriness to our representations, and not that 
there is a mind-independent world.

Ruth, thanks for that. The argument from experiment is key of course; But I 
believe this is an abductive proof, of the same sort used by Peirce, and, 
at least from what I can see, does not do enough to differentiate CR from 
pragmatism.

Thanks
Phil.



On Jun 15 2007, critical-realism-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:

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> Today's Topics:
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>    1. Re: rts2-11 (Dave Taylor)
>    2. Re: ways of knowing the real (Kitching, John W)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 19:51:30 +0100
> From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
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> 
> Hi John
> 
> To take a different approach to Ruth - not citation of Bhaskar but 
> direct explanation in terms expressed elegantly by Arthur M Young in "The 
> Geometry of Meaning":
> 
>  - the intransient is the transient with time still further abstracted 
> (it being granted that experience provides only a snapshot of time, so 
> even the intransient may change).
> 
> To relate Bhaskar and Young it is perhaps necessary to distinguish 
> abstract mathematical models from concrete applications of them. Young 
> explains the equivalent of Bhaskar's three/four-level reality in terms of 
> a mathematical sequence in which changes in time are repeatedly 
> abstracted, and illustrates it concretely in terms of the Newtonian 
> differential formulae for position, speed, acceleration and controlling 
> force at a point in time. He argues that these are not different 
> situations but different ways of looking at the same situation. If one 
> changes the force one changes all the others and thereafter one is 
> discussing a different situation.
> 
> Fairly obviously, in Bhaskar's account, empirical events occur on 
> shorter timescales than actual things than types of structure than the 
> deep laws of nature (to try and put it simply). Likewise, they are all 
> there at the same time.
> 
> Arguably that is necessary and sufficient to differentiate (but not to 
> characterise) the "transient" first two from the [relatively] 
> "intransient" third and fourth [new laws of nature emerging with the 
> evolution of new types of structure].
> 
> Best
> 
> Dave T
> 
> -----Original Message----- From: 
> critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of 
> Kitching, John W Sent: 15 June 2007 17:05 To: Continuation of the Spoon 
> Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> Would any members of the list like to say any more about the links 
> between the intransitive/transitive dimensions? In what sense do 
> transitive objects of knowledge connect to intransitive objects of 
> knowledge?
> 
>  
> 
> I am thinking about how to respond to critics who 'bracket out' the 
> intransitive & who focus on the transitive. The late Richard Rorty comes 
> to mind as someone who might say don't worry about the way the world 
> really is as we can never know what it's really like. Better to 
> concentrate on entering a conversation with others & attempting to build 
> a consensus in order that we might combine to get things done we all 
> value.
> 
>  
> 
> John
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of ehrbar
> Sent: 15 June 2007 15:36
> To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Subject: [Critical-Realism] rts2-11
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> ======================================================
> 
> {RTS2:21} Chapter 1. Philosophy and Scientific Realism
> 
> ======================================================
> 
>  
> 
> 1. TWO SIDES OF  KNOWLEDGE
> 
>  
> 
> Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of
> 
> grappling with this central paradox of science: that men in
> 
> their social activity produce knowledge which is a social
> 
> product much like any other, which is no more independent of
> 
> its production and the men who produce it than motor cars,
> 
> armchairs or books, which has its own craftsmen,
> 
> technicians, publicists, standards and skills and which is
> 
> no less subject to change than any other commodity.  This is
> 
> one side of `knowledge'.  The other is that knowledge is
> 
> `of' things which are not produced by men at all: the
> 
> specific gravity of mercury, the process of electrolysis,
> 
> the mechanism of light propagation.  None of these `objects
> 
> of knowledge' depend upon human activity.  If men ceased to
> 
> exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall
> 
> to the earth in exactly the same way, though ex hypothesi
> 
> there would be no-one to know it.  Let us call these, in an
> 
> unavoidable technical neologism, the intransitive objects of
> 
> knowledge.  The transitive objects of knowledge are
> 
> Aristotelian material causes.^1  They are the raw materials
> 
> of science - the artificial objects fashioned into items of
> 
> knowledge by the science of the day.^2  They include the
> 
> antecedently established facts and theories, paradigms and
> 
> models, methods and techniques of inquiry available to a
> 
> particular scientific school or worker.  The material cause,
> 
> in this sense, of Darwin's theory of natural selection
> 
> consisted of the ingredients out of which he fashioned his
> 
> theory.  Among these were the facts of natural variation,
> 
> the theory of domestic selection and Malthus' theory of
> 
> population.^3  Darwin worked these into a knowledge of a
> 
> process, too slow and {RTS2:22} complex to be perceived,
> 
> which had been going on for millions of years before him.
> 
> But he could not, at least if his theory is correct, have
> 
> produced the process he described, the intransitive object
> 
> of the knowledge he had produced: the mechanism of natural
> 
> selection.
> 
>  
> 
>          We can easily imagine a world similar to ours,
> 
> containing the same intransitive objects of scientific
> 
> knowledge, but without any science to produce knowledge of
> 
> them.  In such a world, which has occurred and may come
> 
> again, reality would be unspoken for and yet things would
> 
> not cease to act and interact in all kinds of ways.  In such
> 
> a world the causal laws that science has now, as a matter of
> 
> fact, discovered would presumably still prevail, and the
> 
> kinds of things that science has identified endure.  The
> 
> tides would still turn and metals conduct electricity in the
> 
> way that they do, without a Newton or a Drude to produce our
> 
> knowledge of them.  The Wiedemann-Franz law would continue
> 
> to hold although there would be no-one to formulate,
> 
> experimentally establish or deduce it.  Two atoms of
> 
> hydrogen would continue to combine with one atom of oxygen
> 
> and in favourable circumstances osmosis would continue to
> 
> occur.  In short, the intransitive objects of knowledge are
> 
> in general invariant to our knowledge of them: they are the
> 
> real things and structures, mechanisms and processes, events
> 
> and possibilities of the world; and for the most part they
> 
> are quite independent of us.  They are not unknowable,
> 
> because as a matter of fact quite a bit is known about them.
> 
> (Remember they were introduced as objects of scientific
> 
> knowledge.)  But neither are they in any way dependent upon
> 
> our knowledge, let alone perception, of them.  They are the
> 
> intransitive, science-independent, objects of scientific
> 
> discovery and investigation.
> 
>  
> 
>          If we can imagine a world of intransitive objects
> 
> without science, we cannot imagine a science without
> 
> transitive objects, i.e. without scientific or
> 
> pre-scientific antecedents.  That is, we cannot imagine the
> 
> production of knowledge save from, and by means of,
> 
> knowledge-like materials.  Knowledge depends upon
> 
> knowledge-like antecedents.  Harvey thought of blood
> 
> circulation in terms of an hydraulic model.  Spencer, less
> 
> successfully perhaps, used an organic metaphor to express
> 
> his idea of society.  W. Thomson (Lord Kelvin) declared in
> 
> 1884 that it seemed to him that `the test of "do we
> 
> understand a particular {RTS2:23} topic in physics
> 
> [e.g. heat, magnetism]?" is "can we make a mechanical model
> 
> of it?".'^4 And as is well known this was the guiding maxim
> 
> of physical research until the gradual disintegration of the
> 
> Newtonian world-view in the first decades of this century.
> 
> Similarly economists sought explanations of phenomena which
> 
> would conform to the paradigm of a decision-making unit
> 
> maximizing an objective function with given resources until
> 
> marginalism became discredited in the 1930's.  No doubt at
> 
> the back of economists' minds during the period of the
> 
> paradigm's hegemony was the cosy picture of a housewife
> 
> doing her weekly shopping subject to a budget constraint;
> 
> just as Rutherford disarmingly confessed in 1934, long after
> 
> the paradigm was hopelessly out of date, to a predilection
> 
> for corpuscularian models of atoms and fundamental particles
> 
> as `little hard billiard balls, preferably red or black'.^5
> 
> Von Helmont's concept of an arche was the intellectual
> 
> ancestor of the concept of a bacterium, which furnished the
> 
> model for the concept of a virus.  The biochemical structure
> 
> of genes, which were initially introduced as the unknown
> 
> bearers of acquired characteristics, has been explored under
> 
> the metaphor of a linguistic code.  In this way social
> 
> products, antecedently established knowledges capable of
> 
> functioning as the transitive objects of new knowledges, are
> 
> used to explore the unknown (but knowable) intransitive
> 
> structure of the world.  Knowledge of B is produced by means
> 
> of knowledge of A, but both items of knowledge exist only in
> 
> thought.
> 
>  
> 
>          If we cannot imagine a science without transitive
> 
> objects, can we imagine a science without intransitive ones?
> 
> If the answer to this question is `no', then a philosophical
> 
> study of the intransitive objects of science becomes
> 
> possible.  The answer to the transcendental question `what
> 
> must the world be like for science to be possible?'
> 
> deserves the name of ontology.  And in showing that the
> 
> objects of science are intransitive (in this sense) and of a
> 
> certain kind, viz. structures not events, it is my intention
> 
> to furnish the new philosophy of science with an ontology.
> 
> The parallel question `what must science be like to give us
> 
> knowledge of intransitive objects (of this kind)?' is not a
> 
> petitio principii of the ontological question, because the
> 
> intelligibility of the {RTS2:24} scientific activities of
> 
> perception and experimentation already entails the
> 
> intransitivity of the objects to which, in the course of
> 
> these activities, access is obtained.  That is to say, the
> 
> philosophical position developed in this study does not
> 
> depend upon an arbitrary definition of science, but rather
> 
> upon the intelligibility of certain universally recognized,
> 
> if inadequately analysed, scientific activities.  In this
> 
> respect I am taking it to be the function of philosophy to
> 
> analyse concepts which are `already given' but `as
> 
> confused'.^6
> 
>  
> 
>          Any adequate philosophy of science must be capable
> 
> of sustaining and reconciling both aspects of science; that
> 
> is, of showing how science which is a transitive process,
> 
> dependent upon antecedent knowledge and the efficient
> 
> activity of men, has intransitive objects which depend upon
> 
> neither.  `That is, it must be capable of sustaining both
> 
> (1) the social character of science and (2) the independence
> 
> from science of the objects of scientific thought.  More
> 
> specifically, it must satisfy both:
> 
>  
> 
>  (1)' a criterion of the non-spontaneous production of
> 
> knowledge, viz. the production of knowledge from and by
> 
> means of knowledge (in the transitive dimension), and
> 
>  
> 
>  (2)' a criterion of structural and essential realism,
> 
> viz. the independent existence and activity of causal
> 
> structures and things (in the intransitive dimension).
> 
>  
> 
> For science, I will argue, is a social activity whose aim is
> 
> the production of the knowledge of the kinds and ways of
> 
> acting of independently existing and active things.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  ^1 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1.3.
> 
>  
> 
>  ^2 See J. R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems, pp.
> 
> 116-19.
> 
>  
> 
>  ^3 Cf. R. Harre, Philosophies of Science, pp. 176-7.
> 
>  
> 
>  ^4 W. Thomson, Notes of Lectures on Molecular Dynamics p. 132.
> 
>  
> 
>  ^5 See A. S. Eve, Rutherford.
> 
>  
> 
>  ^6 Cf. I. Kant, On the Distinctiveness of the Principles of
> 
> Natural Theology and Morals.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
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> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Fri, 15 Jun 2007 20:14:01 +0100
> From: "Kitching, John W" <J.Kitching@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] ways of knowing the real
> To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>,
> 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Message-ID:
> 	<BB8DF83D6585554FB71E0A41B4B624A80535C853@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> 	
> Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> 
> 
> It is worth remembering that transitive objects (theories, models, 
> concepts, philosophies) also constitute intransitive objects about which 
> knowledge claims can be made. The transitive is part of the intransitive. 
> This, of course, would include CR itself.
> 
> While this argument does not undermine the intransitive/transitive 
> distinction, it might be confusing for newcomers to understand it.
> 
> John
> 
> 
> -----Original Message----- From: 
> critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of 
> pohanlon03@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Fri 6/15/2007 18:46 To: 
> critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [Critical-Realism] ways of 
> knowing the real
>  
> Hi, firstly, in CR a lot hangs on the epistemic fallacy, conflating 
> knowledge and being. Given this, I don't think sufficient attention has 
> been paid to the issue of how we know 'reality' and not just our 
> concepts, imaginings, or sense impressions. I think this is a type of 
> criticism that may be made by those coming from positions that CR 
> criticises, e.g. pragmatism, idealism, empiricism. Ruth mentioned that 
> "fire" as an intransitive that does not change. Strictly speaking though, 
> I think, our concept of fire is our way of referring to whatever it is 
> that we take to be intransitive, i.e. "fire" is a concept. When Kuhn 
> talks of the world changing with our paradigms I don't think he means 
> that the World (capital "w") changes actually, but that OUR world 
> changes, which to some extent it always does. It's very easy to 
> misrepresent Kuhn and hold him up as straw man, which is another thing 
> that critics criticise CR for doing.
> 
> So, I think John's initial point was a pertinent one, and I still 
> personally believe that the main theoretical issue for critical realists 
> is to demonstrate in more detail and with more clarity than has been the 
> case hitherto, just how we distinguish what we know as Reality from what 
> we know as our concepts and impressions. I think that will involve a much 
> more nuanced and differentiated account of the process of knowledge 
> acquisition and ways of knowing the object. CR has been good on 
> differentiated ontology but less so (IMHO) on the epistemic side. I think 
> if CR is to sustain the distinction between transitive/intransitive 
> against pragmatist or sceptical and idealist counter attack then this 
> would need to be more carefully thought out.
> 
> Do we need to be so fast with the RTS postings? One per week would surely 
> be good enough?? I personally find it difficult to keep up if it's too 
> fast. Thanks. Phil.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> think it is more important than would be suggested by all existing 
> discussion of this matter in CR, to differentiate our ways of knowing 
> more adequately.
> 
> 
> 
> On Jun 14 2007, critical-realism-request@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
> 
> > Send Critical-Realism mailing list submissions to
> > 	critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > 
> > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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> > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
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> > 
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> > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> > than "Re: Contents of Critical-Realism digest..."
> > 
> > 
> > Today's Topics:
> > 
> >    1. Re: RTS Reading1 on a discussion board (gdemetrion@xxxxxxx)
> >    2. Re: Also quick last re: Hume, etc. (Ruth Groff)
> >    3. on Transcendence (Ruth Groff)
> >    4. Re: Hyperlinks in the TOC (Tom Wayburn)
> >    5. Re: RTS Reading1 on a discussion board (Dave Taylor)
> >    6. RTS.ALT: Reading society's Aristotelian apparati (Fred Zaman)
> > 
> > 
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 1
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 07:31:38 -0400
> > From: <gdemetrion@xxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID: <BAY103-DAV54FD1E5A2ABFDA4634CD5C51F0@xxxxxxx>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > 
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Merv, Hans, that might be ok as Merv suggests. On the other hand I 
> > like the way you have those paragraphs highlighted a great deal, which 
> > at lest cause me to pause a good deal more than through a linear 
> > reading of the preface. On the other hand, taking that approach through 
> > the whole book would be a great deal of effort. One alternative as we 
> > move on in the reading is a highlighting of key paragraphs/or passages 
> > (2-3 paragraphs) in any given section. Regardless, there is a great 
> > deal to recommend in the close reading that your method provides that 
> > better enables those of us who would benefit by such to highlight 
> > shorter extracts that may well help us to think about them more 
> > extensively.
> > 
> > Two brief comments on the preface:
> > 
> > A) It's interesting that Bhaskar, nor in anything that has surfaced 
> > here, has referenced Peirce and Dewey in the postpositivist tradition, 
> > particularly on the latter, Dewey's Essays in Experiential Logic (1916) 
> > and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) which are as rigorously as 
> > scientific in the postpositivist sense that I have come across even as 
> > acknowledged I have not done much work in the critical realist 
> > tradition.
> > 
> > B) Closely related, perhaps some critical commentary on Bhaskar's 
> > claim that "only the position developed here can do full justice to the 
> > rationality of scientific activities as theory-construction and 
> > experimentation. And that while recent developments [pace 1975] in the 
> > philosophy of science mark a great advance on positivism they must 
> > eventually prove vulnerable to positivist counter-attack, unless 
> > carried to the limit worked out here." Perhaps Bhaskar delivers on 
> > this. Perhaps he offers some very fruitful insights about some higher 
> > order transcendence that cannot be exclusively circumscribed within the 
> > framework of CR. Be that as it may one of the broader issues in both 
> > the history of philosophy and epistemology (for at some level, I don't 
> > think CR gets beyond epistemology even though its reach (like, in a 
> > different way as Popper's World Three knowledge) moves toward a greater 
> > objectivity and transcendence of the subjective. Thus whether in terms 
> > of CR's claims we're speaking of an heuristic that has substantial 
> > impact in terms of what can be grasped (Popper calls science fiction in 
> > the best sense of the term) or something more transcendent is also 
> > perhaps a matter worthy of additional consideration.
> > 
> > In any event, thank you Hans. I find the way you have demarcated single 
> > paragrpahs highly instructive for further reflection.
> > 
> > George Demetrion
> > 
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Mervyn Hartwig
> > Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2007 4:37 AM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > 
> > Hi Hans
> > 
> > I think this would be great as a supplement to the list -- and I take 
> > it that's the way you intend it, not as substituting for it. It 
> > 'archives' it as a resource for the future -- it is already archived of 
> > course, but this systematises it in a form that some will prefer.
> > 
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Mervyn
> > 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 2
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 07:38:14 -0400
> > From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Also quick last re: Hume, etc.
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, 	"Continuation of the Spoon
> > 	Bhaskar List"	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID:
> > 	<0E53E25A408CD847A76100C1D5D3479721D05F2F@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="iso-8859-1"
> > 
> > Hi all,
> > 
> > I wanted to emphasize that the point for Hume is that you can't - he 
> > thinks - actually observe causality itself. You can only observe event 
> > a, followed by event b. I used the example of paper burning. I can see 
> > the paper; I can see the fire; I can see the ashes. I can see the paper 
> > being tossed into the fire; I can see it burning. But what I can't see 
> > is "causality." So as I said, the referent for that, according to Hume, 
> > is my own feeling of anticipation regarding the expected outcome. I 
> > project that, reify it -- and voila: something called "causality," 
> > supposedly indicative of a "necessary connection."
> > 
> > It is worth noting that Harre and Madden, following Roy Wood Sellars 
> > (don't know about his son, Wilfred, on this), one of an interesting 
> > bunch of philosophers in the early to mid 20th c. who called themselves 
> > "critical realists" -- Harre and Madden, in CAUSAL POWERS (1975), take 
> > Hume on directly on causality, but, unlike RB, their argument is that 
> > we do too experience causality directly. (Sellars has the more 
> > interesting argument for it, I think ...) But RB's response in RTS is 
> > to challenge the idea that the only things that we can say exist are 
> > things we can observe directly. So, as we'll see, he introduces what he 
> > calls the "causal" criterion of existence, as a contrast to the 
> > "perceptual" criterion.
> > 
> > Given that Hume's line of argument is to say "We know things by 
> > observing them; we can't observe x; therefore we can't know that x 
> > exists," another important way to respond - taking the cue from Kant 
> > (or Hegel) - would be to say right off the bat "No, that isn't quite 
> > right, actually, with respect to how we know things; knowing is not 
> > simply passive reception of sensory input; therefore we can't rule out 
> > of existence those things that can't be known that way." Of course RB 
> > does think this, but the response to Hume takes the form I said. 
> > Horkheimer has useful things to say, too, about the non-passive 
> > character of knowing. I say this only because I think that it is so 
> > important to see how all of this is part of a big on-going 
> > conversation, a point that I worry sometimes it's easy to lose sight 
> > of.
> > 
> > Meawhile, the thing about empiricism that is interesting is that if it 
> > were true, everything would be very easy. You can see the appeal.
> > 
> > I am sorry to be taking up so much air time. I've just been trying to 
> > fill in what seems to me to be absolutely crucial background. I'm sure 
> > that there won't be continued need for this.
> > 
> > r.
> > 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 3
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 07:40:36 -0400
> > From: "Ruth Groff" <RGroff1@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: [Critical-Realism] on Transcendence
> > To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
> > 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID:
> > 	<0E53E25A408CD847A76100C1D5D3479721D05F30@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> > 
> > Hi George,
> > 
> > I just wanted to make one small point, which is that in RTS the term 
> > "transcendental" in "transcendental realism" has a Kantian spin. The 
> > term "transcendnetal argument" does too. What that means is that 
> > "transcendental" has to do, not with sweeping, grandiose 
> > over-and-above-ness, but rather that is means "that which is a 
> > necessary pre-condition of the possibility of something else." We 
> > should come back to this as we get into the book further.
> > 
> > Meanwhile, I think paragraph by paragraph is great. That's how you have 
> > to read material like this, or at least how I have to.
> > 
> > r.
> > 
> > 
> > -----Original Message----- From: 
> > critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of 
> > gdemetrion@xxxxxxx Sent: Thu 14-Jun-07 7:31 AM To: Continuation of the 
> > Spoon Bhaskar List Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a 
> > discussion board
> >  
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Merv, Hans, that might be ok as Merv suggests. On the other hand I 
> > like the way you have those paragraphs highlighted a great deal, which 
> > at lest cause me to pause a good deal more than through a linear 
> > reading of the preface. On the other hand, taking that approach through 
> > the whole book would be a great deal of effort. One alternative as we 
> > move on in the reading is a highlighting of key paragraphs/or passages 
> > (2-3 paragraphs) in any given section. Regardless, there is a great 
> > deal to recommend in the close reading that your method provides that 
> > better enables those of us who would benefit by such to highlight 
> > shorter extracts that may well help us to think about them more 
> > extensively.
> > 
> > Two brief comments on the preface:
> > 
> > A) It's interesting that Bhaskar, nor in anything that has surfaced 
> > here, has referenced Peirce and Dewey in the postpositivist tradition, 
> > particularly on the latter, Dewey's Essays in Experiential Logic (1916) 
> > and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) which are as rigorously as 
> > scientific in the postpositivist sense that I have come across even as 
> > acknowledged I have not done much work in the critical realist 
> > tradition.
> > 
> > B) Closely related, perhaps some critical commentary on Bhaskar's 
> > claim that "only the position developed here can do full justice to the 
> > rationality of scientific activities as theory-construction and 
> > experimentation. And that while recent developments [pace 1975] in the 
> > philosophy of science mark a great advance on positivism they must 
> > eventually prove vulnerable to positivist counter-attack, unless 
> > carried to the limit worked out here." Perhaps Bhaskar delivers on 
> > this. Perhaps he offers some very fruitful insights about some higher 
> > order transcendence that cannot be exclusively circumscribed within the 
> > framework of CR. Be that as it may one of the broader issues in both 
> > the history of philosophy and epistemology (for at some level, I don't 
> > think CR gets beyond epistemology even though its reach (like, in a 
> > different way as Popper's World Three knowledge) moves toward a greater 
> > objectivity and transcendence of the subjective. Thus whether in terms 
> > of CR's claims we'r!
> >  e speaking of an heuristic that has substantial impact in terms of 
> > what can be grasped (Popper calls science fiction in the best sense of 
> > the term) or something more transcendent is also perhaps a matter 
> > worthy of additional consideration.
> > 
> > In any event, thank you Hans. I find the way you have demarcated single 
> > paragrpahs highly instructive for further reflection.
> > 
> > George Demetrion
> > 
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Mervyn Hartwig
> > Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2007 4:37 AM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > 
> > Hi Hans
> > 
> > I think this would be great as a supplement to the list -- and I take 
> > it that's the way you intend it, not as substituting for it. It 
> > 'archives' it as a resource for the future -- it is already archived of 
> > course, but this systematises it in a form that some will prefer.
> > 
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Mervyn
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 4
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 06:52:00 -0500
> > From: "Tom Wayburn" <twayburn@xxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Hyperlinks in the TOC
> > To: <critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID: <002101c7ae7a$6b3c5e30$6401a8c0@DCLT7J61>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="us-ascii"
> > 
> > Does anyone have the power to convince the webmaster to add hyperlinks 
> > to the Table of Contents of the Digest so that one can go directly to 
> > the one post in which one is interested? It is convenient if there is a 
> > return-to-menu button at the end of each post too.
> > 
> > Tom Wayburn, Houston, Texas
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 5
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 13:05:08 +0100
> > From: "Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
> > 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID: <005d01c7ae7c$409d0b00$04000100@DAVE>
> > Content-Type: text/plain;	charset="US-ASCII"
> > 
> > > I don't think CR gets beyond epistemology even though its reach 
> > > (like, in a
> > different way as Popper's World Three knowledge) moves toward a greater
> > objectivity and transcendence of the subjective.
> > 
> > George perhaps misses the point that CR is not about epistemology OR 
> > ontology, it involves BOTH, for the epistemology interprets on the 
> > basis of what it is taken for granted to be a correct ontology. Thus 
> > Hume assumed logic required certainty and misinterpreted Baconian 
> > scientific method on the basis of that assumption. Bhaskar has taken on 
> > board retroductive logic, which doesn not deliver certainty but 
> > provides a more feasible interpretation of scientific method.
> > 
> > Dave 
> >  
> > 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > [mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> > gdemetrion@xxxxxxx
> > Sent: 14 June 2007 12:32
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > 
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Merv, Hans, that might be ok as Merv suggests. On the other hand I 
> > like the way you have those paragraphs highlighted a great deal, which 
> > at lest cause me to pause a good deal more than through a linear 
> > reading of the preface. On the other hand, taking that approach through 
> > the whole book would be a great deal of effort. One alternative as we 
> > move on in the reading is a highlighting of key paragraphs/or passages 
> > (2-3 paragraphs) in any given section. Regardless, there is a great 
> > deal to recommend in the close reading that your method provides that 
> > better enables those of us who would benefit by such to highlight 
> > shorter extracts that may well help us to think about them more 
> > extensively.
> > 
> > Two brief comments on the preface:
> > 
> > A) It's interesting that Bhaskar, nor in anything that has surfaced 
> > here, has referenced Peirce and Dewey in the postpositivist tradition, 
> > particularly on the latter, Dewey's Essays in Experiential Logic (1916) 
> > and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) which are as rigorously as 
> > scientific in the postpositivist sense that I have come across even as 
> > acknowledged I have not done much work in the critical realist 
> > tradition.
> > 
> > B) Closely related, perhaps some critical commentary on Bhaskar's 
> > claim that "only the position developed here can do full justice to the 
> > rationality of scientific activities as theory-construction and 
> > experimentation. And that while recent developments [pace 1975] in the 
> > philosophy of science mark a great advance on positivism they must 
> > eventually prove vulnerable to positivist counter-attack, unless 
> > carried to the limit worked out here." Perhaps Bhaskar delivers on 
> > this. Perhaps he offers some very fruitful insights about some higher 
> > order transcendence that cannot be exclusively circumscribed within the 
> > framework of CR. Be that as it may one of the broader issues in both 
> > the history of philosophy and epistemology (for at some level, I don't 
> > think CR gets beyond epistemology even though its reach (like, in a 
> > different way as Popper's World Three knowledge) moves toward a greater 
> > objectivity and transcendence of the subjective. Thus whether in terms 
> > of CR's claims we're speaking of an heuristic that has substantial 
> > impact in terms of what can be grasped (Popper calls science fiction in 
> > the best sense of the term) or something more transcendent is also 
> > perhaps a matter worthy of additional consideration.
> > 
> > In any event, thank you Hans.  I find the way you have demarcated single
> > paragrpahs highly instructive for further reflection.
> > 
> > George Demetrion
> > 
> > ----- Original Message -----
> > From: Mervyn Hartwig
> > Sent: Thursday, June 14, 2007 4:37 AM
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] RTS Reading1 on a discussion board
> > 
> > Hi Hans
> > 
> > I think this would be great as a supplement to the list -- and I take 
> > it that's the way you intend it, not as substituting for it. It 
> > 'archives' it as a resource for the future -- it is already archived of 
> > course, but this systematises it in a form that some will prefer.
> > 
> > I'm not sure how aligning the discussion with paragraphs is going to 
> > work, as most contributions cover more than one para and sometimes the 
> > whole book and beyond... Wouldn't this tend to fragment the discussion? 
> > I'd suggest aligning discussion to the whole chunk of text posted.
> > 
> > Mervyn
> > _______________________________________________
> > Critical-Realism mailing list
> > Critical-Realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> > http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/critical-realism
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > Message: 6
> > Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2007 05:13:45 -0700 (PDT)
> > From: Fred Zaman <agent.redstone@xxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: RTS.ALT: Reading society's Aristotelian apparati
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
> > 	<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Message-ID: <436358.42352.qm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
> > 
> >  
> >    
> >   Brian Dick (Wed Jun 13 13:38:51 MDT 2007) notes that Bhaskar 
> >   argues ?it is a condition of the possibility of experimental and 
> >   applied activity that the objects of scientific enquiry (causal 
> >   laws, generative mechanisms, structured things) not only exist 
> >   but act independently of that activity--transfactually, in open 
> >   and experimentally or otherwise closed systems alike.? The 
> >   transfactuality of such objects of science, argued by Bhaskar to 
> >   be required in order for the experimental and applied activities 
> >   of science to proceed, is supported by the Aristotelian causes 
> >   below; which here read through the lens of nature?s 
> >   instrumentality determine the ?social mechanics? of agents using 
> >   nature?s laws as the instruments of their agency, in both the 
> >   experimental and applied activities of science:
> >    
> >   1. material cause: the structural constraints imposed on agents, 
> >   as materially determined by the laws, principles, and rules of 
> >   physics, chemistry, biology, society, etc.
> >    
> >   2. efficient cause: the instrumentality of nature made possible 
> >   through the employment of nature?s laws, the employment of which 
> >   always involves complex amalgamations of such, as instruments of 
> >   control by agents in the accomplishment of their subjective 
> >   projects.
> >    
> >   3. formal cause: the agents employing nature?s laws as 
> >   instruments of control, which cause includes the guiding 
> >   theories, principles and assumptions that make the above material 
> >   and efficient causes comprehensible and further increase their 
> >   usability as instruments of control.
> >    
> >   4. final cause: the final cause of a thing is its purpose as 
> >   determined by an agent (the formal cause) in its instrumental 
> >   employment of nature?s laws, which necessarily involves complex 
> >   amalgamations of such,  to successfully conclude a subjective 
> >   project.
> >    
> >   These causes, taken together, form what conveniently can be 
> >   labeled the ?generative mechanisms? of Aristotelian apparati, the 
> >   ?mechanics? of which, in studies of the social character of 
> >   science called critical realism, pertains to scientific change 
> >   and development. The effects of nature?s laws here--as critical 
> >   realism generally understands--are tendential; because the 
> >   conjunction of events is determined not only by the laws 
> >   themselves, but also by just how the laws are employed, by agents 
> >   as instruments of control in the fulfillment of their subjective 
> >   projects. Aristotelian apparati thus conceived provide a 
> >   philosophical account of science as a social phenomenon. Such 
> >   apparati can serve as an underlaborer to assist scientists in 
> >   better understanding their subjective role in the conduct of 
> >   scientific research. The critical realism of Aristotelian 
> >   apparati also might serve as an occasional ?mid-wife? in birthing 
> >   a particular theory--?A Critical-Realist Theory of America? being 
> >   one of recent note on this list. The inadequacy of positivism as 
> >   a scientific philosophy is clearly highlighted as well.
> >    
> >   Now, how, in the terms of the agent-driven generative mechanisms 
> >   advanced above, does experimental science advance, whether in 
> >   physics, biology or the social sciences. One first makes 
> >   observations--of the past, present or both--of ?structures? 
> >   either seen or believed to exist in nature or society; one then, 
> >   as an independent agent, applies the laws or principles presently 
> >   understood or believed to apply to obtain some hoped-for 
> >   predetermined outcome; the explanation thereof is then modified 
> >   to take into account the discrepancies noted in what actually 
> >   occurred. The cycle is repeated again and again over long periods 
> >   of time, always employing nature?s laws--the employment of which 
> >   always involves complex amalgamations of such--as instruments of 
> >   control in whatever experiments are conducted. Aristotelian 
> >   apparati thus defined may seem at first to be ?too mechanical,? 
> >   but the mechanics thereof is always that of social relations.
> >    
> >   Giving one example in the realm of the social, social experiments 
> >   inspired by orthodox Marxism have failed; so that modifications 
> >   thereof are now in order, and have been for some time; which, in 
> >   a fundamentally new approach based on the instrumentality of 
> >   natural law operating at the highest possible level of 
> >   explanation, ?A Critical-Realist Theory of America? provides. 
> >   Might this achievement one day be hailed as a Copernican 
> >   revolution in social science? Which possibility suggests that the 
> >   social sciences today may effectively still be ?medieval? in 
> >   their world view, because they have yet to understand the scope 
> >   of natural law in the inner workings of society.
> >    
> >   fz
> >    
> >   ---------------------------------------------------------
> >    
> >   A counter-critique of the critics: (I feel I must say something 
> >   in my defense)
> >    
> >   An objective, rational critique? Is that what Mervyn and Tim call 
> >   their postings on the subject of nature?s instrumentality, which 
> >   in fact neither has touched on at all in any substantive way? 
> >   What is it about this idea that brings them to boiling point? Do 
> >   not scientists thus employ nature?s laws, in physics, chemistry 
> >   and biology in the conduct of their experimentation? Is this not 
> >   a realist point of view that is critical of the positivist 
> >   perspective, and of the false scientism which critical realism 
> >   opposes? How can this be off point, as Ruth put it?
> >    
> >   What is true in fact is that my critics on this list have 
> >   steadfastly avoided addressing this fundamental issue in CR. Why? 
> >   Possibly because they have an extreme personal distaste for the 
> >   idea that the laws of nature are the instruments by which agents 
> >   materially pursue their various ?subjective projects.? But 
> >   consider the follow, just a few examples of what could be an 
> >   infinite list of nature?s instrumentality:
> >    
> >   When I purposely drop an object onto the ground, am I not 
> >   employing the law of gravity as an instrument of my intentions?
> >    
> >   As I type this message am I not employing the physiological 
> >   forces involved in accordance with the laws governing these 
> >   forces? And thus the laws themselves as well?
> >    
> >   Does NASA institutionally employ nature?s laws for realizing the 
> >   objective of putting men in orbit? And them bring them back down 
> >   safely through the same?
> >    
> >   Do not such as these represent the critical-realist perspective 
> >   par excellence of science, of technology, of everyday actions and 
> >   experiences?
> >    
> >   And if not, then why not? Rather than being dismissive, critics 
> >   should provide substantive reasons without being personally 
> >   abusive, which is a sign of intellectual weakness rather than 
> >   strength.
> >    
> >   And if the critics do not, is it not likely they do not because 
> >   in fact they cannot?
> >    
> >   The instrumentality of the laws of nature in the accomplishment 
> >   of the subjective projects of agents indeed is directly on point 
> >   in CR, and in a fundamental way. The natural sciences have 
> >   objectively defined for us what nature?s laws objectively are, 
> >   but they in no way specify in what ways these laws are to be 
> >   employed instrumentally for whatever purposes. In fact they have 
> >   steadfastly avoided becoming embroiled in issues regarding just 
> >   how we are to apply these laws, either technologically or 
> >   socially to whatever purposes. A consideration of the use to 
> >   which they are put socially, however, should be fundamental to a 
> >   CR-oriented philosophy of the doing of science. This 
> >   notwithstanding, any critique of the fundamentals of CR orthodoxy 
> >   here evidently is anathema.
> >    
> >   Incidentally, Mervyn?s ridiculous characterizations of the essay 
> >   show he absolutely has no conception of what the essay is about. 
> >   Nostromo is neither myself nor any other individual, but a 
> >   collective political unconscious that rules over a particular 
> >   domain of activity. Nostromo here, on this list for example, is 
> >   that collective unconscious which--among other things--prohibits 
> >   out of hand any discussion regarding the role nature?s 
> >   instrumentality may play in the development of science, history 
> >   or whatever, through laws of nature serving as instruments of 
> >   control. I could, through the political unconscious the essay 
> >   collectively personalizes as Nostromo, objectively explain in 
> >   theory the controversy over several of the subjects discussed on 
> >   this list--which of course would only further alienate my several 
> >   (all very uninformed) critics. Indeed, they may understand this 
> >   possibility intuitively, and fear it because doing this would put 
> >   at risk their own supposed objectivity--Nostromo is inherently 
> >   reflexive.
> >    
> >   fz
> > 
> > 
> > Fred Zaman <agent.redstone@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:  
> > The subject of ?nature?s instrumentality,? in which laws of 
> > nature (physical, chemical, biological, etc.) function as 
> > instruments that enable agents to appropriate and/or modify 
> > existing structures for their own purposes, thereby materially 
> > facilitating diverse ?subjective projects,? certainly raises the 
> > passions of some--to such a degree they are unable to consider 
> > the subject rationally and resort to personal abuse.
> > 
> > The reality of this elementary ?principle of action? nonetheless 
> > is not subject to serious debate. Physicists do it, chemists do 
> > it, biologists do it; we all do it all the time and everywhere. 
> > As I now type on the keyboard, for example, I am appropriating 
> > the laws of nature, as they have been instantiated in the 
> > physiological structures of my nervous system and musculature 
> > (which mediate the constraints imposed by natural law), to type 
> > this message. Every belief, thought, and action (or non-action) 
> > involves the same; for whatever purpose (including on this list, 
> > for example, bullying and attempted character assassination). 
> > This clearly is not difficult to understand. And so, to the 
> > extent that critical realism truly reflects reality, it must 
> > recognize nature?s instrumentality under the hand of agents both 
> > conscious and unconscious, and come to terms with this empirical 
> > fact in principle and theory. That is what ?The Critical-Realist 
> > Theory of America? indeed accomplishes on a grand scale.
> > 
> > My previous post on Engleskirchen?s consideration of Bhaskar 
> > shows how this elementary principle of agency in the material 
> > world relates to the critical-realist perspective of the inter-
> > causality of agents and structures--a subject currently under 
> > discussion on this list. I will continue my discussion of this as 
> > an alternate, parallel response (RTS.ALT) to the ?RTS Reading 1? 
> > just started by Mervyn and Ruth (here labeled RTS.STD); which 
> > based on the response thus far I must presume rejects a priori 
> > the possibility that nature?s instrumentality can serve as a 
> > first principle of CR theory. That way, the reader can compare 
> > the two to determine which provides the strongest foundation for 
> > the critical realist philosophy of science. Also, this way I 
> > won?t corrupt the discussion on .STD (the standard reading that 
> > presumably does not allow nature?s instrumentality above) with my 
> > supposedly--but which below will be shown to actually not be--
> > heretical views about critical realist philosophy. My detractors 
> > hopefully will do the same and avoid more personal abuse, at 
> > least on .ALT postings. Reasoned commentary/criticism of 
> > substance is invited on RTS.ALT of course, but not the 
> > disgraceful diatribes I?ve recently been subjected to. :-)
> > 
> > I shall start out by discussing here in a .ALT reading the 
> > Aristotelian causes cited by Groff in the .STD discussion: 
> > material cause, efficient cause, formal cause, and final cause:
> > 
> > 1. material cause: the structural constraints materially imposed 
> > on agents, as determined by the laws of physics, chemistry, 
> > biology, etc.
> > 
> > 2. efficient cause: the instrumentality of nature made possible 
> > through the employment of nature?s laws as instruments of control 
> > by agents in the accomplishment of their subjective projects.
> > 
> > 3. formal cause: the agents employing nature?s laws as 
> > instruments of control, which cause includes the guiding 
> > theories, principles and assumptions that make nature?s material 
> > and efficient causes comprehensible and further increase their 
> > usability as instruments of control.
> > 
> > 4. final cause: the final cause of a thing is its purpose as 
> > determined by an agent (the formal cause) in its instrumental 
> > employment of nature?s laws.
> > 
> > This Aristotelian causality harmonizes the work of doing modern 
> > science with the scientific laws, principles, and assumptions 
> > thereby created. It in substance defines in Aristotelian terms 
> > causality in a modern sociology of science.
> > 
> > Brian notes that Bhaskar explicitly asserts the possibility of 
> > characterizing the work of doing science in Aristotelian terms--
> > presumably constituting thereby a critical-realist analysis of 
> > this work. The above definitions of Aristotelian causality show 
> > one way in which this can be done very simply, when the 
> > scientists themselves (including their guiding theories, 
> > principles, and assumptions) are the ?formal cause? under 
> > consideration. Everyone here is fundamentally Aristotelian as 
> > well in what we do, however, including you, me, and sociologists.
> > 
> > If it is important to get a handle on the Aristotelian categories 
> > of cause in the context of critical realism, as RB seems to 
> > suggest, the above is a very simple way of doing it?indeed one 
> > much simpler than the confused accounts currently available in 
> > RTS and other CR literature.
> > 
> > fz
> > 
> > p.s. 1. The entire text was earlier posted as plain text attachment to 
> > an earlier posting, I thought. Did no one receive the attachment? 2. I 
> > am not a government or any other agent attempting to subvert CR. This 
> > once again is a ploy to poison the messenger, of a new approach to CR 
> > that Mervyn appears to hate and would like to censor under the table. 
> > 3. I am still making some changes to the paper and will email it out to 
> > those that have requested it soon, one that will include the tables and 
> > figures. Sorry for the delay.
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Fred Zaman wrote:
> > 
> > Before going ahead with a consideration of Engelskirchen?s post 
> > ?Side on Harre? (Wed Jun 6 14:29 2007), I would like to comment 
> > briefly on several criticisms that have arisen. First, the laws 
> > of nature referred to in my essay ?A Critical-Realist Theory of 
> > America? clearly refer to those of the natural sciences, not any 
> > humanist ?law of nature? regarding the human condition that 
> > stands independent of the sciences. The essay in it entirety, 
> > obviously, is about grounding our understanding of society in 
> > those laws which science has discovered to materially govern 
> > nature.
> > 
> > A second contention, that the vanguard ?as a way forward went out 
> > with Methuselah? completely misses the point?which is that once 
> > the laws of nature discovered by science are recognized as 
> > instruments of agent control by both individuals and society, a 
> > theoretical foundation can be laid for a vanguard of the future 
> > that can effectively guide society?s development. There indeed 
> > will be those that resist this possibility, but it is there 
> > nevertheless. Orthodox Marxism was unable to do this, so that 
> > this project had to be abandoned, but this doesn?t mean that 
> > it?ll never be done.
> > 
> > A third contention, that CR and Marxism are not compatible in all 
> > readings is certainly true but irrelevant. The essay never 
> > suggests that the theory is consistent with all readings, either 
> > of CR or Marxism (of which there are many of both). It 
> > nonetheless does provide a coherent unification of many of the 
> > basic themes of both, which unification indeed does explain, at a 
> > very high level of conceptualization in terms of an unconscious-
> > grounded class struggle operating over the long term, the 
> > historical trajectory of American capitalism from colonial days 
> > to the present.
> > 
> > The final contention, that I somehow got the unfounded idea that 
> > CR philosophy endorses the idea that nature?s laws are employed 
> > as instruments of control, is simply false. I fully realize there 
> > is no such endorsement, and I never said there was. If there had 
> > been, I would have cited such, which I did not. What I in essence 
> > said is that this unstated, unacknowledged premise, precisely 
> > because there is no such endorsement, is implicit in CR 
> > philosophy?s objective of laying out the ?pre-conditions? that 
> > make science the successful enterprise it certainly has been. It 
> > is this precondition of science that has been, and continues to 
> > be, the fundamental reason for its success. Do I need to cite 
> > simplistic examples of this to convince? Surely not. And if CR, 
> > thus grounded in what clearly is a fundamental principle (pre-
> > condition) of science, is unrecognizable to some; then that is 
> > due simply to their inability to see what CR is about 
> > fundamentally.
> > 
> > -----------------------------------------
> > 
> > Now, returning to the task at hand, Engelskirchen?s reference to 
> > SRHE (p. 122) is principally about ?The criterion for 
> > differentiating the social from the purely ?natural? material 
> > causes...?, which he understands correctly as social causes that 
> > cannot be reduced to the intentional acts of individuals. Bhaskar 
> > has not, here, reduced the causal explanation of social phenomena 
> > to what individuals do, ?For while society exists only in virtue 
> > of human agency, and human agency (or being) always presupposes 
> > (and expresses) some or other definite social form, they cannot 
> > be reduced or reconstructed from one another? (p. 124). 
> > Engelskirchen thus concludes that ?Society is manifest in the 
> > conditions and products of intentional agency also,? so that 
> > ?society is a composite of human agency, activity, and a very 
> > definite social form.?
> > 
> > The Critical-Realist Theory of America is precisely about what 
> > Bhaskar and Engelskirchen speak of. The first principle thereof 
> > rigidly differentiates the social from the purely natural, 
> > material causes. The material causes simply put are the 
> > constraints imposed by the laws of nature, through the material 
> > structures formed in accordance therewith; and the social causes 
> > are then the purposes to which these same laws are put 
> > voluntarily as instruments of human agency. Society here indeed 
> > is a composite of human agency, activity, and social form--all in 
> > accordance with CR?s above, currently unstated, unacknowledged 
> > ?first principle?--an abstract principle of nature personalized 
> > in the essay as Nostromo. Bhaskar?s ?positioned practices? in 
> > this account are composites of activity and form that are 
> > structured and determined by the laws of nature which 
> > structurally constrain these practices, while at the same time 
> > enabling them as the instruments of human agency.
> > 
> > Human agency here is ?moored socially in a complex of social 
> > relations and physically determinate at locations in space and 
> > time? (p. 130)--whose social relations in ?Nostromo? are mediated 
> > by nature?s laws voluntarily employed as instruments of control; 
> > and whose locations in space and time are due to the structural 
> > constraints imposed by the same; which complexes form ?social, 
> > objects, entities, things that are in themselves causally potent 
> > in ways that cannot be reduced to the activities of which they 
> > are composed.? The abstract personalization of nature in the 
> > abstract first principle of CR called Nostromo provides the 
> > fuller concept of causality needed to explain such social 
> > objects, entities and things than the triumph of modernity has 
> > made available. Paraphrasing Engelskirchen, Nostromo affirms 
> > through the laws of nature discovered by natural science the 
> > materiality of practices manifested in the ongoing expenditure of 
> > energy in the exercise of causal force by social objects, 
> > entities, and things. The relations by which these can all be 
> > individuated are in essence material or physical in much the same 
> > way that natural structures are, but at a much higher level of 
> > abstraction.
> > 
> > In the essay ?The Critical-Realist Theory of America,? the 
> > fundamental object is the triad of unconscious-based classes that 
> > historically have been in a perpetual state of struggle, which 
> > has involved the continual expenditure of the nation?s energy 
> > through the causal exercise of class-based forces that are 
> > economic, political, and cultural. The claim by uninformed, 
> > misguided critics that the theory of America thus formulated is 
> > neither critical realist nor Marxist is simply preposterous. This 
> > is not intended as a criticism of Engelskirchen, however, whose 
> > post correctly addresses fundamental issues in CR that ultimately 
> > must be resolved. ?Nostromo,? as a personalized, holistic, 
> > voluntaristic agency within nature that acts in accordance with 
> > the materialist laws of nature discovered by science, is 
> > certainly one approach to doing this.
> > 
> > It now should be clear to readers of the critical-realist list 
> > that there is a new way to approach CR, one that gets to the 
> > basics regarding the pre-conditions that make science possible; 
> > and which--at the same time--provides a conceptual foundation for 
> > critical realism that is both theoretically effective and highly 
> > practical.
> > 
> > fz
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Fred Zaman wrote: 
> > George,
> > 
> > The essay?s literary allusion to Joseph Conrad?s ?Nostromo? 
> > personalizes the essay?s first principle about natural law?that 
> > which in its totality (whatever that turns out being) governs the 
> > ?real world? of matter and energy. In this personalization 
> > nature?s laws at the same time also are the instruments through 
> > which agents pursue their subjective projects. Our agency, 
> > traditionally thought to manifest embedded spirits, souls, etc., 
> > is in Nostromo both ?immanent? (here meaning subject to the 
> > structural constraints imposed by natural law) and ?transcendent? 
> > (we employ the same laws in volition as the instruments of our 
> > agency). Our agency thus understood, each of us is immanent in 
> > nature because everything we feel, think, and do is circumscribed 
> > by nature?s laws. In Nostromo, however, the ?we? thus understood 
> > also employ these same laws as the instruments of our agency, 
> > through which we voluntarily engage in life?s countless 
> > ?subjective projects.? In Nostromo we as humans thus are perhaps 
> > defined as much--or even more--by what we as agents choose to 
> > accomplish through our employment of nature?s laws 
> > instrumentally, as we are in how these laws constrain and limit 
> > us structurally.
> > 
> > The reductive materialism of the natural sciences recognizes only 
> > our subjective immanence (thus defined) in nature, which from 
> > their point of view implies our complete subjugation to nature?s 
> > unyielding laws, with no allowance given (in theory) for being--
> > at least to some degree--a free agent. These sciences thus 
> > strictly avoid coming to terms with the possibility of an agent?s 
> > transcendence over nature through the instrumentality of natural 
> > law. This remains so even though those who are professionally 
> > engaged in the natural sciences freely employ, in their work in 
> > science, nature?s laws as instruments of their agency.
> > 
> > The science philosophy personalized as Nostromo, however, has no 
> > such constraints imposed on the possibility of agency: whether it 
> > is individual or collective, human or not. Nostromo?s 
> > epistemology and ontology are fundamentally neither positivistic 
> > nor scientistic. Looked at it from a non-reductionist point of 
> > view, Nostromo?s agency also is holistic. It circumscribes a 
> > whole that is greater than the sum of its parts, which naturally 
> > emerges through nature?s agency and thereafter is maintained 
> > through laws of nature holistically functioning as instruments of 
> > control. What thus emerges, in nature holistically through laws 
> > operating as instruments of control at whatever level of 
> > organization, is an agency in and of nature here personalized in 
> > theory as Nostromo.
> > 
> > Because it is fundamentally grounded in the principle of natural 
> > agency, Nostromo has no build-in bias against religion, which 
> > itself is naturally grounded in agency as well. Nostromo clearly 
> > does not rule out of court the religious point of view. The 
> > opposite is true: religion is ruled in court absolutely. God in 
> > the religious view is Nostromo of the cosmos--immanent in the 
> > material universe while at the same time transcending the 
> > material universe through a cosmic agency that employs the 
> > instrumentality afforded by natural law. There can be, in the 
> > philosophy of critical realism thus formulated, no repression of 
> > religion thus grounded. In this formulation one is free to be 
> > religiously motivated, or not. One?s viewpoint on religion makes 
> > no difference to the scientific philosophy thereof.
> > 
> > On this list I want to discuss Nostromo more from the perspective 
> > of science philosophy rather than religion, however. I prefer a 
> > version of critical realism that stands independent of one?s 
> > views on religion, whether pro or con. And from this point of 
> > view I shall next address, in terms of nature?s personalized 
> > agency ?Nostromo,? the issues of structure and agency touched on 
> > by Howard Engelskirchen in his excellent ?Side on Harre? posted 
> > Wed Jun 6 14:29:43.
> > 
> > Fred
> > 
> > 
> > George demetrion wrote:
> > Fred,
> > Fred,
> > 
> > Thank you for that cogent summation.
> > 
> > Though not as familiar as you and others, isn't ontology the overriding 
> > concern of any CR focus that is both critical and realist rather than 
> > natural law per se, which, I presume, assumes a materialist basis?
> > 
> > I raise this as someone with religious intent, but also on the 
> > assumption that even in a CR universe we are still working from 
> > epistemology toward ontology rather than to any notion of ontology 
> > achieved. If that is the case, then ontological truth claims from the 
> > vantagepoint of epistemology are very much on the table. No doubt they 
> > have to carry their own muster from the basis of clear argumentation 
> > and evidence presented, but if the religious is ruled out of court by a 
> > built-in bias toward a naturalistic epistemology, then what becomes 
> > construed as the ontological is thereby skewed by implicit operative 
> > assumptions that, in the most unreflective sense, circumscribe the 
> > universe. This is not an argument for religion per se. It is to argue 
> > that to rule out the religious or to subsume it within a naturalistic 
> > paradigm is thereby to limit what is perceived as the real itself. This 
> > concern is part of the broader argument I've been making on the 
> > repression of religion within the 20th century academic universe which 
> > is more of a convention than a reflection of truth, however dimly our 
> > perceptions of what we claim truth may be.
> > 
> > Why not a healthy pluralism instead that keeps the focal point of 
> > ontology open subject to valid criteria of investigation that are not 
> > unnecessarily constrained by ideological bias however scientifically 
> > construed they may be? To put it in other terms, science, by all means 
> > yes, but scientism as a self-enclosed circumscribed world view, by all 
> > means no, emphatically no.
> > 
> > 
> > George Demetrion
> > 
> > 
> > From: Fred Zaman 
> > Reply-To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar 
> > List
> > To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar 
> > List
> > Subject: The Vanguard?s Way Forward: Through Understanding Nature?s 
> > Instrumentality
> > Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2007 06:21:42 -0700 (PDT)
> > 
> > 
> > According to the recent thread ?the way forward,? everything on this 
> > list should directly relate to CR. In A Critical-Realist Theory of 
> > America, for example, natural law is fundamental and thus directly 
> > related to everything that fundamentally concerns CR--including 
> > structure, agency and their causal interactions. The implicit ?first 
> > principle? on which CR is based in this theory (essay Section 1) is 
> > that CR philosophy is all about subjective beings that objectively 
> > employ nature?s laws as instruments of control; which then as 
> > instruments are the means through which agents initiate and bring to 
> > fruition (or fail in) their diverse ?subjective projects.? Natural law 
> > surely must dominate CR as a true ?first principle? if it is to be a 
> > true ?underlaborer? to social science; certainly in the structures with 
> > which CR is concerned, but also as well in the instruments these laws 
> > at the same time provide to agents, which in varying degrees enable 
> > agents to appropriate or modify existing structures for their own 
> > purposes. Isn?t a principle that causally relates nature?s laws to both 
> > structures and agents indeed a first principle of CR? And, if this is 
> > true, what then is the implication of the instrumentality of natural 
> > law for critical-realism generally, as an underlaborer that assists the 
> > social sciences in relating their domain philosophically to the natural 
> > sciences. In the above theory it is shown how, through natural law?s 
> > instrumentality formulated in CR terms, the Marxist principle of class 
> > struggle explains at a very high level of
> > 
> > === message truncated ===
> > 
> >        
> > ---------------------------------
> > Moody friends. Drama queens. Your life? Nope! - their life, your story.
> >  Play Sims Stories at Yahoo! Games. 
> > 
> > ------------------------------
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
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> > 
> > 
> > End of Critical-Realism Digest, Vol 32, Issue 78
> > ************************************************
> > 
> 
> 

-- 
Reality leaves a lot to the imagination. - John Lennon.


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