Re: [Critical-Realism] Holism and social structure

["Andrew Brown" <A.Brown@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Hi Doug,
 
Re. spatial location: So far it is Harre I have been dealing with in this regard. Harre's ontology is based on powerful particulars. As particulars, these are entities that must have spatial location. Thus spatial location is a big deal only because without it something cannot be a powerful particular. You are, in effect, taking the view that causal agents do *not* have to be powerful particulars (or alternatively you are positing somehow non-spatial powerful particulars). You are disagreeing with the bedrock of Harre's ontology. Fair enough, that is a reasoned response to Harre. I will not rehearse his likely replies to the various examples you give (Harre's own contribution to the 1990 collection 'Harre and his critics', edited by none other than RB, gives such replies). Rather, I'll switch to my own point of view. 
 
In short what is at stake here is *abstraction*. Should we abstract from all spatially determinacy, from matter, especially from material practices, when conceptualising social structure? Should we do so when conceptualising 'reasons'? When it comes to key social structures, I don't think so. For example, exploitation is not just a set of relations it is a set of ongoing activities. It is no use anlaytically splitting the activities of exploitation apart from the relations of exploitation, only to put them together again at the end of such analysis. That is 'violent' abstraction. Rather one has to theorise these key relations and activities together at the outset: these activities and relations are, contra Archer and RB, analytically *inseparable* aspects, or ways of viewing, a single social strutcure.
 
Finally, on the materialist theorisation of reasons, and on a materialist psychology more generally, Vygotsky is the indispensable starting point. You will not find 'reasons' cleaved from material actvities in Vygotsky. Harre has in fact turned to Vygotsky but like many others Harre has neglected the Marxian materialism and dialectics that is at the core of Vygotsky's work.
 
Many thanks,
 
Andy
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Douglas Porpora
Sent: Tue 6/5/2007 1:49 PM
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Holism and social structure



Very interesting discussion!

Andy,

I haven't yet read your paper and so am only responding to what you
are saying here.

It seems to me you are overly worried about spatial location. I would
think lots of things are causally efficacious without being spatially
located. How about reasons? Harre would actually take a
post-Wittgensteinian line on them, denying their attribution to
agents, but I do not think that is any longer very defensible. Thus,
outside of a failed physicalist reductionism, reasons are causally
efficacious wiithout spatial location. How many centimeters is your
Marxism?

There further seems (to me) nothing very mysterious about the causal
efficacy of specifically social relations. Consider in evolution such
concepts as symbiosis and competition. These causally powerful
relations are not spatially located either. I don't see the need to
speak of preying and being preyed upon as practices to render such
relations material. And competition or symbiosis among species or
within species may exist quite independent of whatever is going on
inside the heads of the creatures involved. So no need to invoke
rules here either.

doug
--
doug porpora, head
Department of Culture and Communication
Drexel University
Phila PA 19104
(215) 895-2404

porporad@xxxxxxxxxx
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