Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface

["Dave Taylor" <dave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

>>How would we define mechanisms to them?
>>How & why is this kind of approach better than the ones already available?

The Newtonian science of mechanics is about physical force, and mechanisms
are means for the transmission of force.

This definition is better than one in terms of causes in that it is simpler,
more historically significant and opens the way for consideration of causes
other than applied force (notably broadcast information).  

It is simpler because it is representable mathematically by a simple
abstraction rather than a generalisation.  It is historically significant in
that the theoretical understanding of the means of transmission of force and
hence of dynamics and time-related quantities like power only took off with
the disentangling of measurable physical force from loose generalistions
about political and natural force.

To take up the third reason why this definition in terms of force rather
than causes is "better", the contemporary equivalent of Newton has been C E
Shannon, who not only showed how deductive logic physically worked but also
disentangled the concept of information from generalisations about
information content and meaning in the course of inventing dynamic error
correcting logic.  

The fourth question John (and social scientists generally) seem reluctant or
unable to ask is whether their field should be interpreted (as has been
assumed since long before Shannon) as concerning social "mechanisms" like
"market forces" and "balance of power"; or whether it should be interpreted
(an "information system" where the power is in the people and their
activity, but what is socially significant is the reproduction or
transformation of economies, policies and culture through the communication
and physical embodying of information.

Tom Wayburn raised a relevant point recently: weren't we taught to go back
as nearly as possible to primary sources?  (as against taking in each
others' dirty washing).  

[That's perhaps harder for a philosopher than a scientist, but compare N R
Hanson's "critical example" treatment of retroduction in "Patterns of
Discovery" with Bhaskar's transcendental arguments.  Put both approaches
together and you get somewhere].

Dave


-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Alex
Clark
Sent: 13 June 2007 16:53
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface

Great questions John - I work with health professionals and policy people
mostly and they are really comfortable with thinking in terms of causes,
complexity and mechanisms as this reflects often how they see patients and
their practice. I often use examples of deep causation in relation to
service usage to explain why understanding what is going on in the real
domain is a prerequisite to reasoned action - and how agency and structure
are both important in understanding events in the actual domain. It is
easier for me to talk of mechanisms and deep causation in terms of examples
than operationalized definitions, partly because the latter are scant.
Talking about 'complexity' and embedded systems also helps to make it all
make sense. 
 
Researchers are more sceptical because we like (esteem) to intervene,
correlate and predict rather than look at causes. Causation is linked
strongly to the RCT (randomized control trial) and the rush to intervene
preceeds or replaces understanding what is going on in my field.

A
 
 



Hello Alex

I think you are right about mechanisms existing at different levels of
nature/society but to avoid a more complex discussion at this stage, I am
thinking about how we would sell a CR approach to colleagues/students/
policymakers & anyone else looking for a new way of understanding/doing
research. Unless our persuasion is effective at this stage, we'll never keep
them long enough to move on to more complex questions.

How would we define mechanisms to them?
How & why is this kind of approach better than the ones already available?

John



-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Alex
Clark
Sent: 13 June 2007 16:16
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface

That's a really good point Brian - I have worked with Pawson and Tilley's
realist evaluation approach. Agree - a little too mechanical and linear.
Significantly, they give no clear definition of what a mechanism is and
through at least their 97 book, there is a degree of flexibility (or even
inconsistency...)  in how they define mechanism.

I think there are also superficial mechanisms and deeper causal mechanisms -
a distinction that their approach does not make...

Interested in others thoughts...

Alexander M Clark PhD BA (Hons) RN
Assistant Professor
AHFMR Population Health Investigator
Faculty of Nursing
University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB.
Canada T6R2G3
Tel: 001 780 492 8347
Fex: 001 780 492 2551

________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Brian Dick
Sent: Wed 6/13/2007 8:58 AM
To: critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [Critical-Realism] Summary of RTS2 Preface



Hi John,

I've always found the notion of 'generative mechanism' problematic because
of its (mechanical) connotations.  I think that this becomes an even bigger
problem when we move on to the analysis of society where social relations
become central.  That is, mechanisms seem to point to a more substantive
interpretation rather than relational (in Sewell's terminology).  Of course,
this is not what Bhaskar is arguing, but for others who do not understand
what is meant by the term it can lead to some confusion.

I'm not completely sure what would be a better alternative.  Here are some
ideas: 'generative apparatus', 'generative actants' (too Latourian?),
'generative process', 'generative thingamabob' :)  (Oh, and 'generative
thingamajig').

Brian



Thanks, Ruth.

I'd like to raise the issue of 'mechanism'. This is a fundamental concept &
yet quite difficult to define for the uninitiated.

Trying to persuade colleagues of the meaning & implications of this term, I
can see their eyes (& possibly minds) start to glaze over. The language is
already starting to become a little abstract for some & carries the
unfortunate & unintended disadvantage of using such a mechanistic metaphor,
quite contrary to the aims of CR? Sayer refers to mechanisms as 'the ways of
acting of causal powers' - but this might not attract CR critics/agnostics
either.

How do the list think the term might be redescribed in a way that might make
it more digestible for those unfamiliar with RB & subsequent writers?

John
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