Re: BHA: Mainstream Philosophy of Science

[rsmyhre@xxxxxxxxxx]

Howard, Ruth, and others

Howard wrote:

>The Harre and Madden book is not that widely engaged in establishment
>literature either, is it?

Harre and Madden critically engages with existing literature. Mackie,
Achinstein, Ernest Nagel, Davidson, Kim are all engaged with in Causal Powers.
Such detailed critical engagements is systematically lacking in RTS.

>Tell me this, based on your review of the materials referenced, does anyone
>else develop the idea of ontological stratification?  Does Aristotle or the
>aristotelian tradition?  Hegel?

The concept of ontological stratification is certainly present in what I
termed the 'underground Aristotelian tradition.' The best (to my knowledge)
are these

William A. Wallace [1996] The Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and
Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis (Washington DC: Catholic University Press of
America)

James Cahalan [1985] Causal Realism: An Essay in Philosophical Method and the
Foundations of Knowledge (Lanham: University Press of America)

Cahalan, like Bhaskar, insists on the mere actual status of events as distinct
from the metaphysical real status of objects (substances). Wallace is not as
interested in the distinction between the real and the actual as developing a
robust theory of emergence. Both accounts are a lot more detailed than Bhaskar.

I think Aristotle himself developed a stratified ontology. The Metaphysics 7-9
and the Physics 1-3, 8, together with the biological works are the most
important with regard to this. Unfortunately Aristotle is quite difficult to
read. (the arabian philosopher Avicienna said that he had read the Metaphysics
forty times without understanding it). Crucial to Aristotle's thinking is that
some entities are what he terms Primary Beings in the sense that all other
entities are dependent on them for their existence. This may sound as
reductionism, but it is totally out of question for Aristotle that the
dependent entities may be reduced to the primary beings. The philosophical
tradition after Aristotle followed Plato in thinking that the primary beings
(if there were any) must be ontological simples. Plato thought that
transendent forms were simple and ontological basic. Complex entities were
understood as derivative entities in that they were constructed out of their
simple parts. Aristotle thought different. For him it the basic entities were
entities that were endowed with irreducible causal powers. These entities
(called natures) had an internal principle of change and stability. This meant
that what change that is possible for a object depended on the nature of that
object or individual. Events, actions, processes in addition to properties
were therefore regarded as dependent entities, in that they presupposed the
existence of a substance (we might call substances powerful particulars) for
their existence. In Metaphysics 9 Aristotle criticises the 'actualists' of
Antiquity (the Megarians) in that they thought that what was possible for a
thing to do was what the thing actually did. If Tom the Builder do not build
then it is not possible for him to build. If he builds then it is not possible
for him not to build. In short Aristotle drove a wedge between what a thing
were capable of doing and what it actually does.

On Aristotle:

The best place to start, I think is the following anthology:

Theodore Scaltsas; David Charles; Mary Louise Gill (eds) [1994] Unity,
Identity, and Explanation in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press)

especially the essays by Scaltsas, Kosman, Moravcsik, Fine, and Lewis. Avoid
the essay by Charlton.

All those who have read Ellis should also cf.:

Sheldon M. Cohen [1996] Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Sheldon uses the term 'disposition essentialism' to characterize Aristotle's
position. It is quite like Ellis' position. Cohen uses 'dispositional
essentialism' independently of Ellis.

Other interesting works on Aristotle:

Alexander Mourelatos [1967] "Aristotle's Powers and Modern Empiricism" Ratio
IX (1967)

Sarah Waterlow [1982] Nature, Change, and Agency in Aristotle's Physics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press)

Last, I want to commend the following work:

Dennis Des Chene [1996] Physiologia: Natural Philosophy in Late Aristotelian
and Cartesian Thought (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

Des Chene set out in considerable detail how Descartes constructed his
passivist and actualist worldview in opposition to the causal realism of the
renaissance Aristotelians.

On Hegel:

I find much of the english-language literature on Hegel nearly a waste of
time. As I have not worked on Hegel since 1999 some new works that have
appeared may have changed the picture. Some quite interesting work have
appeared however. I am mostly interested in the Logic of Essence (from
Wissenschaft der Logik) and Chapter 3 from the Phenomenology. It seems to me
that this may be read as implying ontological stratification.

I can only recommend the following:

Kenneth Westphal [1989] Hegel's Epistemological Realism (Dordrecht: Reidel)

Crawford L. Elder [1980] Appropriating Hegel (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University
Press)

Avoid the works of the overrated Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard as they are
stuck in the Kantian anti-metaphysical transcendental philosophy of language
reading.

>The New Dialectics and Value Form theory
>people for example specifically rely on Hegel for not taking that up.  (For
>example, and there is no need to take up this thread, in Value Form Theory
>and the State, Geert and Williams acknowledge the significance of Bhaskar,
>but, if not there, then otherwise, reject ontological stratification by
>appeal to Hegel).  But actually, rather than the history of philosophy
>stuff, I'm more immediately interested in your impression of contemporary
>philosophers of science in their engagement with causal realism.  Why has
>so little been made of the issue of ontological stratification?  My guess
>is because mainstream realisms have emerged from the soil of Quine and
>Putnam.  Another way of asking this is how central has the critique of Hume
>been to the mainstream evolution of scientific realism?  (Back to Harre and
>Madden again.)  In other words, it has not been the underground tradition
>of aristotelian realism that has driven the mainstream.  Though even there
>is ontological stratification to be found?  By the way Erin McMullin has a
>wonderful small, readable set of lectures called something like "The
>Inference that Made Science" that traces a realist thread from Aristotle to
>contemporary scientific realism.  He's after what Peirce called abductive
>reasoning, though curiously he doesn't make that much of Pierce as I
>recall.

I have not read Geert Reuten and barely looked at Tony Smith, So I have not
anything interesting to add on their reading of Hegel. How do they reject
ontological stratification? At least Hegel's distinction between the Logic of
Being and the Logic of Essence in WdL seem to be committed to ontological
stratification.

I am wholly in agreement with your diagnosis regarding the philosophical
tradition. Scientific Realism is fully compatible with light Humeanism. I
think that Ellis belief that it is passivism in general that lead to Humeanism
as one of the possible varieties of passivism is more true to the history of
philosophy than merely stating that the epistemic fallacy lead to actualism.
Actualism is implicit in Descartes and Malebranche but neither of the
committed the epistemic fallacy in the same way that Hume did. Traditional
Empiricism could not accept theoretical entities but most philosophers do so
today, they embrace some sort of scientific realism. But this realism is not
committed to any sort of break with Actualism, Actually, I think Actualism is
in some ways more entrenched today than ever. Just look at some of the newest
vogues - Four-Dimensionalism. Therefore I think it is wrong to believe that
scientific realism is some sort of allies to Critical Realism (Bhaskar) or the
New Essentialism (Ellis). Some of the staunchest actualists of today accept
both scientific realism and metaphysical realism (I am thinking of David
Armstrong).

>I'm interested onlist or off on anything more you could  say about the
>underground aristotelian tradition.

See above.

I agree with your appraisal of RTS and PON.  Without in any way intending
divisive evaluations of Bhaskar's later work, for those of us interested in
a CR scientific realism, these are foundational.  Some want to qualify them
in terms of later developments.  Fine.  But they are there as a common
language for us.

I do think that DPF and Plato has some merits too. Even FEW was in some ways
informative.

I think it would be great to do some common reading of some of the
references you mention.  This would take up the task of engagement you
establish as necessary.  We could  do this with Ellis or Psillos, but
perhaps it makes most sense to start with the Papineau collection since we
have Marshall to get us going.  Moreover the Papineau collection is a group
of separate shorter essays so we wouldn't get bogged down as we always do.
We could read one and move on, or not, or get bogged down anyway.  Also it
is readily accessible and inexpensive.   Psillos or Ellis are harder to
come by and take a considerably more sustained effort than is likely to be
resonant with our common energies.  But I do think Psillos would be great
to work through and actually it is readily available through Amazon etc.

I would not recommend the Papineau anthology. Some of the essays are worth
reading (the ones by Boyd (which I don't have read) and Cartwright is quite
good I think). Most of the pieces seem to be centered around some fashionable
contributions that either questions scientific realism (Bas van Fraassen) or
seeks to elaborate something that can do the work without being comitted to
the entities that science postulates (Fine, Putnam). As most, if not all,
members to this list is already committed to a strong version of realism I
don't think we would find it as helpful as we hoped (In fact I think it will
lead to more dismissiveness of contemporary philosophy of science). Psillos, I
think is difficult. Ellis is not as heavy as Psillos, but as you said his book
is not particulary common and is expensive. A better choice, maybe would be
reading an introduction to philosophy of science that emphases the issue of
realism. James Ladyman's Understanding Philosophy of Science (London:
Routledge, 2002) or Alex Rosenberg's Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary
Introduction (London: Routledge, 2001) is both good introductions to
philosophy of science with chapters on realism/anti-realism. The best I think
would be if we agreed on what we will discuss. In any case I don't think the
Papineau piece would suit us. On the other hand, I don't think I will mange to
contribute to this discussion before August. So maybe you should go for the
Papineau piece anyway.

The whole issue of moral realism is completely mysterious to me.  You'd
think you could go to moral realism and more or less readily find stuff you
could relate to from a critical realist perspective.  But I'm inclined to
think they are off on a different tack.  Here Marx needs to be present in
the debate, but instead there seem to be concern with the reality of moral
entities that doesn't seem to make much realist sense to me at all.
Perhaps I'm wrong.  I don't know this material and so will reserve judgment
until I get a better idea of what is going on.

Bhaskar for one seems to be committed to moral realism.

Best Regards,

Ronny

PS. Someone, I think it was Marsh, asked for some literature on positivism. On
of the biggest problems of course is how we are to define positivism. The
Positivism of Comte is different from the positivism of Hempel. In any case
the best critique, I think, of the related positions of positivism, formalism
(deductivism), linguisticism, and (strong) empiricism is still Rom Harr's
Principles of Scientific Thinking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970)


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