[Critical-Realism] Holism and social structure

["Dave Elder-Vass" <d.eldervass@xxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Dear All,

First, let me say that this is exactly the sort of debate I hoped to see 
when I joined this list - a vast improvement on recent fare.

Second, I'd like to suggest that the missing piece from the various accounts 
of social structure discussed below is social entities. 'Social structure' 
can be causally effective only as the emergent properties (and thus the 
causal powers) of an actual entity. This, I take it, is the point of Harre's 
critique of critical realist accounts of social structure; for him, the 
social structures advanced in these accounts (e.g. 'class structures' and 
'legal systems') are not powerful particulars because powerful particulars 
are entities with emergent causal powers and he regards the examples 
mentioned as being taxonomic categories rather than such entities. The 
appropriate response to this argument is to identify entities that DO meet 
the requirements to be entities with emergent causal powers (though Harre 
himself might remain unconvinced, for other reasons).

Elsewhere I have examined the ontology of two such types of social entity 
(though I expect there are others): organisations and normative communities. 
(On organisations, see my paper in the Journal for the Theory of Social 
Behaviour, March 2007 and my paper at BSA 2005; on normative communities, my 
papers at IACR 2006 and BSA 2006 - the former is forthcoming in JCR and 
versions of the conference papers are available through my website 
http://www.eldervass.com/ ). To put the argument at its simplest: both of 
these are types of social entity that are composed of groups of people (just 
as people, for example, are entities composed of biological cells), and with 
emergent causal powers conferred by mechanisms that arise from the structure 
of the group (i.e. its members and the relations between them, e.g. as 
specified by roles in organisations).

This is precisely the ontological form implied in Bhaskar's RTS (see my 
paper in JCR 4:2, 2005): causal powers are emergent properties of things, 
arising from their structure. Despite this, there seems to be a great deal 
of resistance to the idea that social structure refers to the causal powers 
of social entities. This seems to me perverse, particularly amongst 
realists. When we discuss non-social causal powers we refer to the entities 
that possess them - we would not discuss physics without attributing the 
causal powers concerned to particular particles, or chemistry without 
molecules, or biochemistry without cells or psychology without people. Why, 
then, is it assumed that we can discuss 'social structure' as a genus of 
causal powers while ignoring the entities that such talk implicitly depends 
upon? What is the point of critical realism's ontology of entities, powers, 
and mechanisms if we don't apply it as soon as we get to the case that 
interests us most?

One reason for the problem is the tradition of talking as if 'social 
relations' could be causally effective. But relations can do nothing without 
the things related; and once we have BOTH the things related and the 
relations themselves we are no longer looking at 'relations' but rather at a 
higher-level social entity constituted by these parts and relations. 
(Incidentally, Marx, according to Ollman, sometimes used relations in our 
usual sense and sometimes to stand for BOTH the relation and the things 
related, which has contributed to confusion on this front. When he uses it 
in the latter sense he is in effect referring to social entities.)

And once we recognise that social structure stands for the causal powers of 
social entities, the problem of materiality also becomes more accessible, 
though perhaps not uncontroversial, as materiality is one of those slippery 
concepts that are bandied about without much thought as to what they 
actually mean. If it refers simply to extension in space, which seems to be 
the criterion most frequently referred to in this thread, then social groups 
such as organisations and normative communities are material since they are 
composed of parts (i.e. people) that occupy space. They are unusual compared 
to most other material things, in that these parts (a) can move around 
rather freely of each other; and (b) may also be parts of other social 
entities at the same compositional level. Nevertheless they are material in 
a sense in which 'relations' alone can never be.

Cheers,

Dave

-----Original Message-----
Date: Tue, 5 Jun 2007 08:56:40 +0100
From: "David Bailey" <d.bailey@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism
To: "'Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List'"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Message-ID: <02b101c7a747$0d0b4ef0$93f89786@lssimage>
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Andy,

In order to clarify this position further - what, then, DOES constitute
social structures - presumably it's the relationships between the actors
(rather than their actions themselves)?

David

-----Original Message-----
From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[mailto:critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Andrew
Brown
Sent: 05 June 2007 08:45
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism

Mervyn,

You say social structres are constituted by social practices. I'd be
interested to know how, then, you interpret Marget Artcher's critique of
'central conflation'? Most people, including me, seem to think thqt this
critique (i) precisely denies that social structures are so constituted,
(ii) attributes this denial to Bhaskar, and finally, that (iii) Bhaksar now
agrees with Archer on this very point! I suggest you read Archer's 'tennis
match' account of ch.2 of PON in Archers 1995 'Morphogenesis' book.

I'd also be interested to know how you would argue that social structures,
as social practices, are in a 'deep', 'non-actual' domain, since social
practices are actualities, they are the flux of actual events of the social
world! No, for CR it is and must be the case that practices are resultant
actualities, they are constrained and facilitated by social structres but
they do not constitute the latter, just as the flux of actual events of the
the natural work are contrained and enabled by natural structures and
mechanisms. Now, I grant you that not all CRists take this view. Some are
much closer to Giddens, and PON ch.2 can be read in this way (As Archer
herself points out). But your assertion of 'nonsense' is characteristically
over the top!

Many thanks,

Andy


________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Mervyn
Hartwig
Sent: Mon 6/4/2007 11:54 PM
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism



Hi Andy, et al.

It seems to me a nonsense to say that Bhaskar denies that social structures
are social practices. Practices are central to his conception, and why you
should think his emphasis on them 'cunning' (previous post) I don't know.
What he denies is that they and the relations by which they can be
individuated are material or physical in the way that natural structures
are. This seems to me self-evident. They of course have a material context
or ground or substrate, as others have emphasised, and they have material
effects, but this is not the same as saying that they themselves are
material. The word 'material' needs underlining. They are *materially*
present -- they exist materially -- only in their effects.

Mervyn


----- Original Message -----
From: "Andrew Brown" <A.Brown@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
<critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Monday, June 04, 2007 4:03 PM
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism


Doug,

Long time no virtual (or real) conversation!

I hope you can see from my last post that the question isn't merely about
one phrase 'present only in their effects' but rather about the whole set up
of the TMSA, especially as developed by Archer. Once more, I absolutely
agree that social structures are material but you tell me how to uphold this
view whilst conceiving of them as social positions, and their relations, but
denying that they are social practices (denying what Archer terms 'central
conflation')

I would stress that it is this very point that is at the heart of Harre and
others criticism of the TMSA. They do not have an a priori prejuduce against
wholes but, rather, an a priori conception of causality as implying powerful
particulars, where powerful particulars are by definition spatially located.
(Paul Lewis, argues, in reponse, that the TMSA we should look to a different
conception of causality to that of Harre and Madden).

The issue of magnetic fields has certainly come up in this regard and, yes,
the response of Harre and followers is to flatly deny that a magnetic field
is analytically separable from a magnet.

Best wishes,

Andy

________________________________

From: critical-realism-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Douglas
Porpora
Sent: Mon 6/4/2007 3:31 PM
To: Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List
Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism



Yes, I agree with Howard's last few posts vis-a-vis Ruth and was
similarly provoked by Andy's comments. I think too much has been
conceded by this idea of social structure's existing only in its
effects. Would we say the same of an electro-magnetic field? I don't
hear physicists saying that, but you cannot point to a field either.

doug


>Hi Andy,
>
>Thanks very much for your interesting comments.
>
>In what sense not instantiated in space? Pointing of course is a different
>thing.  The whole point (pun accepted) of realism is to vindicate the
>reality of unobservables, and yes you cannot point at relations, but you
>can
>certainly point at their material ground.  What are relations that have no
>material ground?  A question for Tobin -- are signs instantiated in space?
>There is no sign without a material ground.  So your point Andrew really
>goes to Ruth's critique of Bhaskar's notion that social structures are a
>material cause of actually I forget what -- the TMSA?  Why isn't the
>relation between husband and wife instantiated in space?  Yours is.  It has
>a specific location right now.  I have friends, including you, that are
>long
>distance.  This is a different relation than one that is next door.  If you
>are right about CR, then that calls into question whether the realism of CR
>is in a thoroughgoing sense materialist.
>
>As for 'powerful particulars', that goes to the points I made about our
>reluctance to think about the causal potency of social things.  We get away
>with this because of the pervasive tendency to think of cause as efficient
>cause only.  Do you think the social form of commodity producing labor is
>causally potent?  Capital?  Are these materially grounded?  If they are
>materially grounded, do those material grounds have spatial location?  Are
>they, the social forms of commodity producing labor and capital, causally
>potent?  If they are causally potent why aren't they 'powerful
>particulars'?
>Or fields of them.  Notice, for example, the historical significance of the
>'home market' and its territorial ground.
>
>On your other point, the thing one works on is material cause only insofar
>as one thinks of it materially.  I don't need to reduce everything to
>midsized solids -- I think forms of energy, and, in particular human
>activity, are material.  But it is possible to think of 'the thing one
>works
>on' metaphorically and not concern oneself with its material ground -- and
>it may be indeed that the reference to social structures as material cause
>works like that.
>
>Great to hear from you!
>
>Howard
>
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Andrew Brown" <A.Brown@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: "Continuation of the Spoon Bhaskar List"
><critical-realism@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
>Sent: Monday, June 04, 2007 3:10 AM
>Subject: Re: [Critical-Realism] Comment re: holism
>
>
>Howard and Ruth,
>
>(1) Howard, the difference between a social structure, as conceived of
>within CR, and the structure of an atom, is that the latter is indeed
>instantiated in space but the former is not. E.g. one cannot point to the
>husband-wife relation as one can to an atom (admittedly pointing to atoms
>requires experiment). It is this that Harre and others seize on in their
>critique of Bhaskar and the TMSA. That is, social structures are 'present
>only in their effects', for Bhaskar and CR, whereas atoms are just present.
>Atoms are 'powerful particulars' but social structures have no spatial
>location so cannot be. This is related to the fact that, for CR, social
>structures are relations of *social positions* (which do not have spatial
>location) not of individuals or persons (who do have spatial location). In
>my view the way out of this is to see structures as relations of
>*practices*
>but Archer calls this 'central conflation'!
>
>(2) Ruth, surely the thing one works on ('material cause') constrains and
>facilitates one's work (your 'formal cause')?
>
>Best wishes
>
>Andy
>

<snip>



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